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Preface
Since the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September
11, 2001, terrorism and, more generally, political violence have become
central topics in media representations as well as in academic debates and
studies. The recent spread of allegedly religiously motivated suicide bomb-
ings and other kinds of attacks involving the deaths of both attackers and
victims has caused an attendant surge of interest in the relationship be-
tween events of political violence and the martyr figure. Many contempo-
rary studies seek to understand martyrological representations and narra-
tives as forms of propaganda for a particular cause and aim, in order to
highlight the mechanisms and procedures by which martyr figures are con-
structed and contested. This investigation is a contribution to the debate
concerning the relationship between martyrdom and political violence. It
places emphasis on historical, social and cultural phenomena, which so far
have been largely neglected, namely the emergence, aesthetics and perfor-
mativity of the state martyr figure. Because of the actuality of so-called «Is-
lamicist terrorism», many researchers have focused on the role of the mar-
tyr figure in the Islamic religious and cultural tradition, often comparing it
in particular with Christian and Jewish concepts of martyrdom. Re-
searchers often highlight the overlap between terrorism and martyrdom by
identifying commonalities and differences in the use and function of mar-
tyrological representations in different historical and social contexts of
struggle. Great attention has been directed towards the propagandistic use
of martyrological representation for the legitimization of violence and for
the promotion of an ideology aimed at destroying «Western» culture, soci-
ety, and institutions. Far from denying or criticizing these interpretations,
this research study focuses on a structurally related but different phe-
nomenon: the representation of victims of political violence as state mar-
tyrs who died for the salvation of the democratic social and political order
and state institutions. While I focus on the martyrological representations
of a specific case of political violence—the kidnapping, imprisonment and
assassination of the Italian Christian Democrat politician Aldo Moro in
1978 by the Red Brigades—this work is not a case study in the strictest
sense. The «Moro case» serves as a point of departure for developing critical
reflection on the emergence, use and function of state martyrology and
mythology in the modern and contemporary world.
9
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Author’s Note
All translations, Italian and German, are my own unless indicated other-
wise in the footnotes.
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Es gibt keine Herrscher mehr, keine Könige, die die Masse, die die
Meute noch im Zaume halten können; es gibt nur noch das Bild des
Märtyrers.
Jacob Taubes, Die politische Theologie des Paulus
 
No martyr is among ye now
Whom you can call your own.
Dylan, Bob, I Dreamed I Saw St. Augustine, from the album John Wesley
Harding
 
È incredibile fino a che punto sia giunta la totale confusione delle
lingue.
Aldo Moro, Lettera alla moglie Eleonora
13
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Introduction
This study inquires into the emergence and performativity of the state mar-
tyr figure from the perspective of a discourse and cultural analysis-oriented
study of religion. It locates itself in the wake of investigations into the per-
formative force of religious language, rhetorical patterns and narrative
models in modern and contemporary political discourses. It specifically
addresses the strategies by which social actors have tried to frame, give
meaning to and relate a whole series of circumstances, facts, actions and re-
actions to each other, surrounding the kidnapping and assassination of
Italian politician Aldo Moro in 1978. Focusing on practices of representa-
tion and memorialization of Moro’s death as a sacrifice and martyrdom,
this investigation aims to develop historical-philosophical reflection on the
relationship between language and discourse, procedures of legitimization
of political authority, the construction of political community and events
of political violence. More generally, it aims to make a contribution to the
debate about the relationship between religion, politics and violence.
The investigation is situated at the intersection of the disciplines of the
study of religion and political philosophy. This transdisciplinarity requires
the distinction of two different research levels. As an enquiry into the
study of religion, it is especially interested in the individuation and analysis
of religious significance within political discourse. More precisely, it aims
to grasp the significance of the martyr figure within discursive practices
surrounding and referring to the historical, cultural and political circum-
stances of Aldo Moro’s death. As an enquiry into political philosophy, it
aims, on the one hand, to focus on and criticize the political, ideological
and instrumental use of the state martyr figure within a hegemonic discur-
sive formation and, on the other, to explore the possibility of resistance
through to the use of alternative, subversive forms of representation and
memorialization.
The Event of Political Violence
The point of departure for this investigation is a series of events that began
on March 16, 1978, with an attack by the Red Brigades (BR), in which the
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with his murder and the discovery of his body. On the morning of March
16, 1978, the Christian Democrat politician was ambushed together with
his security guards in via Fani, Rome. Four officers were killed in the am-
bush; a fifth officer died a few hours later in hospital. The politician was
on his way to parliament to begin debates aimed at ratifying a new govern-
ment. It was to be the first implementation of the political vision as de-
fined by the compromesso storico («Historic Compromise»), a historical po-
litical alliance and accommodation between the Christian Democracy
(DC) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI). This strategy originated
from within the PCI, but Moro had promoted it within his own party and
was considered the architect of the new government headed by Giulio An-
dreotti, who assumed the office of Prime Minster on the same day as the
kidnapping. For the first time in Italian history, the PCI, despite not being
part of the government, would surrender its oppositional role by agreeing
not to contest the executive. After the ambush, Moro was abducted and
held in captivity in via Montalcini, Rome.
During the 55 days in which Moro was held captive, the BR published
nine communiqués through the press, which on the one hand attacked
and accused what they called the «Imperialist State of the Multinationals»
(SIM), and on the other hand addressed the Italian «proletariat», promising
the imminent beginning of the revolution. Moreover, they did not only
send their communiqués to the media, but also some of the letters that
Moro wrote during his captivity. From within the so-called «people’s
prison» Moro wrote several letters, among others to co-workers at the uni-
versity, cabinet ministers, colleagues from the DC, members of other par-
ties, the Secretary General of the United Nations, his family, friends, and
Pope Paul VI.1 In these letters, Moro tried to convince the government, his
own party, the Catholic Church and civil society of the moral imperative
1 Most of Moro’s letters were not delivered and appeared in three separate historical
moments. Twenty-six autographs—the letters written by Moro’s hand that were
known to have been delivered and were recovered from their addressees—appeared
during the period of time in which Moro was held prisoner. A second set of the
letters became public in October 1978. Twenty-eight letters were found in a BR
hideout, an apartment in via Montenevoso in Milan, by the Italian anti-terrorist
unit headed by Carabinieri general, Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa. The Carabineri
found the set, which consisted of photocopies of typed, unsigned letters. In addi-
tion, a part of the so-called Memoriale, Moro’s responses to BR interrogations, was
found alongside the photocopies. The last collection of letters became public in
June 1990, when a second cache of letters was found in the same apartment in via
Montenevoso, behind a plasterboard discovered (at least according to the official
version) by workers during some renovation works. It consisted of 419 handwritten
1 Introduction
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and political utility of negotiations for his release. In one of their eight
communiqués, the BR proposed exchanging Moro’s life for the freedom of
thirteen prisoners. The choice to make some of Moro’s letters public, espe-
cially those in which he asked the representatives of his own party and of
the government to open negotiations for his liberation, was part of their
communications strategy. They «used» the media, propagandistically, for
the diffusion of their political convictions and to accuse their enemies and,
strategically, to force, through the dissemination of some of Moro’s letters,
political parties to choose the path of negotiations. This strategy soon
proved to be a complete failure.
The new «government of national solidarity»—formed a few hours after
the abduction with the votes of the major parties—decided straightway,
even before some explicit requests could be made, to adopt the so-called
linea della fermezza («line of firmness»), a political strategy which consisted
of the categorical refusal to negotiate with the terrorists for Moro’s libera-
tion. The leaders of both the DC and the PCI as well as most of the media
considered it unacceptable to negotiate with the terrorist organization. In-
deed, the latter claimed that any negotiation would legitimize the position
of the terrorists and probably open the path for other acts of politically
motivated violence. The DC was divided into two factions: a minority of
Moro’s friends and allies argued in favor of negotiations, while most party
representatives were worried, for similar reasons to those of the Commu-
nists, but mostly because they feared the possible political consequences of
leaving the PCI as the only opposition to negotiations with the terrorists.2
Threatened by the rejection and radical critique of the «line of firmness»
expressed by Moro in his letters, politicians began to say, and most parts of
the media repeated this, that Moro was no longer himself. The Interior Mi-
nister Francesco Cossiga established a so-called comitato degli esperti, con-
sisting of well-known linguists and graphologists as well as the American
adviser and expert on international terrorism Steve Pieczenik, which con-
cluded that the letters were the product of an alienated mind. This allowed
the Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to inform the Chamber of Deputies
that «a careful and competent evaluation of the text of the letter addressed
and two typed pages, which reproduced most of the letters and the Memoriale.
Miguel Gotor, who has edited the letters, trying to order them chronologically,
dedicated an extensive study to them and to the history of their appearance and es-
timates that forty-eight of Moro’s letters were not delivered during the time he was
kidnapped. See Gotor 2008, 223–235.
2 See Glynn/Lombardi 2012, 2.
1.1 The Event of Political Violence
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to Mr. Cossiga led experts to believe that the letter was actually written by
Aldo Moro, but it is not morally attributable to him.»3 On April 25 the
Christian Democrats in their Roman headquarters, distributed to reporters
a document signed by fifty people, who declared themselves «old friends»
of Moro, stating that «[h]e is not the man we know, who with his spiritual
political and legal vision, has contributed to the drafting of the Republican
Constitution.»4 The operation of delegitimizing Aldo Moro’s letters also
played out massively in the press. Several hypotheses were made in differ-
ent newspapers, for example, that he was writing under duress or was suf-
fering from the psychological effects of the Stockholm syndrome.
On May 9, Aldo Moro was assassinated. His body was found in via Cae-
tani in Rome, halfway between the headquarters of the DC and the PCI, in
the trunk of a red Renault 4. In the final days of his life, Moro seems to
have realized that he would soon be killed. On April 24, in a letter to the
secretary of the DC Benigno Zaccagnini, which was published on the same
day as the BR’s eighth communiqué, Aldo Moro once more vehemently
criticized his party’s categorical refusal to negotiate, asking that «neither an
authority of the State nor a party man attend my funeral» and «to be fol-
lowed by the few who truly loved me and so are worthy of accompanying
me with their prayers and their love.»5 Moro’s family took his request seri-
ously and, following the recovery of his body, issued a statement request-
ing «that the will of Aldo Moro be fully respected by the State and party
authorities”6 and organized a private funeral that was held on May 10, in
Torrita Tiberina, a small town near Rome where Moro spent his summers.
Three days latter, in the absence of Moro’s body, a state funeral was held in
the Archbasilica of St. John Lateran in the presence of the majority of the
representatives of the political establishment and Pope Paul VI. The funer-
al was televised and followed throughout Italy.
3 See Bianconi 2001, 174; it.: «Una attenta e competente valutazione del testo della
lettera indirizzata all’onorevole Cossiga ha indotto gli esperti a ritenere che la let-
tera è stata materialmente scritta da Aldo Moro, ma non è moralmente a lui ascrivi-
bile.».
4 Quoted in Sciascia 1978, 102; it.: «Non è l’uomo che conosciamo, con la sua vi-
sione spirituale, politica e giuridica che ha ispirato il contributo alla stesura della
stessa Costituzione repubblicana.».
5 Moro 2008j, 100; it.: «[…] chiedo che ai miei funerali non partecipino né Autorità
dello Stato né uomini di partito. Chiedo di essere seguito dai pochi che mi hanno
veramente voluto bene e sono degni perciò di accompagnarmi con la loro
preghiera e con il loro amore.».
6 Quoted in Glynn/Lombardi 2012, 4; it.: «[…] che sia pienamente rispettata dalle
autorità dello stato e del partito la precisa volontà di Aldo Moro.».
1 Introduction
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During his 55 days of captivity, the media strongly influenced the way in
which Moro’s kidnapping and imprisonment were handled by the institu-
tions and presented to the public. Newspapers, radios and televisions pro-
vided daily reports on the status of the investigation and on the debates
about the political strategy to be adopted by the government and political
parties. But the majority of the media did not limit themselves to provid-
ing information on the investigation and on the decisions (or lack of deci-
sions) of political parties and institutions. In fact, they largely served as a
platform for the justification of the «line of firmness» adopted by the gov-
ernment and most of the parliamentary parties. Not only journalists, but
also writers, artists, politicians, representatives of the clergy and academi-
cians intervened in the press, expressing moral and political judgments
about what was happening, accusing some and absolving others, offering
possible interpretations and proposing plans and strategies of action. The
media were a stage for political, philosophical and ethical statements as
well as for the rhetorical celebration or demonization of certain individu-
als, social groups or political parties by other individuals, social groups and
political parties.
Despite Moro having categorically denounced «the sacrifice of innocents
in the name of an abstract principle of legality»7 as morally unjust and po-
litically unsustainable, most of the political and civil society and the media
represented his death as a sacrifice for the state and as martyrdom for the
salvation of the Italian Republic and its citizens. Indeed, since the day of
the kidnapping in via Fani, Aldo Moro was glorified as a great statesman,
thus beginning what Alessandro Silj has pointedly defined as a «beatifica-
tion process.»8 The construction of a state martyr is definitely a key ele-
ment within this process of beatification. This beatification process and
the politico-ideological strategic instrumentalization of this event of politi-
cal violence have never ceased and continue to persist into the present.
State apparatuses, representatives of the government, political parties and
the established media represented and still represent Moro as a martyr. In
fact, in September 2012 the Diocesan Tribunal of Rome gave the green
light for an investigation into the potential beatification and canonization
of Aldo Moro. The main argument of the promoters of the beatification is
that Moro’s death is a martyrium in odium fidei, namely martyrdom that oc-
curred because of the executioners’ aversion to Christian faith. Although
7 Moro 2008b, 8; it.: «[…] il sacrificio degli innocenti in nome di un astratto princi-
pio di legalità.».
8 Silj 1978, 185.
1.1 The Event of Political Violence
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the process began in recent times, this model of an explicitly Christian rep-
resentation of the event has been present from the beginning, as this re-
search will demonstrate.
Status Quaestionis
The circumstances of Moro’s kidnapping, detention and assassination were
the subject of an enormous amount of discursive practices and were debat-
ed in many lengthy institutional procedures. They have been the subject of
five trials and three debates in parliamentary commissions of enquiry, one
of which is still active. They were recounted and presented using many per-
spectives adopted by different social actors within different media. These
include movies, novels, journalistic investigations, monuments, interviews,
documentaries, theatrical plays, songs, as well as essays in criminology, his-
tory, law, and psychology. Despite this plurality of voices, narrative forms,
mediums and perspectives, there is a theme or a recurring motif in the dis-
course on the Moro case: his death was and is still represented as a martyr-
dom and a sacrifice for the sake of national security and unity.
Both the renewal of terrorist actions in Italy—the assassination of Massi-
mo D’Antona in 1999 and of Marco Biagi in 2002 by the self-declared
«New Red Brigades»—at the turn of the century and the importance of the
global security agenda nowadays are surely among the basic causes behind
the increasing interest in the dissemination and implementation of the cul-
ture of violence that characterized the seventies and the first half of the
eighties in Italy.9 Although the BR were only one of many terrorist groups
and despite the fact that between 1974 and 1988 they claimed to have com-
mitted 86 murders, the killing of Aldo Moro was an act of political vio-
lence that dominated public debates and the collective memory the most.10
It is undoubtedly the most significant act of political violence in Italian his-
tory from the World War II onwards and one of the most serious cases of
political assassination worldwide, only comparable with the assassination
of Mahatma Gandhi, John Kennedy and Yitzhak Rabin.11 Never before had
an event of political violence in Italy been addressed this significantly
through novels, journalistic investigations, interviews, movies, documen-
taries and theatrical plays.
1.2
9 See Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 1.
10 See Zavoli 1994, 467.
11 See Formigoni 2016, 378.
1 Introduction
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Despite the BR having already carried out a number of kidnaps and
murders, the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro in 1978 was un-
doubtedly their most striking act. It is not surprising, therefore, that there
is an enormous number of publications of different kinds on the Moro
case. These publications can be divided into two broad categories. The first
category includes all research exploring the factual and historical circum-
stances of the kidnapping, imprisonment and assassination of Aldo Moro.
They aim to answer the following questions: Who did what, when, where,
how and why? The studies in the first category can be divided into two
sub-categories. Many of these studies have the characteristics and style of
investigative journalism and apply the methods and instruments of foren-
sics and criminal investigation. This interest in the crime’s factual circum-
stances predominates them, as does the goal of clarifying who did what,
when, how and where. The second sub-category of studies is interested in
clarifying the historical setting, processes and responsibilities that led to
the event of political violence. In these studies the prevailing question re-
mains: why could these events occur? However, the boundary between
forensic investigations and historical research is often fluid and blurred.
Moreover, public interest in general focuses on the particular factual cir-
cumstances of spectacular events, such as the bombings in piazza Fontana
and piazza della Loggia, and on the attack in via Fani—just to name a few
—rather than on the causes and contexts of these events of political vio-
lence.12 This is also the case in a wide range of publications addressing the
Moro case, which focus more on the allegedly inexplicable elements of the
circumstances of Moro’s kidnapping and assassination, rather than on the
political, social and cultural context in which they occurred.
The second category of studies addresses the way in which this event of
political violence has been narrated and represented in different kinds of
media. These studies seek to describe, analyze and interpret the impact, the
importance and role of the event in literature, journalism, cinema, art and,
in more general terms, in the Italian cultural and social imaginary. These
studies—their ways of approaching the event, their interests and questions,
their methods and analytical tools—generally belong to or are influenced
by academic fields dealing with semiotics, media representation and proce-
dures of cultural production, regulation and reception. This research is
clearly located in this second category of studies, retaining and elaborating
their results and their general hermeneutic horizons. In a recent publica-
tion on the rhetoric and representation of political violence in Italy from
12 See Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 7.
1.2 Status Quaestionis
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1969 to 2009, Pierpaolo Antonello and Alan O’Leary identify and isolate
three key narrative modalities that were used to account for events of polit-
ical violence in these intervening years: the oedipal, the conspiracy and the
sacrificial models. As they point out, all three can be considered «forms of
textualization of the events which perform both an interpretative and rep-
resentational function.»13
These three narrative models were generally used to frame and to give
meaning to a wide range of events of political violence that happened in
the whole period of the so-called «years of lead» (anni di piombo), some-
how attempting to give a generalized explanation of the conflicts depicted.
Within the first narrative modality, the escalation of political violence be-
tween 1968 and 1982 has been interpreted and represented as the outcome
of a generational conflict, in which militant and utopian sons and daugh-
ters were revolting against fathers and mothers considered to have been re-
sponsible for fascism or, at least, to have betrayed the revolutionary values
and principles of the Resistenza. Significantly, this kind of narrative and
representation can be found in many books and interviews with former
members of the BR, which understood Aldo Moro as the paternal figure
and symbol of the nation and bourgeois authority, which they rejected.14
Similarly, the second narrative has been and is still used to represent and to
interpret the anni di piombo, especially the circumstances of Moro’s kid-
napping and assassination. The so-called dietrologia—the production of
conspiracy theories—is characterized by the attempt to find a fil rouge, a
plot that would connect all the events of political violence that occurred in
Italy in the anni di piombo. As Antonello and O’Leary observe, conspiracy
theories were employed in particular by the Italian left, which was averse
to recognizing the emergence of an ideology of violence within the work-
ing class and the student movement and its own inability to prevent it.
Moreover, «conspiracy theory tends to confirm the extreme right’s concep-
tion of a society ruled by violence, and implicitly validates the view that
the effective exertion of authority and power is the only real question of
importance.»15 The third narrative model is what interests this study, since
it analyzes the ways in which the sacrificial narrative of the kidnapping,
imprisonment and assassination of Aldo Moro has emerged and been con-
solidated, and the use, within that narrative, of semantic units, rhetorical
patterns and images that make reference to and iterate elements of Chris-
13 Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 5.
14 See Tricomi 2009, 16–29.
15 Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 6.
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tian martyrology. The theme of this thesis can thus be conceptualized as
the martyrological representation and narration of the kidnapping, imprison-
ment and assassination of Aldo Moro.
The presence of very divergent and conflicting representations and inter-
pretations of the Moro affair is the sign of a very difficult relationship be-
tween narrative and history. There is long tradition of the questioning of
this problem in Italian culture.16 In recent times, it has been interrogated
in the writings of Carlo Ginzburg, who is interested in the rhetorical con-
struction of historical events and their reference to «objective» reality.17
With regard to the anni di piombo and in particular to the events related to
the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, in Italy there is widespread dis-
satisfaction with judicial sentences as well as with «official» narratives,
which is linked to a perceived need for supplementary justice. The diffu-
sion of a wide range of narratives, hypotheses and interpretations in differ-
ent media such as films, novels, essays, journal articles and TV documen-
taries, which are structured according to different «genres» and «modes»,
«has created the sense that history, above all in the Italian case, could and
should also be written and interpreted outside the courtrooms or historical
archives.»18 There are many artistic (at least in their intention and self-un-
derstanding), fictional representations of the Moro case, which try to fill
an explanatory vacuum, that is, to give meaning to Aldo Moro’s death, to
explain not only what happened, but why it happened. As Antonello and
O’Leary observe, «fiction has become the pre-eminent means to account
for […] missing pieces of our recent history and to keep the memory of
certain events alive among non-experts. Fiction, and artistic representation
more broadly, persistently supplement history, and function as an instru-
ment that the tradition of Manzoni or Sciascia may contribute to challeng-
ing the verosimile of official history, to uncovering the vero of reality, to con-
structing a collective experience of justice.»19
Perhaps it is precisely because of this proliferation of divergent narratives
and memorialization practices that, instead of producing a consensual col-
lective memory, which reproduces and reflects social and political divi-
sions, in recent years there has been a rapid increase in studies on represen-
tations of political violence in Italy. Interestingly, most of the scientific
studies that focus on cultural productions related to the Moro case were
16 See Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 10.
17 See Ginzburg 1991.
18 Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 10.
19 Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 10.
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conducted in the Anglophone academic world.20 Robin Erica Wagner-Paci-
fici’s The Moro Morality Play is the first academic study that explicitly ad-
dresses the representations and narratives of the Moro case and focuses on
the «dramatic/narrative […] modes of structure», namely the ways in which
the kidnapping and the murder of the Italian politicians were framed as
«social drama.»21 This is undoubtedly a very important and pioneering in-
vestigation. The theoretical framework of Wagner-Pacifici’s study is based
on Victor Turner’s social drama theory. Referring to the famous cultural
anthropologist, the author addresses historical events as intrinsically repre-
sentational, as they are interpreted through certain given models of narra-
tive emplotment. Wagner-Pacifici also refers to Paul Ricoeur’s reflections
on the relationship between history and interpretation, according to which
an event becomes «historical» only if there is an interpreter who organizes
the facts of the event according to a narrative structure.22 The choice of us-
ing Turner’s theory as a heuristic tool of analysis is due to the fact that it
does not only «assert and employ a posteriori the narrative analysis of
events but also regards the social actors themselves as proceeding through
and attempting to direct certain events with, among other kinds of con-
sciousness and motives (e.g., political, moral, economic), a theatrical self-
consciousness.»23 The theatrical self-consciousness of social actors is the
main topic of the last chapter of Wagner-Pacifici’s investigation. The re-
searcher defines her own methodological approach as «ethnography of the
social text» and the object of the analysis as the «intertextuality of the writ-
ten, spoken, and gestured world.»24 She analyzes a broader body of
sources25 and distinguishes between three levels of analysis: a) modes of ad-
dress, b) stylistic variations and c) different codes and channels. In a second
20 See Glynn/Lombardi 2012, 11–12.
21 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 5–7.
22 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 6.
23 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 7.
24 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 15.
25 Radio news program transcripts (firsts and second national RAI, independent
left-wing Radio Onda Rossa and Radio Città Futura); television news program tran-
scripts (first and second national RAI channels); newspaper articles, editorials,
letters to the editor and photographs (in L’Unità, Il Popolo, Il Messaggero, Corriere
della Sera, La Repubblica, Lotta Continua, Il Manifesto, Il Giornale, Il Tempo); all
publicly available letters by Aldo Moro; the nine communiqués of the BR (and
the false seventh communiqué); the texts of speeches delivered during this period
by Prime Minister Andreotti, Pope Paul VI and former Secretary General of the
United Nations Kurt Waldheim; the places established as the spatial frames of the
event (via Fani and via Caetani). See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 16–17.
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analytical step, she analyzes the totality constituted by this heterogeneous
pool of «texts» as «social drama.»
Other scholars focus on the emergence, strategies and goals of left-wing
terrorism in Italy. Political scientists David Moss and historian Richard
Drake analyzed the documentation produced during the legal proceedings
against the BR and the first Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry and in-
terpreted the significance of the event in the light of those documents.26 In
two articles, David Moss also analyzes the terrorist operations of the BR as
a sequence of symbolic actions and communicative acts.27 Drake also deep-
ens the theme of Italian terrorism in a series of articles, in which he exam-
ines the cultural, political and social contexts of both right-wing and left-
wing terrorism and further analyzes the way in which the Moro case was
politically and legally handled.28 In recent years there has been an increas-
ing interest in the media’s representation of the Moro case in different aca-
demic fields. Several recent publications focus their attention on the inves-
tigation of cinematic representations. This is the case in the survey con-
ducted by Alan O’Leary, who analyzes the representation of terrorism in
Italian cinema and dedicates one chapter to the representation of the Moro
case in different movies.29 The same author has edited, along with Ruth
Glynn and Giancarlo Lombardi, an anthology on the subject of terrorism
in the cinema.30 The films that deal with the Moro case were analyzed and
compared in a number of other academic articles.31 One of the cinematic
productions dealing with the kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro that
has been analyzed and discussed the most is Marco Bellocchio’s Buon-
giorno, notte (Italy, 2003).32 Other scholars address the representation of
the kidnapping and murder of the Italian politician in theater, television
and literature. With regard to the theater, special attention was paid to the
theatrical piece by Marco Baliani Corpo di Stato. Il delitto Moro: una gener-
azione divisa, which was broadcast live on the RAI network in 1998.33 Is-
abella Pezzini has analyzed the debate and the representation of the Moro
affair in documentaries and television services, in particular in Sergio Za-
26 See Moss 1989; Drake 1995.
27 See Moss 1981; Moss 1983.
28 See Drake 1984; Drake 1999; Drake 2001; Drake 2008.
29 See O’Leary 2011.
30 See Glynn/Lombardi/O’Leary 2012.
31 See Testa 2007; O’Leary 2009; O’Leary 2012; Lombardi 2009.
32 See Lombardi 2007; Glynn 2009; Mancino 2014.
33 See Marini-Maio/Nerenberg 2012; Marini-Maio 2012.
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voli’s La notte della Repubblica.34 Last but not least, several authors have ex-
amined the representation of the events of spring 1978 in literature.35
The State Martyr Figure
Given this extensive bibliography, one cannot but pose the legitimate
question: is further research on the representation and rhetoric of the Mo-
ro case really necessary? Is there still something of importance left to inves-
tigate? The answer is of course: yes, there is. There are still many issues and
problems that, through a thorough analysis of the representations and nar-
ratives with which different social actors framed what happened over the
last four decades, have to be brought to light. However, this research would
not have been possible if a considerable number of studies had not already
identified key issues, important questions, and drawn attention to a num-
ber of cultural practices and media representations linked to the case.
These studies will be a constant reference point within this investigation,
providing interesting impetus for reflection and discussion. This study is a
contribution to the series of research studies that have tried to understand
and to explain how a single event of political violence could impact upon
Italian culture so deeply, affecting language, media communication, cat-
egories of historical understanding, artistic representation, practices of rep-
resentation and memorialization. Moreover, despite Wagner-Pacifici and
other scholars having already drawn attention to sacrificial narratives of the
event of political violence in specific media, a systematic analysis of the use
and function of sacrificial and martyrological representations and narra-
tives is lacking. This study makes up for this by analyzing and placing rep-
resentations and narratives that have emerged in different media in a time
frame that spans almost four decades in relation to each other. Further-
more, this investigation addresses the allocation of the martyr role and the
representation of the event of political violence as a sacrifice and martyr-
dom from the point of view of discourse and cultural analysis and focuses
on the questions of how, through such allocation and representation, a po-
litical community is constructed and political authority is legitimized.
The thematic fulcrum on which this investigation turns is the performa-
tivity of martyrological representations and of the sacrificial narrative that
has been and is still used to account for the event of political violence. As
1.3
34 See Pezzini 2009; Pezzini 2012.
35 See Testa 2007; Mecchia 2012.
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has been mentioned above, the sacrificial narrative has been identified as
one of three key modes of representing political violence in Italy. In Narra-
tives of Sacrifice: Pasolini and Moro, Pierpaolo Antonello adopts the Girar-
dian theory of the scapegoat mechanism to explain how, within the sacrifi-
cial narrative mode, Moro’s assassination assumes the significance of sacri-
fice for the sake of the political community: «a man’s death is exploited by
political power to repair the worn-out fibers of its authority, to reaffirm
the ‹ragioni dello Stato›, to ‹mythically› rebuild the Republic anew.»36 Fol-
lowing an interpretative path already traced by Leonardo Sciascia and ad-
dressed by Wagner-Pacifici, the author highlights how, during the 55 days
of captivity, the «rhetoric of the State and of the mass media forced Moro’s
image to make the […] symbolic trajectory: from ‹uomo solo›, and ‹crea-
tura› to ‹personaggio›, to a fictional character, a character that was political-
ly and mythically exploited by the sacrificers, by the ‹purgers›, who toyed
with the idea that Moro was morally subjugated by the BR, deprived of his
reason and his usual rhetoric, and had become ‹mad.›»37 Antonello argues
that this negation of the human traits of the victim was functional in justi-
fying the sacrificial act as a way of excluding Moro from the political com-
munity. Moreover, he highlights the presence in Aldo Moro’s letters of a
sort of Christological counter-narrative. Shifting from the perspective of
the «sacrificers» to that of the «victim», he argues, the mythological scape-
goat assumes the connotation of the Christian martyr: «Moro cannot inter-
pret his fate according to the logic of this political ‹myth›, but through the
figural ur-example of the victim who was unjustly scapegoated: Christ.»38
The argument goes further saying that the «martyr» Moro used his body as
testimonial evidence, since the language of the body was the only thing
that was left to him; he is the «anti-hero that refused to be part of the col-
lective ritual in which his body would be exhibited and sanctified by the
same authorities that contributed to his death.»39 Antonello mentions four
examples of anti-sacrificial cultural productions, namely Leonardo Scias-
cia’s L’affaire Moro, an article by Italo Calvino which appeared on May 18,
1978, in the newspaper Corriere della Sera, Marco Baliani’s theatrical perfor-
mance Corpo di Stato, and Marco Bellocchio’s Buongiorno, notte. In the
latter especially he sees the «plenitude of the figura Christi» realized and he
interprets its final scene as a «symbolic and Christological resurrection», as
36 Antonello 2009, 38.
37 Antonello 2009, 40.
38 Antonello 2009, 40.
39 Antonello 2009, 41.
1.3 The State Martyr Figure
27
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
an «attempt to reconcile ourselves to the trauma of that event, with the col-
lective responsibility for that murder, to undo (were it only possible) the
tragic trajectory taken by events, asking for a redemptive, symbolic form of
collective forgiveness.»40
Antonello’s article indicates the general coordinates of a possible analy-
sis of the sacrificial narrative model and undoubtedly offers an interesting
point of view, which this investigation will further develop and discuss.
The author adopts a bipolar scheme of interpretation. This scheme postu-
lates the presence of two opposing models, two ways of narrating violence:
on the one hand mythological–sacrificial narrative, which represents Mo-
ro’s death as necessary for the salvation of society; on the other hand there
is the Christological–martyrological narrative, which instead unmasks and
brings out the immorality and iniquity of the scapegoat mechanism. De-
spite this interpretative scheme, which allows the identification and expo-
sure of two different ways of narrating and representing political violence
and to rightly point out the subversive nature of a certain kind of martyro-
logical representation, it tacitly obscures the fact that the figure of the mar-
tyr has played and still plays a very important role within those representa-
tions, through which state mythology is constructed and sustained. This
study will demonstrate that the martyr figure is not an exclusive character
of the Christological narrative or, more precisely, that in many representa-
tions Christological and mythological narratives overlap to the point of be-
coming, in certain cases, indiscernible. The interpretative scheme adopted
by Antonello cannot explain this phenomenon—it was not the goal nor
the issue in his article—because it implicitly relies on the Girardian an-
thropological presupposition that sacrifice is a ritual form that «restrains»
violence understood as something rooted in human nature. According to
René Girard, violence is an inevitable expression of mimetic desire, which
he considers a universal human trait.41 For Girard there are two ways to re-
strain violence from its socially destructive excesses: on the one hand there
is the sacrifice of the scapegoat, which is expressed and elaborated lin-
guistically in the myths of non-Christian societies, and on the other hand
there is the Christian martyr, who is represented in the Christological nar-
rative. Girard, in other words, hypostatizes the relationship between ritual
and narration, between event and representation, in the belief that there
are two spheres of meaning, two essentially distinct and separate ways to
attribute meaning. This interpretative scheme, which in my view is already
40 Antonello 2009, 43.
41 See Girard 1979.
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questionable when used to explain phenomena of violence in pre-modern
societies, is even more problematic when it comes to explaining phenome-
na of violence and the way in which meaning is attributed to them in
modern and contemporary society. Because of its universalistic anthropo-
logical approach, the scapegoat theory does not pay enough attention to
the historically changing relationship between language and violence, dis-
cursive and non-discursive events, or to the way in which violence is repre-
sented differently in different pragmatic and hermeneutic contexts.
This is the reason why this study approaches political violence and mar-
tyrological representations from the perspective of discourse analysis. One
of the central goals of this study is to demonstrate that the figure of the
martyr does not have an essential and unchanging meaning and function,
but rather that it has undergone a series of signatures, through which it has
become part of a mythological narrative that, instead of exposing, conceals
the political use of violent events. Instead of considering the martyr figure
to be fundamentally and essentially external and «oppositional» to the po-
litical myth justifying the «reason of state», this study wants to show how it
became part of this myth, becoming even one of its central and most im-
portant figures. The first novel element of this study can therefore be for-
mulated in the following way: instead of assuming two distinct strategies
of representation which always recur as two essentially distinct semiotic
spheres, it assumes that to grasp the meaning and function of martyrologi-
cal representations of Moro’s death, one must first carefully analyze the
pragmatic and hermeneutic context in which they appear. In other words:
instead of assuming a fixed, universal function of the martyr figure, this
study aims to analyze it in a context of appearance and figure out, from
time to time, the different functions it assumes. Only through this ap-
proach, this study claims, can one get to the bottom of the strange phe-
nomenon of the emergence of the state martyr figure.
The second novel element is deeply connected to the first. Since the goal
is to analyze the martyr figure in its various media and contexts of appear-
ance, it is necessary to examine a large body of the media. In this respect,
the approach is similar to that of Wagner-Pacifici, but differs from it in
three respects. First, this study also examines media and representations
missing in her research, which examines almost only representations pro-
duced during or shortly after the 55 days of Moro’s imprisonment; I ana-
lyze representations that were produced over a period of almost 40 years.
Secondly, the focus of this study is neither the dramatic construction of the
event nor the dramatic self-awareness of the social actors, but the perfor-
mativity of the martyrological representation of the event. In other words,
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this study is not so much interested in the intentions of the acting subjects,
but rather on the efficacy of the discursive practices themselves. Thirdly,
this study approaches the representations according to the theoretical and
methodological framework of discourse analysis and not that of the
«ethnography of the social text.» The focus lies not in the intertextuality
that gives shape to a social drama, but in the identification of regularities
and exceptions within a discursive formation. Moreover, it focuses on the
hegemonic, doxological practices of representation as well as on the at-
tempt to subvert them.
The third novel element of this study lies in its genealogical analysis of
the martyr figure. As Wagner-Pacifici observes, social actors reacted to the
kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro through the recurrence of «their
culture’s stock of sedimented symbols, archetypal characters, and rhetori-
cal appeals.»42 The question of imitation or iteration of historically «sedi-
mented» forms of representation is the «center of gravity» of this investiga-
tion. The central questions are: What exactly happens during the process of
the iteration and dislocation of the martyr figure from its «original» con-
text of appearance, which as we will see is that of the early Christian com-
munities, to the modern and contemporary context which is at issue here?
How was it possible for the martyr figure to be transformed into the figure
of the state martyr? This study considers martyrological representations as
discursive practices with a performative force, as they are able to appeal to
individuals, affect their feelings and determine the way they perceive, under-
stand and relate to the political community and to authority. Obviously,
the martyr figure could not exercise such a performative force without ap-
pearing with certain regularity. In other words, the more frequent its mate-
rialization and media manifestations in the public space, the higher its effi-
cacy and ability to appeal to people. The spatial, temporal, and multimedia
diffusion of the martyr figure can thus be regarded as a condition of possi-
bility for the figure’s own success and efficacy.
But the diffusion of the martyr figure alone does not explain its success;
on the contrary: this quantitatively successful dissemination must be quali-
tatively justified. This study argues that this success depends on the aesthet-
ic potential of secularized Christian language: «Christianity produced lan-
guage. It has been and still is a potentiated linguistic genius
[Sprachgeist].»43 The figure of the martyr has played a fundamental role in
this «linguistic genius» since the beginning. Despite, as I argue in the third
42 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 7.
43 Schleiermacher 2012, 17.
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chapter, the signification of martyrdom as a bodily act witnessing the truth
of the soteriological power of Christ’s death and resurrection emerged in
the second century AD (and not already in the New Testament), the inter-
pretation of the Passion of Christ as a form of martyrdom soon became a
central and generally accepted topos of Christian theology. The death of the
Messiah on the cross was soon framed as a sort of martyrdom prefiguring
and empowering all other coming forms of martyrdom. Within Christiani-
ty, it represents to some extent the act of witnessing absolute truth par excel-
lence. In Catholic theology, martyrdom is today still conceptualized not
only as the imitation of Christ, the most radical and powerful act of wit-
nessing the absolute truthfulness of Christian religion, but also as a prac-
tice that in itself has a soteriological power.44 As we will see, the martyr fig-
ure is intrinsically connected to an eschatological understanding of history:
in its original context of appearance, a Christian martyr was both someone
who witnesses the soteriological power of Christ, the truthfulness of the fi-
nal salvation of the ἐκκλησία, the Christian community, at the end of time,
and someone who accuses the profane political authority as based on the
mythological glorification of power and on the exercise of violence. Now
this study argues that despite or, more precisely, because of the process of
secularization, the idea of martyrdom as an act of witnessing an absolute
truth could be successfully transposed and reutilized in modern and con-
temporary representations of events of political violence. The martyr figure
that was originally part of a narrative of rebellion, which radically rejected
any kind of exercise of violence, became part of a narrative in which the
exercise of violence by the sovereign is basically represented as a legitimate
means in the fight against the enemies of society. In the context of moder-
nity, with the emergence of nation-states, martyrdom assumed the mean-
ing of an act that witnesses the necessity of the state as this absolute entity,
which saves the secular political community called the «nation-state» from
its destruction. Moreover, the mystical relationship between the Christian
martyrs’ bodies and the body of the Christian community reappears in
state mythology as a mystical relationship between state martyrs’ bodies
and national communities.
This is the perspective with which this study addresses the martyrologi-
cal representation of Aldo Moro. In the last four decades, Moro’s death has
been repeatedly represented as a form of martyrdom necessary for the sal-
vation of the Italian Republic and for the sake of national unity. Through
the allocation of the martyr status, Moro’s death has come to assume the
44 See Rahner 1937.
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meaning of a (voluntary) witness to the absolute and transcendent truth of
human rights guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, as well as the necessi-
ty of the Italian State to guarantee these rights. This study argues that the
martyrological representations of Aldo Moro’s death serve to mythologize
and de-historicize the event of political violence, that is, to make it appear
as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a cosmic conflict between
good and evil forces. Within this mythological framing, the state assumes
the connotation of the absolute sovereign, who is necessary to restrain and
contain the forces of absolute evil that seek to destroy order and society.
Following the research path outlined by Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Ja-
cob Taubes and Giorgio Agamben, this study addresses state mythology as
a secularized theological–political narrative in which the state assumes the
meaning of the «katechontic» restrainer that impedes the «war of all
against all.» While, in their original context of appearance, martyrological
representations were part of a narrative of rebellion that opposed and sub-
verted hegemonic narrative glorifying sovereign authority by revealing its
power-preserving function, state martyrology has the opposite function of
sustaining and concealing the mechanism of the glorification and legit-
imization of power. Moreover, by mythologizing violence as the unavoid-
able outcome of a perennial fight between good and evil, state mythology
and martyrology conceal the intrinsic relationship between state and non-
state violence, that is, between the sovereign exercise of power and terror-
ism. In other words, they serve to obscure the utility of terrorism for the
subsistence of established power relations.
A central reference point in this study is in particular Giorgio Agam-
ben’s homo sacer theory.45 Far from wanting to demonstrate the universal
validity of this theory, this study uses it as an heuristic tool to grasp the
complicated relationship between sovereign power over bare life, practices
of sacralization and events of political violence. Rather than understanding
the sacralization of a political community as the result of a ritual act of
(self-)sacrifice, this study understands sacralization as the result of the ex-
clusion of Aldo Moro from the profane and political sphere during his cap-
tivity by the means of discursive practices, which made him appear as
someone who already appertained to the sacral sphere and thus could no
longer participate in political debate. This reduction to bare life was, from
this point of view, the outcome of a strategy necessary to silence Moro’s
voice, who from the «people’s prison» tried to subvert the rhetoric of the
«reason of state.» When he was actually murdered, the government, major
45 See Agamben 1998.
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political parties and most of the established media were able to retrospec-
tively represent him as the sovereign-martyr who died for the sake of na-
tional security and unity. From this point of view, reduction to bare life
and the allocation of the martyr role are two sides of the same coin or,
more precisely, two moments within the same process of sacralization.
To sum up, this study argues that the effectiveness of martyrological rep-
resentations depends on a) the historically stratified meaning and aesthetic
potential of the martyr figure, b) their repetitive materialization and media
manifestations in the public space, c) their ability to appeal to the audi-
ence, that is to say, to appeal to the «consumers» of the discursive practices
through which Aldo Moro is represented as a state martyr. Discursive prac-
tices produce an emotional and ideological response in the public that is
capable of putting mechanisms of identification with a constructed politi-
cal collectivity into motion, delimitating it from other (existing or possi-
ble) forms of collectivity. The construction of the symbolic unit of the
community itself can be seen as a result of discursive practices. Moreover,
through his serial representation as a martyr, Aldo Moro acquires a sacred
status and his death, the connotation of being a witness to the meta-histori-
cal or absolute truth of civil and human rights and, more importantly, of
the necessity of sovereign political authority for the defense of citizens. By
virtue of this sacralization, the martyr serves as a symbolic body of national
community, which is experienced as sacred.
Organization of the Investigation
Political violence is first of all a real, non-discursive phenomenon, the re-
sult of a clash between material bodies and things, but like every phe-
nomenon it needs to be narrated and represented, in order to become
meaningful; only in language and through language can it acquire a certain
meaning. The next chapter outlines the basic hermeneutic horizon and the
conceptual, theoretical and methodological framework of this study. More-
over, it presents and in particular distinguishes between two different and
opposite models of representing and narrating events of political violence.
This distinction is fundamental to this study, since it serves as the starting
point for the development of its path of investigation. Starting from the as-
sumption that those acts of violence that occur in the context of a struggle
between at least two groups of individuals are political, the chapter de-
scribes two oppositional discourses within which such acts of violence are
represented and narrated as acts of resistance or of terrorism. Referring to
1.4
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Michel Foucault, this study defines these discourses respectively as the dis-
course of rebellion and as the discourse of sovereignty. I argue that the
martyr figure, in its «original» context of appearance, was a central figure
within the discourse of rebellion, which had the function of delegitimizing
a given political authority. The chapter continues by addressing the prob-
lem of the emergence of state martyrologies, arguing that the martyr figure
has undergone a long process of re-signification, at the end of which it be-
came part of the narrative of sovereignty, thus begging to serve as a figure
for the legitimization of state authority. The conceptual and methodologi-
cal apparatus of discourse analysis will be set out in the last three sections
of this chapter. The establishment of this apparatus has a strategic and tac-
tical function. The goal is to put a coherent system of heuristic tools in
place as well as lay the interpretative path that shall allow me to face and to
analyze the discursive practices related to the aforementioned event of po-
litical violence. Section 2.4 presents the characteristics and specificity of
the discourse analytical approach to the martyrological representation of
the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro. Section 2.5 discusses the
performativity of martyrological representation as discursive practices,
which have the power to appeal to individuals and groups and to construct
and sustain national political identities. Finally, the last section presents
the organization of my corpus of sources and the methodological frame-
work of the study.
The third chapter discusses the relationship between sacrifice, martyr-
dom and political violence from a theoretical point of view and recon-
structs the history of the martyr’s figure signatures. First, it summarizes
and discusses the state of research into the martyr figure in various academ-
ic disciplines and exposes this study’s approach, which is concerned with
two aspects: on the one hand, the focus on the emergence of the state mar-
tyr figure, which has so far been largely ignored, and on the other hand,
the transition from an approach that addresses martyrdom as a ritual prac-
tice to an analysis in which the martyr figure is considered a product of dis-
cursive practices. The thesis can be summarized as follows: the performa-
tive force of the martyr figure—understood as the ability to appeal to indi-
viduals and to produce collective identification with social and political or-
der through the sacralization of the same—is not necessarily the result of a
ritual act of self-sacrifice performed by a voluntary subject, but rather the
product of the allocation of the martyr role through discursive practices.
Secondly, the chapter exposes the advantages of choosing to use the homo
sacer theory to analyze how Aldo Moro has been represented and memori-
alized over the last four decades. Thirdly, the chapter deals with the geneal-
1 Introduction
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ogy of the figure of the Christian martyr, drawing attention to the speci-
ficity of the use of the term μάρτυς in the social and political context of the
first Christian communities, and showing how the term no longer referred
to the linguistic act of witnessing in a trial, but to the act of self-sacrifice as
a witness to Christian faith. The last part of the chapter describes the signa-
tures of the martyr figure over the centuries, that is, the most significant
pragmatic and hermeneutic dislocations that preceded and determined the
emergence of the state martyr figure in modernity. It shows how, with the
institutionalization of Christianity, the figure of the martyr takes on a new
meaning and a new function. The figure of the soldier martyr, who dies in
battle in defense of the Christian faith and is functional for the legitima-
tion of «holy wars», emerged. It also describes the development of the mar-
tyrs’ cult and especially of the martyria, that is, places of worship around
which a ritual for the glorification and sacralization of power and political
authority took place. Finally, it shows how with the birth of the nation
states the figure of the state martyr emerged and how, at the least from the
French Revolution on, it became part of a mythological narrative of the
state.
The fourth chapter describes the pragmatic and hermeneutic context in
which martyrological representations of Aldo Moro emerged and were
consolidated. The first part of the chapter discusses the ideological and cul-
tural heritage of the Resistenza and of the Risorgimento. Its focus is mainly
on the rise of national martyr figures in Italy from the nineteenth century
onwards and the importance of this in the formation of national identity.
The second part of the chapter describes the sociopolitical and cultural
context in Italy after the World War II, illustrating the political history of
the first three decades of the First Republic, namely from the Italian Con-
stitution’s entry into force in 1948 to the killing of Aldo Moro in 1978. It
reconstructs the history of the two major parties, the DC and the PCI, and
their relationship with the forces of the two blocs (especially the Soviet
Union and the United States) during the Cold War. Particular attention is
also given to the figure of Aldo Moro, his political career, his ethical, legal
and political conception of the state, and the difficult and controversial
role he played in the DC. Finally, it addresses the role played by the secre-
tary of the PCI Enrico Berlinguer and of the Christian Democrat Aldo Mo-
ro in drawing up the strategia dell’attenzione and the compromesso storico to
counter the danger of an authoritarian drift and possible coup d’état in Italy
(which found articulation in the so-called strategia della tensione). The third
part faces the political conflicts and struggles that began with the move-
ment of 1968 and in particular in the period of the autunno caldo (1969), as
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well as the emergence and evolution of Fascist terrorist groups on the one
hand, Anarchist and Marxist-Leninist groups on the other. Particular atten-
tion is paid to the birth of the BR, their relationship with the worker and
student movements, as well as the formation and development of the ide-
ology of the «armed struggle.» Finally, the last part of the chapter briefly
summarizes the facts and gray areas of the Moro case and the various theo-
ries concerning the possible involvement of state apparatuses (Italian or
foreign), secret services and occult groups in the events that led to death of
the Christian Democrat. The purpose is not to strive for one or another in-
terpretation, but rather to draw a clear line of demarcation between what
is established as a fact, what is just hypothetical, and what is clearly the
product of a simplistic reading of events and untenable conspiracy theo-
ries. It also aims to provide the readers with information to enable them to
understand the reasons why, almost four decades since the murder of Aldo
Moro, there is still no shared and accepted representation and memory of
what happened in the spring of 1978.
The fifth and sixth chapters examine the media’s representation of the
Moro case in the time period from the day of the kidnapping (March 16)
to the day on which the state funeral was held in the Archbasilica of St.
John Lateran in the presence of Pope Paul VI (May 13). The first part of the
fifth chapter identifies and describes three distinct models of representa-
tion used by different social actors during and after Moro’s abduction and
imprisonment. First of all, there is the model of representation used by the
BR in their communiqués, in which the killing of Moro’s escort is framed
as a revolutionary guerrilla act and the captivity of Moro as a proletarian
trial against the DC. Then, there is the model of representation adopted by
both the DC and the PCI, as well as by most of the established media,
which firstly represents Aldo Moro as a great statesman willing to sacrifice
himself (before the publication of his first letter), then as a man robbed of
all political dignity and reduced to a mere instrument in the hands of the
BR (after the publication of his first letter), and finally as a state martyr (af-
ter his death). Finally, there is the model adopted by Moro and by very few
other social actors, aiming to oppose and to highlight the ideological char-
acter of the other two representative models. The second part illustrates the
public image of Moro before the abduction, in order to make clear the rad-
ical change that it underwent in a very short time. This part specifically ad-
dresses a famous newspaper article by Pier Paolo Pasolini, in which Aldo
Moro is represented as a man of power, but also as «the least involved of
1 Introduction
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them all.»46 The allegations directed at the DC in early 1978 concerning
the Lockheed scandal are also mentioned. This part also discusses a speech
held by Moro in defense of the Christian Democrats Luigi Gui and Mario
Tanassi, who were likewise accused of being involved in the system of cor-
ruption that emerged with the Lockheed scandal, in which the then party
president clearly expresses his aversion to any attempt «to offer […] a vic-
tim to the reason of state.»47 The fourth part examines in the first place the
rhetoric of national unity in the press, the symbolism of the flags, the dif-
ferent ways of constructing and representing the attack in via Fani as an at-
tack on the whole community, and secondly, the representation of the BR
as an external entity that is not attributable to Italian society. In particular,
it highlights a tendency by the media and representatives of the major par-
ties to use semantic units and rhetorical forms aimed at representing the
conflict of the BR versus the Italian State in terms of a struggle between
the forces of good and the forces of evil. Finally, the last part focuses on the
representation of Aldo Moro as a «great statesman» willing to sacrifice
himself in order to save the Italian Republic and its society, and of the BR
as «monsters» or «beasts», whose only aim was the destruction of social or-
der and of the well-being of citizens. Particular attention is paid to the re-
production and description in the media of the first photograph of Moro
delivered to the press by the BR. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing
how on Easter Day (March 26, 1978) the rhetoric used in several newspa-
per articles tended to represent Moro’s imprisonment as a form of «Cal-
vary» analogous to that of Christ, that is, how the Passion of Christ has
been rhetorically used as a prefiguration of the passion of Moro.
The sixth chapter resumes the analysis of the media’s representation
from March 30, 1978 onwards, the day when Moro’s first letter addressed
to the then Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga was published by different
newspapers. The first part describes Moro’s and very few other social ac-
tors’ attempts to let the argument of the «the sanctity of human life» of ev-
ery single citizen prevail over the argument that negotiations for the pris-
oner’s liberation would betray the «reason of state» and undermine the le-
gitimacy of state institutions and apparatuses. The chapter goes on to show
how some few intellectuals and journalists as well as Aldo Moro himself,
in the letters he wrote during his imprisonment, tried to resist the
widespread hegemonic representation of the events in the media, offering
46 Pasolini, Pier Paolo, «Il vuoto del potere», Corriere della Sera, 2.2.1975, 1; it.: «[…]
il meno implicato di tutti […].»
47 Moro 1979, 353; it.: «[…] offrire […] una vittima alla ragione di Stato.»
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an alternative reading of what was happening. It also describes the forma-
tion of the so-called «party of the negotiation» and analyzes, in particular,
the position paper in favor of negotiation published by the radical-left
newspaper Lotta Continua. The first part of the chapter highlights how
Moro, aware of the media operation to deny the authenticity of his letters,
began to distance himself from his own party («I do not want, I repeat, the
men of power around me»)48 and finally accepted his imminent death, un-
derstanding and expressing it in Christological terms («I have only under-
stood in these days what it means to be necessary to add our own suffering
to the suffering of Jesus Christ for the salvation of the world»).49 The se-
cond part of the chapter reconstructs the way in which, at first, the estab-
lished media denied the authenticity of Moro’s letters or disbelieved the
psychological and physical integrity of the prisoner, but then went on to
represent Aldo Moro as a man denuded of all political dignity and con-
cerned only with his individual salvation. This strategy is interpreted in
light of the homo sacer theory as a hegemonic practice functional to the ex-
clusion of Moro from the political sphere. It also shows how this operation
is related to the rhetoric of the «reason of state.» The last part of the chap-
ter finally analyzes the consolidation of the representation of Moro as a
state martyr after the finding of his corpse on May 9, 1978. It shows how
Moro is re-sacralized as a great statesman, a sovereign-martyr who died for
the salvation of the Italian Republic.
The seventh chapter focuses on different practices of memorialization
and commemoration of Aldo Moro, on the way in which the Moro case
has been represented in literature and cinema, and finally discusses briefly
the reason and arguments behind the launch of an initiative promoting the
beginning of a process for the beatification and canonization of Aldo Mo-
ro by the Catholic Church. The aim of the chapter is to describe the at-
tempt to construct an official memory, as well as to draw attention to the
forms and practices of subversive and alternative representation that chal-
lenge official memorialization practices. The first part of the chapter exam-
ines memorialization practices which attempt to construct an official
memory of the events of spring 1978. It focuses on monuments erected in
memory of Aldo Moro and on the ritual practices of commemoration
48 Moro 2008k, 143; it.: «Io non desidero attorno a me, lo ripeto, gli uomini del
potere.»
49 Moro 2008f, 60; it.: «Ho solo capito in questi giorni che vuol dire che bisogna ag-
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which happen on the occasion of the anniversaries of the attack in via Fani
(March 16) and the discovery of Moro’s body (May 9). The chapter contin-
ues with an analysis of critical interventions by three important Italian in-
tellectuals and writers: Umberto Eco, Italo Calvino, and Leonardo Sciascia.
This part, in particular, brings to light the way in which Sciascia and Eco
deconstruct both the rhetoric of the BR as well as the dominant represen-
tation of Moro’s abduction and death in the media. It further shows how
Calvino, despite being aware of the instrumental dimension of the hege-
monic discourse on the abduction and killing of Moro, basically repro-
duces a sacrificial and mythological conception of political violence. The
third part deals with the representation and memorialization of the events
of 1978 in television and cinema. Since there are many television and film
productions which deal with these events, documentaries and films in
which the use or criticism of martyrological representations play a leading
role have been chosen. The last part of the chapter addresses the initiative
launched in 2012 by the Federazione dei Centri studi Aldo Moro e Renato
dell’Andro to obtain the beatification and canonization of Aldo Moro by
the Catholic Church. This final part reconstructs the procedural steps of
the first phase of the process of beatification and canonization; secondly, it
analyzes the arguments for the recognition of Moro’s death as a form of
martyrium in odium fidei expressed by two of the promoters of the case, Lui-
gi Ferlicchia and Monsignor Andrea Venezia, and by Postulator Nicola Gi-
anpaolo.
The final chapter summarizes the results of the study and draws atten-
tion to aspects and questions that still have to be explored. In particular, it
develops reflections on the actuality of the issue of the performative force
of the martyr figure and, more generally, of the iteration of language units,
rhetorical forms, and narrative models which belong to one or more reli-
gious traditions, when it comes to framing or giving meaning to events of
political violence. The study ends with some reflections concerning the
problem—which is difficult because of its ethical, political, and even es-
thetical implications: What kind of representations and narrations of
events of political violence could continue to deploy performative force,
appealing to people to reject all kinds of implementations of violence,
both by state and non-state organizations, without falling into the trap of
mythicization?
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A Discourse Analytical Approach to Political Violence
The Representation of Violence in the Context of Political Struggle
The term violence can be used in many ways. In common language we re-
fer to natural phenomena, such as earthquakes or tornados, as violent. We
may also generalize violence, referring to all forms of behavior or forms of
life involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill other forms
of life. We may also speak metaphorically of the violence of feelings, of vio-
lent speaking or writing, of certain forms of representation—the violence
of a song, a novel or a poem—, of political systems, of the law, and so on.
The term violence is used to refer to a wide range of phenomena with vari-
ous connotations, which is why it is important to clarify what form of vio-
lence is at stake in this investigation. First of all, it is necessary to focus on
the relation between violence as a term and real phenomena. For this rea-
son, I operate with two levels of delimitation. The first realm of delimita-
tion concerns the phenomena referred to, namely the denotation of the
term, while the second concerns the meaning of the term, that is, the con-
notation it assumes through different uses.
The term violence refers to historical events where human beings act
with their bodies to damage other bodies. Bodies are the means through
which acting individuals exert physical force on other individuals. Violence
happens in a specific historical moment and involves human beings acting
with their bodies to change the status, or the integrity, of other bodies.
Starting from this formulation, we can make two general phenomenologi-
cal delimitations. The first is obvious: only human beings commit the
form of violence examined in this investigation. Secondly, we are not deal-
ing with phenomena that are violent in a metaphorical way, nor is the vio-
lence referenced here exercised by means of language. It is also not the vio-
lence of perceptions or feelings focused on subjective experience. The fo-
cus of this study is the phenomenon of action which has material and bod-
ily consequences and happens at a certain, specific moment.
In the history of humankind, this form of violence was and is inflicted
daily on a large number of men and women. Most violent acts that occur
on a daily basis, today and throughout history, do not become objects of
discourse; on the contrary, most accounts are never told, never represented,
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resentations of acts of violence in public spaces are a minority among
many acts of violence. Obviously, this cannot be empirically proven, be-
cause historical events that were never told, that were not represented
and/or recorded, are not observable for future generations and thus limit
our historical knowledge. While this is true, it is self-evident that only a
tiny part of the violent acts that actually happened in history have been
narrated, documented and represented, and have thus become part of our
historical and collective memory. Moreover, it can be assumed that acts of
violence occurring in what is generally called the «private sphere of life»
are documented to a lesser extent than those occurring within a public
context. Acts of violence exercised in places far from an observing audience
(for example, a barn, house, convent, or workroom), are less represented
and narrated than those that occur in a space frequented by a multitude of
people. In other words, the larger the audience, the greater the chance of
acts of violence being represented and narrated. Perhaps this is the reason
(or at least one of the reasons) why our libraries and museums are filled
with representations of wars, battles, executions, public tortures and
killings of all kinds. Conversely, acts of domestic violence are less frequent-
ly documented. This, then, allows me to make another phenomenological
distinction between different types of violence. The acts of violence at
stake here are those that occur in front of an audience and of which there
is at least one documented representation that is embodied in a material
medium.
Representations of violence vary; for example, murder can be represent-
ed as a result of God’s plan, as necessary for the salvation of a community,
as an act of pure evil, or as a psychopathological outcome. Thus, if it is true
that the term violence, as we define it, always denotes the typology of phe-
nomena described above, it is also true that there is always a connotation.
The connotation of the term depends on the way the term is used within
discourse or, more precisely, within a discursive practice. The term always
assumes a certain meaning within a certain pragmatic and hermeneutical
context. This means that the same act of violence can assume different con-
notations, depending on how, by whom, when and where it is represented.
At this point, we can approach the second kind of delimitation. This inves-
tigation addresses a real phenomenon, a historical event, which is largely
and regularly represented as an act of political violence.
In modernity, there are two terms generally used, depending on the con-
text, to define acts of violence within the context of a struggle against an
existing political authority: resistance or terrorism. The first term normally
carries a positive connotation and represents violence as a legitimate means
2.1 The Representation of Violence in the Context of Political Struggle
41
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
in the fight against a political authority that is considered illegitimate. One
example of this is the struggle against the Italian Fascist regime under Mus-
solini. The concept of martyrdom, which in its «original» context of ap-
parition indicated a passive act of resistance against violence perpetuated
by the political authority, is also used to represent people who actively act-
ed violently against totalitarian and despotic states. In Italy, the cult of the
«martyrs of the Resistance» against Fascism is widespread, evidenced by the
many plaques erected to partisans in the squares and streets of many Italian
cities; but the allocation of the martyr role also affects people who actively
fought violently against democratic political systems. In fact, even the men
responsible for the September 11 attacks, to name only the most striking
example from this century, are considered martyrs among certain groups
and communities. In short, individuals considered to be «terrorists» by
some people can be considered «martyrs» by others.
Terrorism is a term that was and is still used to describe violence per-
ceived as illegitimate. One contemporary example of this is the violence
perpetuated in the name of the so-called Islamic State or DAESH. Obvi-
ously, the perception of a certain act of violence as legitimate or illegiti-
mate is a question of perspective, inasmuch as some individuals and
groups regard a political authority as legitimate, while others do not. The
Red Brigades saw themselves as inheritors of the Resistenza against the Ital-
ian Fascist regime during World War II and as legitimate revolutionary
fighters against the Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali. This, to them,
was the historical continuation of the Fascist regime responsible for impe-
rialism and the economic exploitation of workers by the bourgeois class.
Most Italian citizens disagreed with this view (although, as we shall see, the
project of lotta armata was, for a time, partially supported by the student
movement). Instead, to most citizens the Red Brigades were nothing but
terrorists and brutish murderers, who indiscriminately killed people.
At first glance, it thus seems that the terms «martyrdom» and «terrorist
attack» can be used to represent the same identical act of political violence,
depending on the perspective and ideological setting of both the producers
and consumers of discursive practices. This is also the thesis of Karin
Fierke, who, as we will see in detail in the next chapter, distinguishes be-
tween two different, competing language games: the language game of
those who resist state violence, which represents a person who died in pas-
sive or active resistance as a martyr; and the language game that «expresses
the meaning structure employed by state authorities, which depoliticizes,
by identifying the actor as a criminal or terrorist, whose death may be at-
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tributed to ‹suicide.›»1 What I take care to emphasize is that, despite their
antithetical meanings, the two words «martyr» and «terrorist» both refer to
people that died within the context of a struggle against existing state appa-
ratuses.
If we look at the history of the term «terrorist», we realize that the origin
of the word has a completely different meaning from its current applica-
tion. In fact,
the term was coined to refer to an allegedly illegitimate use of violence
by the revolutionary government of France against its own people in
the period of the ‹terror› (1793-94). By the early twentieth century the
word had shifted to refer to the illegitimate use of violence against the
state, which could be seen as, in some sense, operating within the na-
tion.2
The term «terrorism» is thus no longer used to represent the use of vio-
lence by a political authority as illegitimate, but is rather used to make the
repressive state apparatuses appear absolutely necessary for the defense of
citizens and society. The term «martyr» also underwent a transformation,
but one far more complex than that of the term «terrorist» and with much
more ancient historical roots. In fact, as we will explore in the next chapter,
the term underwent a series of shifts in a long process of re-signification,
by which it was transposed from a discourse of rebellion to a discourse of
sovereignty.
In the lectures at the College de France, particularly the lectures in the
years 1975–1976, which were published with the title Society Must Be De-
fended, Michel Foucault argues that war and violence are central to under-
standing power as a «relationship of force» and as «something that is exer-
cised and exists only in action.» Inverting Clausewitz’s famous proposition,
he proposes approaching power as «the continuation of war by other
means.»3 Furthermore, he analyzes the «how» of power, namely the way in
which discourses of power generate powerful effects. He is interested in
the «multiple relations of power» that «traverse, characterize, and consti-
tute the social body.» Foucault also stresses the fact that power relations
«are indissociable from a discourse of truth» and that they «can neither be
established nor function unless a true discourse is produced, accumulated,
1 Fierke 2013, 48.
2 Janes/Houen 2014, 1.
3 Foucault 2003, 14–15.
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put into circulation and set to work.»4 Foucault’s analytical approach is
characterized by a focus on the effective practices, the networks, the dispos-
itives, and the micro-mechanisms through which discourses of power and
subjectivity are produced.
Starting from this conceptualization of war and power, Foucault address-
es the emergence and political function of the two aforementioned dis-
courses. His main thesis can be summarized as follows: until the end of the
Middle Ages, the discourse of sovereignty had the main function of enforc-
ing, glorifying and legitimating power relations. Foucault underlines the
continuity between the discourse of sovereignty in the Middle Ages and
the «politico-legendary history of the Romans.»5 He argues that the way in
which the discourse of sovereignty represents power corresponds very
closely to the Indo-European and especially Roman representations of
power. Implicitly referring to Georges Dumezil, he indicates the two main
functions of this system of representation: on the one hand, the power to
subjugate and to bind through the use of obligations, oaths, commitments
and the law and, on the other hand, the power to fascinate and terrorize
through the use of rituals and discursive practices of glorification.6 In other
words, the discourse of sovereignty was at once «juridical and magical.»7
On the threshold of modernity, especially with the constitution of mod-
ern nation-states, the concentration of power, and the monopolization of
war and violence, a new discourse appeared. Foucault characterizes it as a
«counter-historical» discourse, which «was no longer a discourse of
sovereignty, of even race, but a discourse about races, about a confronta-
tion between races, about the race struggle that goes on within nations and
within laws.»8 Just as he emphasizes the analogy between the discourse of
sovereignty and the Roman way of representing power, he also identifies
the presence and operativeness of «a certain number of epic, religious or
mythical forms which, rather than telling of the untarnished and un-
eclipsed glory of the sovereign, endeavor to formulate the misfortune of
ancestors, exiles, and servitude» within this new discourse.9 These new
forms of representation and narration of war and violence, Foucault ar-
4 Foucault 2003, 24.
5 Foucault 2003, 71.
6 See Foucault 2003, 68.
7 Foucault 2003, 73.
8 Foucault 2003, 69.
9 Foucault 2003, 71.
2 A Discourse Analytical Approach to Political Violence
44
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
gues, «are much more closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews
than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans»; in fact,
at least from the second half of the Middle Ages onward, the Bible was
the great form for the articulation of religious, moral and political
protests against the power of kings and the despotism of the church
[…]. In the Middle Ages, Jerusalem was always a protest against all the
Babylons that had come back to life; it was a protest against eternal
Rome, against the Rome of the Caesars, against the Rome that shed the
blood of the innocent in the circus. The Bible was the weapon of poverty
and insurrection; it was the word that made men rise up against the
law and against glory, against the unjust laws of kings and the beautiful
glory of the Church. To that extent, it is not surprising that we see, at
the end of the Middle Ages, in the sixteenth century, in the period of
the Reformation, and at the time of the English Revolution, the ap-
pearance of a form of history that is a direct challenge to the history of
sovereignty and kings—to Roman history—and that we see a new his-
tory that is articulated around the great biblical form of prophecy and
promise.10
This new «discourse of rebellion and of prophecy, of knowledge and of the
call for the violent overthrow of the order of things» challenges the dis-
course of sovereignty, because, by iterating biblical motifs, figures and nar-
ratives, it uncovers what the discourse of sovereignty deliberately and
strategically concealed: that power, rulers, kings, and laws are the result of
the triumph of some through the submission of others.11 According to
Foucault, the discourse of rebellion relates to a new kind of historical
memorialization:
In Roman-style history, the function of memory was essentially to en-
sure that nothing was forgotten—or in other words, to preserve the
law and perpetually to enhance the luster of power for so long as it en-
dured. The new history that now emerges, in contrast, has to disinter
something that has been hidden, and which has been hidden not only
because it has been neglected, but because it has been carefully, delib-
erately, and wickedly misrepresented. Basically, what the new history is
trying to show is that power, the mighty, the kings, and the laws have
concealed the fact that they were born of the contingency and injustice
10 Foucault 2003, 71 (emphasis added).
11 Foucault 2003, 74.
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of battles. […] Unlike the historical discourse of Indo-European soci-
eties, this new discourse is no longer bound with a ternary order, but
with a binary perception and division of society and men; them and
us, the unjust and the just, the masters and those who must obey
them, the rich and the poor, the mighty and those who have to work
in order to live, those who invade lands and those who tremble before
them, the despots and the groaning people, the man of today’s law and
those of the homeland of the future.12
This new kind of memorialization is explicitly eschatological, inasmuch as
it unmasks «Rome as a new Babylon» and demands «the lost rights of
Jerusalem.»13 As Foucault highlights, in the Middle Ages, Rome «func-
tioned as a sort of permanent and contemporary historical presence», inas-
much as «all the nations of Europe claimed to have been born of the fall of
Troy»; this is the reason why «all the nations, all the States, and all the
monarchies of Europe could claim to be Rome’s sisters.»14 By iterating and
referring to biblical motifs, figures and narratives, the discourse of rebel-
lion reproduces and recontextualizes an eschatological understanding of
history. The European Nations are represented as oppressive powers that,
like those of Babylon and Rome, will be defeated by an approaching new
and definitive political order. However, as Foucault explains, it would be a
mistake to regard the discourse of rebellion as belonging only to the op-
pressed and the enslaved:
It is true that we see it taking shape, at least initially perhaps, in the
eschatological themes or myths that developed together with the popu-
lar movements of the second half of the Middle Ages. But it has to be
noted that we very quickly—immediately—find it in the form of his-
torical scholarship, popular fiction, and cosmo-biological speculations.
For a long time it was an oppositional discourse; circulating very
quickly from one oppositional group to another, it was a critical instru-
ment to be used in the struggle against a form of power, but it was
shared by different enemies or different forms of opposition to that
power. We see it being used, in various forms, by radical English
thought at the time of the seventeenth century revolution. A few years
later, we see the French aristocratic reaction using it against the power
of Louis XIV, and it has scarcely been transformed at all. In the early
12 Foucault 2003, 72–74.
13 Foucault 2003, 74.
14 Foucault 2003, 75.
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nineteenth century, it was obviously bound up with the post-revolu-
tionary project of at last writing a history whose real subject is the peo-
ple. But a few years later, we can see it being used to disqualify colo-
nized subraces. This is, then, a mobile discourse, a polyvalent dis-
course. Although its origins lie in the Middle Ages, it is not so marked
by them that it can have only one political meaning.15
Foucault defines the new discourse as a discourse about race and not about
class struggle, precisely because it was soon used to qualify and legitimize
the political interests of different political groups in the struggle against
each other. This is why the term «race» should not be understood as
«pinned to a stable biological meaning», but rather as a word that «desig-
nates a certain historico-political divide.»16 In other words, the discourse of
rebellion is a discourse about race struggle as it represents history as the
conflict between at least two major «groups which, although they coexist,
have not become mixed because of the differences, dissymmetries, and bar-
riers created by privileges, customs and rights, the distribution of wealth,
or the way in which power is exercised.»17 However, Foucault clearly says
that the history of revolutionary projects and practices is intrinsically
bound to the emergence of counter-historical discourse.18
According to Foucault, the counter-historical discourse of rebellion did
not replace the discourse of sovereignty. Rather, both continue to operate
throughout modernity and into postmodernity in a struggle characterized
by perpetual interaction between each other, producing fields of knowl-
edge and knowledge-contents. More precisely, at a certain historical mo-
ment, the discourse of sovereignty intruded upon and took possession of
the discourse of rebellion, inverting its functionality. The glorification of
power relations, then, is realized through the representation of the state as
the bastion of the defense of society and the social heritage of one race,
that is: the nation-state as a unified social body that must be defended
from inside and outside. As Foucault puts it:
Whereas the discourse of races, of the struggle between races, was a
weapon to be used against the historico-political discourse of Roman
sovereignty, the discourse of race (in the singular) was a way of turning
that weapon against those who had forged it, of using it to preserve the
15 Foucault 2003, 76–77.
16 Foucault 2003, 77.
17 Foucault 2003, 77.
18 See Foucault 2003, 79.
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sovereignty of the State […]. Thanks to the shift from law to norm,
from races in the plural to race in the singular, from the emancipatory
project to a concern with purity, sovereignty was able to invest or take
over the discourse of race struggle and reutilize it for its own strategy.
State sovereignty thus becomes the imperative to protect the race. It
becomes both an alternative to and a way of blocking the call for revo-
lution that derived from the old discourse of struggles, interpretations,
demands, and promises.19
Fundamental to this study, this passage allows us to understand and ana-
lyze the emergence of the state martyr figure. Foucault delineates the his-
torical process through which the discourse of sovereignty took possession
of the biblical figures and narratives that previously belonged to the dis-
course of rebellion. The martyr figure is precisely one of these appropriat-
ed biblical figures, just as martyrology is one of these narratives. In fact,
when Foucault writes that «Jerusalem was always a protest against […] eter-
nal Rome, against the Rome of the Caesars, against the Rome that shed the
blood of the innocent in the circus», he implicitly refers to the martyr figure,
inasmuch as among the people who died in the circus of the imperial cities
disseminated in the Roman Empire, there were many who in the counter-
narrative of Christian martyrology are represented as martyrs. As we will
see, just as the sovereign figure is essential to the discourse of sovereignty—
whose function ultimately is nothing more than to make the power and
monopoly of violence appear absolutely necessary for the protection of
race (or, more precisely, of society within the boundaries of the nation-
state)—, the martyr figure is indispensable to the discourse of rebellion.
Therefore, to understand the nature, structure and development of the dis-
course of rebellion, as well as to understand how the discourse of
sovereignty took possession of certain elements that originally belonged to
the «mythico-religious discourse of the Jews», we have to analyze the emer-
gence and shifts of the martyr figure.
Narratives of Sovereignty and Rebellion
Before I focus on the process that led to the emergence of the state martyr
figure, it is necessary to delineate in more detail the modes of emplotment
of both discourses of sovereignty and rebellion as well as to describe how
2.2
19 Foucault 2003, 81–82.
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they function, or the source of their performative efficacy. The concept of
emplotment was coined by Paul Ricoeur and defines the arrangements of
events into an ordered narrative whole.20 Since the goal here is not to de-
scribe the two discourses in terms of their historical emergence and posi-
tivity, but rather to identify their two general structures, two modes of nar-
rating and representing events of violence that can be found in different
pragmatic-hermeneutic contexts, I will no longer talk of discourses, as dis-
courses are always unrepeatable singularities appearing positively in specif-
ic historical contexts, but of narratives. The narrative of sovereignty and the
narrative of rebellion are not to be considered to be two historical manifes-
tations, that is, two narratives recounted and invented by specific authors
in places and times that could be clearly localized in history, but rather as
the historical a prioris or conditions of possibility for the emergence of posi-
tive and very concrete discourses of sovereignty and rebellion.21 They are,
in other words, not things locatable in a chronology, but rather operative
forces within history.22
The narrative of sovereignty refers to war and violence as fundamental
presences in the history of mankind and as permanent threats that can de-
stroy society at any moment. Within this narrative, violence is represented
as something inherent in human beings, as if humans had some sort of
natural predisposition to violence that permanently threatens the social or-
der. The sovereign seeks to neutralize or at least to minimize the potential
for violence inherent in every society and every historical period. To pre-
vent the emergence of primitive, anarchic and savage violence, the
sovereign must take possession of violence and monopolize it. In other
words, it must be so powerful that it can impose peace by the means of vi-
olence. The narrative of rebellion instead refers to war and violence as a
confrontation between two groups, as a hostile encounter between the op-
pressed and their oppressors, and always emerges as the negation of the
narrative of sovereignty inasmuch as it challenges its way of representing
history, specifically historical events of violence. Instead of enforcing and
legitimizing the power of the sovereign as necessary for the defense of soci-
ety, the narrative of rebellion seeks to reveal the iniquity of sovereign pow-
er and unmask its contingency and injustice. The narratives of sovereignty
and of rebellion can be understood as antithetical ways of referring to and
giving meaning to political violence. The first represents violence as a per-
20 See Ricoeur 1991, 138–139.
21 See Foucault 1972, 126–131.
22 See Agamben 2009, 110.
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manent threat to society, which must be controlled and held off by the po-
litical authority, while the other represents violence as an instrument of op-
pression used by a certain group to rule and control another. Thus, these
narratives hold two opposite political functions. The narrative of sovereign-
ty legitimizes the use of violence by a political authority as necessary to
prevent the use of violence by the enemies of society. In contrast, the dis-
course of rebellion does not legitimize any kind of violence, but rather un-
masks it as a simple and pure instrument of the fight and struggle for pow-
er. Within the discourse of rebellion, violence is neither legitimate nor ille-
gitimate, but merely a means to the attainment of power.
At the base of modern hegemonic political thought, with the idea of
sovereign power at its ideological core, is the anthropological Hobbesian
premise: in the «state of nature» men are homo homini lupus. This anthro-
pology postulates a state of nature, in which human beings live in a perma-
nent «war of all against all» while life is «solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and
short», due to man’s passion and to the «perpetual and restelesse desire of
Power.»23 To avoid the infinite perpetuation of war, individuals must relin-
quish a degree of individual sovereignty to an authority that, in return,
provides protection. In order for man to recognize the authority of the
sovereign, a permanent fear of punishment is necessary. To counter the
«state of nature», Hobbes conceives the state as a machina machinorum,
which holds a monopoly on violence to ensure peace.
The mechanism that legitimates holding a monopoly on violence within
modern hegemonic political thought follows a mythical narrative struc-
ture. The «mythical symbol of the Leviathan» does not simply function as
an illustration of political theory, but is rather a symbol that recalls and
highlights the mythical substrate that accompanies hegemonic modern po-
litical thought.24 According to Hans Blumenberg, myth is one of the origi-
nal structures of human thought: because «fear [Angst] must be rational-
ized to fear [Furcht] again», and man invents «artifices such as the supposi-
tion of the familiar for the unfamiliar, the explanations for the unexplain-
able, the names for the unnamable.» The myth, in other words, is an «abso-
lutism of reality.»25 Thus, on one hand, the Leviathan is the explanation of
the inexplicability of chaos and, on the other, puts order into reality. Chaos
is the situation of war of all against all. This chaos is generated from below,
by the masses in revolt, by the mob. The mob is Behemoth, the monster
23 Hobbes 2003, 79 (EW III 85).
24 See Taubes 1983, 9–15.
25 Blumenberg 2014a, 10–11.
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that lives in the shadows and in the mud (Job 40: 19–24), and the
Leviathan is its corrective: an awesome power that keeps the chaos in
check. Consequently, the function of the Leviathan’s symbol is to keep the
mythical fear of chaos alive. Without the Leviathan, the mechanism that le-
gitimizes violence perpetuated by the state loses its symbolic power, and
therefore, the sovereign remains a sterile figure, without body and without
authority.
In the 20th century, the narrative of sovereignty found its greatest repre-
sentative in the jurist Carl Schmitt. Schmitt brought Hobbes’ reasoning to
its most extreme consequences. In Schmitt’s thought, the sovereign is de-
fined as one who decides on the state of exception:
He [the sovereign] decides whether there is an extreme emergency as
well as what must be done to eliminate it. Although he stands outside
the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is
he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended
in its entirety […]. There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For
a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is
sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actual-
ly exists. All law is ‹situational law›. The sovereign produces and guar-
antees the situation in its totality. He has the monopoly over this last
decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which
must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or
to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most
clearly the essence of the state authority. The decision parts here from
the legal norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves
that to produce law it need not be based on law.26
The power to decide on the state of exception is the missing piece in
Hobbes’ theory. It is the piece that manifests the sovereign as legitimate on-
ly within a framework of mythical thought. The sovereign is only absolute-
ly necessary to the preservation of order when confronted with advancing
chaos. This is the strategic core of Schmitt’s political theology: he conceives
the state as a katechon, an arresting power whose raison d’être is to stop the
anarchic, chaotic and demonic forces that perpetually threaten the social
order.27 This also reveals that the representation of violence and war as a
potentially omnipresent threat plays a central and strategic role in the dis-
course of sovereignty.
26 Schmitt 1985, 7, 13.
27 See Schmitt 1988, 59–62; Schmitt 1996.
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In the contemporary world, the mythic structure of violence legitimiza-
tion manifests itself in the language and rhetoric adopted by many pur-
ported democratic and liberal governments. A paradigmatic example of
this rhetoric comes from US President George W. Bush’s administration in
its justification of the US’ military intervention in Iraq. The Bush adminis-
tration represented enemies of the United States not simply as political op-
ponents tied to specific interests—economic, national, cultural etc.—but
as the acolytes of absolute evil. By placing the concept of the «terrorist» at
the center of foreign policy, the Bush administration managed to universal-
ize the enemy. The figure of the terrorist is the main character of a mythi-
cal narrative. In the rhetoric of the «war on terror», the «terrorist» is not a
specific enemy within a specific cultural context linked to its own historici-
ty, but rather a variable without determinations; it could be anyone and be
anywhere. The enemy embodies the Otherness in body politics: an out-
sider that is at the same time an insider. Fear of foreigners and complete
difference on the one hand, and fear of chaos caused by the masses, or the
social body itself, on the other are constitutive for the acceptance of vio-
lence perpetuated by the state. What sustains this narrative is not a struc-
ture of logical and rational thought, but rather a mythical one. The mythi-
cal narrative of the sovereign is based on the idea of permanent violence
and war, in which the enemy can be anyone. It is this mythical universal
enemy that allows states to declare a permanent state of exception, in
which the use of violence always seems necessary, inevitable, and therefore,
legitimate.
According to Jacob Taubes, the narrative of sovereignty finds its opposite
in Walter Benjamin’s idea of the messianic revolution. In his eight theses
on the philosophy of history, Benjamin takes the fundamental concepts of
Schmitt’s thought and overturns their meaning: the state of exception,
which in the writings of Carl Schmitt is dictatorially imposed or dictated
from above, becomes the starting point for a messianic revolution from the
bottom.28 To understand the meaning of this reversal, it is necessary to take
into account the distinction made by Benjamin between mythical and di-
vine violence:
Far from inaugurating a purer sphere, the mythical manifestation of
immediate violence shows itself fundamentally identical with all legal
violence, and turns suspicion concerning the latter into certainty of
the perniciousness of its historical function, the destruction of which
28 See Taubes 1987, 28.
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thus becomes obligatory. This very task of destruction poses again, in
the last resort, the question of a pure immediate violence that might be
able to call a halt to mythical violence. Just as in all spheres God op-
poses myth, mythical violence is confronted by the divine. And the lat-
ter constitutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythical violence is law-
making, divine violence is law destroying; if the former sets bound-
aries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings
at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former
threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal
without spilling blood.
When Benjamin speaks of mythical violence, which founds the law, he
clearly has in mind the violence perpetuated by the state, specifically the
kind of violence that legitimizes itself through recourse to fear of chaos. In
this sense, violence is lawmaking: it constitutes the established order,
which contains the chaos that arises from the masses, from the mob. Law
does not possess the power to legitimize violence perpetuated by the state
—it has only the function of making it legal. Furthermore, law is a result
of mythical violence, and violence is the means to deploy the power over
mere life. The concept of mere life is a boundary concept since it marks the
intersection of mythical and divine violence. Within the narrative of
sovereignty (and therefore within the logic of mythical violence), a human
being can be reduced to mere life—to a body that a political authority may
freely dispose of—where authority may find legitimacy in destroying it for
the sake of maintaining peace. In a sort of dialectic inversion, mere life is
also the condition of possibility for the redemption of the oppressed; it is a
specific form of life, from which it is possible to destroy the law and dele-
gitimize violence perpetuated by the state. What Benjamin calls divine vio-
lence is precisely that form of power that manifests itself and becomes pos-
sible in the condition of mere life:
[...] with mere life the rule of law over the living ceases. Mythical vio-
lence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake, divine violence
pure power over all life for the sake of the living. The first demands
sacrifice, the second accepts it.29
What is this violence that «accepts sacrifice», that «is lethal without spilling
blood»? Is it not a contradiction to speak of violence that accepts sacrifice?
I propose to elucidate this distinction by resorting to the distinction be-
29 Benjamin 1995, 297.
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tween active and passive violence. An example of passive violence, for Ben-
jamin, is a general strike, which aims at suspending sovereign power over
mere life and annihilating the rule of law.30 A strike is violent because it
opposes the violence of the state, and it is passive because it opposes vio-
lence without spilling blood. Accepting sacrifice means accepting the pos-
sibility of giving up one’s own life for a cause larger than life itself. In the
context of oppression, sacrifice is a «form of life» through which a single
subject, passively resisting the violence perpetuated by the state, highlights
the injustice suffered by a group of individuals. The kind of violence that
resides in the act of sacrifice is no longer a means, as it is in the case of vio-
lence that founds the law and maintains order, but pure manifestation.31 In
this sense, sacrifice is an «act of speech» in which the suffering body mani-
fests the injustice experienced by a group to a larger audience. The injured
or dying body becomes the medium that bears witness to the condition of
an oppressed group. The transformative power of self-sacrifice lies precisely
in the reconstitution of the boundaries surrounding the individual body
that is sacrificed and the larger body politic. Double performativity of the
act of sacrifice therefore exists: the act not only witnesses injustice, but also
shapes the body politic, making possible a common identity between peo-
ple who may never meet but who are still united by a common experience.
Therefore, the divine violence mentioned by Benjamin can be understood
as the symbolic power that flows from the suffering or dying body. Per-
haps, then, this is the meaning behind the concept of mere life. With mere
life the rule of law, (a system of rules that legalizes violence perpetuated by
the state), ceases, because its deep iniquity is «materialized» in the body of
the one who sacrifices himself or herself.
Why does Benjamin define the violence related to the act of sacrifice as
«divine»? Once again, we can find the coordinates to answer this question
in Jacob Taubes’ writings. In his interpretation of the Pauline letters,
Taubes clarifies Benjamin’s messianism. His argument begins as such: the
Messiah is a martyr, meaning the one whom with his own sacrifice bears
witness to injustice. In the tradition of Western thought, the best-known
example of such a sacrifice is the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Christ is
the one who, with his sacrifice, undermines the authority of the Roman
Empire and the authority of the Jewish theocracy, testifying with his own
body the injustices perpetuated by the established power. For Taubes, in
the Pauline letters, Christ is conceived as the one who, with his own sacri-
30 See Benjamin 1995, 291–292.
31 See Agamben 2005a, 62.
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fice, constitutes a universal social body. In the community of Christ there
is no difference between Greeks, Jews and Romans, between fathers and
sons, between slaves and masters. On the contrary, the battered body of the
Christ is the symbol of the universal community of the oppressed.32 In-
deed, the identification of the individual with the community no longer
takes place in terms of ethnicity, as in the case of the Jewish law of the Old
Testament, and even in terms of belonging to a specific realm such as the
law of the Empire, but rather in terms of belonging to a community of
universal subjects.33
For Taubes, the martyrdom of Christ is the paradigmatic example of an
act that delegitimizes the established order and simultaneously constructs
and legitimizes a new community. This legitimation of the oppressed com-
munity is expressed in the idea of resurrection. The resurrection of Christ
promises the resurrection of all, at the end of time, in a new body politic.34
The dialectic of martyrdom and resurrection, of a past and future event,
constitutes what both Taubes and Benjamin call a «messianic time» or
«now-time».35 This time is characterized by a conception of history in
which the established order is already perceived as illegitimate, but is not
yet a new order. The eschatological tension between the act of martyrdom
(a past event) and the resurrection of all in a new body politic (a future
event) constitutes the «now-time». This allows us to clarify Benjamin’s con-
cept of divine violence. The violence inherent in sacrifice is «divine» be-
cause it breaks the mechanism of mythical thought, in which history is
conceived as circular. In fact, the circular concept of time, which is the ba-
sis of mythic thought, follows the logic of the eternal return: every time
the world is threatened by chaos, mythical violence falls upon it to restore
order. Divine violence departs from this concept of repetition, which im-
plicitly legitimizes and justifies the maintenance of the status quo, and cre-
ates the possibility of a radical change.
In summary, mythical and divine violence are two different ways of con-
ceiving the body politic and historical time. On the one hand, active vio-
lence founds the state and the dictatorship of the law, using the perpetual
fear of the onset of chaos. Mythical violence always needs an enemy that
signifies chaos and evil. From this point of view, the body politic of the
sovereign state must always exclude someone who, as potentially danger-
32 See Taubes 2003, 164.
33 See Taubes 2003, 146.
34 See Taubes 2003, 71–72.
35 See Taubes 1987, 21–24; Benjamin 1968, 261.
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ous, does not have the same rights as citizens of the state. What makes this
mechanism of inclusion/exclusion very effective is that, since anyone is po-
tentially dangerous, anyone can be represented and perceived as the enemy.
The perpetuation of this omnipresent enemy is guaranteed only within a
circular conception of history. Indeed, the need for maintenance of order is
provided only if the danger of chaos is perceived as always latent.
Acts of passive violence, which undermine the legitimacy of the state
through witnessing evil uses of violence, are the radical antitheses of active
violence. Violence perpetuated by the state loses its legitimacy when what
was previously represented as an enemy, or force of chaos, is displayed in
all its weakness: a weak body, or mere life. The act of passive resistance re-
veals the structure of the mythical narrative, showing the absurdity of the
fear of chaos, and reveals the ultimate function of such a prominent narra-
tive, which is the maintenance of power over mere life. The body of the
oppressed becomes the signifier of an entire community of oppressed peo-
ple, now a political body that is no longer based on a mechanism of exclu-
sion, but on a universal conception of the human being. In this respect,
the martyr figure is the antithesis of the Leviathan.36 If the Leviathan is the
mythical symbol of the authoritarian sovereign, a monster that embodies
the citizen and protects the citizens from external enemies and from them-
selves, the martyr figure is the divine symbol of the community of the op-
pressed. This undermines the illegitimacy of state violence, showing its
deep iniquity, and lays the basis for forming a universal political body.
From this point of view, the martyr figure becomes the model for the de-
velopment of an aesthetic of resistance. In fact, the purpose of my argu-
ment is not to make a pamphlet on martyrdom, but to highlight the aes-
thetic dimension of political practices, especially within practices where
the staging and representation of the body holds a central role. In order to
highlight what is at stake here, I propose to compare the act of martyrdom
with a less radical form of resistance than self-sacrifice, which, following a
suggestion made by Giles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben in two different
essays,37 is exemplified in Herman Melville’s novel Bartleby, the Scrivener: A
Story of Wall Street. Melville describes a less radical form of resistance than
self-sacrifice that is still quite powerful. Bartleby is always the one who says
«no, I prefer not», when his boss asks him to do something. This is an ex-
ample of a speech act, in which a lack of action forces the authority of the
master into a state of crisis. When Bartleby denies the will of his master,
36 See Weigel 2007b, 15; Fierke 2013, 53.
37 See Agamben/Deleuze 2012.
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the hierarchical structure of the relationship between the two characters is
completely thrown into crisis. This occurs in such a way that the authority
of the employer loses all meaning. The fundamental difference between
the act of Bartleby and the radical act of martyrdom is obvious: Bartleby
does not have to sacrifice his body or his own life to undermine the au-
thority of the powers in charge, because Bartleby does not fight against
state institutions. Instead, he fights against a particular model of work or-
ganization personified by his employer.
What is interesting, however, is not the difference between the two acts,
but their similarities. In both cases, we find an act that rebels against the
expectations of those who operate within dominant discourses. Just as
Bartleby shatters his employer every time with every negative response,
state institutions are completely unable to grasp the meaning of this kind
of martyrdom. Indeed, within the narrative of sovereignty, a healthy indi-
vidual never sacrifices his own life, and from the point of view of a
sovereign power the act of martyrdom is a meaningless action. The reason
for this is that, as suggested by the above analysis of the anthropological
implications of Hobbes’ thought, the narrative of sovereignty always be-
gins with the premise that man is a selfish animal, only interested in the
preservation of his own life. The power of martyrdom lies precisely in this:
that the power over mere life and death ceases to exist when an individual
accepts the possibility of sacrificing life itself. When faced with sacrifice,
the expectation of the sovereign, (that is, that every man will do anything
to save himself), collapses like a house of cards. From this perspective, it
appears that the core of Benjamin’s divine violence is not so much a will-
ingness to sacrifice one’s own life for a cause, but rather the ability to over-
ride the rules of the dominant narrative. The performativity of resistance
lies not only in the fact that the act makes manifest the iniquity of mythi-
cal violence, but also that the act goes against all expectations. This refor-
mulation of the passive act of resistance drives the development of a less
radical concept of mere life, one in which mere life possesses power be-
yond sacrifice.
We may reinterpret the concept of mere life not as a reduction of the hu-
man being into a body, or living flesh, but as the condition of possibility to
develop a performative language that starts from the body. As previously
explored, for Benjamin, the reduction of man to a mere life occurs under
the dictatorship of the law; it is a product of the practices of government in
which the idea of defending sovereignty, and the need to contain chaos,
justifies the use of violence. Yet, for Benjamin, if this reduction is a product
of mythical violence, it is also the condition of possibility of divine vio-
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lence. To determine the relationship between these two types of violence,
Benjamin uses the Hegelian concept of «antithesis» to show that it is myth-
ical violence itself that produces its own negation. The overcoming of a
thesis and its antithesis lies in the production of heterogeneous forms of
life, which become possible with the condition of mere life. The reduction
of a subject to a mere life undermines all signifiers of social life: confront-
ed with mythical violence, the subject ceases to identify with a particular
ethnicity, gender, or social status and experiences itself as equal to all other
beings. Starting from this universal «zero point», the subject develops sub-
versive forms of life, which, against all the expectations of the dominant
narrative, override its rules and undermine its structure.
In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler explains the performativity of such a
subversive act in the following way: «If subversion is possible, it will be a
subversion from within the terms of the law, through the possibilities that
emerge when the law turns against itself and spawns unexpected permuta-
tions itself. The cultural constructed body will then be liberated, neither to
its ‹natural› past, nor to its original pleasures, but to an open future of cul-
tural possibilities.»38 Here, subversion is understood particularly as a sub-
version of gender categories. The mechanism by which the subversion be-
comes possible, however, is applicable to other forms of categorization—
such as those of ethnicity or social status—produced by the dominant nar-
rative. But what mechanism is it? For Butler, the practices of drag and
cross-dressing are examples of a subversive act against the categories of gen-
der. These practices are parodies of categories constructed by the dominant
discourse. By parodying the identifications of gender, these practices high-
light their own contingency and gender’s constructed nature. Their perfor-
mativity lies in advertising the fact that any form of identification is con-
structed within a discourse. In fact, «performative suggests a dramatic and
contingent construction of meaning.»39 This performativity is only possi-
ble because the body presents itself as a «signifying lack.»40 What allows a
person to become aware that every identity is constructed? It seems to me
that, according to Butler, it is precisely through subversive acts that it is
possible to undermine the categorizations of the dominant discourse, and
therefore to make visible their constructed nature. Mere life is exactly this
«zero point» from which the constructed nature of all social determina-
tions emerges and becomes manifest. The reduction to mere life is what re-
38 Butler 1990, 93.
39 Butler 1990, 139.
40 Butler 1990, 135.
2 A Discourse Analytical Approach to Political Violence
58
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
veals to us the signifying lack of the body, opening the possibility for the
creation of alternative forms of life, no longer determined by the dominant
narrative.
But what kind of political practices might subvert the logic of mythical
thinking? As I argue above, such a thought is kept alive by the conception
of man as a selfish animal, interested only in preserving its own life and
increasing its own power. Therefore, one must try to think and give a
shape to forms of life through bodily and/or language performances,
which destabilize this conception of human beings. Martyrdom, under-
stood as self-sacrifice for a higher cause over mere individual survival, is
one of these forms; perhaps even the most paradigmatic form. But there
are many other, less radical ways to subversively use language and body.
Contestations enacted by public assemblies, strikes, vigils, and the occupa-
tion of the public space are, for example, important forms of embodied ac-
tion with which dominant expectations and categorizations can be subvert-
ed, especially when they bring together individuals «belonging» to social
strata, ethnicities, nationalities, genders, etc. in defense of the rights and
dignity of social minorities.41 The subversive power of these practices lies
in something very simple: all these practices show that human beings are
capable of acting in solidarity and fighting for others, and thus have the
power to make manifest the deep iniquity of the entire narrative of
sovereignty. They not only show that human beings are much more than
homo homini lupus, but also show that behind the excuse of defending na-
tional security and order lies an inhuman logic, one that is, in its nature,
mythical.
Hegemonic and Subversive Uses of the Martyr Figure
If the martyr figure is antithetical to that of the sovereign, and the perfor-
mative force of martyrdom lies in its ability to reveal the iniquity of state
violence and to unmask the legitimizing mechanism of the mythical narra-
tive of the sovereign, how can we explain the emergence of the state martyr
figuration? How is it possible, with regard to the case at the center of this
study, that Aldo Moro was represented as a martyr of the Italian Republic,
who died for the defense of the state? The state martyr figure seems to
function conversely to the statement above: rather than delegitimizing the
political authority, and serving as a symbolic body of oppressed communi-
2.3
41 See Butler 2015.
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ties, the state martyr seems to legitimize and support the discourse of
sovereignty, serving as a symbol of the national community. In other
words, the central figure of the discourse seems, in this case, to become
part of the discourse of sovereignty.
The two archetypical narratives outlined in the previous section intro-
duce at least three major problems. First, by referring explicitly to the mar-
tyrdom of Christ as a model of non-violent resistance, in the previous sec-
tion I deliberately omitted reflection on the presence of martyrologies
within concrete and positive discourses in which violently acting individu-
als are also represented as martyrs. In fact, the martyr figure also played
and still plays an important role in narratives that can hardly be regarded
as an expression of the suffering of oppressed communities. There are thus
martyrological representations in which the situation is at least partially re-
versed compared to what has been outlined above. In these situations the
victims are not represented as martyrs who died by the hands of state appa-
ratuses but, on the contrary, are depicted as martyrs who sacrificed them-
selves in defense of the nation-state, its principles and its laws.
The second problem is directly connected with the first: since the aim of
the previous section was to outline the two archetypes of sovereignty and
rebellion narratives, I did not problematize the different roles martyrologi-
cal representations play in positive historical discourses. By focusing on
«self-sacrifice» as a bodily performance, I omitted any discussion of the role
of language, rhetoric and media within both mechanisms of legitimiza-
tion/delegitimization, political authority and subjectification/communiza-
tion. In fact, as we develop later, an act of «self-sacrifice» deploys performa-
tive power only if it is represented, recognized and accepted as such by so-
cial actors. The specific case of martyr figuration examined in this study
should be considered a borderline-case, inasmuch as it is highly problemat-
ic to talk about self-sacrifice, because Aldo Moro categorically refused to as-
sume the role of a martyr. Since Aldo Moro did everything in his power to
avoid being killed, it is necessary to change our approach and focalize on
the performativity of discursive practices that represent and construct his
death as martyrdom.
A third, more general problem concerns violence perpetuated not by
members of the state apparatuses (primarily police and military forces),
but by those who use active violence as a means of political struggle against
established forms of political authority. We must, then, consider the reality
of non-state violence, namely those forms of violence that function and
perpetuate the narrative of sovereignty by maintaining and spreading the
fear of an omnipresent internal and/or external enemy. What happens if
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the martyr figure becomes part of a narrative that represents victims of
non-state violent acts as «martyrs»? In other words: what happens if terror-
ism becomes the point of reference for the production of state martyrolo-
gies?
The task of solving these problems is reserved for the next chapter,
which describes the historical process that led to the incorporation of the
martyr figure within the narrative of sovereignty. The process of disloca-
tion from its original context of apparition suspended the fundamental op-
position of the figure of the martyr to the sovereign, resulting in the anni-
hilation of the narrative of rebellion. Potential discursive re-enactment of
the narrative dropped drastically, since its central figure was incorporated
within the narrative of sovereignty. The concepts of martyrdom and
sovereignty coincide and overlap in a sphere of indiscernibility, from
which emerged the state martyr figure.
The martyrological representation of Aldo Moro is located at the end of
a long process of displacement and relocation of the martyr figure. What
makes the Moro case special, taking on almost a character of exemplarity, is
not merely the serial, repetitive and massive presence of representations of
Moro as a state martyr, but rather that these representations were contested
even before the actual event of violence, to which the representations re-
late, happened. Several other social actors besides Aldo Moro objected and
attempted to give, both during the 55 days in which Moro was held prison-
er and after, an alternative representation of the violent event. The Moro
case is therefore an excellent starting point not only for analyzing the func-
tioning and performativity of the figure of the state martyr and under-
standing how such a figure could become part of a discourse of sovereign-
ty, but also for identifying and discussing alternative forms and models of
representation of events of political violence, which have, at least potential-
ly, the power to subvert hegemonic discourses. In fact, what makes this
case so interesting is that the figure of the martyr was and still is used in
both dominant and subversive forms of representation and narration. In
other words, in the pragmatic and hermeneutic context of the case study,
the subversive use of the martyr figure survived, thus revealing that, at least
potentially, it still plays a role in discourses of rebellion to the mythical
narrative of the nation-state.
If the martyr figure can be used in both narratives of sovereignty and re-
bellion in the same historical context, then the martyr’s performativity can-
not be understood by hypostatizing its meaning and function, but by ac-
counting for its different uses and discursive manifestations. Martyrologi-
cal representations exercise a performative force inasmuch as they strongly
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influence and canalize the interpretation and perception of historical
events of political violence. Within the dominant and hegemonic dis-
course, representations of Aldo Moro as a state martyr serve to conceal po-
litical power structures and legitimize established forms of political author-
ity. As I will try to demonstrate in the fifth and sixth chapters, through the
use of martyrological representations and the allocation of the state martyr
role, different social actors tried to attribute the meaning of a voluntary act
of self-sacrifice in defense of the nation-state and for the sake of the Italian
citizens’ well-being to Moro’s death. Martyrological representations are dis-
cursive practices that deploy a performative force inasmuch as they are able
to signify Aldo Moro as a sacral victim, a martyr who witnesses the truth-
fulness of citizen rights and the necessity of the nation state as the supreme
guarantor of these rights. Here, he becomes the central figure of a narrative
in which sovereign state authority is experienced and perceived as absolute-
ly imperative. Moro’s violent death in itself acquires the meaning of an ab-
solute and meta-historical event, namely of an event that could not be
avoided as it was necessary for the preservation and the defense of the Ital-
ian Republic and the laws and values at the base of a liberal, democratic
political order.
Through this absolutization of a specific historical event of violence, the
social struggle of the seventies in Italy assumes the connotation of a con-
flict between good and evil forces, order and chaos, and the preservation
and destruction of life. The effectiveness of this absolutization is threefold.
First, it legitimates state authority and its monopoly on violence, present-
ing it as necessary for the defense of society and the preservation of the
rights and lives of citizens. Second, it justifies the decisions (and non-deci-
sions) made by the Italian government during the Moro affair, in particu-
lar the decision not to negotiate for Moro’s release. Third, it causes «con-
sumers» (as well as «producers») of hegemonic representations to identify
with the national community, inasmuch as Moro’s body becomes the sym-
bolical body of the national community and thus serves as a symbol of col-
lective identification. Aldo Moro becomes the symbol of a political com-
munity who suffered and risked destruction yet found renewed strength,
inner solidarity and vitality.
Now, what distinguishes the subversive use from the hegemonic use of
the martyr figure? For the purpose of this study, I propose to distinguish
between instrumental and poetic uses of language. According to Agam-
ben,
Language […] appears for each speaker as what is the most intimate
and proper; and yet, speaking of an ‹ownership› and of an ‹intimacy› of
2 A Discourse Analytical Approach to Political Violence
62
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
language is certainly misleading, since language happens to the human
being from the outside, through a process of transmission and learning
that can be arduous and painful and is imposed on the infant rather
than being willed by it. And while the body seems particular to each
individual, language is by definition shared by others and as such an
object of common use.42
Each use of language units—signs, words, and constellations of words (sen-
tences)—is an iterative use. Discursive practices take up something that is
always already given, a positivity present in history, placing them in a new
hermeneutic and pragmatic context. The unique character of discursive
practices depends on historical location, through which the same sign,
word or sentence not only takes on a special and different meaning from
time to time, but also does something different each time. The effectiveness
of language is determined not only by semantic elements themselves, but
also by the signatures to which they are subjected as well as by the context
in which they appear. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter,
Foucault and Agamben define the iteration and dislocation of language
units as a signature.
The concealment of iteration and dislocation characterizes the instru-
mental use of language. Discursive practices are instrumental when they
use semantic elements as tools for the objectification and absolutization of
reality or to hide their historicity and contingency. This concealment leads
to the hypostatization of words and things, acts or events. In other words,
the instrumental use of language completely hides the externality of lan-
guage, the external imposition to which we are exposed every time we
make use of language itself. In this way, not only is historicity concealed,
but so is the historical development of the language; in addition, its perfor-
mative force is masked and silenced. As Agamben notes, today we live in
an age that has perfected and taken to extremes this instrumental use of
language:
What has changed […] is that language no longer functions as a histor-
ical a priori, which while remaining unthought, determines and condi-
tions the historical possibilities of speaking human beings. In being to-
tally identified with being, it is now put forward as a neutral ahistori-
cal or post-historical effectuality, which no longer conditions any rec-
ognizable sense of historical becoming or any epochal articulation of
time. This means that we live in a time that is not—or at least pretends
42 Agamben 2015b, 86.
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not to be—determined by any historical a priori, which is to say, a post-
historical time (or rather, a time determined by the absence or impossi-
bility of such an a priori).43
The ethical and political value of poetry and, more generally, art, lies in its
ability to use semantic elements without hiding its signatures, but rather
by making them manifest. Discursive practices that make poetic use of lan-
guage reveal and unmask the exteriority of language:
[Poets] must […] abandon conventions and common use and, so to
speak, render foreign the language that they must dominate, inscribing
it in a system of rules as arbitrary as they are inexorable […] The appro-
priation of language that they pursue, that is to say, is to the same ex-
tent an expropriation, in such a way that the poetic act appears as a
bipolar gesture, which each time renders external what it must unfail-
ingly appropriate.44
In order to be able to distinguish between instrumental and poetic, subver-
sive uses of the martyr figuration, this investigation has to reconstruct its
historical signatures and metamorphoses. In the seventh chapter, I will dis-
cuss examples of alternative usages of the martyr figuration that operate
poetically, at least in the sense of the definition presented above, since they
make explicit and highlight its radical historicity, versatility and ambiguity.
A large majority of martyrological representations of Aldo Moro operate
according to instrumental language usage, since they hide the martyr fig-
ure’s stratifications of meaning and metamorphoses. They disguise in par-
ticular the strong subversive potential it had in its «original» context of ap-
pearance, that is, within a discourse of rebellion.
The Discourse Analytical Approach
Discourse theory has already been incorporated into the study of religion
for some time. Fundamental reflections on the fertility of the «discursive
study of religion» were first formulated in the eighties.45 Hans Kippenberg
proposed an interpretative model, which refers to the theory of speech acts
and rejects an essentialist separation of action and language by understand-
2.4
43 Agamben 2015b, 114.
44 Agamben 2015b, 86.
45 See Kippenberg 1983; Lincoln 1989.
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ing linguistic expressions as acts. This creates the possibility of examining
religious expressions as discursive practices that significantly determine the
construction of reality. Kocku von Stuckrad in particular argues for the dis-
cursive study of religion.46 More specifically, he argues for the inclusion of
both sociological discourse analysis as well as historical discourse analysis
in the theoretical framework of the study of religion. Sociological dis-
course analysis assumes that everything perceived, experienced and felt is
structurally intertwined with the socially constructed forms of preserved,
recognized and objectified knowledge.47 On the other hand, historical dis-
course analysis examines the discursive genealogy of meaning or reality-
generating processes of communication in history.48 According to von
Stuckrad, the combination of these two approaches opens up a new per-
spective on the research subject of the study of religion. From the perspec-
tive of discourse theory, religion loses the status of a phenomenon sui gener-
is and therefore can be studied as an empty signifier, which constantly re-
ceives new meaning within different discursive practices and is constituted
by them. The subjects of a discourse analysis-oriented study of religion are,
accordingly, discourses on religion. These discourses produce meaning and
orders of knowledge materialized in certain concrete practices and institu-
tions.
This investigation is in line with von Stuckrad’s proposal of a discursive
study of religion. However, since the discursive practices investigated in
this investigation cannot all be explicitly considered elements of a dis-
course about religion, the selection criteria of what is a legitimate research
subject within the study of religion must be extended. I am of the opinion
that the discipline is not limited to discourses on religion, but also extends
to discourses in which linguistic and visual elements occur, which iterate
semiotic, narrative and rhetoric models that «belong» to historically pre-
served religious systems of knowledge and representation. This extension
allows the examination of the role and function of «religious signs» within
discourses, which are difficult to identify as explicitly «religious». The focus
of this investigation resides, on the one hand, in those representations and
narratives that recall and iterate elements of language linked to the figure
of the martyr, and on the other, in the political use and function of those
elements of language.
46 See von Stuckrad 2003; von Stuckrad 2010; von Stuckrad 2013.
47 See Keller 2008.
48 See Landwehr 2008, 92.
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Following Foucault’s understanding of the goal and analytical strategy of
«historical-philosophical research», rather than conceptualizing and isolat-
ing putative transhistorical universals, I want to establish a conceptual
framework that allows for the exploration of an event of political violence
and its representation in discursive practices as singularities. Foucault calls
this interpretative path an examination of «eventualisation» (événementiali-
sation).49 Using a topological terminology, the aim of this investigation can
be described as an attempt to map the history of the event. The positivity
of the historical event is the focal point on the basis of which it becomes
possible to analyze the organization, function, and the interconnection of
the discursive practices referring to the event. The unit of these discursive
practices is what from now on I will call discursive formation. The goal of
historical–philosophical research is to «record the singularity of events out-
side of any monotonous finality», to «reject the meta-historical deployment
of ideal signification and indefinite teleologies»50 and to analyze «groups
of elements where, in a totally empirical and temporary way, connections
between mechanism of coercion and contents of knowledge can be identi-
fied.»51 A central question concerning historical–philosophical research in-
to discursive formations is: «How is it that a particular statement appeared
rather than another?»52 If we apply this principle to this study, further ques-
tions are raised: how and why is a concrete historical event of political vio-
lence repetitively and regularly represented in different media with the
martyr as a central figure? Which interplaying mechanisms of coercion de-
termine the acceptance and diffusion of martyrological representations?
Which mechanisms of coercion organize, select and canalize the modes
and contents of the representations of the event in a certain direction
rather than another? What effects of power are linked to the martyrological
representation of the event?
The state martyr figure cannot deploy effects of power without a certain
diffusion and regularity of manifestation in the public space and material-
ization in different media. It would be hard to sustain the thesis presented
above if there were only one or few martyrological representations. If the
first task of this investigation is the individuation of martyr figuration sig-
natures, its second task is to analyze its diffusion and regularity within the
discursive formation referring to the Moro case and to describe how, when
49 Foucault 2007, 59.
50 Foucault 1977, 139–140.
51 Foucault 2007, 59.
52 Foucault 1972, 27.
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and where this figure emerged. In other terms, it has to analyze the general
organization of the discursive formation referring to Moro’s death to prove
that the martyr figure has effectively a prominent presence within it. To
master this task, I will use some of the instruments found in Foucault’s dif-
ferent «toolboxes», as the French historian and philosopher once defined
his books.53 One toolbox in particular will serve as a central point of refer-
ence: the work Archeology of Knowledge. In the center of this book stands
the effort to relate the description and individuation of statements in their
singularity of appearance with the broader task of analyzing discursive for-
mations. The starting point is the demarcation or distanciation of archeol-
ogy from traditional scientific procedures and the epistemological premis-
es of what is generally known as the «history of ideas». This critique con-
cerns a range of categories, such as «tradition», «science», «literature», «po-
litics», «book», «authorship», etc., whose functions are to synthetize a «pop-
ulation of dispersed events», to set and define unities of knowledge and to
link those unities with the ideas of a genuine source or origin, continuity
and collective consciousness.54 Foucault proposes to deconstruct this prin-
ciple of ordering so as to identify and describe other unities, or other «dis-
cursive formations». He also criticizes what we could call an essentialism of
meaning, namely the idea that historical statements, events and objects are
always to be considered and analyzed as «documents», or signs of some-
thing else, searching for their hidden meaning and essential truth.55 He op-
poses this with his conception of enunciations as unrepeatable events,
which must be described as «monuments», i.e. to describe the historical,
discursive, institutional and material conditions for their appearance.
The position of Archeology of Knowledge within Foucault’s thought is
controversial. There have been many attempts to distinguish Foucault’s
works according to phases,56 wherein some researchers understand the
Archeology as part of a first group of discourse analytical works, opposed to
and viewed as outdated after a second phase of analysis of power.57 Others
consider this work quite relevant and not obsolete in relation to Foucault’s
theory of power.58 Although preferring the latter reading, this study does
not defend a certain model of systematization of Foucault’s works, but
53 Foucault 2002, 887.
54 Foucault 1972, 22; See Kammler 2014b, 54.
55 See Foucault 1972, 138–139.
56 See Kammler 2014a, 11.
57 See Davidson 2003, 192; Gehering 2004, 10.
58 See Dreyfus/Rabinow 1983, 79–100.
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rather takes seriously his exhortation to use his books as research tools.
From this point of view, I follow the line traced by British cultural studies,
especially by Stuart Hall, and seek to address discursive practices as «signi-
fying practices» that have an intrinsically performative force, i.e. the power
to exert effects. Hall addresses discourse as a «system of representations»,
i.e. «a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—a
way of representing the knowledge about—a particular topic at a particu-
lar historical moment.»59 Here, the effectiveness of the relation power/
knowledge is at stake, namely the way in which the discourses assume the
authority of the truth and the power of discursive formations to produce
and sustain regimes of truth.60 It is not the content but the effects of the
truth of discursive practices that are at stake here.
Stuart Hall defines representation as «the production of the meaning of
the concepts in our minds through language», arguing that «it is the link
between concepts and language which enables us to refer to either the ‹real›
world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary world of fiction-
al objects, people and events.»61 The representations that are at stake here
are of the first kind, since they refer to a real event—the assassination of
Aldo Moro—and a real individual, which is at the same time a material ob-
ject—Moro’s dead body. This is obvious: the statements «Aldo Moro is
dead» or «Aldo Moro has been killed» refer to something real and not
imaginary. The language elements within these statements are signs—writ-
ten or spoken words—that carry and express meaning. The kind of mean-
ing they carry is understandable to all, because we all agree on the mean-
ing of «is dead» or «has been killed». There is a general consensus that guar-
antees that all who use, read or listen to these words correlate them with
shared conceptions of what it means to be «dead» or to be «killed» (which
obviously is not the same). The same can be said for the proper noun «Al-
do Moro», which refers to a certain person and not another, and all will
agree without discussion—no work of interpretation is needed—which in-
dividual is intended. This representation is denotative inasmuch as the con-
sensus is wide and all people agree on the meaning of the sentences and to
what the individual words refer.
This first level of meaning does not seem to pose problems of any kind.
The allocation of meaning and communication work smoothly. But if we
say, write, listen or read «Aldo Moro died so that the Republic can live» or
59 Hall 1993, 291.
60 See Hall 2013b, 33–34.
61 Hall 2013b, 3.
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«Aldo Moro has been killed by beasts», the work of representation is not
the same. Here we are faced with a second level of signification referred to
as connotative. Here, the signifiers used connect with broader themes and
meanings, linking them with what Hall calls «the wider semantic fields of
our culture» and the «wider realms of social ideology».62 In fact, a mean-
ingful use and understanding of these statements presuppose that we have
an idea of the «life of the Republic» or an idea of «bestiality». In the first
statement, the word «life» is used metaphorically, as it refers to something
(the Italian Republic) that does not have a life in the common sense of the
word. The same can be said of the attribution of bestiality to the BR,
which for all we know had no animals in their ranks. The Republic is not a
living organism or, more precisely, can be considered a living organism on-
ly in a broader, metaphorical sense. The BR were not beasts but, as we will
see, for many social actors they acted, thought and felt as beasts. Both state-
ments thus require an active process of interpretation.
The first statement has meaning only for those who are familiar with po-
litical language—a second kind of shared code, which presupposes, but is
not identical with, the basic code of language. Only if we know the code of
political language can we interpret the statement and create meaning for
ourselves. The statement presupposes, for example, that we have an idea of
a republic as a form of government, or a sovereign state, that may cease to
exist (for example, because of a coup, a war—civil or with other nations—,
a revolution, etc.). Furthermore, it presupposes pre-existent knowledge of
the idea that the government «represents the body of citizens» (another po-
litical metaphor), and that if the government ceases to exist, the body of
citizens symbolically «dies» due to the loss of its representation. The specif-
ic use of these words is ideological, which is demonstrated by the fact that
the concept of a republic, can be contested as evidenced by Marxist–Lenin-
ists, as the BR identified themselves, or by anarchists. The implication of
the republic as a good and right form of government proves the use of
these words is ideological as well. To summarize, we can say that at this sec-
ond level of signification, the understanding of the performance requires
the knowledge of a given code of political language, and that even if indi-
viduals have this knowledge, we cannot necessarily presuppose they accept
this knowledge as true.
The use of the word «beasts» in the second statement requires interpreta-
tion, because we must know the meaning of this attribution of «bestiality»
to a group of individuals. As we will see, within the specific cultural con-
62 Hall 2013b, 23–24.
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text of this statement, bestiality implies ferocious animal behavior and the
non-reflected use of violence. To say that the BR are beasts implies that
they acted, or killed, like beasts—that is, without a clear political purpose.
The very act of killing assumes the meaning of an act that is not political
but ferocious and tied to the most bestial human passions: an ancestral and
primitive death wish. As we shall see, the denial of the political nature of
the act strategically denies the responsibility of government policies, politi-
cal parties, and in general, all those involved in the affair. With beasts, in
fact, it is not possible to negotiate. Thus, this second level of signification
is linked to wider realms of ideology. It does not only imply the knowledge
of the conventional use of «beasts» as a metaphor in reference to individu-
als acting violently, but also a certain interpretation of the causes of the vio-
lent act. The event is inscribed in a meaningful system of causes and ef-
fects. The representation should therefore be considered part of a narra-
tion, a way of telling what happened, which of course can be (and has
been) contested.
Let us return one more time to the first statement. Here, we are faced
with a more complex, meaningful construction of a causal relationship
through the use of the word «for», by which the perpetuation of the Re-
public is represented as an effect of Aldo Moro’s death. Death is not repre-
sented as a simple fact, but as an event with a political reason and mean-
ing. Now, taken in its singularity and without knowing the context in
which the statement was written or spoken, it is impossible to exactly iden-
tify its meaning. We understand that the statement constructs a causal rela-
tionship, but we are not able to say how to interpret it. Why is the death of
a single man, who as president of the Christian Democratic Party played
an important political role even without acting as a government represen-
tative, important for the subsistence of the Italian Republic? It is only by
taking into account the general pragmatic, discursive and hermeneutic
context in which the statement was made that we can grasp its meaning.
For example, we have to know that the Italian government refused to nego-
tiate with the terrorists (even before the terrorists proposed negotiations)
for the liberation of Aldo Moro and argued that such a deal would be
equal to political legitimation of the terrorists and undermine the values
and principles at the base of a democratic political order. We have to know
that this statement was the title of the first page of the newspaper Corriere
della Sera the day after Moro’s body was found, and that during the entire
period of the kidnapping this newspaper supported the government’s «line
of firmness». We also have to know that Moro’s death was represented,
even before its occurrence, as inevitable according to the following scheme
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of logic: If Moro lives, then the Republic will die; if the Republic lives, Mo-
ro will die.
All this will be discussed in detail afterwards. Here, I want to call atten-
tion to the fact that the meaning of single signs and statements often de-
pends «on larger units of analysis—narratives, statements, groups of im-
ages, whole discourses which operate across a variety of texts, areas of
knowledge about a subject which have acquired widespread authority.»63
This is why to analyze the production of meaning through representation,
we must switch from a genuine semiotic to a discursive approach, and thus
not study language, but discourse as a system of representation. Represen-
tation itself is not analyzed as a way to produce meaning, but as a source of
the production of social knowledge connected to social practices and mi-
cromechanisms of power. This switch from the semiotic to the discursive
approach directly leads into the orbit of Michel Foucault’s thought, whose
studies were focused primarily on the analysis of rules and practices linked
to the production of knowledge. Especially in his later work, he was con-
cerned with the implementation of knowledge through discursive practices
in specific institutional settings to regulate the conduct of people. By fo-
cusing on the link between knowledge and power, he drew attention to
the effectiveness of discursive practices, their ability to not only produce
meaning, but also to signify in one way rather than in another and thus to
profoundly affect the way we perceive the world, others and ourselves. This
also affects our way of being in the world, to act (or not act). In other
words, he highlighted the performativity of discursive practices.
Performativity of Discursive Practices
The first researcher who drew attention to the performativity of language
is John Langshaw Austin through his general theory of speech acts. Accord-
ing to this American philosopher, speech acts are not simply a way to com-
municate something, but a way to do something. They actively deploy ef-
fects on reality and factuality. Austin identifies «three groups of things»
that are done by saying something. He calls the first one a locutionary act,
«which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain
sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to ‹meaning› in the
traditional sense.»64 He opposes traditional ways of conceiving the use of
2.5
63 Hall 2013b, 27.
64 Austin 1962, 108.
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language with two others, which he calls the performances of illocution and
perlocution. What distinguishes these two different dimensions of the use of
language from the former is that they produce effects or consequences,
that is, they have a force. By focusing on the force of discursive practices,
Austin introduces a completely new way of analyzing the use of language.
The interest is no longer directed (only) to the truth or falsity of linguistic
units, to their referential relation to the world and their function as «bear-
ers» of meaning, but rather to the conditions in which a speech act is suc-
cessful or unsuccessful or, in Austin’s terminology, «happy or unhappy», in
deploying some effects.65
One of the most typical examples of illocutionary force is a judge deliver-
ing a sentence, through which a man is condemned. The act of formulat-
ing the sentence corresponds to the act of condemning. The effect here is
somehow internal to the performance itself, because the latter deploys its
power at the same moment the formulation is expressed. The judge has
this power because of conventions, the institutionalized rules that deter-
mine him as actually holding this power. It is therefore a preexisting sys-
tem of conventions that stabilizes the authority of the agent and thus guar-
antees the success of the speech act. The perlocutionary force is instead de-
fined by Austin as the effect speech acts have on the audience, such as the
ability to persuade, to convince, to scare and so on. The force of a perlocu-
tionary act is external to the performance itself because it is related to the
reactions of the audience of the speech act. One of the most important dif-
ferences between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is that the former
are «bound up with effects», while the latter produce consequences «in the
sense of bringing out states of affairs in the ‹normal› way, i.e. changes in
the natural course of events.»66 The point here is that Austin’s illocutionary
acts (as well as locutionary acts) always follow conventions, while perlocu-
tionary acts «may always achieve their response or sequel by non-conven-
tional means.»67 In other words, the force of perlocutionary acts lies in
their ability to break with expectations, to be an exception to rules and
conventions. Another important difference between the two uses of lan-
guage stressed by Austin is that the effects of illocutionary acts are always
intentional, while perlocutionary acts may be unintentional.68 In fact, as
Austin argues, one or more intended effects can be achieved only when
65 Austin 1962, 132.
66 Austin 1962, 116–117.
67 Austin 1962, 118.
68 See Austin 1962, 106.
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there are conventions that guarantee the speech act has certain effects and
not others. This does not apply to perlocutionary acts, as we have seen: we
do not follow the tracks established by and through conventions.
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words was an influential work that de-
ployed itself with strong performative power. Jacques Derrida gave one of
the first direct critical responses to Austin’s theory of performativity in his
essay Signature Event Context, written in 1971. In this essay, Derrida coun-
ters Austin’s understanding of conventionality and intentionality on which
the distinction of perlocutionary and illocutionary acts is based. According
to the French philosopher, the root of the theory’s problem is that Austin
does not take into account the structure of locution before any illocutory
or perlocutory determination.69 For Austin the intentionality of the speak-
er is central to the accomplishment of the performative. This leads Austin
to focus on illocutionary acts, looking for what he calls «the pure perfor-
mative», namely a speech act that is realized by and through the presence
of an intentional agent.70 The presupposition is that «there is always some-
one who is delegated to speak or that performative discourse has to take the
form of discrete verbal enunciation.»71 The consequence of this is the fail-
ure to recognize (or at least the underestimation of) the performative pow-
er of language even in the absence of a speaking subject.
The second problem with Austin’s theory, which is intrinsically tied to
the first one, is his conception of conventionality. As Derrida observes, the
success of performative utterances does not depend only on the conven-
tionality constituting the pragmatic circumstances in which they occur, but
also in «a certain conventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the speech
act itself.»72 In fact, the condition for the function of such acts is a certain
«self-identity» of the language elements or units within them.73 Only if this
self-identity is guaranteed, are the speech acts recognizable; only if the
statement «I condemn you» makes sense for the speaker and the listener, is
it able to deploy an illocutionary force. Derrida’s argument that a certain
stability in the identity of language unities is a precondition of performa-
tivity because it allows recognition and identification should not be con-
fused with the idea that speech acts with identical language units are in
turn also identical. In fact, all concrete manifestations of language should
69 See Derrida 1988, 14.
70 Derrida 1988, 81 (see also 83–93).
71 Butler 2010, 150.
72 Derrida 1988, 15.
73 Derrida 1988, 10.
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be considered unique and unrepeatable events, even when they have the
same signs in the same sequential order. In order to explain this central
point, Derrida introduces the concepts of iterability or citationality:
We should first be clear on what constitutes the status of ‹occurrence›
or the eventhood of an event that entails in its allegedly present and
singular emergence the intervention of an utterance [énoncé] that in it-
self can be repetitive or citational in its structure, or rather […]: iter-
able. […] Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation
did not repeat a ‹coded› or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the
formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a
marriage were not identifiable in some way as a ‹citation›? […] there is
a relative specificity, as Austin says, a relative ‹purity› of performatives.
But this relative purity does not emerge in opposition to citationality or
iterability, but in opposition to other kinds of iteration within a gener-
al iterability.74
The introduction of the notion of iterability in the theory of performativi-
ty has two main consequences. First, it allows us to redefine conventionali-
ty as a condition for the success of speech acts, insofar as it now indicates
not only the pragmatic, extra-linguistic conventions surrounding speech
acts, but also the conventionality of language itself. In other words, a speech
act can be performative and exert effects only if it iterates pre-existent lan-
guage units that guarantee its recognizability. As Judith Butler observes, re-
calling the example of the judge: «the judge learns what to say, and must
speak in codified ways, which means that the codification and ritualization
of that discourse precedes and makes possible the subject who speaks.»75
This brings me directly to the second consequence: the de-potentiation
and relativization of the role of a conscious and intentional speaker as a
precondition for the functioning of a performative utterance. If successful
speech acts always iterate pre-existent language unities, pre-established for-
mulations, then we can imagine situations—and in this investigation we
will face many of them—in which language exerts a force without the im-
manent presence of an intentional speaker. To understand this, two opera-
tions are necessary: we must replace the concept of speech acts with discur-
sive practices, and we must highlight the mediality and materiality of those
practices. In other words, we must turn our attention to Michel Foucault’s
theory of discourse.
74 Derrida 1988, 17–18.
75 Butler 2010, 148.
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In Archeology of Knwoledge, written two years before Derrida’s aforemen-
tioned essay, Foucault discusses (although he does not explicitly mention
the American philosopher) Austin’s theory of performativity, in particular
its concept of the illocutionary act. He argues that
the speech act is not what took place just prior to the moment when
the statement was made (in the author’s thought or intentions); it is
not what might have happened, after the event itself, in its wake, and
the consequences that it gave rise to; it is what occurred by the very
fact that a statement was made, — and precisely this statement (and
not other) in specific circumstances. Presumably, therefore, one indi-
vidualization of statements refers to the same criteria as the location of
acts of formulation: each act is embodied in a statement and each
statement contains one of those acts. They exist through one another
in an exact reciprocal relationship.76
The main innovation compared to Austin’s lies in a focus on embodiment,
i.e. on the mediality and materiality of discursive practices. In fact, it is ex-
actly because of this shift from verbal enunciation in particular to all forms
of embodiment of language in general that I propose a strategic switch
from the concept of speech acts to that of discursive practices. The concept
of discursive practices does not only avoid the postulate of an intentional
speaking subject, implicit in the notion of speech, but also opens this re-
search field to an analysis of correlations between singular manifestations
of language: in other words, analyzing discursive practices as elements of a
discursive formation. This theoretical switch changes the way we conceive
and analyze performativity, since the effects of discursive practices cannot
be identified without taking into consideration their medial and material
manifestation: «Could one speak of a statement if a voice had not articulat-
ed it, if a surface did not bear its signs, if it had not become embodied in a
sense-perceptible element, and if it had not left some trace—if only for an
instant—in someone’s memory or in some space?»77 Materiality and medi-
ality are constitutive for the functioning of discursive practices because
they «must have a substance, a support, a place, and a date. And when the
requisites change, it too changes identity.»78 Thus, it is always in and be-
cause of a concrete, unique context of appearance that practices have a per-
formative force, that is, they are able to exert effects of power.
76 Foucault 1972, 83.
77 Foucault 1972, 100.
78 Foucault 1972, 101.
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Each practice should therefore be considered a unique, unrepeatable and
singular event. But if this is correct, we must solve an important problem:
how is it possible to analyze, as this investigation wants to, the efficacy of
martyrological representations in their different contexts of appearances?
In fact, if it is true that each discursive practice is unique and exerts a per-
formative force precisely because of its uniqueness, then it does not seem
possible to compare different martyrological representations in order to in-
dividuate a common function or an identical force. As we have seen, Derri-
da argues that what can be iterated are not concrete performances, the ab-
solute singularities of language events, but rather language unities (signs,
statements, etc.). Following this line of reasoning, he argues that it is the
iterability of language units that guarantees that language performances, in
their uniqueness and non-repeatability, have a performative force. Does
that mean that different discursive practices using identical language units
necessarily produce the same effects? Again, to solve this problem we must
turn to Foucault, who argues that the task is not to find a common identity
of different discursive practices but rather to identify certain regularities
within and between them, which can then be compared with other regu-
larities.79 Foucault distinguishes between the uniqueness of enunciations
and the repeatability of statements. It is worth quoting the central passages
on this topic:
The enunciation is an unrepeatable event; it has a situated and dated
uniqueness that is irreducible. Yet this uniqueness allows a number of
constants—grammatical, semantic, logical—by which one can, by neu-
tralizing the moment of enunciation and the coordinates that individ-
ualize it, recognize the general form of a sentence, a meaning, a propo-
sition. The time and place of the enunciation, and the material support
that it uses, then become, very largely at least, indifferent: and what
stands out is a form that is endlessly repeatable, and which may give
rise to the most dispersed enunciations. But the statement itself cannot
be reduced to this pure event of enunciation […] For a statement may
be the same, whether written on a sheet of paper or published in a
book; it may be the same spoken, printed on a poster, or reproduced
on a tape-recorder; on the other hand, when a novelist speaks a sen-
tence in daily life, then reproduces the same sentence in a manuscript
that he is writing, attributing it to one of his characters, or even allow-
ing it to be spoken by that anonymous voice that passes for that of the
79 See Foucault 1972, 143–144.
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author, one cannot say that it is the statement in each case. The rule of
materiality that statements necessarily obey is therefore of the order of
institution rather than of spatio-temporal localization; it defines possi-
bilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds and limits),
rather than limited and perishable individualities. […] Whereas an
enunciation may be begun again or re-evoked, and a (linguistic or logi-
cal) form may be reactualized, the statement may be repeated—but al-
ways in strict conditions.80
Following Foucault’s argumentation, we can say that a statement—for ex-
ample «Aldo Moro is a martyr»—can of course be repeated, but performa-
tivity depends on the mediality of signs or, in other words, the material em-
bodiment of language.81 There is a substantial difference between whether
the statement «Aldo Moro is a martyr» is pronounced by a government mi-
nister, a bishop, a journalist or a Fiat worker; and it is equally different if
this statement is expressed during dinner with friends, said by a character
in a movie, delivered during a commemoration broadcast on television,
written in a newspaper or painted on the walls of a train station. The
meaning of the statement may remain the same (as we will see, this is also
not always the case) but its performative force depends on the context of
apparition. The task of discourse analysis is, then, on the one hand, to ana-
lyze discursive practices in their different context of medial and material
manifestation, and on the other, to compare them in order to find regulari-
ties and variations.
Foucault uses a series of terms to address the issue of repeatable materiali-
ty: re-inscription, re-evocation, re-actualization, repetition. What is at stake
here can be circumscribed with this question: What are the conditions of
possibility of the transfer of signs from one context to another? Or, to refor-
mulate the question from the point of view of semio-pragmatics: What are
the characteristics that a sign should have in order to have more success to
be repeated, and relocated in a new pragmatic and hermeneutic context?
The question of repeatable materiality is related to the discussion of itera-
tion in Derrida’s writings as well as Charles Sanders Pierce’s type-token dis-
tinction.82 Both Foucault’s and Derrida’s discussion of the problem of rep-
etition/iteration is only understandable if one is willing to reject the idea
of the existence of an original type, from which all tokens would be de-
80 Foucault 1972, 101–105.
81 See Wirth 2002, 44.
82 See Wirth 2002, 47.
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rived.83 Both philosophers argue, though with different terminology, that
there is not something like an absent original sign, statement, representa-
tion or idea, which could be iterated and thus presented through discursive
practices and in different material and medial manifestations. Rather, dis-
cursive practices always iterate already existing signs and statements, that is,
signs and concepts that were embedded in previous historical discursive
practices. The basic thesis is that there is no transcendental source or origin
of language, but that any use of linguistic forms always refers to forms pre-
viously used (some of which are archived or memorialized in various types
of media). If one accepts the fundamental conception of the nature of lan-
guage, then it becomes possible to grasp the function of iteration through
and within discursive practices. The thesis is as follows: It is the custom-
creating iteration which increases the potential for further repetitions. The
more widespread the signs, statements, and representations, both syncreti-
cally and diachronically, the higher their chances of being reiterated in fur-
ther discursive practices increases. The analysis of martyrological represen-
tations as discursive practices that exert effects of power thus takes into ac-
count their materiality, exteriority and seriality (repetition). The success of
martyrological representations depends on their repetitive materialization
and medial manifestation in different discursive practices. Only in the mas-
sive spread of the martyr figure in public spaces can a stable and lasting
«system of knowledge» emerge, through which the efficacy of the discur-
sive practices is guaranteed.84
As previously mentioned, Foucault characterizes the effectiveness of dis-
cursive practices with reference to the correlation between knowledge and
power. Discourse analysis must detect the «connection between mechan-
isms of coercion and contents of knowledge»85 in order to understand
what allows contents of knowledge to constitute themselves as elements of
truth and thus deploy effects of power. For Foucault, this allows us to un-
derstand the conditions of acceptability of a system of knowledge. Discur-
sive practices exert effects on their recipients as well as on the acting sub-
jects themselves. They can have the power to influence the way we perceive
and experience others, things and events in the world as well as ourselves.
When social actors speak, write, photograph, perform (here in the sense of
bodily action) or film something—in short, when they make use of repre-
83 See Derrida 1988, 7.
84 Foucault 2007, 59.
85 Foucault 2007, 59.
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sentational systems86—they do not simply report on or describe things as
they are, but instead represent them in one way rather than another. In this
way, they are not only able to affect how we perceive and experience reality,
but also influence our imagination, our normative view of the world and,
subsequently, our actions. Referring to Louis Althusser, we can call this the
power of interpellation, namely, the ability to appeal to the receivers, con-
sumers and re-producers of discursive practices and demand from them
subjective positioning. Through the process of interpellation, individuals
are «recruited» and «transformed» into subjects.87 We can also define this
process as subjectification, referring to the process of constructing individ-
ual identity. This is not necessarily forced from outside, (it does not need
to be an instrument of power used consciously by others), but it is often
the result of self-allocation. The individual is able, through discursive
practices, to incite its own subjectification and build its own identity. In-
terpellations are not able to produce only subjects, but collective identities
as well. In fact, the subjectification process is almost always based on the
distinction of belonging/not belonging to a certain collectivity. The distinc-
tion can be based on a differentiation in gender, race, nationality, political
conviction and so on. Discursive practices then produce, in their receivers
as well as in their producers, an ideological response, which launches
mechanisms of subjective identification with a certain collectivity and de-
limitation from other forms of (existing or potential) collectivity. The con-
struction of subjectivities and collectivities can be considered a result of
discursive performances.
Judith Butler powerfully draws attention to the importance of performa-
tivity of discursive practices and, more generally, to the «reiterative power
of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains.»88
Butler’s research is important for this study because she links, adopting
Foucault’s thesis that the subject is always discursively constructed, the
question of the performativity of discursive practices with the question of
identification. By analyzing the process of «assuming a sex», she shows that
«sexed identifications» are constructed through the means of discursive
86 See Hall 2013a, xvii.
87 See Althusser 2014, 188–194. In line with Foucault’s thought, we can understand
the interpellation by discursive practices not as an instrument of power used ex-
clusively by the state apparatuses or the ruling class (as theorized by Althusser),
but rather as a form of micro-physics of power, through which «docile subjectivi-
ties» are routinely produced. For more details in this regard, see Hanssen 2000,
97–157.
88 Butler 1993, 2.
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practices, which are regulated by the heterosexual imperative. Through the
iteration of pre-existent and regulated discursive practices, individuals as-
sume a specific identity over another. Stuart Hall argues that this concerns
not only «sexed identifications», but all forms of social and political identi-
fication, and stresses the role played by the exclusion of what we could call
counter-identities, which within discourses are represented as abnormal or
abject: «all identities operate through exclusion, through the discursive
construction of a constitutive outside and the production of abjected and
marginalized subjects.»89 Furthermore, Hall highlights the intrinsic link
between identificatory practices and the double-sided character of discur-
sive subjection/subjectification. Discourse does not only construct certain
subjectivities, (figures that are always specific to a specific discursive
regime and a specific historical time), but also provides subject positions
for identification. Individuals, as they cannot live and act outside certain
given discursive formations, cannot assume an identity until they identify
with those positions or figures constructed and sustained by means of dis-
cursive practices.
I argue that martyrological representations of Aldo Moro have the power
to appeal to people and to produce identification with the republican na-
tion-state. Through the consumption (and reproduction) of martyrological
representations, individuals experience themselves as part of a political col-
lective, which is (constantly) threatened by those who are outside, who are
external to it. The state martyr figure is part of an ideological structure,
whose main function is to construct a «good, normal and sane» inside and
a «bad, abnormal and dangerous» outside. A fundamental point is that this
twofold mechanism of identification is connected with the construction of
a regime of truth. The political community and its dangerous outside are
experienced as absolute, ahistorical entities. The assassination of Aldo Mo-
ro becomes a sort of hypostatized event that symbolizes a cosmic war be-
tween good and evil forces, between the nation state and its enemies.
This last point cannot be fully understood without taking into account
what I call a mythical narrative of the nation state, where «myth» indicates
an «absolutism of reality» (Absolutismus der Wirklichkeit).90 As a form of ab-
solutism, the myth is a narrative that conceals precisely that it is a narra-
tive, namely that it is only one way, among many ways, to represent and
cognitively organize reality. One of the tasks of this investigation is to de-
construct this narrative, focusing peculiarly on its effects of power. Fou-
89 Hall 1996, 15.
90 Blumenberg 2014a, 10.
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cault stresses the intrinsic relationship between power and concealment
strategies, arguing that «power is tolerable only on the condition that it
masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to
hide its own mechanisms. Would power be accepted if it were entirely cyn-
ical? For it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to its
operation.»91 The task is then to unmask the instrumental, and conse-
quently ideological dimension of the martyrological representation of Al-
do Moro, along with its central role in the construction, acceptability and
maintenance of nation state mythology, which functions to legitimate es-
tablished power structures. In short, I consider the martyr to be the funda-
mental rhetorical figure in the modern mythical narrative of the nation
state.
To summarize thus far, the discourse analytical approach to the martyro-
logical representations of Aldo Moro and their performativity takes into ac-
count the following different aspects. Firstly, the martyr figure could not
be performative and deploy effects of power if people did not recognize it,
that is, if the martyrological representation of Aldo Moro had not preceded
historically by other martyrological representations. It is because martyro-
logical representations iterate and implicitly refer to previous historical,
successful figurations—that the figure can successfully operate in its new
pragmatic and hermeneutic context of appearance. The consideration of
this aspect falls under the domain of the analysis of the martyr figure’s sig-
natures. Its task is to detect the «secret index» and the historical stratifica-
tions of the figure, as well as to «attempt to restore the conditions for the
appearance of a singularity born out of multiple determining elements of
which it is not the product, but rather the effect.»92 Secondly, discourse
analysis describes the new pragmatic and hermeneutic context in which
the martyr figure appears. Only by considering the particular social, cultur-
al, mediatic, political and economic context of the event and its representa-
tions is it possible to identify and understand the peculiarity and unique-
ness of the connotative and symbolical significance that the figure of the
martyr takes on. Thirdly, the discourse analytical approach scrutinizes each
martyrological representation in its temporal, medial and material context
of appearance. In a following step, all martyrological representations of Al-
do Moro are compared and placed in relation to each other in order to
show their seriality and diffusion in public spaces and within different me-
91 Foucault 1978, 86.
92 Foucault 2007, 64.
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dia. This allows regularities and exceptions in the discursive formation to
emerge.
The consideration of these last two aspects falls under the domain of the
archeology of discourse. Archeology analyzes the processes of the shortage,
regrouping and unification of the discursive formation. It seeks to describe
the rhetorical organization and distribution of discursive practices and
then identify which rules, criteria of selection, control, organization and
canalization regulate their appearance. Starting from the positivity of the
concrete representations of the killing of Aldo Moro, archeological analysis
individuates the system of acceptability that makes a certain way of repre-
senting the event more acceptable than others. The efficacy and acceptance
of representations within a discursive formation is proportional to the
amount of their serial iteration. The main questions here will be: How do
representations interact; how do they appear in the public space; and what
mechanisms of selection, control, organization and canalization regulate
their appearance?
Unity of the Discursive Formation and Methodological Framework
What are the characteristics of the discursive formation that this study
seeks to examine? What are the grouping and unification principles that
enable us to describe and analyze this discursive formation? More concrete-
ly, how can we unify and define the discursive formation that refers to the
events of political violence, which is the starting point of this study—the
kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro? According to Foucault, the term
«discourse» indicates first of all the «totality of all effective statements»93,
namely all spoken and written discursive events. At this level, one can
speak of discourse in the singular. The strategic function of this first defini-
tion is twofold. On the one hand, it makes explicit the difference between
discourse analysis and the analysis of language. Language is a «system for
possible statements […] that authorizes an infinite number of perfor-
mances», while the field of discursive events is a «grouping that is always
finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic sequences that have
been formulated.»94 On the other hand, it serves to distance itself from
other forms of unification of knowledge (books, oeuvres, science, etc.) in
order to make it possible to describe and analyze other unities.
2.6
93 Foucault 1972, 27.
94 Foucault 1972, 27.
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The positivity of all discursive practices forms what Foucault calls the
archive, that is, the «system of formation and transformation of statements»
or, recalling Hall’s operationalization of Foucault’s discourse theory for
cultural studies, the system of formation and transformation of representations.
This archive is not simply, at least not only, a collection of all that has been
said, written, or, more generally, represented in a certain culture or society,
but also what «defines at the outset the system of […] enunciability» as
well as the «system of […] functioning» or «mode of occurrence» of repre-
sentations.95 In other words, the archive is not only an ensemble of memo-
ries, and past discursive and cultural practices, but also determines the
horizons of what and how something can be represented, as well as the
modes in which representations can occur in the public space. The archive
thus not only contains all the discursive practices that can be iterated and
recontextualized, but also determines the rules and modes of iteration and
recontextualization themselves.
As Foucault highlights, «it is obvious that the archive of society, a cul-
ture, or a civilization cannot be described exhaustively; or even, no doubt,
the archive of a whole period.»96 For this reason each archeological analysis
has to identify and determine how to group discursive practices within a
certain discursive formation. Since Foucault wrote Archeology of Knowledge,
many different proposals on how to group discursive practices within a sin-
gle discursive formation have emerged in scholarship.97 Foucault himself
indicates four systems of formation, which concern a) the objects, b) the
enunciative modalities, c) the concepts and d) the strategies of discursive
formation. These systems of formations, Foucault argues,
must not be taken as blocks of immobility, static forms that are im-
posed on discourse from the outside […]. By system of formation […]
I mean a complex group of relations that function as a rule: it lays
down what must be related, in a particular discursive practice, for such
and such an enunciation to be made, for such and such a concept to be
used, for such and such a strategy to be organized. To define a system
of formation in its specific individuality is therefore to characterize a
discourse or a group of statements by the regularity of a practice.98
95 Foucault 1972, 129–130.
96 Foucault 1972, 130.
97 See Diaz-Bone 1999; Keller 2011; Jäger 2004; Hjelm 2011; Landwehr 2008.
98 Foucault 1972, 73–74.
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This means that every discourse analytical study must be designed individ-
ually, because each field of discursive practices has its own rules of forma-
tion. Within this study, the virtual corpus of sources of this search includes
the totality of all the discursive practices in which, in one way or another,
the kidnapping, imprisonment, and assassination of Aldo Moro are repre-
sented. From this point of view, violence itself is considered the extra-dis-
cursive object/event, or the referent of the group of discursive practices that
this study wants to analyze. I call this a virtual corpus, because the amount
of media referring to the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro is
enormous and it is therefore practically impossible to analyze them all in a
single inquiry. For this reason, we need principles of selection that allow us
to establish and define a concrete corpus.99 In an enquiry that examines his-
torical discursive formations, it is important that the selected media and
representations are numerous and distributed over a sufficiently long peri-
od of time. In this study, the time frame is almost four decades: from 1978
to the present.
The first principle of selection concerns the enunciative modalities of dis-
cursive formation. The focus lies here on all the discursive practices in
which the events of violence are inscribed in a narrative, that is, the event is
emplotted. In other words, this study addresses discursive and cultural
practices configuring events, agents and objects as part of a larger whole, in
which each part takes a place in the network that constitutes the narrative
response to why, how, who, where, and when. The main features of the
enunciation modes in which I am interested are: the presence of a teleolog-
ical representation of the event indicating the causes, reasons, motives and
goals that have determined what happened; the presence of opinions and
moral judgments about the main perpetrators (the «guilty people») and
the main victims (the «innocent people»); and the frequent use of rhetori-
cal patterns and figures. The second principle of selection concerns the lan-
guage forms used in the discursive practices. The focus here is on the use of
language units (blood, martyr, witness, sacrifice, innocence, torture, accu-
sation, guilt, etc.) and rhetorical patterns («He died so that the Republic
lives»; «Moro’s Passion view from the Pope»; etc.) which implicitly or ex-
plicitly recall and refer to the figure of the martyr. These language units
and rhetorical patterns are found mainly in sources in which a historical,
moral and/or political judgment of the events is inscribed into a narrative
plot. The third principle of selection concerns the strategies within discur-
sive formation. I understand «strategy» as a threshold concept that allows
99 See Landwehr 2008, 103.
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the correlation of Foucault’s project of an archeological and genealogical
analysis with his works on the constellation power/knowledge. In fact, in a
famous lecture entitled Qu’est ce que la critique?, held in 1978 at the Sor-
bonne for the Société Française de Philosophie, Foucault prescribed three sets
of methodological tools required to master the task of investigating the
«conditions of acceptability» that produced power/knowledge «events»: the
already known archeology and genealogy, to which he added the analysis
of strategies.100 Archeology is described here as an analytical procedure
that focalizes on the system of acceptability, while genealogy serves to dis-
card the conventional monocausal model of derivation in favor of multiple
«descendants» and investigate «conditions of apparition» that allow multi-
ply determined historical singularities to be consolidated. Then he added a
third tool, the analysis of strategies, which surveys the plurality of effects
produced by a perpetually mobile, contentious agonistic field of struggles.
In this and other lectures,101 Foucault redefined discourse, that is, discur-
sive formations, as strategic force fields of ever-contending discursive
acts.102
Given this redefinition, this study takes into account sources in which
there are discursive practices in competition with other discursive
practices. The dimension of struggle between different representations of
the event of violence is both a selection and an analytical criterion. By fo-
cusing on the agonistic element within discursive practices, it becomes
possible to analyze and compare their effects on the whole discursive for-
mation. The central task of analyzing strategies is to show that in the strug-
gle between discursive practices, between ways of representing the event of
violence, some have more success than others, thus becoming the models
for further representations. This therefore serves to bring out a regularity
that produces a hegemonic model of representation, as well as to individu-
ate alternative, anti-hegemonic representations.
The concrete corpus of sources analyzed in this investigation includes a
wide range of media and modes of representation. The examination of dif-
ferent media and modes is a methodological challenge: different semiotic
forms characterize the modes, while media have their own mechanisms of
production and specific strategies of mediation.103 Discourse analysis is a
100 See Foucault 2007, 41–81.
101 See especially Discourse on Language and the lectures held at the Collège de France
in 1975–1976: Foucault 1972, 215–238; Foucault 2003.
102 See Hanssen 2000, 97.
103 See Kress/van Leeuwen 2001, 24–44.
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theoretical and methodological framework, which makes it possible for us
to compare different modes of representation with regard to their appear-
ance and interaction in the public space. Different media «employ» discur-
sive practices, and at the same time are also elements of the infrastructure
that organizes, controls and selects discursive practices into an ordered sys-
tem of knowledge and representation.
The primary sources analyzed in this study are articles published in sev-
en Italian newspapers: Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa, L’Unità,
Il Popolo, Avanti! and Lotta Continua. The first three were and still are the
newspapers with the highest national circulation (except for the sports in-
formation newspaper Gazzetta dello Sport, which today is ranked third, fol-
lowed in fourth place by La Stampa).104 Since this study aims to analyze the
use and performativity of martyrological rhetoric on a national scale, these
newspapers are of great interest. L’Unità, Il Popolo and Avanti! were official
organs of the three major parliamentary parties—the Italian Communist
Party (PCI), the Christian Democracy (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party
(PSI)—during the Moro affair and until the beginning of the nineties,
while Lotta Continua was the newspaper of far left extra-parliamentary or-
ganization of the same name. These last four newspapers are an important
source for understanding the relationship between ideologies and political
positions, discursive strategies and the representation of the events. Al-
though I examined the articles published in these newspapers throughout
the year 1978, I place my focus on newspaper articles published in the peri-
od ranging from March 16, the day of the kidnapping, to May 14, the day
after Aldo Moro’s public funeral. The results of my analysis of the newspa-
pers published in this time frame are presented in the fifth and sixth chap-
ters. The seventh chapter addresses and analyses different media produc-
tions in a much broader time frame, namely from 1979 to 2016. Here the
focus lies on the different practices of memorialization within different
media. As mentioned in the introduction, here the analysis focuses on
memorialization and commemoration of Aldo Moro, the representation of
the events of political violence in literature and cinema, and finally on the
debate emerging in the Italian press in response to the launch of an initia-
tive promoting the beginning of a process for the beatification and canon-
ization of Aldo Moro by the Catholic Church.
The sources have different semiotic modes (images, written and spoken
words, images-in-motion, etc.) within different media (newspapers, maga-
104 See http://www.adsnotizie.it/_dati_ante98.asp (accessed May 6, 2016); http://ww
w.adsnotizie.it/_dati_DMS.asp (accessed May 6, 2016).
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zines, television, movies, books, records, etc.). My discourse analysis must
simultaneously take into account the specificity of individual sources and
create an interpretive space in which these can be compared and placed in
relation to each other. In view of this dual task, my methodological process
is divided into four steps: context analysis (contextual framework), macro-
analysis, micro-analysis, and analysis of the discursive formation. This ap-
proach combines the methodological tools of historical discourse analy-
sis105, critical discourse analysis106 and multimodal discourse analysis107.
Context analysis distinguishes between four levels: each discursive prac-
tice—each representation—stands in a situational, medial, institutional
and historical context.108 Firstly, on the level of contextual analysis, this in-
vestigation must clarify the position (the situation) in which the particular
discursive practice occurs, that is, who does what at what time? Further-
more, the occasion on which the discursive practice occurs (Easter Day, the
funeral of Aldo Moro, the annual anniversary of the event, among others)
must not be neglected. The same applies to the media (party newspapers,
monuments, etc.) and the type of document in which the discursive prac-
tice occurs (editorial, novel, documentary, etc.). The institutional context
must consider the institutional setting under which the document
emerged. This is particularly important with regard to the citation or pub-
lication of government documents or procedural acts, press releases, party
statements, etc. Finally, the entire historical context must be considered,
that is, the overall political, social, economic and cultural situation.
Macro-analysis examines the general structure and surface of media rep-
resentation. As regards textual sources, in this study the following aspects
will be taken into consideration: material texture, formal/graphic design
(photos, drawings, headings, inscriptions, etc.), the disposition in individu-
al sections, emplotment, the way the author/speaker may stand in the doc-
ument, the principles of representation or mediation strategies, and the
presence of key topics and subtopics. As regards audiovisual sources,
macro-analysis follows the methodology of cinematic diegesis and must
consider the following aspects: figures and characters (types, roles, situa-
tions, conflicts, action structures), spaces (the function of space within the
narrative, connections/breaks between space and action) and the narrative
105 See Landwehr 2008.
106 See Jäger 2004.
107 See Kress/van Leeuwen 2001.
108 See Landwehr 2008, 107; Jäger 2004, 176.
2.6 Unity of the Discursive Formation and Methodological Framework
87
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
perspective (the relation between characters, space, time, audience pos-
ition, connections/breaks between different narrative perspectives).109
The micro-analysis of textual sources focuses on argumentation, rhetoric
and style, which is found on the text level, sentence level, and word lev-
el.110 On the text level special consideration is given to patterns of argu-
mentation, rhetoric structure and the acting causalities, hierarchies and cat-
egorizations. The analysis of the sentence level is concerned with the ar-
rangement of main and subordinate clauses, the sentence types and the
rhetorical figures (metaphors, prefigurations, etc.) that are used. On the
word level, the denotative or connotative uses of words are determined.
The micro-analysis of audiovisual media examines the «aesthetic of the sur-
face», which encompasses the following aspects: image composition/design
(framing, image composition, camera setting, camera perspective, light,
color), montage (cutting style, rhythm), and the auditory level (origin of
sounds, noise, music, language).111
The method of analyzing the audiovisual sources adopted here also uses
the categories of socio-semiotic multimodal discourse analysis. These cat-
egories are not limited to linguistic texts, but are applicable to all semiotic
systems, and are therefore pan-semiotic. Language and visual communica-
tion realize the same far-reaching and comprehensive systems of meaning,
but have their own means, forms and restrictions in expressing them inde-
pendently. From the basic assumption of the multimodality of communi-
cation results the concept of multimodal texts. These texts consist of differ-
ent semiotic modes, such as music, speech, intonation, image, physical ex-
pression, etc. This study considers its audiovisual sources to be multimodal
texts.
The three methodological steps just presented relate to the analysis of
different media—the discursive practices embodied in the media—in their
singularity. The fourth methodological step focalizes on regularities and ex-
ceptions within the whole discursive formation. It strives to identify recur-
rent and deviating words, motifs, rhetorical figures, images, themes, etc. as
well as the central and most influential social actors. The aim here is pri-
marily a matter of reconstructing and describing the complex interrela-
tions between structure and action, and between discursive formation and
discursive practices. Ultimately, in the analysis of practices as well as of the
109 See Bienk 2008.
110 See Landwehr 2008, 118–134.
111 See Bienk 2008.
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entire discursive formation, the main question relates to the «establish-
ment of a legitimate worldview.»112
112 See Landwehr 2008, 128.
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Signatures of the Martyr Figure
The Martyr Figure as a Counterpart of the Sovereign
The figure of the martyr has been investigated from many points of view
through different theoretical and methodological models. In recent years,
it has been the subject of research in various academic disciplines. Since
the attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, greater attention
has been paid especially to the ideologies of martyrdom in Islamic culture
and society.1 Beyond terrorist attacks, other contemporary social phenome-
na also contributed to the proliferation of studies and research on the top-
ic, such as self-immolation and other forms of physical destruction or in-
jury during the Arab Spring and the Arab–Israeli conflict.2 All these events
have re-drawn attention to the phenomena and contexts of political vio-
lence.
Studies on martyrdom are heterogeneous.3 Both general and specific his-
torical studies exist: for example, Paul Middleton describes the general de-
velopment of martyrdom, as a concept and as a social phenomenon in
Christianity, Islam and Judaism, while other studies focalize on the role
and function of the martyr figure in specific historical contexts.4 Moreover,
in recent years many anthologies were published which examine martyr-
dom as a cultural phenomenon in relation to, among others, visual art,
film, theater, poetry and prose.5 Other researchers specifically focus on the
issue of martyrdom as a «religious–political challenge».6
Although a plurality of interests, questions, and hypotheses exists, one
can distinguish between essentialist and constructivist approaches to the
martyr figure. The essentialist position attempts to define the «being and
essence of the martyr», which is obviously highly problematic, since, by
distinguishing true (and good) martyrs from false (and bad) martyrs, it can
3
3.1
1 See Gambetta 2005; Pedazhur 2006; Kepel 2015; Ali/Post 2008; Juergensmeyer
2008.
2 See Khalili 2007; Allen 2006; Allen 2009; Fierke 2013.
3 Key works on martyrdom include Bowersock 2002; Boyarin 1999; Castelli 2004;
Wicker 2006; Cook 2007; Middleton 2011; Mitchell 2013.
4 See Middleton 2011; Hung 2008; McWilliam 1995; Spiegeleer 2014.
5 See Krass 2008; Horsch 2011; Pannewick 2004; Weigel 2007a.
6 Niewiadomski 2011.
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and often is used by certain individuals or social groups to deny the martyr
role and status to other individuals or social groups. Those who want to
prevent the martyr figure from being «exploited» by others, always advo-
cate the essentialist and normative approach. Those who choose the essen-
tialist perspective often decide on the basis of ethical, religious and/or po-
litical convictions. The essentialist approach has its historical roots in
Christian theology, which since its beginnings has sought to establish crite-
ria in order to determine the essence of martyrdom.7 But the essentialist
perspective does not only belong to the Christian theologies of past ages.
The essentialist definition can also be found in contemporary debates and
writings about phenomena of political violence. As Sigrid Weigel notes,
the discrepancy between the European conceptions of martyrs, which
have their origin in Christian history, and television pictures from the
international battlefields, with scenarios of Shi’ite or Sunni worship-
ing martyrs, often triggers a discussion as to whether the suicide
bombers […] are ‹true martyrs›. […] The criteria for who is recognized
as a martyr are always formulated from the perspective of a certain con-
fession.8
Today, this approach is often criticized in academic writings as a form of
dangerous cultural essentialism.9 In fact, one of the main characteristics of
the new academic orientation in dealing with the topic of political vio-
lence and the figure of the martyr is the transition from an essentialist to a
constructivist approach. Where the essentialist approach tends to involve a
fixed definition of martyrdom—based on the definition, an event is then
determined to be an act of martyrdom or not—, the constructivist ap-
proach instead analyzes the social and cultural production of the figure of
the martyr and the self-allocation of the martyr role. The fundamental
question asked in current research on martyrdom is therefore: How and for
what purpose are martyrs «made»? However, despite the criticism of essen-
tialist approaches and although the issue is discussed in different ways and
from different perspectives, many researchers support the thesis that the
emergence of martyr figures and the allocation of martyr roles have a polit-
7 Clement of Alexandria, who condemns «voluntary martyrdom» as a form of «self-
killing», was the first to distinguish between «true» and «false» martyrdom; in this
regard see Middleton 2014, 123.
8 Weigel 2007, 16.
9 See Weigel 2007b, 16–19; Krass/Frank 2008, 8; Middleton 2011, 1–30.
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ical function.10 What does this political function consist of? Why does the
figure of the martyr always, or at least so often, emerge in relation to con-
texts of political struggle?
In the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Religion, Samuel Klausner
defines martyrdom as an act of self-sacrifice, which «imbues economic and
political conflict with sacred meaning« and «aims to reduce political au-
thority to ineffectiveness by challenging the sacred basis of the legitimacy
of the adversary’s authority. […] The martyr […] is a sacred symbol of an
authority around which the society rallies.»11 Although Klausner does not
express it explicitly, at the roots of this view there is undoubtedly the idea,
exposed by Hubert and Mauss, that sacrifice is a sacrum facere, a ritual prac-
tice that consecrates the sacrificial victim.12 Through sacrifice, the victim
passes from the realm of the profane to the realm of the sacred (in
Durkheim’s sense of the terms). Martyrdom, as an act of self-sacrifice, con-
secrates both the victim and the political authority of the social group to
which the victim belongs. The self-sacrifice of the victims of political vio-
lence legitimizes a new political order.
Another important issue in current research on the martyr figure is the
distinction, which plays a decisive role in the mimetic theory of René Gi-
rard, between the sacrifice of the scapegoat and the self-sacrifice of the mar-
tyr. According to Girard, at the core of sacrifice there is substitution, that
is, fury felt toward one party is redirected toward a surrogate scapegoat,
who was chosen only because of his or her vulnerability and dispensabili-
ty.13 The sacrificial object is thus an innocent who pays the debt of a guilty
party. From this point of view, sacrifice is a ritual practice through which a
community is reconciled to itself by the extermination of a victim. By con-
trast, Girard describes (Christian) martyrdom as the annulment of the «vi-
olent sacred», because of its recognition of the victim’s innocence.14 Maria
Grazia Recupero dedicates an extensive anthropological–philosophical
work to martyrdom, in which the Girardian conceptualization of martyr-
dom is well summarized. The general thesis is that in the historical transi-
tion from archaic myths to the mythical–ritual structure of Christianity,
disclosure of the sacrificial mechanism occurred, through which sacrifice
assumed a political function. The strength of the archaic myth—in which
10 See Weigel 2007b, 13–15; Fierke 2013; Krass/Frank 2008, 7–21; Recupero 2011.
11 Klausner 2005, 5738.
12 See Hubert/Mauss 1964.
13 See Girard 1979.
14 See Kirwan 2009, 921.
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the sacrifice of the scapegoat is able to end a social crisis —is its ability to
«hide» the victim. Martyrdom, in contrast, showcases the innocence of the
victim and thus the arbitrariness of sacrifice. In other words, the archaic
sacrifice legitimates the status quo, whereas the Christian anti-sacrifice
constitutes and legitimates the future community.15
Karin Fierke, a researcher in international relations, also supports the ar-
gument that the martyr figure delegitimizes the status quo and legitimates
new forms of political community. She describes sacrifice as a «form of
life» or a practice which is visible across cultures yet is embedded in differ-
ent systems of meaning.16 Unlike Girard and Recupero, she argues that
self-sacrifice, rather than being a substitution, «is an act of speech in which
the suffering body communicates the injustice experienced by a commu-
nity to a larger audience.»17 Since the sacrifice of the material body is an
act that communicates without words, it must be understood as an inver-
sion of the speech act, that is, the illocutionary act, which has a certain
force in the act of saying. By contrast, she considers self-sacrifice as a per-
locutionary act because it produces effects in the feelings, thoughts or ac-
tions of the audience. She criticizes Girard’s argument because it is based
on the distinction between pre-modern practices of sacrifice and their
elimination in modernity, while contemporary self-sacrifice is a political
weapon, which crosses the boundaries between the two:
On the one hand, the frameworks for attributing meaning to the act
are […] at least in part religious, but also refer to international laws re-
lating to human rights. On the other hand, the use of self-sacrifice as a
political weapon has been facilitated by the development of a global,
and particularly a visual, media. […] In this respect, acts of political
self-sacrifice are situated across three different ways of organizing life:
the pre-modem religious; the rationalized modern state, which is part
of the international system; and the globalizing postmodern culture of
the media. Against this background, political self-sacrifice may play a
role in bringing alternative forms of community into being.18
From this point of view, she argues that political self-sacrifice in modernity
does not involve the substitution of a marginalized victim, by which exist-
ing power structures are reinforced and legitimized, but rather communi-
15 See Recupero 2010, 20.
16 Fierke 2013, 33.
17 Fierke 2013, 37.
18 Fierke 2013, 38.
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cates a political message on behalf of a marginalized community, potential-
ly contributing to its regeneration.19 On the basis of four examples from
the period after World War II, she argues that an injured or dead body can
function as a medium of an experienced injustice.20 Fierke compares the
functioning of the act of self-sacrifice within modern and contemporary
societies with «traditional» ritual action, which transforms the profane into
the sacred.21 She indicates formality, traditionalism, invariance, and shared
features with theatrical performance as main characteristics of successful
ritual actions.22 She quotes Chaterine Bell, who states that «ritualization is
the way to construct power relations when the power is claimed to be from
God, not from military might or economic superiority.»23 Self-sacrifice, she
argues, is a sacralizing act that transfers the divine qualities of the sacrificed
victim to the marginalized community. According to this view, the martyr
is the person who, sacrificing himself for the sake of an oppressed commu-
nity, makes the injustice and arbitrariness of violence exercised by those
who hold political authority visible on his or her body and, at the same
time, sacralizes the marginalized community. Fierke refers explicitly to
Giorgio Agamben’s conceptualization of «bare life»:
The visualization of ‹bare life› in images of the body is a central ele-
ment of the emotional impact […]. The observer is faced with ‹bare
life›, stripped of its social meaning, standing alone and facing his or
her own mortality […] The sight of the suffering body represents a
confrontation with ‹bare life› that is followed by a struggle to inscribe
it with meaning, which is spectacularized by the visual nature of the
performance.24
Thus, the visualization of bare life not only delegitimizes dominant power
structures, but also potentially legitimizes alternative forms of community.
According to Fierke, the transformative power of self-sacrifice lies in the re-
constitution of the boundaries surrounding the individual body that is sac-
rificed and a larger «body politic»:
19 Fierke 2013, 54.
20 The hunger strikes of 1980–1981 in Northern Ireland; the martyrdom of the Pol-
ish Roman Catholic priest Popieluszko in 1984; the self-immolation of Buddhist
monks in Vietnam in the early sixties; self-sacrifice in the Middle East.
21 Fierke 2013, 44.
22 Fierke 2013, 40–44.
23 Bell 2009, 116.
24 Fierke 2013, 79, 101–102.
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The agent of political self-sacrifice, often referred to as a martyr, be-
comes the embodiment of the suffering nation. If Hobbes’ Leviathan
[…] is the symbol of the authoritarian sovereign, who embodies the
people, the martyr is the embodiment of the nation, which seeks to
transcend its humiliation through a restoration of dignity and
sovereignty. The two images, Leviathan and the martyr, are not mutu-
ally exclusive in a situation of this kind but are, rather, the site of con-
testation and a struggle for recognition.25
In fact, the main goal of her study is to contrast the image of the
Leviathan, in which the body of the biblical monster contains the peoples
of the state, with the image of the martyr as the symbol of resisting people
when the state violates its commitment to protect. Finally, she argues, «self-
sacrifice is a performance of speech in a context in which speech has been
silenced. It expresses a desire to have a voice.»26
Interestingly, we find a very similar theoretical model in Sigrid Weigel’s
studies on the martyr figure.27 She assumes that in the violent death of the
martyr, life is reduced to its purely fleshly dimension (unsurprisingly, she
too refers to the concept of «bare life»), and that precisely this reduction
leads to the sacralization of the dead body. Death acquires a metaphysical
sense and gains the status of a profession of faith. The body itself becomes
a witness of truth. The martyr is the paradigmatic figure of one who, even
in death, remains steadfast in his or her faith. In reference to Carl Schmitt,
Weigel sees the martyr as a dialectical negation of the sovereign. For those
who are brutalized by the sovereign power and who live in submission,
opting for martyrdom represents the ability to act «sovereignly». If the
sovereign is defined as the one who decides on the state of exception, who
has power over «bare life», the martyr is the one who decides in the state of
exception.28 Weigel also observes a return of the figure of the martyr in sec-
ularized societies and considers it an ideal medium for ritual reproduction.
Through photography, film and the Internet the reproducibility of marty-
rological representation has increased exponentially.29 Weigel describes
martyrs as «media of ritual reproducibility»: images, narratives and rituals
contribute to the spread of the martyr figure, which serves as a model for
imitation. The perfect interplay between the martyr figure and the most
25 Fierke 2013, 53.
26 Fierke 2013, 247.
27 See Weigel 2006; Weigel 2007b.
28 See Weigel 2007b, 12.
29 See Weigel 2007b, 21.
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advanced media technology, she argues, can only be understood by analyz-
ing the structure of the martyr’s «performative, ritual reproducibility».30
Furthermore, the compatibility of global media technology with religious
symbols and cults is guaranteed by images: in the era of the digital repro-
ducibility of images, the dynamics of ritually re-produced martyr figures
are accelerated and amplified.31
This means that to fully understand the performativity of the martyr fig-
ure, it is not enough to analyze martyrdom as a performance of the body,
in the sense of self-sacrifice as an act of speech, but also the performativity
of discursive practices and the manifestation and materialization of these
practices in the public space. Here too, Weigel and Fierke seem to follow a
similar interpretive path. In fact, the latter explicitly states that the sacrifi-
cial act alone is not sufficient to produce the delegitimization of the politi-
cal authority in charge. The act itself can be described and represented not
only as a form of martyrdom, but also as a suicide (or murder-suicide in
the case of suicide bombings). This depends on the attribution of mean-
ing, that is, how the act is represented. Based on her empirical study,
Fierke identifies a formal constant in the dynamics between the act and its
linguistic representation. In all four cases she analyzes, the community to
which the agent of self-sacrifice belongs, tends to politicize and sacralize
the act by representing it martyrologically. Conversely, the social actors
who recognize the sovereign power in force tend to depoliticize the act by
representing it as a suicide or murder-suicide. Referring to Wittgenstein,
Fierke proposes a distinction between two language games:
The first language game of martyrdom provides a structure of rules
within which the resistance gives meanings to acts of political self-sac-
rifice. The martyr is a witness to injustice, which refers to the humilia-
tion of a population vis-à-vis what is defined as an occupying power, as
distinguished from the historical but oppressed community that the
resistance seeks to restore. This draws on a larger international dis-
course on human rights, which prohibits humiliation and highlights
the dignity of all people. […] The second language game expresses the
meaning structure employed by state authorities, which depoliticizes,
by identifying the actor as a criminal or terrorist, whose death may be
attributed to ‹suicide›. The naming of the criminal or terrorist is part of
a securitizing move that identifies an existential threat to the state,
30 Weigel 2007b, 20.
31 See Weigel 2007b, 21.
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which links to a larger international discourse of sovereignty and justi-
fies the punishment or elimination of this extremist element.32
According to Fierke, there are thus two different language games that oper-
ate on the basis of two competing discourses—the discourse of sovereignty
and the discourse on human rights—which refer to the same event. The act
of political self-sacrifice is, from this point of view, the site of a discursive
contestation.
We have thus reached the heart of this study: the role of language and
discourse in the construction and contestation of martyr figures. Let us at-
tempt to summarize the aforementioned considerations. Firstly, as pointed
out by Fierke, the act of self-sacrifice alone is not enough to make a martyr.
A martyr must be represented and then become socially recognized as a
martyr. In other words, in order for someone to be able to emerge as a
martyr figure, it is not sufficient for an audience to witness the martyr’s
violent death; someone must represent the event of violence as a form of
martyrdom. From this point of view, we can define martyrological repre-
sentations as perlocutionary discursive practices through which the victim
referred to is sacralized and its sacredness transferred to the oppressed com-
munity. Second, as suggested by Weigel, the consolidation and diffusion of
martyr figures is directly proportional to the amount and serial production
of martyrological representations. The reproduction of the figure in the
media increases its performativity. This means that to understand martyr-
dom it is not enough to analyze it as an act of bodily self-sacrifice; it is also
necessary to analyze the serial representation of an event of violence as an act
of martyrdom. The focus thus moves from the attitudes and subjective in-
tentions of social actors to the mechanisms of production and reproduc-
tion of martyr figurations.
But there is an element that Fierke’s and Weigel’s theoretical models
seem unable to integrate and explain: the emergence of the state martyr
figure. Both understand the martyr figure as a counterpart of the
sovereign, since they focus on martyrs from communities without political
legitimation or, more precisely, communities whose legitimacy is ques-
tioned by so-called sovereign states. The case of the martyrological repre-
sentation of Aldo Moro reveals a completely different situation, a kind of
exception, which is difficult to explain with these two theoretical frame-
works. First, Aldo Moro wrote on several occasions that he had no inten-
tion of sacrificing himself for the national community and thus refused the
32 Fierke 2013, 48.
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allocation of the state martyr role. Fierke’s model of explanation does not
seem to be adequate in analyzing the martyrological representation of Al-
do Moro for the simple reason that her study focuses on willing martyrs.
Second, Weigel and Fierke do not seem to consider the possibility that acts
of violence perpetrated by non-state organizations may be directed against
representatives of the sovereign power and that the consecutive death of a
holder of political authority may be represented as a form of martyrdom.
Third, there is a problem concerning Fierke’s distinction between two dif-
ferent and separate language games, according to which martyrdom is al-
ways somehow an appeal to human rights, while established political au-
thorities always refer to the discourse of national security. In fact, as we will
see, the Italian government, major political parties and the established me-
dia argued that Aldo Moro had to sacrifice himself and accept his role as a
state martyr in order to save the Italian State and its institutions. Converse-
ly, Aldo Moro argued that it was iniquitous to sacrifice him with the argu-
ment of national security, because the state had the duty to preserve every
single human life. We are therefore faced with a very strange situation: Mo-
ro was represented as a state martyr, whose death was necessary to safe-
guard national security. The situation is even more complicated, because
the choice of not dealing with the Red Brigades to obtain the release of
Moro was justified with the argument that the Italian State could not deal
with terrorists, because they endangered the safety of the citizens. In other
words, Moro had to sacrifice himself to ensure that the state could contin-
ue to defend human rights. Fourth, in the case of Aldo Moro, the figure of
the martyr operates both as a political body of the community—the peo-
ple of the Italian Republic—as well as a legitimizing figure of dominant
power structures and relations.
In a recent publication, Paul Middleton presents some general reflec-
tions on martyrdom, which can help shed some light on the phenomenon
of state martyrology. He perfectly sums up the role of political purposes in
the cultural processes of the «creation» of martyrs as well as their contesta-
tion:
Religious, political, and even academic theological accounts of martyr-
dom today function primarily as identity markers which reinforce reli-
gious, cultural, national and even trans-national group boundaries.
The distinction between a ‹martyr› and a ‹terrorist› is the difference be-
tween two stories; […] Martyrologies still function as a means of creat-
ing group identity, through sympathy or rejection of particular mar-
tyrs; martyrology demands people take sides. […] Martyrs can be ap-
propriated or even ‹created› in order to legitimate religious or political
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causes […] Significantly, this can be the case whether or not the ‹mar-
tyr› intended to die for that cause, or even counted themselves among
the movement which goes on to celebrate their martyr status. […]
Martyrologies can be created independently of the particular convic-
tions of the ‹martyr›. […] In the end, martyrdom cannot be defined;
martyrdom is what martyrdom does; a narrative that creates or main-
tains group identity, by holding up an ideal representative of the com-
munity, who chose to or is made to die for its values.33
Thus, according to Middleton, martyrs can even be created when there is
no intentionality of self-sacrifice. This means that, in some cases, martyr
figures can be constructed only through the serial and repetitive representa-
tion of events of violence as martyrdoms, which is exactly what happened
with Aldo Moro. In the case of the Christian Democrat politician, it makes
no sense to speak of an act of self-sacrifice, since we know that Moro reject-
ed self-sacrifice «in the name of an abstract principle of legality.»34 It is thus
only and exclusively through language and discourse that the victim was
sacralized and through which its sacredness was transferred to the national
community.
Sacrifice, Scapegoat, Martyrdom
Sacrifice, from the Latin sacrificium (sacer, «holy»; facere, «to make»), carries
the connotation of a religious act that sanctifies or consecrates an object.
Offering is often used as a synonym (or as a more inclusive category in
which sacrifice is a subdivision) and means the presentation of a gift (Latin
offerre, «to offer, present»). Romance languages contain words derived from
both Latin words. The German Opfer is generally understood as a word de-
riving from offerre, but some derive it from the Latin operari («to perform,
accomplish»). Some scholars have tried to distinguish between offering
and sacrifice, such as for example the cultural anthropologist Jan van Baal,
who defines offering as «every act of presenting something to a supernatu-
ral being» and sacrifice as «an offering accompanied by the ritual killing of
the object of the offering.»35 This definition can be criticized as too nar-
row, however, «since ‹killing› is applied only to living beings, human or an-
3.2
33 Middleton 2014, 128–130.
34 Moro 2008b, 8; it.: «[…] in nome di un astratto principio di legalità.».
35 van Baal 1976, 161.
3.2 Sacrifice, Scapegoat, Martyrdom
99
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
imal, and thus does not cover the whole range of objects used in sacrifice
as attested by the history of religions.»36 Nevertheless, The Encyclopedia of
Religion indicates three essential elements of sacrifice, which are somehow
present in van Baal’s definition: sacrifice as a gift or a payment to some su-
pernatural or transcendent entities; destruction, which can be applied both
to unanimated objects and to living beings; the removing of something
from a human’s disposal, which is transferred to the supernatural or tran-
scendent recipient. In a general morphology or topology of sacrifice, the
Encyclopedia distinguishes between the sacrificer (or offerer), the sacrificed
material, the praxis or rite of sacrifice, the place and time of sacrifice, the
recipient of sacrifice and the intention of sacrifice.
For a long time, scholars have tried to develop theories on the origin of
sacrifice. In Primitive Culture: Research Into the Development of Mythology,
Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom, published in 1871, Edward Burnett
Taylor argues that sacrifice was originally a simple business transaction of
do ut des («I give so that you will give in return»). The English anthropolo-
gist supposes that «higher» forms of religion, including monotheism,
gradually developed out of animism as the «earliest» form. According to
Taylor, sacrifice as abnegation or renunciation developed only gradually
from the practices of making gifts to spirits resident in nature, gifts
through which the spirits could be bribed; but even when it was de-
veloped, Taylor argues, the do ut des idea continued to be operative for a
long time in the later stages of religion.
18 years later, William Robertson Smith developed a theory of sacrifice
for the Semitic world, which he regarded as universally applicable, in his
masterpiece Lectures On the Religion Of the Semites. Here, he criticizes Tay-
lor’s theory for not paying sufficient attention to the function of sacrificial
practices, which according to him was the establishment or maintenance
of social community. Assuming that the shared core of the earliest forms of
religion (among the Semites and elsewhere) was the belief in a theriomor-
phic tribal divinity with which the tribe had a blood relationship, Smith
defines sacrifice as a ritual communal meal in which a totemic animal
(which under ordinary circumstances was not to be killed) was slain and
eaten in order to renew the community. According to Smith, in this ritual
the recipient, offerers and victims were all of the same nature; therefore,
sacrifice was originally a meal in which the offerers entered into commu-
nion with the totem.
36 Henninger 2005, 7997.
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In their famous Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice, published in
1898, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss reject both Taylor’s and Smith’s at-
tempts to develop a theory of sacrifice, arguing that their mistake was the
attempt to identify the essence of sacrifice by searching for its origin in an-
cient and primitive cultures. The problem with Taylor’s theory is that «this
theory described accurately the phases of the moral development of the
phenomenon» but «it did not account for its mechanism», while «the great
flaw in [Smith’s] system is that it seeks to bring the multiplicity of sacrifi-
cial forms within the unity of an arbitrarily chosen principle.»37 According
to Hubert and Mauss, Smith’s theory arbitrarily chooses totemism as a uni-
versally applicable point of departure and reconstructs the development of
the forms of sacrifice solely by analogy and without adequate historical ba-
sis. In particular, Hubert and Mauss criticize Smith for claiming to estab-
lish a historical sequence and a logical derivation between the communion
sacrifice and other kinds of sacrifice. Instead of deriving all forms of sacri-
fice from one ‹original› communion sacrifice, they want to demonstrate
that «the expulsion of a sacred spirit, whether pure or impure, is a primor-
dial component of sacrifice, as primordial and irreducible as commu-
nion.»38 Hubert and Mauss summarize their thesis with the famous formu-
la, according to which
Sacrifice is a religious act which, through the consecration of a victim,
modifies the condition of the moral person who accomplishes it or
that of a certain object with which he is concerned.39
The victim is not holy by nature, as it is in Smith’s theory. Rather, the con-
secration is effected by destruction, and the connection with the sacral
world is completed by a sacred meal. Implied here is the view (which re-
turns to Émile Durkheim) of the French sociological school that the sacral
world is simply a projection of society. Ultimately, Hubert and Mauss con-
sider the recipient of sacrifice to be simply a hypostatization of society it-
self.
The idea that the consecration of the sacrificial object is obtained by its
destruction deeply influenced theories of martyrdom. This is true not only
for Samuel Klausner’s definition of martyrdom, but also for Fierke’s con-
ceptualization of martyrdom as an act of self-sacrifice—that is, the destruc-
tion of one’s own body—, through which the sacrificed self becomes sa-
37 Hubert/Mauss 1964, 2, 5.
38 Hubert/Mauss 1964, 6.
39 Hubert/Mauss 1964, 13.
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cred and with him the community to which the martyr belongs. The same
can be said of Weigel’s understanding of martyrdom, who, referring explic-
itly to Hubert and Mauss, argues:
If, in the case of the archaic or pagan sacrifice, in whose ritual the gift
to the gods is sanctified, the moral change of the sacrificer [des Opfern-
den] goes hand in hand with the transformation of the sacrificed [des
Opfers/Geopferten] into something sacred, a radical change comes into
play with the martyr. For here, it is one and the same person who is
killed or kills himself, and who, at the same time, becomes sacred and
undergoes the moral transformation that predisposes this person to be-
come a saint.40
I believe that this way of conceiving either the sacrificial ritual, in which a
sacrificer destroys an object other than himself or herself, or martyrdom,
in which the agent of sacrifice and the person sacrificed are the same, is
highly problematic because it is based on the silent premise that sacraliza-
tion or consecration is primarily the result of ritual practice. Though Fierke
and Weigel recognize the fundamental role of language, rhetoric and dis-
course in the construction (and contestation) of martyr figurations, they
still think of the function and performativity of martyrdom in ritualistic
terms. But, as the case of Aldo Moro perfectly exemplifies, there can be sit-
uations in which sacralization is achieved only by means of discursive
practices—that is, when an event of violence is represented linguistically,
rhetorically and narratively as a ritual, a sacrifice, a form of martyrdom. I
do not want to say that ritual practices do not have a sacralizing function—
the history of religion is full of such rituals. What I am saying is, in fact,
very simple: no sacrifice or martyrdom has performative efficacy unless it is
supported by a mythical narrative and that, in the absence of a ritual, it is
possible to sacralize a person, to produce the sacred, with only the aid of
what we can define as discursively constructed mythology.
There is a second reason why I am very skeptical of the attempt to con-
ceive sacralization or consecration as the outcome of a ritual act, in which
an object or a person must be sacrificed. I suspect that behind this theo-
rization lies a universalistic conception, according to which human social
life is governed by man’s natural disposition toward aggressiveness, which
results in a certain cyclical, eternal return to violence. The idea of an intrin-
sic and therefore universal relationship between sacrifice, sacralization and
violence, which, in my opinion, implicitly operates in the theory of Hu-
40 Weigel 2007b, 26.
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bert and Mauss, is the core of René Girard’s thought. In fact, for Girard,
who tries to combine Hegel’s analysis of the dialectic struggle for recogni-
tion and Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment, each human being is driven by
desire for what others have or want. He calls this «mimetic desire».41 This
causes a triangulation of desire and results in conflict between the desiring
parties. This mimetic contagion increases to a point where society is at
risk, and it is at this point that the scapegoat mechanism is triggered. This
is the point where one person is singled out as the cause of the trouble and
therefore expelled or killed by the group. Social order is restored in peo-
ple’s contentment that they have eliminated the cause of their problems by
removing the scapegoated individual; and then the cycle begins again.
Despite Girard criticizes «the formalistic tradition of Hubert and
Mauss», arguing that their problem is in the belief that «sacrificial rites
have no basis in reality», his scapegoat theory reproduces their idea of
sacralization as the outcome of ritualized destruction, that is, violence.42
The main problem here is not the definition of sacrificial practices as a rit-
ualized form of violence—a definition that, when the sacrificial object is a
living being, can hardly can be denied—but in the idea that this ritualized
violence is necessary for the establishment and perpetuation of social or-
der. This idea is also at the basis of the Girardian conception of martyr-
dom. In fact, the French Catholic scholar understands myth and gospel as
two rival descriptions of the social process of violent persecution. In the
Gospels and Christian martyrologies, he argues, the perspective that pre-
vails is not that of the community, but that of the oppressed victim. This
allows him to expose his specific secularized Christian conception of histo-
ry: «throughout occidental history persecutory representations (myths)
have lost their effectiveness. For Girard, our contemporary recognition of
the victim’s innocence […] is ultimately a radicalized intensification of our
solidarity with the martyrs—which in turn derives from our immersion in
the story of Christ’s Passion.»43 This conception of martyrdom as a radical
rejection of violence history is only apparently similar to that of Walter
Benjamin and Jacob Taubes, which I discussed in the previous chapter. In-
deed, starting from the premise that violence is a natural disposition of
man, Girard comes to regard state repressive apparatuses as necessary tools
for the containment of violence:
41 See Girard 1979, 143–168.
42 Girard 1979, 6–7.
43 Kirwan 2009, 920.
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The elimination of sacrificial violence is not just ‹good› or ‹bad›; it is
an ambivalent and ambiguous progress in the fight against violence,
which may include regressive moments when humans, who in the past
were being held back by this violence, become more violent. The
peace we have enjoyed until recently is often based on sacrificial vio-
lence, which is obviously no longer present in the form of blood sacri-
fice, but which exists in institutions such as the police, the army, the
dominance of American power, which still instills respect around the
world.44
Ultimately, Girard has a political-theological understanding of history simi-
lar to that of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Since, in the state of na-
ture, human beings live in a permanent «war of all against all», the
monopoly of violence by the state assumes the connotation of something
absolutely necessary to restrain the omnipresent threat of the apocalypse.
In such a world, the sacrifice of innocents is, however tragic, inevitable. In
Girard’s thinking, the martyrdoms of those who imitate Jesus Christ are
human attempts to imitate the divine, that is, something that is radically
metaphysical and metahistorical:
What Jesus calls us to imitate is his desire, it is the momentum that di-
rects him toward the goal he has set: to be more like the Father. […]
His only purpose is to become the perfect image of God. Christ there-
fore commits with the utmost zeal to imitating this God who is his Fa-
ther. Inviting us to imitate him, he invites us to imitate his own imita-
tion.45
The crucial point is that, for Girard, martyrdom is the imitation of some-
thing that is not human, since humans are predisposed by nature to
mimetic desire. In this way, martyrdom assumes a metaphysical connota-
tion, where both violence and non-violence are depoliticized, because the
first is placed in the sphere of nature while the second is located in the do-
main of the divine sphere; the human being is therefore imprisoned be-
tween these two poles. Despite saying the opposite, Girard ultimately does
not consider martyrological representations to be instruments of political
struggle against sovereign power, but to be human attempts to overcome
«natural» guilt: the guilt of being an animal who desires mimetically.
44 Girard 2011, 24.
45 Girard 2001, 27.
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To counteract these two theoretical problems—the conception that
sacralization is primarily the result of ritual destruction and the anthropo-
logical premises underlying it—I propose to take inspiration from Giorgio
Agamben’s theory of the homo sacer. According to the Italian philosopher,
the sacralization or consecration of human beings is the result of the praxis
of excluding them from the community, a ban through which life is de-
politicized and reduced to «bare life». Marcel Mauss drew attention to the
homo sacer figure in his first study of sociology of religion, published in
1896.46 In this text, he points out that, in ancient Rome, not only was what
belonged to the gods of the city sacred, but so was what the individual
granted to the gods. In other words, everything withdrawn from common
usage was sacred. The main distinction here between res sacra and res com-
munes is that what belonged to the gods could not belong to men, and vice
versa. Thus, if something was consecrated to the gods, it belonged defini-
tively to the sphere of the sacred. This could also affect people. In fact, the
Roman penal code prescribed that the chief priest could consecrate a crim-
inal to the gods before the altar and in the presence of the people. The
consecreatio capitis et bonorum, Mauss claims, was both a religious and legal
practice, and only later, through the historical development of criminal
law, did the distinction between public law and religious law emerge. In an
important passage, Mauss writes that «l’homme devenu sacer était voué à la
mort. Tout citoyen avait le droit de le tuer, de détruire sa propriété, son
troupeau» [«the man who had become sacer was doomed to death. Every
citizen had the right to kill him, to destroy his property, his flock»].47
Agamben, although he does not explicitly mention Mauss’ essay, resumes
the argument traced by the French anthropologist and proposes «to inter-
pret sacratio as an autonomous figure», which «may allow us to uncover an
originary political structure that is located in a zone prior to the distinction
between sacred and profane, religious and juridical.»48 This originary struc-
ture is that of the sovereign exception, namely what allows the sovereign to
suspend the law in the state of exception and to ban a person from the po-
litical community by consecrating that person to the gods. To consecrate
someone means nothing more than to permit someone to be killed with-
out such killing being considered a murder, that is to say, without the
killing being prosecuted and punished by law:
46 See Mauss 1896a; Mauss 1896b.
47 Mauss 1896b, 59.
48 Agamben 1998, 74.
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The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill with-
out committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sa-
cred life—that is, life that may be killed but not sacrificed—is the life
that has been captured in this sphere.49
According to Agamben, this practice of consecration—the sovereign deci-
sion through which an individual is deprived of his or her social and politi-
cal life and reduced to «bare life»—«is the originary activity of sovereign-
ty.»50
Unlike Hubert and Mauss (in the Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacri-
fice there is no reference to the figure of the homo sacer, which is why we
are led to believe that Mauss had dropped the intuition he had had two
years before), Agamben conceives consecration not exclusively as the result
of religious ritual performances, but of practices of exclusion, which are
both juridical–political and religious. Furthermore, this consecration is
achieved not only by means of ritualized practices of exclusion, but also
and especially through discursive practices of declaring that someone is al-
ready sacred and thus killable without punishment. Thus, it is not only
through ritual acts performed with the body, but also through discursive
practices performed by iterating language units, rhetoric patterns and nar-
rative models, that consecration is produced. In other words, the success of
consecration is related to the ritualization of both corporal and discursive
practices—that is, the repetition of actions and representations that were
established and promoted over time.
It is clear that Agamben’s homo sacer theory does not have the universal
claim of explaining the function of all kinds of sacrificial practices in any
historical and pragmatic hermeneutic context, but rather considers the role
of consecration within and in reference to what Foucault, as we have seen,
defines as the discourse of sovereignty or the «politico-legendary history of
the Romans». It is therefore in the context of Greek–Roman culture that
consecration intended as a form of exclusion from the profane community
of the living, that is, from the political and juridical spheres, must be
placed. Thus, the homo sacer theory allows us to better understand and ex-
plain the intrinsic relationship between sovereignty and violence, between
sovereign exception and the reduction of a human to bare life in the con-
text of «Western» history, culture and society.51
49 Agamben 1998, 83.
50 Agamben 1998, 83.
51 As William Cavanaugh rightly observes, «the West is a construct, a contested
project, not a simple description of a monolithic entity.» Here I use the term
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At this point, the task is to understand the relationship between the ho-
mo sacer figure and the martyr figure, to thus analyze the encounter, con-
frontation and mutual influence between the consecration of bare life
through the sovereign practice of exclusion and sacralization through mar-
tyrological representations. In the next chapters, I will expose the heuristic
value of the homo sacer theory for my analysis of the martyrological repre-
sentation of Aldo Moro and, in broader terms, for understanding the state
martyr figure’s performativity. But before that it is necessary to first recon-
struct the history of the signatures of the concept of martyrdom in order to
understand how the martyr figure emerged in the encounter between the
discourses of sovereignty and rebellion, between the «politico-legendary
history of the Romans» and the «mythico-religious discourse of the Jews».
Signature is a terminus technicus of discourse analysis.52 It broadens the
interpretative horizon that makes it possible to observe how signs and
concepts change meaning over time. In this sense, it marks a breaking
point between semiology and hermeneutics. Semiology is what allows the
identification of signs, while hermeneutics discovers their meaning in a
particular historical, political, social and cultural context. A central task of
this study is to reconstruct the history of the martyr’s signatures and in par-
ticular to demonstrate that, on the threshold between the Middle Ages and
modernity and with the emergence and constitution of modern national
states, the martyr figure underwent a signature through which it was trans-
posed from the pragmatic and hermeneutic context of Christian religion
(and theology) to a secular (and political) one.
From this point of view, the emergence of the figure of the state martyr
is a product or result of secularization. In fact, in line with Agamben, secu-
larization can be regarded as a process of dislocation of signs and concepts
from the sacred to the profane sphere of meaning. Signatures play an im-
portant strategic role: they direct the interpretation of signs in a certain di-
rection. The central idea is that some religious language forms, which in
modernity and post-modernity are used in profane and secular contexts
and discourses, have a secret index: they recall previous religious meanings
without making them explicit.53 Among these secularized religious lan-
«Western» in the same way as Cavanaugh uses it, namely as an ideological con-
struct which is both made and shaped by certain narratives and forms of represen-
tation. Just like the «myth of religious violence» analyzed by Cavanaugh, state
martyrology should be understood as «an ideological accompaniment to shifts in
Western configurations of power.» See Cavanaugh 2009, 7, 12.
52 See Foucault 1966, 44; Agamben 2009, 33–80.
53 See Agamben 2011, 3–4.
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guage forms there is the figure of the martyr or, more precisely, there are
the signs, images, and the rhetorical and narrative structures through
which the figure of the martyr takes shape and manifests itself in a new
semiotic, pragmatic and hermeneutic context.
The phenomenon of the formation of analogies, the transfer, resetting or
reversal of religious language into new contexts, can also be conceptual-
ized, in line with Hans Blumenberg, as a prefiguration.54 According to the
German philosopher, prefiguration is an anthropologically derivable pro-
cess that consists in reducing the complexity of reality by iterating past
forms of representation, narrative models, and rhetorical patterns in order
to reduce contingency and create meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit). Prefigu-
rations are «acts of repetition» (Akte der Wiederholung), by which actions or
events are made plausible and significant by relating them to the character-
istics, power and meaning attributed to historical or mythical actions or
events.55 The success of such meaningful analogies is de facto determined
by both the conciseness and the contextual applicability of the reference
figures. Prefiguration «does» something only through its concrete appear-
ance in a particular pragmatic and hermeneutic context. It is a practice
which iterates a certain past event or action and transposes the meaning or
efficacy attributed to it in its «original» context to another event or action.
The performativity of the martyr figure is strongly linked to what Hans
Blumenberg calls the «aesthetic potential of secularized [religious] lan-
guage».56 In The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, the German philosopher
quotes Friedrich Schleiermacher’s aphorism, according to which «Chris-
tianity produced language. It has been and still is a potentiated linguistic
genius [Sprachgeist] from the beginning […].»57 Referring to this aphorism,
Blumenberg argues that «the phenomena of secularization derives to a
large extent from this linguistic genius, from the familiarities that it pro-
duced, the transferable materials that it left behind it, and the residual
needs that are associated with its materials.»58 There are certain signs,
concepts and statements that deploy a specific form of performativity with
a specific power of persuasion by referring to a religious «linguistic ge-
nius», to residues of religious signification. According to Blumenberg, sec-
ularized religious language has a «rhetorical function», which is that «of
54 See Blumenberg 2014b.
55 Blumenberg 2014b, 9.
56 Blumenberg 1985, 108.
57 Schleiermacher 2012, 17.
58 Blumenberg 1985, 114.
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evoking effects along the spectrum between provocation and familiarity by
means of an emphatic display of the terminology’s marks of derivation».59
In line with the arguments of both Agamben and Blumenberg, this in-
vestigation is based on the assumption that a critical analysis of the figure
of the martyr and its performativity cannot help but consider its historical
roots and transformations. What is the «original» meaning of the figure of
the martyr, and what is its secret index? In order to avoid any misunder-
standing, I wish to underline that I am not arguing that there is a genuine,
true meaning of martyrdom, which has remained unchanged for centuries.
That would mean a return to a dangerous form of essentialism. My goal is
not to detect an inexistent essential meaning, but to trace the «cultural and
medial metamorphosis» of the martyr figure in history.60
Emergence of the Martyr Figure
In what social, political and cultural context did the martyr figure emerge
for the first time in history? The question of the origin of martyrdom has
been a controversial research topic for a long time and even today the de-
bate seems to be far from coming to an end. There are two basic approach-
es to the question. On the one hand, there are researchers who are interest-
ed in determining the origin of the idea of martyrdom, namely in under-
standing in what social, political and cultural contexts the idea of a volun-
tary form of martyrdom, considered positive, desirable or «noble», could
be developed. On the other hand, there are researchers for whom martyr-
dom begins at the moment when ancient Christians started using the term
martyrdom to describe a person who chooses to suffer death rather than
renounce faith in Christ or obedience to his teachings.61
We find this last kind of approach both in Norbert Brox’s classic study
Zeuge und Märtyrer and in the more recent study Martyrdom and Rome by
Glen Bowersock. Both trace the evolution of the term from its pre-Chris-
tian use in courtrooms to its titular use in Christianity. Originally, the
Greek word μάρτυς meant «witness» in a trial. The word «was part of the
forensic and legal language of Greek court», but it could also be used
metaphorically for all kinds of observations and attestations. It thus never
3.3
59 See Blumenberg 1985, 104–105.
60 Weigel 2007b, 16.
61 See Moss 2012, 2.
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designated «dying for a cause» until the mid-second century AD.62 Resum-
ing a thesis already present in Brox’s study, Bowersock argues that the con-
cept of martyrdom was alien to the ancient world and criticizes those re-
searchers who consider, for example, the death of Socrates, the three Jews
in the fiery furnace of Nebuchadnezzar, or the Maccabees, earlier forms of
martyrdom.63 According to Bowersock, «martyrdom, as we understand it,
was conceived and devised in response to complex social, religious and po-
litical pressures», which took place from the second century onwards.64
Many scholars criticize this kind of approach and instead point to an-
cient Jewish «antecedents» of Christian martyrdom. William Hugh Clif-
ford Friend calls attention to forms of martyrdom found in Daniel and in
the second and fourth books of the Maccabees, claiming that «without
Maccabees and without Daniel, a Christian theology of martyrdom would
scarcely have been possible.»65 The «martyrdoms» of Eleazar (2 Maccabees
6–7), who is killed for refusing to eat pork, and of the seven brothers tor-
tured and killed when each refused to abandon the ancestral laws, are of-
ten addressed as pre-Christian examples. In his study of the Maccabean
martyrs, Jan Willem van Henten argues that the deaths of Jewish heroes for
the salvation of their people formed the notion of martyrdom in the early
Church.66 Also, Middleton argues that the «pattern of refusal to compro-
mise religious belief in the face of an edict and then torture is common to
both Jewish and Christian martyr acts», which is why «the novelty of the
technical μάρτυς vocabulary is less significant than Bowersock claims.»67
The tradition of «noble-death» in Greco-Roman literature and culture is
also often addressed as an antecedent of Christian martyrology. Scholars
highlight that, in fact, early Christian writers praised pagan suicides as
forerunners of martyrdom.68 Candida R. Moss shows, on the basis of many
examples of «noble deaths» (Homeric heroes, Antigone, Lucrezia, Socrates,
etc.), how the memory of pre-Christian heroic suicides acts as a reference
for the creation of martyr figures in the second and third centuries, stress-
ing that, «when interpreting their own experiences and their own concept
62 Moss 2012, 4.
63 See Baumeister 1980; Musurillo 1954.
64 Bowersock 2002, 5.
65 Frend 1965, 65.
66 See van Henten 1997.
67 Middleton 2014, 121.
68 See Weigel 2007b, 22–24, Middleton 2014, 121; van Henten/Avemarie 2002, 1–8.
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of martyrdom, early Christians, transformed, shaped, and subverted exist-
ing cultural tropes.»69
Although there are undoubtedly Greek–Roman and ancient Jewish in-
fluences, I agree with Brox’s and Bowersock’s thesis, according to which
the martyr figure emerged for the first time in the second century. In fact,
there are substantial differences between the martyr figure and the tradi-
tion of death for faith in the Jewish context or of the noble death in the
Greco-Roman context. In both traditions, death was a sign of virtue: «the
willingness to die proved the purity of one’s intentions and served as a
guarantor of the veracity of one’s claims.»70 Undoubtedly, in the Jewish
context, death also had the connotation of «dying for God»;71 but the act of
dying was not conceived and represented as an act of witnessing faith before
the mid-second century AD. Bowersock points out that, even in the New
Testament, the word μάρτυς is used only to denote a spectator or eyewit-
ness, one who testifies to what he has seen.72 However, there is no doubt
that within the New Testament the act of witnessing assumes a different
connotation. The word continues to denote the act of witnessing some-
thing verbally (or the person who is a witness to something), but what is
being witnessed now has a transcendent and metaphysical value. In the
Gospels, particularly in the Acts of the Apostles, the word μάρτυρες is used
to designate those who witnessed Jesus’ suffering and especially those who
witnessed his resurrection (see, for example, Luke 24:48 and Acts 1:22,
2:32, 3:15). What is witnessed is thus no longer the truth of a historical
fact, as in the case of something witnessed before a trial, but of an absolute
truth. The earliest appearance of these words, referring to death at the
hands of a hostile authority, is in the Martyrium polycarpi, which describes
the events connected with the execution of the elderly bishop of Smyrna, a
town in western Asia Minor, around the year 150.
This new meaning of the term «martyrdom», namely «to die for a cause»,
is therefore a product of late antiquity. It gradually took shape in the sec-
ond century and «had been an essentially urban manifestation of Christian
zeal»; in fact, «martyrdom in a city provided the greatest possible visibility
for the cause of the nascent Church, and it simultaneously exposed the Ro-
69 Moss 2012, 47.
70 Moss 2012, 47.
71 Weigel 2007b, 24.
72 According to Bowersock, the only passage in the entire New Testament «that
might have effectively encouraged the sense of martyrdom as it was to develop» is
Acts 22:20, where Paul refers to the stoning of Stephen with the words: «when the
blood of your martyr Stephen was shed». See Bowersock 2002, 15.
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man administrative machinery to the greatest possible embarrassment.»73
What happened in the second century was not a simple renomination of a
social phenomenon that did not change over time. In the Greek cities of
Asia Minor, Bowersock identified the necessary context for the genesis of
the phenomenon of Christian martyrdom. Martyrdom could occur only if
a Roman magistrate chose to impose the death penalty on a confessing
Christian. From this point of view, the apparatus of Roman court proce-
dures, along with their technical language, was a conditio sine qua non for
the emergence of martyr figurations. This is why the first martyrological
narratives had a common narrative structure that reproduced the funda-
mental steps of Roman court procedure.74 For the whole durance of the
martyr’s trial large parts of the population were present:
The whole drama unfolded in the conspicuous places of a city. The
martyr was moved from prison to tribunal, usually in the agora and
close by the temple at which sacrifice to the emperor would be en-
joined. The final scene was normally set in the amphitheater […]. Mar-
tyrdom served as a catalyst of the intellectual and social rituals of the
city by holding a mirror to the traditional functions of the agora and
the amphitheater as well as to the urban environment to which they
belonged—prison, temple, and brothel. Furthermore, crowds were an
essential part of the martyrdoms, and these could only be mustered in
sufficient numbers in the big cities.75
It is in this context (and under the influence of the ethics of suicide mod-
eled on the paradigm of Greek–Roman tradition) that «an ideology of
death to promote a cause» was born.76 Of course, voluntary death, under-
stood as suicide, was soon harshly criticized by Church fathers (particu-
larly by Clement of Alexandria and Origin), and the concept of martyr-
dom again assumed, in its theological interpretation, the meaning of «bear-
ing witness», in the sense of a confession of faith in God: to die as a martyr
means, then, to witness the truth of Christ’s death and resurrection—mar-
tyrdom as imitatio Christi. Despite this reinterpretation or re-signification,
the idea of martyrdom as a sort of «bodily performance» remained. During
the second century, the public death of members of the Christian sect be-
came the act of witnessing the transcendent and absolute truth embodied
73 Bowersock 2002, 42.
74 See Lanata 1973.
75 Bowersock 2002, 52, 55.
76 Bowersock 2002, 74.
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by Christ. Through the signature of the word «martyrdom»—that is, the
transposition of the term from a legal and forensic context into a religious
one—public events of violence acquired a new, metaphysical meaning.
This signature strongly determined attribution of meaning to events of po-
litical violence in which someone was tortured or killed. Dying (in certain
circumstances) became an act of witnessing the truth of the Christian faith,
or, more specifically, the truth of Christ’s death and resurrection.
Candida R. Moss, despite assuming a less radical position, underlines
the importance of this re-signification:
Even if the shift in the term’s meaning does not mark the beginning of
martyrdom itself, the refinement of language and the application of ti-
tles as identity markers are important historical developments. These
moments of transition reveal changes in the structures of ancient social
and conceptual hierarchies.77
One of the most important changes lies in the fact that, through the repre-
sentation of violent death in the public space as «martyrdom», an ideology
was promoted which was strongly subversive. In classical Rome, sacrificing
one’s life for one’s family or community was considered honorable, but, as
Carlin Barton notes, «Romans rarely identified with or wanted to be seen
as victims […]. Their stories of the vindication of honor are designed not
to elicit pity, not to reveal a victim, but to reveal an unconquered will.»78
Early Christians were undoubtedly influenced by these attitudes, but they
understood themselves as part of a community of believers. If, within Ro-
man culture, spectacles of death were intended to deprive criminals of
their honor through stripping them of agency, Christians appeared to have
chosen to die and their deaths were represented as acts of witnessing the
truth of Christ’s revelation. Martyrs assumed the meaning of fully active
citizens of the city of God. Furthermore, the Acta martyrum «ensured that
these performances were not only remembered but individualized as acts
of personal self-expression. Martyrdom was, in these accounts, an act […]
legitimized by the example of the Passion of Christ.»79 In the same way
that, according to Pauline theology, Christ was considered the symbolic
body of the Church (and vice versa), the martyrs, as imitators of Christ in
death, were experienced as being the same symbolic body. The martyr, we
can say, assumed the meaning of one who re-actualized the mystical bond
77 Moss 2012, 6.
78 Barton 2002, 27.
79 Janes/Houen 2014, 5.
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between Christ and the community.80 In eschatological terms, it can be
said that the figure of the martyr also had a legitimizing function. The
Christian martyr figure, by witnessing the death of Christ with his own
death, also bore witness to the future establishment of the city of God. In
this way, it delegitimized the authority of the Roman Empire.81
The martyr figure, in the first context in which it appeared, was part of
what in the second chapter I define as a narrative of rebellion. Moreover,
the opposition proposed by Foucault between the «mythical–religious dis-
course of the Jews» and the «politico-legendary history of the Romans»
here becomes clearer and more intelligible. In fact, what Middleton calls
the «radical martyrdom» of early Christianity seems to be the encounter/
clash of these two discourses.82 The martyr figure maintained subversive
potential as long as it was inscribed within an eschatological and messianic
narrative structure. This structure emerged historically for the first time in
apocalyptic literature and was consolidated in the messianic narrative of
Christianity. Apocalyptic and messianic thought developed in the histori-
cal context of conflicts between conquerors and the conquered, first under
the Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great, and then under the Ro-
man Empire, and strongly influenced the cultural, religious and political
history of late ancient world.
The novelty of the Christian messianic narrative lies not in the vision of
a coming Kingdom of God, which already existed in the apocalyptic and
eschatological narratives that preceded it, but in the idea that the Kingdom
will soon be realized or even that it has already been realized. In the
Gospels, the apostles are the martyrs, namely those who witnessed the life
and death of Christ (the Messiah) as the revelation/realization of God’s
Kingdom. In further development of the narrative, the Messiah himself be-
came the martyr, the witness, who by dying revealed/realized the Kingdom
and the accuser, who delegitimates not only the authority of the Roman
emperors, but all forms of earthly authority. In the second century, martyr-
dom became, through the signature of the Greek word μάρτυς and in the
context of struggle between Christian communities and the Roman Em-
pire, an act of witnessing through death, which unmasked and exposed the
iniquity of the violence perpetuated by the political authority. Christ was
understood as a τύπος (type or pre-figure) of the martyr who died in this
struggle. It is a typological analogy, similar to the analogy used by Paul
80 See Rahner 1958, 91.
81 See Recupero 2010, 24.
82 Middleton 2006.
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when he says that Adam was «a type [τύπος] of the one who was to come»,
that is, of Christ. The Christ-martyr thus assumed the connotation of the
archetypal martyr, to which every form of Christian martyrology refers.83
The eschatological and messianic narrative radically challenged the Gre-
co-Roman way of conceiving and narrating politics and of glorifying pow-
er. The Romans saw a threat to the stability and social peace of the Empire
in the behavior of Christians, because it undermined the very essence on
which the acknowledgment and legitimization of political authority was
based. Religion has always played an important role in the mechanisms of
legitimization of the social and political structures of the ancient Roman
civilization. Religion was closely associated with socio-political reality, for
which a distinction between inner (religious) and public (political) spheres
was inconceivable. Especially with the expansion of the Empire, when it
was no longer possible to govern the masses through the institutions of the
polis, the princeps as a leader had to monopolize all power. In this way, the
auctoritas passed to the princeps and the religious worshiping of the gods of
the state culminated in the imperial cult. As Erik Peterson notes, the cult
of the «old» state divinities could be tolerant, but the new imperial cult
was necessarily intolerant, since the divine was now embodied by the fig-
ure of the emperor and demanded its own recognition as a numen prae-
sens.84 To refuse to worship the Roman deity or the divinities of the Empire
and oppose the adoration of the emperor’s image meant, for the authority
and for Roman citizens, a lack of loyalty and a public demonstration of
disavowal of the constituted power. That is why the main accusation of
Christians was atheism, blasphemy, impiety, crimen religionis, crimen majes-
tatis, which, though with different shades, indicated the same political
problem: opposition to the official religion and therefore the rejection of
established power structures and political authority.85
The rejection of the «politico-legendary history of the Romans» by the
early Christian communities was a radical act of political subversion and
revolt. Hannah Arendt is right when she writes that «Christian morality
[…] has always insisted that everybody should mind his own business and
that political responsibility constituted first of all a burden, undertaken ex-
clusively for the sake of the well-being and salvation of those it freed from
worry about public affairs.»86 However, this radical rejection of vita activa
83 See Recupero 2010, 22.
84 See Peterson 1937, 82.
85 See Noce 1987, 26.
86 Arendt 1998, 60.
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—understood as the participation in public and political life—was in itself
actually quite political. In fact, within the messianic and eschatological
narrative, the distinction between private life and political life, between
ζωὴ (natural life) and βίος πολιτικός (political life), was replaced with the
Paulinian distinction between σῶμα ψυχικόν (physical body) and σῶμα
πνευματικόν (spiritual body). The physical body is the one humanity shares
with Adam, a body of the dust of the earth, while the spiritual body is
what Christ acquired in his resurrection and that all those who belong to
him will have in their future resurrection in heaven (1 Cor 15:47–48).
Thus, the radical difference between the Greco-Roman and the Jewish–
Christian ways of understanding man, society and the world cannot be em-
phasized enough. As Arendt argues,
the Christian ‹glad tidings› of the immortality of individual human life
had reversed the ancient relationship between man and world and pro-
moted the most mortal thing, human life, to the position of immortal-
ity, which up to then the cosmos had held. […] It is precisely individu-
al life which now came to occupy the position once held by the ‹life› of
the body politic, and Paul’s statement that ‹death is the wages of sin›,
since life is meant to last forever, echoes Cicero’s statement that death
is the reward of sins committed by political communities which were
built to last for eternity. It is as though the early Christians—at least
Paul, who after all was a Roman citizen—consciously shaped their
concept of immortality after the Roman model, substituting individu-
al life for the political life of the body politic.87
The messianic and eschatological narrative desacralized the cosmos and
sacralized individual life. According to Arendt, the Greco-Roman under-
standing of natural, private life, whose center was the home and family,
was based on the idea that borders, the boundaries between one estate and
another, were sacred. The sacrality of the household, which «was born of
necessity», was radically different from «the realm of the polls», of political
life, which «was the sphere of freedom». Freedom was thus located exclu-
sively in the political and profane realm, while necessity was «primarily a
prepolitical phenomenon», in which «force and violence are justified […]
because they are the only means to master necessity—for instance, by rul-
ing over slaves—and to become free.»88 Here, the status of the homo sacer
becomes perhaps clearer: Within ancient Roman culture and society, sacer
87 Arendt 1998, 314.
88 Arendt 1998, 30–31.
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was the human being that belonged to the gods, that is: someone who can-
not act freely in the public and political sphere. The Christian messianic
and eschatological narrative radically subverted this understanding of the
relation of household to city, of freedom to necessity, by declaring that ev-
ery individual life was free thanks to the resurrection of Christ, a prefigura-
tion of the resurrection of all believers at the end of time. In Greco-Roman
culture, a sacred individual was not free, inasmuch as his or her life be-
longed to the gods and thus was no longer subjected to the rules of the
city; for early Christians, a sacred individual became free through his or
her faith in the saving power of Christ’ death and resurrection.
Now, we should be able to better understand the singularity of the situa-
tion in which the first martyrological narratives emerged. By refusing to
recognize the official religion of the Empire, the first Christian communi-
ties endangered the entire conceptual and knowledge system, the hege-
monic discourse on which imperial power was based. The martyrological
representation of violent death at the hands of Roman magistrates was
based on a mechanism of subversion of language, through which the term
«martyrdom» assumed the meaning of a performance of the body with
which an individual witnessed the truth of the revelation of a new, univer-
sal community in which every human being is free. From the point of view
of a messianic and eschatological understanding of history, without which
the martyr figure could never have emerged, the distinction between a le-
gitimate and illegitimate use of violence itself made no sense, because
there was no legitimate power in the world despite that of God.
Institutionalization, Militarization, and Nationalization of the Martyr
Figure
Early Christian communities took possession of elements of Greco-Roman
language and rhetoric, subverting their significance. The signature of the
term martyrdom is a paradigmatic example of this very effective re-signifi-
cation of language, through which the «original» meaning of terms did not
disappear but rather assumed a different connotation, permitting a differ-
ent usage. This subversive re-signification did not had a long life, inasmuch
as the subversive potential of the martyr figure was soon disempowered by
a further re-signification that occurred during the historical process that
led to the institutionalization of the Christian religion. After Constantine,
the institutions of the Empire and the Christian Church were increasingly
intertwined. The Christian Church mirrored the centralized imperial bu-
3.4
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reaucracy when it stabilized its structure and hierarchy. The imperial and
Christian administrative structures coincided, and soon religious leaders
also adopted civilian roles. In this changed cultural, social and institutional
context, a cult of martyrs developed whose main function was to legitimize
the new political and administrative structure of the Empire. The center of
worship of the martyrs was the (real or fictional) places of their burials. In
these places, monuments of different types, from simple memorial stones
up to sumptuous sanctuaries, were erected.89
The term μαρτύριον thus underwent further re-signification. It was then
used to indicate sanctuaries and reliquaries built on the remains of mar-
tyrs. These μαρτύρια increasingly functioned as symbols of God’s victory
over the enemy, the moment of the heavenly triumph. As Maria Grazia Re-
cupero observes, these places served as spatial markers that legitimized the
hierarchy of urban administration: «The increasingly decisive role of bish-
ops—the main holders of public functions in the city of the 4th century—
merges with the progressive organization, institutionalization, and admin-
istration of the cult of martyrs.»90 Martyrs were considered mediators be-
tween the community and the sacred, between the inside and the outside,
that is, as intercessors between earthly and divine power. Around the mar-
tyrs’ sanctuaries, a new form of political legitimization developed based on
the glorification and acclamation of a political power and hierarchy that
participated in the martyrs’ sacredness. The figure of the martyr thus be-
came the point of reference, the fulcrum on which practices of acclama-
tion and the glorification of power revolved, practices which, as we have
seen, were typical of imperial society and culture.
Martyrological language was then used to describe a life of spiritual dis-
cipline and asceticism: «martyrdom could become democratized, everyone
could participate. […] Just as martyrdom had produced heroes of who had
displayed acts of extreme courage and endurance, so asceticism could be
taken to an extraordinary level.»91 The martyr figure also served, after a
long process of consolidation of the of martyr cult, to legitimate the con-
cept of Christian Holy War. As observed by Adolf von Harnack in his fa-
mous study Militia Christi, from the beginning Christianity appropriated a
military lexicon92, while systematic militarization of the martyrs occurred
around the 10th and 11th centuries by aligning the exaltation of Christian
89 Pricoco 2007, 67.
90 Recupero 2010, 180.
91 Middleton 2011, 84.
92 See von Harnack 1905.
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spirituality with military glory.93 Within the Christian tradition, Augustine
established rules that defined when it was justified to start a war (jus ad bel-
lum) as well as what were legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence
within war (jus in bello). According to him, war was legitimate when it was
waged to obey divine command.94 A number of Christian Holy Wars were
waged against pagans between the seventh and ninth centuries by figures
such as Charlemagne and the English kings St. Oswald and St. Edmund;
both kings were venerated as martyrs. As Paul Middleton highlights, «once
killing in battle was theologically justified as participation in Christian
Holy War, it was only a small step before the dead in such conflicts were
viewed as martyrs.»95 Soldiers who fought in wars blessed by Pope Gregory
VII were considered militia Christi insofar as they were seen as imitating
the sacrifice of Christ.
The first Christians understood martyrdom as a spiritual conflict against
Satan, who wanted to remove them from their confession through the in-
struments of torture inflicted by the Romans. Satan was considered the
power behind every evil in the world, the one who with his continuous ac-
tion was responsible for the emperor’s idolatry and the violent and im-
moral bloody spectacles of the Romans. In particular, persecution was con-
sidered work carried out by emperors under the influence of Satan. In the
context of Christian Holy Wars the understanding of Satan changed, since
the martyr–warrior figure was understood as someone fighting against infi-
dels. Satan was now understood not only as a force operating in the souls
of all humans, but also as an entity that, through pagans and infidels, in-
tended to destroy Christian society and kingdoms. The second Crusade
preacher Bernard of Clairvaux assured crusaders that both killing and dy-
ing for God was not a sin, but something wanted by God: «The knights of
Christ may safely do battle […] as death for Christ, inflicted and endured,
bears no taint of sin, but deserves abundant glory.»96 A martyr was no
longer someone who died by the hand of an illegitimate political authori-
ty, but a warrior who killed infidels and was willing to die in doing so.
Paul Middleton highlights the role of martyr figures in the context of
the struggle between the Catholic Church and the Reformation move-
ment. The same event of violence was interpreted and represented in oppo-
site ways: some viewed it as the legitimate execution of a heretic, while oth-
93 See Recupero 2010, 13.
94 See Janes/Houen 2014, 9–10.
95 Middleton 2011, 86.
96 Quoted in Middleton 2011, 89.
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ers represented it as the death of a martyr, as an act of bearing witness to
the true doctrine and an accusation of the false church that fell into sin.
Jan Hus, who was influenced by the teachings of John Wycliffe and whose
work would influence Martin Luther, gave a «mass for martyrs», specifical-
ly for three men who were beheaded after a mob burned a papal bull in
July 1402.97 For Luther, the martyrdoms of those who were killed or in-
jured due to their criticism of the Catholic Church were signs that the true
Church was reborn. When two Augustinian friars were burned in Brussels
in 1523, the Reformation movement gained its first martyrs. Through the
production of martyrological representations, the Reformers could claim
continuity with the past.
However, Luther himself criticized the Anabaptist movement and its
own martyrological representations. While the two kingdoms doctrine of
Lutherans and Calvinists de facto legitimized political authority as the nec-
essary sword to restrain evil, according to Anabaptist theology there was no
kingdom other than that of God. In 1525, the radical preacher Thomas
Müntzer, who was foremost amongst those reformers criticizing Luther’s
compromises with feudal authority, was executed in the German Peasants’
Revolt. When Luther was confronted with the deaths of Müntzer and oth-
er Anabaptists, he resorted to Augustine’s adage: non poena sed causa facit
martyrem. The deaths of Anabaptists were recalled in pamphlets and songs.
From the mid-sixteenth century these martyrologies, such as the Swiss
Brethren Hymnal (1564) and the famous Menonnite Martyrs’ Mirror (1660),
were collected, edited and printed. Although both Catholics and Protes-
tants were impressed by the manner of death assumed by Anabaptists, ulti-
mately they justified their execution as a legitimate means in the fight
against heresy.98
Unlike Anabaptism, Protestantism spread quickly and quickly gained
the support of princes; in many areas, civil authorities supported the new
version of the faith. In the military, political and civil clashes that followed
the confessional split of the Protestant from the English Reformations, the
temporal and ecclesiastical political institutions lined the opposing fields
of Protestantism and Catholicism, not only in terms of religious convic-
tions but to also consolidate their political power and authority. In the
context of the European wars of religion, thousands of Protestants were
tried for heresy and burned at the stake, particularly in Germany, France,
the Low Countries, and Switzerland. As Middleton highlights,
97 See Middleton 2011, 91.
98 See Middleton 2011, 96.
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For the first time heretics were not isolated individuals, but comprised
a mass movement of mutual support and encouragement, aided in no
small measure by the printing press. Soon after the burning of the Au-
gustinian monks in 1523, no fewer than sixteen editions of a marty-
rological pamphlet were in circulation, expressly calling the friars both
saints and martyrs. Stories of martyrs, letters of exhortation, and ser-
mons created a theology for a new age of martyrdom. Luther and
Calvin both wrote to those in prison urging them to remain steadfast
to the true faith, and follow the example laid down by the martyrs be-
fore them.99
In these letters, the Passion of Christ, as well as the violent deaths of the
early Christians, were represented as models to inspire acts of courage and
self-sacrifice, while those that persecuted the Protestants were represented
as demonic forces and compared to Roman emperors, such as Nero and
Diocletian, and Satan.
According to Middleton, the most enduring martyrology of this time
was John Foxe’s Book of Martyrs. This book, published originally in 1563,
was a direct response to the persecution of Protestants under Mary Tudor,
who wanted to return England to Roman Catholicism. In the short reign
of «Bloody Mary», more than 300 Protestants were executed. In the Book of
Martyrs, Foxe represents Protestants as the true Church, the Roman
Catholics as heirs of the ancient persecutors, and the Pope as a contempo-
rary manifestation of evil analogous to the evil of Roman Emperors. When
Mary Tudor died in 1558 and was replaced by Elisabeth I, English Protes-
tants interpreted this as the work of God’s hand: «The martyrs were vindi-
cated. History repeated itself. As the persecuted Church became the reli-
gion of the Roman Empire, so with the dawning of a new age of security,
Elizabeth was portrayed by Foxe as the new Constantine.»100
During the period of the European wars of religion, martyrologies func-
tioned to categorize Christians into martyrs, persecutors and heretics; ulti-
mately, each religious denomination tried to connect its own beliefs and
practices with the early Church. Each narrative reinforced the religious
convictions of a martyr’s group and served to accentuate the boundaries
between competing movements. While the narratives of reformists’ move-
ments, such as the Anabaptists, iterated elements of the messianic and es-
chatological narratives of the first Christian communities, inasmuch as
99 Middleton 2011, 96-97.
100 Middleton 2011, 103.
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they rejected recognizing and thus legitimizing any earthly political au-
thority, most martyrologies were used to legitimize different political au-
thorities and construct different collective identities. As Middleton points
out, martyrologies have continued to serve as identity markers and as nar-
ratives of legitimization in the context of political struggle until the
present day:
It is my contention that insights from the history of martyrology fatal-
ly undermine contemporary attempts to distinguish between ‹true›
and ‹false› martyrs. Those religious, political, and even academic theo-
logical accounts of martyrdom today function primarily as identity
markers that reinforce religious, cultural, national and even trans-na-
tional group boundaries. The distinction between ‹martyr› and ‹terror-
ist› is the difference between two stories.101
A good example of national martyrology is that which emerged in the con-
text of the rebellion of the Scottish covenanters against the English monar-
chy. As Middleton argues,
the covenant was […] a contract between the Scottish nation and God,
over and against the claims of Charles I to be God’s prince. […] At the
height of the covenanting uprisings, the king instituted a policy of ex-
tra-judicial killing. Once again, where a British monarch saw danger-
ous sedition, the covenanters saw martyrs. However, the covenanters
were not only martyrs for God, the National Covenant made them
martyrs for Scotland. […] Just as the martyr Jan Hus became an impor-
tant marker of Czech nationalism, so the covenanting martyrs rein-
forced a distinctively Scottish sense of religious identity. […] Although
the covenanters were driven by a religious cause, they were part of a
much more significant political shaping of the nation.102
This was, if not the first, one of the first examples of explicitly national
martyrology. However, this was not a nation-state martyrology in modern
terms, since it was still based on the medieval conception of the relation-
ship between secular political authority and divine sovereignty. The con-
cept of sovereignty, in other words, was not yet secularized. Interestingly,
the modern concept of state sovereignty, which is the basic principle un-
derlying the dominant Westphalian model of state foundation, emerged in
the context of the European wars of religion. Jean Bodin, though he did
101 Middleton 2014, 128.
102 Middleton 2011, 114–115.
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not invent sovereignty, was certainly the first who conceptualized it in a
systematic manner. In his masterwork Les Six Livres de la République, pub-
lished in 1576, Bodin sought to find a way to end chaos and war, which he
perceived to be the natural result of the feudal order, in which principali-
ties, guilds, cities, and trading unions were formally united under the
Church and Emperor, but which did not have the power to subdue the
others in a time of crisis. According to the French jurist and philosopher,
the sovereign must be both able to create laws ex nihilo (the «positive law»)
and free to break them at his own discretion, otherwise he is bound to the
laws he creates and therefore can no longer be the sovereign.103 After expe-
riencing religious wars himself, Bodin’s goal was «to make civil law the will
of the sovereign» in order «to undermine some of the impact of customary
and natural law. Effective law becomes the command of the sovereign.»104
Thus, he conceives sovereignty as absolutely independent from the sub-
jects, inasmuch as the sovereign becomes the source of his own legitimacy
responsible only to God.
Despite Bodin’s unquestionable importance for the development of state
theory, the «father» of the modern narrative of sovereignty is Thomas
Hobbes. Like Bodin’s most famous work, the Leviathan was also a political
answer to the historical context of religious wars. Thomas Hobbes pub-
lished the Leviathan in 1651, three years after the end of the Thirty Years
War. The anthropological assumptions on which the theory is founded re-
flect the experience of violence and terror. As we saw in chapter two, ac-
cording to Hobbes, people, by entering into society, agree to give up their
«natural» sovereign rights in order to avoid constant civil wars and anarchy,
to which humans are prone due to their «evil» human nature. Since the
sovereign is not bound by this original contract, there are no limits to his
authority. While Bodin bases the legitimacy of the sovereign on the divine
sanction, Hobbes builds his own on the social contract between «naturally
free and equal» individuals. Hobbes is thus the first thinker who really sec-
ularized the concept of sovereignty; but the «secret index» of the theologi-
cal understanding of sovereignty continues to operate implicitly in
Hobbes’ conceptualization. The idea of an absolute enemy, which can po-
tentially destroy society from the inside or outside, is in fact itself the prod-
uct of a signature from the pragmatic hermeneutical context of Christian
religion and theology to a secular one. An eschatological conception of his-
tory deprived of the idea of a messianic salvation is the basis of a mythical
103 See Fuller 1966, 19.
104 Vincent 1987, 54.
3.4 Institutionalization, Militarization, and Nationalization of the Martyr Figure
123
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
narrative in which the state monopoly of violence becomes an undisputed
dogma.
It is in this historical, pragmatic and hermeneutic context that the state
martyr figure was able to emerge. The statalization and nationalization of
the martyr is the product of the mutual relationship of influence between
the modern discourse of sovereignty and what Foucault calls discourse
about race struggle. The secularizations of an eschatological understanding
of history—history which is now understood as the battlefield in which so-
ciety within national borders is permanently threatened by internal and ex-
ternal enemies—, sovereignty and the martyr figure are constitutive mo-
ments in the development of a modern political religion. Marcela Cristi pro-
poses a definition of political religion that resumes, criticizes and develops
Robert N. Bellah’s concept of civil religion, which I consider useful for the
purposes of this study. Bellah defines civil religion in America «as a gen-
uine vehicle of national religious self-understanding», which provides a
«transcendental goal for the political process» and contributes to the unity
and collective identity of Americans.105 More than three decades after Bel-
lah’s publication, Cristi adopts some central aspects of this definition, but
makes remarkable changes:
Civil religion is concerned with both the social and the political order.
Civil religion tends to sacralize certain aspects of civic life by means of
public rituals and collective ceremonies. […] Civil religion may be
considered a belief system or, a surrogate religion that expresses the
self-identity of a collectivity. Yet, like secular ideologies of different
kinds, civil religion may also attempt to force group identity and to le-
gitimize an existing political order by injecting a transcendental di-
mension or by putting a religious gloss on the justification. This latter
manifestation I call political religion.106
According to this definition, political religion has one modus operandi and
two functions. The term «sacred» indicates the modus operandi. Civil reli-
gion operates through practices of sacralization, which are identified with
rituals and ceremonies. Those practices are anchored in a system of beliefs,
which seems to be both the fundament and the product of sacralization
practices. Their functions concern two areas of human life: social and po-
litical organization. First, sacralization causes identification of the individu-
al with collectivity and, second, there is a legitimization of the political or-
105 Bellah 1967, 8.
106 Cristi 2001, 4.
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der. Although not explicitly stated, the difference between political reli-
gion and other kinds of ideologies, which Cristi terms «secular», is that the
former gives political and social order a transcendent dimension. It is nec-
essary to postulate this distinction, otherwise the concept of political reli-
gion would lose all heuristic value.
Cristi stresses the political and ideological implications of political reli-
gion. According to Cristi, Bellah was strongly influenced by Durkheim,
who «conceives religion as essentially a spontaneous phenomenon.»107 Due
to this adoption of Durkheim’s «consensual tradition», Bellah’s notion of
civil religion is not useful in studying those cases in which political reli-
gion is used as a tool to further national policies or programs. Cristi pro-
poses combining the theoretical model of Durkheim with that of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, that is, conceptualizing political religion on the basis of
its dual manifestation: as a culture and an ideology. Durkheim’s notion al-
lows one to take into account elements of spontaneity within political reli-
gion. By contrast, the Rousseauian model allows one to consider the possi-
bility of the imposition of political religion.
Indeed, Rousseau—despite calling it «civil religion»—conceptualizes a
political religion that is designed and controlled by the state. He hypothe-
sizes that this form of religion is necessary for the proper functioning of a
good republican political order. The main function of political religion is
to ensure the loyalty of citizens to the social contract, the law and the na-
tion. He considers Christianity (and all forms of positive religion) inade-
quate to fulfill this task; there must be a «purely civil profession of faith,
the articles of which it is the business of the sovereign to determine.»108
The articles are the following: there is a benevolent god; there will be life
after death; the just will be rewarded and the wicked punished; the social
contract and the laws are sacred; sectarian intolerance is prohibited.109
Rousseau, like most Enlightenment thinkers, believed that Christian re-
ligion was destined to disappear with the collapse of the old regime; but he
also believed in its indispensability as a source of transcendental morality
for the legitimization of the state. This is why his philosophical project
called for the creation of a new religious belief. This is the meaning of the
adverb «purely» in the citation above: Rousseau considers a form of faith
purged of the language and the mythologies of positive religions, primarily
Christianity. Rousseau leaves no doubt that political religion must be im-
107 Cristi 2001, 7.
108 Rousseau 1994, 166.
109 See Bertham 2004, 185.
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posed. The state must fix its own cult, its dogmas and its language forms.
But is it possible to shape an ideology that is not articulated by the seman-
tics, narratives, and rituals from earlier traditions of thought and action? To
rephrase the question: is it possible to create a new religious language and
way of social acting from nothing?
There are two passages in Rousseau’s oeuvre that I consider important to
highlight why the idea of a «pure» civil religion should be considered ab-
stract and ahistorical. Those passages also help to establish a connection
between the issue of political religion and that of martyrdom and, in par-
ticular, the emergence of national martyrs. The first passage is situated at
the end of his Social Contract and clarifies the way in which the state
should impose civil religion. Rousseau writes that «it does concern the
state that each citizen should have a religion which makes him cherish his
duties» and that if a citizen is «incapable of cherishing the laws and justice
sincerely, or of sacrificing, when necessary, his life for his duty», he or she
should be banished from the state by the sovereign.110 The second passage
is situated in his Discourse on Political Economy:
If it were to be said that it is well for one to die for the sake of all, I
should admire the saying in the mouth of a virtuous and worthy patri-
ot who voluntarily goes to his death out of duty, for the good of his
country; but if the meaning is that a government is permitted to sacri-
fice an innocent person for the good of the mass, I hold this maxim to
be one of the most execrable that tyranny has ever invented.111
For Rousseau, a state that sacrifices its citizens is tyrannical, but a citizen
who is not willing to sacrifice himself or herself does not have the right to
participate in the rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the state and
should be banished. If the state cannot force citizens, the only option that
remains is to convince them that it is right to sacrifice themselves for the
state. This is where the ideological dimension of civil religion becomes visi-
ble: «Good citizenship […] has to be imposed and enforced through what
Willaime has called L’Etat éducateur.»112 However, what means does the
state have at its disposal to convince people of the necessity of the state it-
self to the point that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for it?
During and after the French Revolution, many people died due to their
belief in the values and principles of the Republic. Many of these devout
110 Rousseau 1994, 166.
111 Rousseau 1994, 19.
112 Cristi 2001, 29.
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citizens were at the center of a new, specifically republican, form of devo-
tion. As indicated by historian Albert Soboul, particularly with the increas-
ing importance of the sans-culottes in political life, popular worship de-
veloped around the «martyrs of freedom», which goes hand in hand with
the processes of dechristianization.113 The most famous martyr of the
French Revolution was certainly the deputy and journalist Jean-Paul
Marat.114 «In memory of Marat», wrote Soboul, «sans-culottes saw an affir-
mation of their republican principles, a form of popular communion, an
exaltation of their revolutionary faith.»115
Political rhetoric played a significant role in the formation of this new
form of worship. On 1 Brumaire an II (1793), citizen Pannequin delivered
an Eloge de Marat before the societé populaire of the Section de Picques. In
this speech, Marat, who was killed in June of that year, was honored as
«l’apôtre et le martyr de la liberté».116 As noted by Joseph Clark:
from the opening assertion that Marat had ‹anim[é] le néant, recré[é]
la nature› to the conclusion that the ‹immortel ami du people› was ‹le
ministre envoyé de la part du Dieu de la nature, pour porter la parole
de vie parmi les peuples qui marchaient dans les ombres de la mort›,
Pannequin’s Eloge was saturated with biblical allusions and messianic
motifs.117
The birth of this republican martyrology shows why Rousseau’s «purely
civil profession of faith» is a problematic concept. It does not consider that
faith in and commitment to any kind of values or principles cannot be
born or develop in a vacuum, but are instead born of necessity and always
articulated by adopting practices and language forms which are socially,
culturally, and linguistically predetermined. The idea of the heroic sacrifice
in the popular imagination turns into a cult of the martyrs. The cult of the
«martyrs of freedom» resumes and iterates semantics, narrations and rituals
that were developed and established within the Christian tradition.118
113 Soboul 1966, 332.
114 See Soboul 1966, 331–337; Schechter 2014, 161.
115 Soboul, 1966, 335.
116 Quoted in Clarke 2007, 171.
117 Clarke 2007, 171.
118 It is not irrelevant to note that the French Revolution also produced martyr fig-
ures on the opposite political front, namely the Catholics and counter-revolu-
tionaries. A famous example is that of the martyrs of Compiègne. It is even
more significant that the murderer of Marat Charlotte Corday acquired the sta-
tus of a martyr of the counter-revolution. This means that there were two com-
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From this point of view, republican martyrology can actually be consid-
ered a narrative that functions analogously to political religion as defined
by Cristi. Firstly, martyrs were figures with which citizens who were loyal
to the revolutionary project and the Republic could identify. Their repre-
sentation and adoration as martyrs make them excellent symbols of the
«political body». At the same time, the cult of the martyrs certainly func-
tioned to legitimize the new political order and delegitimize the ancient
régime. Their death was a sort of manifestation of the truth of republican
principles, since they demonstrated the will of the sovereign citizens to die
for the sovereign state.
Unlike the thoughts and hopes of Rousseau, the civil religion of the First
Republic was articulated by taking up and reframing forms of representa-
tion that belonged to the semantic and symbolic system of the Christian
tradition. Does this mean that we must deny the secular nature of the revo-
lution and, with it, the modern sovereign state? Not at all. Both are results
of the secularization process. I argue that it is precisely due to the process
of secularization that the state martyr figure was able to emerge and quick-
ly spread. On the threshold between the Middle Ages and modernity and
with the emergence of nation-states, the martyr figure underwent a macro-
signature through which it was transposed from the pragmatic and
hermeneutic context of Christian religion (and theology) to a secular (and
political) one. This transfer was possible because the figure of the martyr
soon proved to be useful for the construction of the mythical narrative of
the nation-state and able to appeal to the people by making them feel part
of a new form of political community called the Republic. The birth of the
modern narrative of the nation-state and the secular signature of martyr-
dom are closely linked historical phenomena.
Here it is important to draw attention to the close link between the sec-
ular use of the rhetoric of martyrdom, the birth of the nation-state and hu-
man rights discourse. As Agamben noted,
in the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable
rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and reality at
the moment in which they can no longer take the form of rights be-
longing to citizens of a state. [...] This is in fact implicit in the ambigui-
ty of the very title of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
peting martyrologies: one revolutionary, secular, and republican; the other
counter-revolutionary, religious, and Catholic. They were narratives in competi-
tion, but they referred to the same language and rhetoric.
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Citizen, of 1789. In the phrase La déclaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen, it is not clear whether the two terms homme and citoyen name
two autonomous beings or instead form a unitary system.119
This ambiguity is also present in the state martyr figure, which functions as
a witness to the truth of universal principles, yet simultaneously serves as a
symbolic political body for the citizens of a particular nation. As Hannah
Arendt argues,
The reason why life asserted itself as the ultimate point of reference in
the modern age and has remained the highest good of modern society
is that the modern reversal operated within the fabric of a Christian so-
ciety whose fundamental belief in the sacredness of life has survived,
and has even remained completely unshaken by, secularization and the
general decline of the Christian faith. […] No matter how articulate
and how conscious the thinkers of modernity were in their attacks on
tradition, the priority of life over everything else had acquired for them
the status of a ‹self-evident truth›.120
Just as modern political thought regards the sacredness of the life of the in-
dividual as a sacred truth encoded in the various declarations of human
rights and constitutions of nation-states, it considers that the sovereign
state must hold the monopoly on violence to be equally true and that, in
exceptional situations, political authority has the right, if not the duty, to
suspend human rights, that is, to reduce individuals or groups to mere life.
This is undoubtedly one of the constitutive paradoxes of modern political
thought: it tries to unify two ways of conceiving the sacredness of life,
which, in reality, are diametrically opposed. On the one hand, there is the
idea that life is sacred as part of the universal community of humanity; on
the other hand, life is sacred in the sense that it can always potentially be
killed (or left to die) in order to save and defend particular communities
within the borders of nation-states.
Modern state martyrologies should be regarded ultimately as nothing
more than very effective narratives concealing this paradox and ambiguity.
The state martyr is one who, by dying, witnesses the necessity of the
sovereign state as a guarantor of human and citizens’ rights and national
security. It is therefore no longer a testimony to the truth of the founding
events of Christian religion—the liberation and salvation of the righteous
119 Agamben 1998, 126.
120 Arendt 1998, 314, 319.
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through the death and resurrection of Christ, which prefigure the death
and resurrection of all the righteous in the future universal community—
and an accusation of a political authority that decides over life and death.
On the contrary, the state martyr figure is an instrument for the conceal-
ment of the real functioning of sovereign power, part of a complex mecha-
nism, which, ultimately, has only one function: the maintenance and con-
stant revival of modern state mythology.
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Cultural, Social and Political Context of the Event of
Political Violence
The Rhetoric of Sacrifice During the Risorgimento and the Resistenza
The previous chapter demonstrated that the rise of both the ideology of na-
tionalism and of modern nation-states is intrinsically linked with the emer-
gence of the state martyr figure and the rhetoric of sacrifice for the nation.
The chapter exposed the long process of re-signification by which the mar-
tyr figure ceased to be part of a discourse of rebellion that delegitimizes
any kind of established political authority and became part of the modern
discourse of sovereignty. Now I will turn to the specific case of political vi-
olence on which this study focuses: the kidnapping, imprisonment and
murder of Aldo Moro. This chapter will first describe the presence and
function of the rhetoric of sacrifice and the martyr figure in two key mo-
ments of Italy’s modern political history: Italian unification or the Risorgi-
mento, namely the political and social movement that consolidated the dif-
ferent states on the Italian peninsula into the single State of the Kingdom
of Italy in the nineteenth century; and the Resistenza against Fascism before
and during World War II. Understanding the consolidation of the idea of
sacrifice and of the state martyr figure within these two key moments of It-
aly’s modern history is fundamental, since the memory of both—but espe-
cially of the Resistenza,—profoundly determined the Italian political imagi-
nary and the identity of the Italian people after World War II. Moreover,
the Resistenza, both as a myth and as a historical movement, is ubiquitous
in the discursive and cultural practices that refer to the kidnapping, impris-
onment and assassination of Aldo Moro.
Nationalism profoundly shaped the actions of peoples and states in the
nineteenth century. As Hans Kohn points out in his book The Idea of Na-
tionalism, nationalism encompasses the oldest feelings of man, such as the
predisposition to love one’s place of birth or childhood, the predilection
for one’s mother tongue and domestic customs, and, finally, the tendency
to be proud of one’s own way of life and to look down on other ways of
life or face them with mistrust.1 It was only at the turn of the nineteenth
4
4.1
1 See Kohn 1944.
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century, however, that politicization of broader sections of the population
within individual states was so advanced that the national feeling, which
heretofore was rather spontaneous, became ideologically substantiated.
The age of absolutism had a great significance for the formation of na-
tionalism, because during this period the princes created the modern state,
and thus the vessel of modern nationalism was prepared. Without the con-
centration of power in the hands of the sovereign, and without the leveling
of older social structures as a result, the essential prerequisites for the en-
forcement of nationalism would have been lacking. The centralization of
political power in the state, both internally and externally, had already
been accompanied by nationalist sentiments in the seventeenth century,
particularly in the confrontation of Europe with Louis XIV. The decisive
intellectual work for the formation of national understanding was con-
ducted in the second half of the eighteenth century, especially by the East
Prussian Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803). Herder thought he could
recognize the character of peoples in folk songs; they appeared to him as
an expression of their heart and soul. He claimed that all manifestations of
life of a people were emanations of their specific life principles. For
Herder, the peoples were unities who developed organically, and were thus
creatures of God, which differed from other unities in their own destiny
and tasks.
Modern nationalism fully developed with the French Revolution. The
conception of the Third Estate as a nation was conceived above all as a
weapon against antiquated social stratification, but was also quickly used
against external «enemies». During the external struggles of the revolution-
ary period, the loyalty of the French strongly focused on their nation. It
was not just a question of defending the rights of the nation against the re-
sistance of European monarchies, but it was argued that, through its recent
history, France had enacted a world-historical event and thus had the right
to claim leadership in Europe.
One of the most influential thinkers of Italian nationalism and republi-
canism was Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872). In his publications and corre-
spondence, he repeatedly argued that Italy played a world-historical role.
Just as Italy had already strongly influenced the culture and institutions of
Europe in antiquity and again in the Renaissance, its task now was to open
up the age of nations through their rebirth and thereby take over spiritual
leadership. Mazzini was convinced that only democracy could lift the peo-
ples. His belief that freedom, equality, and fraternity were only guaranteed
in the Republic defined him as a Republican. He idolized the people in a
similar way to romantic French nationalism. Mazzini was, with Giuseppe
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Garibaldi, one of the most prominent Carbonari revolutionaries because
of his actions during the unification of Italy or Risorgimento and his spear-
heading of the Italian revolutionary movement.2
Another leading exponent of the Risorgimento was the Italian clergyman,
philosopher and first President of the Chamber of Deputies of the King-
dom of Sardinia, Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852). In one of his most im-
portant writings, Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani, he maintained
that the Italians always exceeded all nations in art and science; they were
the most «universal» of all nations and the center of Christianity. Accord-
ing to Gioberti, Italy sunk from its greatness by turning away from
Catholicism to political thought, similarly to France. For this reason, he
encouraged a return and renewal of Catholic thought. Catholicism and the
papacy thus gained high importance. Gioberti did not regard the papacy as
an obstacle, but rather as conducive to Italian unification.3
According to Maurizio Viroli, republican political writers of the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries wanted to resurrect a religion that he de-
scribes as «civic Christianity», which appealed to Italian people in defend-
ing republican liberty and serving the common good.4 Viroli distinguishes
between three different ways of appealing for the «resurrection of reli-
gion»: some writers wanted to renew the Christian religion and make it
compatible with liberal values; others, though with less success, tried to
model civic religion on Rousseau’s religion civile; and others wanted to de-
velop a religion of duty and liberty compatible with, but not identical to,
Christian religion. All of them, however, were united by the conviction
that religious sentiment was necessary to unite the Italian people.5
As Viroli highlights, in the discursive practices of the Risorgimento, cul-
tural studies identify the conception of the nation understood as a
community of combatants united in a sacred commitment to uphold
the quasi-metaphysical entity of the patria/nazione (fatherland/nation),
whose distinctive features are kinship (parentela), love/honor/virtue
(amore/onore/virtù), and sacrifice (sacrificio), with its grim complements
of pain, death, and mourning. […] The nation was imagined as a ‹com-
munity of progeny› (comunità di discendenza) that reaches back to great
figures of the past who belong ‹by nature› to the community they have
illuminated with their deeds. […] The biological nexus between gener-
2 See Fenske 2003, 476–477.
3 See Fenske 2003, 476–477.
4 Viroli 2012, xv.
5 See Viroli 2012, xv.
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ations and individuals, summarized in the word ‹blood›, was regarded
as a fundamental feature of the nation. In addition, the religious con-
notation of the Risorgimento’s nationalism clearly emerges from the
relentless use of religious words like ‹regeneration›, ‹apostolate›, ‹faith›,
‹resurrection›, ‹holy war›, and ‹crusade›.6
The protagonists of the Risorgimento, Viroli claims, «drove action, to the
point of self-sacrifice.»7 He offers the example of Luigi Settembrini, who
«embodied a model of religiosity that inspired generous actions for one’s
country» and promoted «a religion of virtue and liberty that his father
taught him, with reference to classical and Christian examples.»8 Settem-
brini, who was affected by the wave of liberalism that spread throughout
Italy at that time, and who soon after his marriage began to conspire
against the Bourbon government, was arrested in 1839, imprisoned in
Naples, and liberated three years later. After being arrested, Settembrini
awaited the court’s verdict and, fearing a death sentence, wrote to his wife
declaring his willingness to accept martyrdom:
If I am sentenced to death, I can promise on our love, and on the love
we have for our children, that your Luigi will not betray his principles;
I will die with the certainty that my blood will bear good to my coun-
try; I will die with the serene courage of the martyrs.9
The willingness to become a martyr during the Risorgimento is also exem-
plified, Viroli claims, by the «martyrs of Belfiore», who were put to death
by the Austrian government between 1851 and 1855. The priest and orga-
nizer of the anti-Austrian insurrection plan, Enrico Tazzoli, stressed the du-
ty of Catholic priests—three of the sentenced were clergymen—to be will-
ing to engage in self-sacrifice for the fatherland. Similarly, Father Luigi
Martini exalted the Christian faith of the sentenced, arguing that their love
of the fatherland coincided with the Christian message. Martini glorified
Tito Spoeri, the most famous among the pro-independence fighters sen-
tenced to death in the valley of Belfiore, as someone who approached capi-
tal punishment in the spirit of a Christian martyr. He wrote that Spoeri
found great consolation in reading the Gospel, strived to conciliate God
and the people and both religion and the fatherland, and maintained that
6 Viroli 2012, xvi–xvii; see also Mario Banti/Ginsborg 2007; Mario Banti 2000.
7 Viroli 2012, 140.
8 Viroli 2012, 141.
9 Settembrini 1934, 239 (trans. Viroli 2012, 141).
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only the religious spirit could afford the nation’s Risorgimento with the nec-
essary strength.
According to Viroli, this and other examples «illustrate the difference be-
tween the new religion of liberty and Rousseau’s old idea that liberty re-
quires the repudiation of Christianity.»10 The Italian Risorgimento, he ar-
gues,
was an experience of political emancipation made possible by a
twofold process: a departure from the republican religion introduced
by the Jacobins, and the rediscovery, in the great riverbed of Christiani-
ty, of a religious conception that pointed to moral and political liberty
as the supreme duty, and therefore openly opposed the doctrine and
practice of the church—although the Catholics who became witnesses
and apostles of the new faith were neither few nor unimportant.11
I am quite skeptical about the heuristic value of this distinction between
the French republican religion and an Italian «new religion of liberty»,
since, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Christian language and nar-
ratives were secularized, iterated and used in the context of the French Rev-
olution and during the formation of the French First Republic, though in
a less explicit way than in Italy. Finally, martyrological representations had,
from a strictly political point of view, the same function in both countries,
namely to frame national identity and to construct a mythology of the re-
publican state. However, Viroli’s excellent and inspiring study demon-
strates how the figure of the republican martyr, also a state martyr figure,
in the Italian pragmatic and hermeneutic context of the nineteenth centu-
ry was able to emerge and be consolidated in a more effective, explicit and
lasting way than in France. This is most likely due to the fact, as Jenny Pon-
zo observes, «that Italian ‹civil religion› tends to manifest itself in—and to
identify itself with—a syncretic set of practices combining institutional,
ideological, Catholic, and sub-Christian elements.»12
Also in the context of the Resistenza against Fascism, the rhetoric and
language of martyrdom was diffuse. As Viroli points out, the stories of two
radical liberal intellectuals, journalist Piero Gobetti (1901–1926) and polit-
ician Giovanni Amendola (1882–1926), «two of the most prominent early
martyrs of antifascism», reveal the great importance of religious sentiment
10 Viroli 2012, 144.
11 Viroli 2012, 153.
12 Ponzo 2017, 142.
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and language in the early Resistance.13 The former advocated «a more spiri-
tual religiosity, a heroic morality that guides the life and action of man and
peoples»,14 while the latter approached the Gospel «with a soul free from
apostolic ends, and only yearning after reproaching the pure expression of
humanity.»15 Although the Vatican had an ambiguous relationship with
Fascism, opposing it with little or no resistance and often even openly
helping the regime, there were undoubtedly many Catholics who opposed
the regime. Many leftist Catholics in particular understood and described
resistance to Fascism as a Christian duty. Priest Giovanni Minzoni, killed
by Fascists on August 23, 1923, wrote in the same year:
Today I realize that a much harsher battle is waiting for me. We are
tenaciously preparing for the fight, and with weapons that for us are
sacred and divine, those of the first Christians: prayer and goodness.
Retreating would entail renouncing a sacred mission. With an open
heart, and the prayer for my persecutors that I hope will never die
from my lips, I am waiting for the storm, persecution, and perhaps
death for the triumph of the cause of Christ.16
Similarly, Catholic journalist and politician Igino Giordani (1894–1980),
in Rivolta Cattolica, published in 1925, openly exhorted Catholics to revolt
in the name of their faith and insisted on the anti-Christian and anti-
Catholic character of nationalism. Don Luigi Sturzo was of the same opin-
ion, arguing that Fascism erected a Leviathan «that absorbs every force and
becomes the expression of an impending political pantheism»;17 according
to him, Fascism, like all forms of totalitarianism, had a deeply anti-Chris-
tian character, since «idolatry […] is the totem of primitive societies, the
symbol of the clan, the tribe, the race, the nation.»18 Another Catholic, the
editor of the party newspaper Il Popolo Giuseppe Donati (1889–1931),
highlighted the importance of religious values in the commitment to
democracy by referring to Mazzini:
All politics is inspired by spiritual principles and is oriented to spiritu-
al purposes […]. This is why we call ourselves, besides democrats,
Christian as well. The movement of the Christian Democrats is con-
13 Viroli 2012, 185.
14 Gobetti 1969, 75 (trans. Viroli 2012, 181).
15 Amendola 1953, 143 (trans. Viroli 2012, 183).
16 Quoted in Palumbi 2003, 24 (trans. Viroli 2012, 187).
17 Sturzo 1965, 258 (trans. Viroli 2012, 189).
18 Sturzo 1967, 286 (trans. Viroli 2012, 190.).
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nected with the purest traditions of our Risorgimento. Mazzini said
that ‹either democracy will be religious, or it will not exist›. And for us,
as for Giuseppe Mazzini, religiosity is nothing other than the spirit of
duty that drives us to sacrifice and complete commitment to the tri-
umph of an ideal. These spiritual values are expressed in the purest
form of Christianity, which is a law of love, freedom, justice and chari-
ty especially for our fellow human beings.19
In some cases, the Catholic opposition to Fascism was expressed by refer-
ring explicitly to Christian eschatological language. This is the case of
philosopher Piero Martinetti (1872–1943), who in Gesù Cristo e il cristianes-
imo, published in 1934, argued that the official Catholic Church was too
distant from the Church of Christ, which was «a persecuted sect of the
poor and the humble». He also affirmed that, though the Kingdom of God
could never be realized in history,
no obstacle whatsoever can obstruct the renewal of that pure Christian
tradition that rises above the history of the churches like the celestial
Jerusalem, which in the Apocalypse rises from the ruins of heaven and
earth. In all times, there have been men who, inspired by the sacred
traditions of the gospel of Jesus Christ, have raised themselves to the
eternal gospel written in the depth of the human spirit; they have not
built kingdoms, nor have they founded churches, but have conserved
among men the tradition of truth.20
Martinetti’s language and eschatological narrative were not related to the
concepts of nation and fatherland. He iterated and recontextualized the
radical rejection of violence against and exploitation of the «poor and
humble» by political authorities, which he found originally expressed in
the Gospel and especially in Paul’s letters. He, in other words, recalled the
narrative of rebellion against established political power without mixing
and linking it with the narrative of sovereignty, which, as we saw, in
modernity is always related to the mythicization of the nation-state.
The situation is different with regard to historian Adolfo Omodeo
(1889–1946), who cultivated the idea of bringing together the traditions of
the Risorgimento and ancient Christianity. His political ideas are a perfect
example of the interaction between the discourse of rebellion and the dis-
course of sovereignty identified by Foucault. For Omedeo, the man of the
19 Donati 1971, 139–140 (trans. Viroli 2012, 190–191).
20 Marinetti 1923, 170 (trans. Viroli 2012, 202).
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Risorgimento «lived a new faith» and embodied the nation «just as the seven
thousand Israelites who at the time of Elija had knelt down before Baal
embodied the true Israel»,21 because «they were aware that they were work-
ing and suffering for Italy and a universally human ideal, which pertained
to all men.»22 Through the mechanism of prefiguration, Omodeo repre-
sents Italy here as the Promised Land. As Viroli points out, he understood
the resurrection of Italy as the revelation of divine assistance to the people.
However, confronted with the «fanatical fury of nationalism and iron dic-
tatorship», a sort of Christian cosmopolitism matured in him. Recalling
the spiritual condition that oriented his studies, in 1946 he wrote that
without repudiating my country, I felt a broader fatherland was aris-
ing, which comprises everything that all the peoples have acquired
(also within the worship of their own countries) according to universal
values.23
This reproduces the same kind of ambiguity that, as we saw in the previous
chapter, characterizes the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Cit-
izen, and which creates a constitutive paradox of modern political thought:
the contemporaneity of particularism and universalism, a universalistic
idea of ethics and a particularistic conception of the mission and tasks of a
nation or, as Omodeo expresses it by referring to Mazzini, of a civilization:
The whole history of mankind is the gradual revelation of divine provi-
dence. […] Once the task of Christianity has been resolved in the new
religion of progress, and once an era has ended rather than begun with
the French Revolution, one must usher in a new era that is at once so-
cial and religious. To Italy, which should rise again as if it had ‹to show
the miracle› of the forces that can restore faith, falls ‹the initiative› that
will give to the world a third Italian civilization, and not with the force
of arms, or with a theocratic dominion, but with the association of free
peoples, who have to proceed together toward the divine end. […]
This faith endowed many with the courage to take action and, instead
of dismaying them in the objective calculation of the facts, exalted
them to the point of martyrdom.24
21 Omodeo 1951, 444–445 (trans. Viroli 2012, 203).
22 Omodeo 1946, xviii (trans. Viroli 2012, 206).
23 Omodeo 1970, 5 (trans. Viroli 2012, 209).
24 Omodeo 1946, 304, 308 (trans. Viroli 2012, 207).
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Now, these examples demonstrate that both in the context of Italian unifi-
cation and in the context of resistance against Fascism, the discourse of re-
bellion expressed through the rhetoric and language of sacrifice and mar-
tyrdom was diffuse, helping to invite people to resist and fight against es-
tablished political authority. In the context of the Risorgimento, the idea of
martyrdom was intrinsically bound with national identity, the willingness
to sacrifice oneself for the fatherland. During the Resistenza, the discourse
of rebellion could be articulated, in some cases, without reference to the
nation. Nonetheless, many promoters and fighters of the Resistance used
patriotic and national rhetoric to frame and give meaning to their actions.
The myths of the nation and the fatherland, inherited from the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, were simply too widely disseminated and em-
bedded in culture and political consciousness.
According to Viroli, it is a mistake to confuse the «universalistic ideal of
the patria» with the «particularistic idea of nation», since, «in the first case,
we have a civil religion centered on the political and moral value of liberty,
which sustains liberal and republican institutions» while, in the second
case, «we find a political religion centered on the principles of cultural and
or ethnic homogeneity and uniqueness, designed to uphold domestic po-
litical and social discrimination or aggressive foreign policy.»25 Here I disa-
gree with Viroli for the simple reason that «patria» and «universality» are
two mutually exclusive concepts or ideas. Since the term «patria» (the
Latin term for «fatherland») frames peoples metaphorically as families, the
attribution of «universality» to it makes sense only on the condition of de-
scribing humanity as a family and earth as the «fatherland» of humanity.
However, it is important to emphasize that within the discourses and
narratives produced in the context of the Resistenza, the rhetoric and lan-
guage of sacrifice and martyrdom were not only used to appeal to a patriot-
ic defense of the nation and to frame national identity. The line of conti-
nuity traced by Viroli between Risorgimento and Resistenza, and the attribu-
tion of a new «religion of liberty» to men and women who fought in both
contexts of struggle, is questionable. In fact, as Norberto Bobbio and Clau-
dio Pavone indicate, the Resistance, unlike the Risorgimento, was character-
ized by the overlapping of three wars: patriotic war, civil war, and class
war.26 In other words, the Resistenza was not a «second Risorgimento», as ar-
gued by a certain Italian historiography for some time.27
25 Viroli 2012, xvii.
26 See Bobbio 2015; Pavone 2006.
27 See Bidussa 2015, ix.
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Like in other European countries occupied by the German army, the Re-
sistance was a national liberation struggle against the imposition of the
Nazi regime. As such, the idea of the patria played a fundamental role. But
on a second level, it was not only a movement seeking to liberate the na-
tion from foreigners, but also from a regime that had established a regime
of dictatorship and abolished all constitutional liberties. Most resistance
movements in other countries were exclusively patriotic warfare move-
ments, while in Italy the Resistance was both a patriotic and an antifascist
movement against the external and the internal enemy. Thus, the Resis-
tance held the dual significance of a national (against Germans) and politi-
cal liberation struggle (against Fascist dictatorship) for the regaining of na-
tional independence and political and civil freedom. Finally, as Bobbio ar-
gues, it was «a movement of social emancipation […], the only great popu-
lar movement in the history of modern Italy.»28 Therefore, «there were
those who fought the Resistance exclusively as patriotic warfare; those who
fought it also and above all as an antifascist war; finally those who adhered
to it with the impetus and hopes of social renewal.»29
The rhetoric and language of sacrifice and martyrdom were implement-
ed by all political fronts in this three-sided war. In fact, Fascist propaganda
had its own martyrological representations and rhetoric of self-sacrifice for
the fatherland’s glory. The philosopher Giovanni Gentile, one of the most
famous ideologues of the regime, wrote for example that «Fascism is a reli-
gion, political and civil, because it has its own conception of the state and
an original way of conceiving life. […] Christian martyrs and the young
heroes of the Fascist revolution have confirmed, through the ages, a bright
reality: only a religion can negate and undo the attachment to mundane
life.»30 As there was widespread use of the rhetoric of sacrifice and martyr-
dom on the popular Catholic front faced with Italian Fascism, there was
also a use of such rhetoric, though to a lesser extent, by Communist and
Socialist partisans.31 In general, the importance of the figure of the martyr
during the Resistenza, and even more in its memorialization after the end
of the war, is demonstrated by the name given to so many antifascist
brigades, such as the Brigata Martiri della Grappa, Brigata Garibaldi Martiri
di Lovere, Brigata Martiri della Val Leogra, Brigata Garibaldi Martiri di
Alessandria, to name a few. The same can be said about the toponymy of
28 Bobbio 2015, 7.
29 Bobbio 2015, 8.
30 Quoted in Gentile 1993, 117.
31 See Perona 2000; Spriano 1975.
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public places: piazza Martiri della libertà, piazza Tre Martiri, Cava dei Mar-
tiri, Casa del Martirio, and so on.32
In conclusion, the figure of the martyr and the rhetoric of sacrifice were
used on all fronts of the patriotic, civil and class wars. As Pavone observes,
in the civil war between Fascists and antifascists, the two sides contended
for the recent past of the nation, especially the Risorgimento; while the Fas-
cists’ appeal to the Risorgimento was primarily national and patriotic, an-
tifascists appealed to the Risorgimento as a historical affirmation of the gen-
eral principles of freedom, justice and brotherhood.33 Both fronts resumed
and iterated the sacrificial and martyrological language and rhetoric that,
as we have seen, were extensively diffused in the discursive practices of the
Risorgimento. For the Fascists, death in battle was equivalent to martyrdom
for the glory of the nation, understood as the unity of the Italian race. On
the opposite front, martyrdom and self-sacrifice could take on different
meanings. Some understood and represented it as martyrdom for the es-
tablishment of a democratic and liberal Republic, while others saw sacri-
fice as the price in the fight for social justice, the victory of the proletariat
and the formation of a socialist society without class differences.
Post-war Italians were the «children of the Resistenza», which was at the
same time a war against foreign invaders, internal Fascism and for the radi-
cal transformation of society.34 After the end of the conflict, Italian people
generally agreed that both foreign invaders and Fascists were defeated. On
these first two levels, the Resistenza was regarded as successful, but those
who held out revolutionary hope in the liberation war claimed that the Re-
sistance had failed and that the dead had died in vain. On the opposite
side, there were those who represented the Resistance as a second Risorgi-
mento, as if a new Italy had been born; but, as Bobbio says, «truth, as al-
ways, lies in the middle: the Resistance was a rescue, not a revolution; a
wake from a bad sleep filled with nightmares, not a complete metamor-
phosis.»35
32 See Collotti/Sandri/Sessi 2001.
33 See Pavone 2015, 35.
34 Bobbio 2015, 15.
35 Bobbio 2015, 12.
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1948–1978: Thirty Years of Italian Political History
The great achievement of the antifascist Resistenza was the drafting of the
Constitution, which came into force on 1 January, 1948, and was written
by a ruling class formed by the elites of antifascist parties present in the
National Liberation Committee. The Constitution resulted from a com-
promise achieved democratically between the two new political forces
born or reborn after the collapse of Fascism: the worker movement, divid-
ed between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist
Party (PSI), which in the first elections of 1946 obtained together about 40
percent of the vote, and the Catholic movement, whose party, the Chris-
tian Democracy (DC), had solely 35 percent of the vote in the same elec-
tions.36 In the struggle against the regime, they had developed a common
language and progressively created a project that excluded both the pure
and simple restoration of pre-emptive liberalism and the revolutionary
programs of Jacobinism or Bolshevism. Among the results obtained with
the Constitution, the following should be remembered: Republic instead
of monarchy; a second house, the Senate of the Republic, also democrati-
cally elected and no longer appointed from above; suffrage extended to
women; recognition of political parties; the assertion of broader social
rights alongside the reaffirmation of traditional rights of liberty; the estab-
lishment of a Constitutional Court called to safeguard the constitutional
rights of citizens, even against Parliament.37
There are two major problems that the political elite was unable to re-
solve. On the one hand, democratic culture did not penetrate the whole
country and antifascism found great resistance in vast territorial spheres
and in large social strata. In fact, vast social strata, which were refractory
and essentially indifferent to democracy, did not intimately accept the
Constitution and in 1946 massively voted in favor of the monarchy.
Francesco Biscione defines this set of substantially anti-democratic forces
as the «submerged of the Republic», which influenced (and still influ-
ences) the political, civil and institutional life of the country.38 These sub-
merged, anti-democratic forces with authoritarian tendencies determined
the evolution of the Italian political landscape by inducing Alcide De
Gasperi, leader of the DC, to change strongly, between 1946 and 1947, the
face and attitude of his party, which in 1947 excluded Socialists and Com-
4.2
36 See Ginsborg 1990, 98–112.
37 See Bobbio 2015, 13.
38 See Biscione 2003; Biscione 2012, 35–40.
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munists from the cabinet. However, the exclusion of the PCI and PSI from
the cabinet in 1947 must also be understood as directly connected with the
incipient Cold War and De Gasperi’s ambition to place Italy on the path
delineated by the Truman doctrine, which would soon lead to the Marshall
Plan.
The second problem in the Italian political landscape lay precisely in the
failure to recognize the full political legitimacy of the leftist parties and, in
particular, of what would soon be the largest Communist party in the
Western bloc. The exclusion of leftist parties from the government con-
verged with the formation of the Western bloc and corresponded to the
US’ political needs and goals. The PCI, which became the second Italian
party after it had split from the PSI in 1947, placed the DC within the im-
possibility of acknowledging the Communists’ legitimacy; the PCI was a
democratically legitimized national force, yet ideologically and politically
bound with the Soviet Union and the nascent Communist bloc. The DC
thus assumed political and electoral primacy, which lasted for over forty
years. It remained antifascist, especially at the summit, yet also represented
anti-democratic and authoritarian social forces.
The DC was founded in 1943 as the successor to the Italian People’s Par-
ty. After the war, the DC, with major US backing, was able to gain power
by demonizing socialist or communist inspired revolutions. The DC was a
mass party with a heterogeneous but predominantly bourgeoisie mass
base, which appealed to people by focusing on the rhetoric of national se-
curity. Internationally, the DC gained the support of the US and NATO.
Moreover, a NATO stay-behind organization called Gladio was established
during the Cold War in Italy with the purpose of counteracting a possible
attack on the Warsaw Pact’s forces in Western European countries and
combating communism with forms of psychological warfare and the use of
false flag techniques.39 Antisocialist and anticommunist propaganda was
also strongly supported by the Catholic Church. The institutional church
repeatedly expressed itself with antisocialist and anticommunist vehe-
mence in papal encyclicals and other pronouncements, as in a famous
1949 decree: the faithful who professed the doctrine of materialist and an-
ti-Christian communism «will be treated as apostates to the Catholic faith,
39 Haberman, Clyde, «Evolution in Europe; Italy Discloses Its Web Of Cold War
Guerrillas», New York Times, 16.11.1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/16/wor
ld/evolution-in-europe-italy-discloses-its-web-of-cold-war-guerrillas.html (accessed
August 22, 2017).
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in the excommunication procedure especially reserved to the Holy See.»40
After World War II, papal diplomacy had emerged as a key player in shap-
ing the post-fascist future of Italy:
Following the abolition of the monarchy by popular referendum in
June 1946, and given the effective absence of the organized anti-fascist
parties and trade unions during the twentieth century, the Roman
Catholic Church with its network of 24,000 parishes throughout the
peninsula was now the major surviving National Italian institution. It
is therefore not surprising that Catholicism, in various institutional
forms, played a powerful and central role in the post-war reconstruc-
tion of Italy, social, economic, political and international.41
In Italy, as in most of Western Europe, there was a resurgence of Christian
sentiment due to the fact that the Church as an organization had overcome
the war as well as because of the need for a vision of the world that was not
compromised by Fascism. Moreover, after the fall of Fascism people still
wanted a political ideology that incorporated all aspects of life as Fascism
had done.42 There was still a demand for political activity that could be in-
tegrated with life, and the DC, with the support of the Catholic Church,
made this identification possible by offering a holistic view of life. In Italy,
the decisive influence came from a school developed in France that re-
newed Christian thought. The DC found its ideal of Christian society, the
idea that Christian virtues should be used for the construction of society,
in the writings of Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain. By combin-
ing the old liberal ideas of representative government and political and
economic freedom with the Christian personalism and humanism theo-
rized by Mounier and Maritain, an ideology that allowed the transition
from Fascism to a democratic society with a parliamentary regime was de-
veloped, keeping intact, at least initially, the possibility of integrating polit-
ics into everyday life. Many Christian Democrats believed Italian democra-
cy could be expanded under their continued leadership. This belief, em-
bodied by Alcide De Gasperi and later carried on by Aldo Moro, shaped
the very strategy of the DC, which aimed to be a centrist party che guarda a
sinstra—which looked to the left.
40 Decretum, 1.7.1949, Actae Apostolicae Sedis, 1949 (quoted in Pombeni 1977,
300); see also Drake 2008, 450–451.
41 Pollard 2008, 109.
42 See Mosse 2015, 5–13.
4 Cultural, Social and Political Context of the Event of Political Violence
144
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Ever since January 21, 1927, when Amedeo Bordiga, together with fif-
teen other ex-Socialist party members (including Antonio Gramsci) found-
ed the PCI, Communists have had a significant political presence in Italy.
During World War II, many Communist and Socialist partisans believed
the Resistance could and would have a revolutionary outcome and that
they would be able to sweep away not only the residues of fascism but also
the capitalist bourgeois state, an expectation encouraged by the success of
Tito in Yugoslavia and the continuing Communist struggle in the Greek
Civil War. When the Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti returned to Italy
in 1944, he sought to dispel the idea of revolution by explaining to his
comrades that, as Stalin had decided, revolution could not occur in Italy
since it had fallen into the Western sphere of influence according to the
terms of the Yalta agreement. Nevertheless, some Communists did not
abandon their revolutionary dreams or hand over their arms to the Allied
forces in May 1945: many simply buried them in their backyards to keep
their hopes of a real proletarian revolution in Italy alive.
Although Communists had actively participated in the drafting of the
Constitution, after May 1947 the PCI was excluded from all governing
coalitions up to 1976.43 After the elections of 1946, the PCI’s legitimacy
and effectiveness was nearly decimated by the results of the 1948 national
elections. As Wagner-Pacifici observes, «these elections, distinguished from
the 1946 elections by the serious anti-Communist campaign of the DC,
overtly and adamantly guided by Washington, effectively denied the PCI
any formal participation in any national government, at least for the fore-
seeable future.»44 The election played a decisive role in changing the par-
ty’s ideology and strategy, which gradually distanced itself from the Soviet
bloc and the idea of a proletarian revolution by means of political violence.
During the Resistance, Italian Communists—especially thanks to the pa-
tient political work of Palmiro Togliatti as well as to Antonio Gramsci’s
writings—had already become internationally known for their efforts to
develop a specific Italian form of communism. Togliatti pursued a parlia-
mentary route to socialism committed to working with the other «popu-
lar» and «progressive» forces in a government of Resistance Unity. This
43 Despite not being represented in the executive, the PCI constructed an en-
trenched and powerful political organization, which represented the interests and
aspirations of several sectors of Italian society and was thus able to govern regions
like the Red Belt of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, the Marches, and Umbria, and sev-
eral important cities, such as Bologna and Florence, as well as Rome and Turin
from 1975 to 1985.
44 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 25.
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form of communism, which was known as la terza via (the third way), as-
serted a commitment to democracy and a gradually increasing refusal of
the Soviet model. Togliatti strived to convince his comrades that Fascism
was not essentially an elite regime, but rather a reactionary regime with
mass characteristics and that, given the ability of reactionary parties to at-
tract a heterogeneous mass of voters, the PCI had to appeal to people be-
yond traditional working-class voters, to the middle classes, in order to
avoid the re-emergence of a reactionary movement.45
The PCI’s break with the Soviet Union gradually unfolded. In 1956, fol-
lowing the invasion of Hungary by Soviet troops, there was enough dissent
within the PCI to justify a break with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU). The overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 was another
step in the direction of a definitive rupture. The definitive break took place
after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries. In 1969,
Enrico Berlinguer, participated in the international conference of Commu-
nist parties in Moscow, where he challenged the CPSU’s leadership and
told Leonid Brezhnev that the invasion of Czechoslovakia clarified the in-
surmountable differences within the Communist movement on questions
concerning national sovereignty, socialist democracy and the freedom of
culture. One of the most important aspects of this rupturing process con-
cerned the rhetoric of violent revolution. The majority of the PCI’s leader-
ship as well as its party newspaper L’Unità represented violence as a politi-
cal instrument used by reactionary forces and was thus illegitimate in the
fight for social justice and emancipation. Despite the Resistenza being re-
membered as a legitimate armed fight against Fascism, the party leadership
began to say that the Resistance had not been a revolutionary movement.46
In 1973, Berlinguer wrote an article in the PCI weekly magazine La Ri-
nascita, entitled Riflessioni sull’Italia dopo i fatti del Cile («Reflections On
Italy After the Facts Of Chile»), in which he launched the project of a com-
promesso storico («Historic Compromise»), namely the project of a political
alliance and accommodation between the DC and the PCI. According to
Berlinguer, who explicitly referred to the «ever-impending menaces of reac-
tionary adventures», the overthrow of the democratically elected Allende
Government in Chile by General Augusto Pinochet with the help of the
US administration of President Richard Nixon proved that the left could
not aspire to govern in democratic countries without establishing compro-
45 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 26.
46 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 26.
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mises with moderate forces.47 Berlinguer’s fears about the possibility of a
coup d’état in Italy were not completely unfounded. In fact, an envisaged
plot—the so-called Piano Solo—for an Italian coup had been requested by
the then President of the Italian Republic, Antonio Segni, and was pre-
pared by the commander of the Carabinieri Giovanni de Lorenzo in 1964.
Neo-fascist groups allegedly planned another failed coup d’état, which was
named after Junio Valerio Borghese, an Italian World War II Fascist com-
mander, in 1970. Berlinguer’s most important ally in attempting to create
an alliance between the DC and PCI was Aldo Moro. Aldo Moro was the
central figure in Italian politics in the sixties and seventies. He was the
most important DC strategist and the greatest interpreter of the role of the
Catholic party in Italian society as an element of stability and progress.48
Born on September 23, 1926, in Maglie, Moro grew up in a middle-class
home. At the age of twenty-one, Moro pursued a degree in law at the Uni-
versity of Bari and subsequently obtained an assistant professorship in the
Philosophy of Law, History, and Politics. Moro arrived at the University of
Bari with a deep attachment to the Church and a predisposition toward
progressive Catholic thought. In 1939, he was elected president of the Fed-
erazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana (FUCI). The traditions of reaction-
ary Catholicism never tempted Moro, who early on became convinced that
the crisis of modern culture could only be overcome by a new understand-
ing of Christianity, not by a return to the outmoded and discredited past.
From 1946 to 1948, Moro edited one of the most prestigious Catholic peri-
odicals, Studium, an important vehicle for progressive Catholic thought:
«In passionate and eloquent editorials inspired by the Church’s tradition of
social justice, from Rerum nouerum to Pius XII’s wartime appeals for Chris-
tian mercy, Moro called upon the Italians to be tolerant, loving, and chari-
table. […] Moro’s Studium editorials chronicled his performance as a
Christian Democratic delegate to the Constituent Assembly of the Repub-
lic, where he actively defended the cause of a strongly antifascist pluralist
state. Working on the Commission of Seventy-Five, which helped to pre-
pare the agenda for the plenary assembly, Moro expressed his concern for
social issues. He called for an interventionist state, one that would actively
fight poverty and injustice, and not simply create ideal conditions for the
enrichment of some millionaires.»49
47 See Berlinguer, 1975.
48 See Biscione 2012, 14.
49 Drake 1995, 6–7.
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Actively pursuing his academic career at the University of Bari, Moro
published his first book in 1939, and in the decade that followed became a
heavily published legal scholar. Moro’s first important work was Lezioni di
filosofia del diritto, a compilation of lectures he gave for two courses at the
University of Bari on the law (1944–1945) and on the state (1946–1947).
Moro’s humanistic moral premise was founded on the idea that life is guid-
ed not only by mechanical laws, but moves toward spiritual goals of self-
realization through the agency of love: «He defined love as the fully con-
scious energy of God creating man, and of man seeking God. Love in this
most exalted sense is the real motor of history. From that moral premise,
Moro drew the principles of his Catholic activist political philosophy. He
identified himself unreservedly with the fundamental revolution articulat-
ed by Christ: all human beings, regardless of background or circumstances,
are perfectly equal in the sight of God. Moro held that this was the single
most revolutionary assertion in history. For two thousand years the world
had struggled in vain to understand it. All other revolutionary programs,
he believed, were of trifling significance.»50 Moro criticized both liberal-
ism and socialism as
two unilateral opposing and false theses of a liberally oriented State,
where liberty does not correspond to ethical freedom but to selfish
caprice, and of a State oriented in a social sense, where society is not
yet equal to ethical society, where people live together free and in lov-
ing solidarity, but to a hard and objective quid, which, despite being
made up of men, has no human substance since their true humanity
has been denied.51
Moro argued that individual liberty and social welfare were entirely depen-
dent upon each other: «an ideal completely coherent to its nature belongs
to the State, which is liberal and social at the same time and is precisely
liberal because it is social and is social because it is liberal.»52 According to
50 Drake 1995, 8–9.
51 Moro 2006, 129; it.: «[…] due opposte tesi unilaterali e false di uno Stato orienta-
to in senso liberale, dove libertà non è uguale a libertà etica, ma a capriccio egois-
tico, e di uno Stato orientato in senso sociale dove ancora società non è uguale a
società etica, come libera e amorosa solidarietà delle persone, ma a un quid duro
e oggettivo, che, costituito di uomini, non abbia tuttavia, per essere stati questi
negati nella loro vera umanità, sostanza umana.»
52 Moro 2006, 128; it.: «[…] appartiene allo Stato una idealità del tutto coerente alla
sua natura, che è liberale e sociale ad un tempo e precisamente liberale perché
sociale e sociale perché liberale.»
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him, the state must promote the ethically inspired liberty of all, not liberty
in the materialistic sense of simply creating a zone of free movement for
acquisitive egotists. Moreover, he stressed that man does not exist solely for
social ends, which is one of the reasons why limits had to be imposed on
the state’s power to control the individual. According to Moro, the state ex-
ists exclusively as a tool of man, to help him realize his full humanity.
Moro was also a fervid proponent of an ethical understanding of the
law, according to which positive law is lawful until it responds to the pro-
found demands of justice for which the legal order is destined:
Natural law cannot but be positive in some measure; it resolves itself,
far from abstraction, in the very concrete actions that take place in a
certain social experience, inspired by the universal and irreducible de-
mands of human consciousness.53
As Norberto Bobbio rightly points out, once natural law is recognized as a
condition of the validity of positive law, the violent rupture of the consti-
tuted order—that is, revolution—becomes legitimate in cases in which
there is an unbearable gap between natural law and the law in force.54 In
other words, from the point of view of natural law or, more precisely, of
the natural law in force assumed by Moro, revolution is undoubtedly a
right in the full sense of the term. Without entering into the debate on the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the revolution in post-war Italy, it should be
emphasized here that for Moro the ultimate foundation of legal systems
had to be Christian ethics, in particular the Christian understanding of in-
dividual human life as something absolute, sacred, and thus inviolable. Ac-
cording to Moro, if a given law proves to be, in its concrete application,
contrary to that value, it is the duty of each individual to oppose it.
Aldo Moro implicitly opposed the concept of the «ethical state», which
became, through Giovanni Gentile, the official formula for defining the
fascist state. In The Value of the State, the contrast between the conception
of the «ethical state of absolute idealism»—developed by the Right
Hegelians and appropriated by the fascist regime—and what Bobbio de-
fines as Moro’s «spiritual conception» of the state is clearly stated:
53 Moro 2006, 298–299; it.: «Il diritto naturale non può non essere in qualche
misura positivo; esso si risolve infatti, ben lungi dal perdersi in una astrazione,
nelle concretissime azioni che si svolgono in una determinata esperienza sociale,
ispirate alle esigenze universali ed irriducibili della coscienza umana.»
54 Bobbio 1980, 13.
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We are now able to evaluate the meaning and intrinsic validity of re-
curring expressions in doctrines that qualify the State as the universal,
the God on earth, the absolute value, completely ethical. […] In these
terms, there is, in our view, both a profound insight into the truth and
a serious misunderstanding. […] The possible misunderstanding that
leads to considering the State […] as an autonomous reality, the only
reality in which human values can be said to be realized, must be frac-
tured. This position swings between considering the totalitarian expe-
rience of the State as the only valid form of ethical experience and the
rejection of the same human content of the State, which leads to con-
ceiving the value of [the State] as a different and autonomous criterion
of ethics and religiosity. Instead, it must be reaffirmed that if the State
is, of course, ethical, it is because it welcomes and compoundes in har-
mony the values developed by individuals and by the smaller social ag-
gregates of which it is composed and without which it would not be.
So it is clear that no myth can substitute for the only ethic that has
meaning in human life and thus no religiousness other than that of
men. The State does not have its own autonomous religious experi-
ence, although it is ethical and religious in the sense that we have spec-
ified.55
Moro was not the only progressive Catholic intellectual and politician
«looking to the left». He aimed to interpret Catholicism in the most pro-
gressive way possible, but there was nothing unprecedented about that. In
fact, similar efforts throughout Italy, especially in the north, characterized
the culture of Italian Catholicism after World War II. Another important
55 Moro 2006, 126.; it.: «Siamo in grado ormai di valutare il significato e la intrinse-
ca validità delle espressioni ricorrenti nelle dottrine che lo Stato qualificano come
l’universale, il Dio in terra, l’assoluto valore, in tutto etico. […] In tali espressioni
c’è, a nostro avviso, una profonda intuizione della verità e insieme un equivoco
grave. […] Va fugato il possibile equivoco che induca a vedere lo Stato […] come
un’autonoma realtà, nella quale soltanto possa dirsi realizzato il valore umano.
Posizione la quale oscilla tra l’intendere la totalitaria esperienza dello Stato come
la sola valida forma di esperienza etica e il rigettare lo stesso umano contenuto
dello Stato, fino a concepire il valore di questo alla stregua di un diverso ed au-
tonomo criterio di eticità e di religiosità. Ed invece bisogna riaffermare che, se lo
Stato è, com’è certamente, etico, lo è in quanto in sé accoglie e compone in armo-
nia i valori sviluppati dai singoli e dagli aggregati sociali minori dei quali si com-
pone e senza dei quali non sarebbe. Dunque è chiaro che nessun mito può sosti-
tuirsi all’unica eticità, che abbia significato nella vita umana e così nessuna reli-
giosità diversa da quella degli uomini. Lo Stato non ha una sua autonoma espe-
rienza religiosa, anche se è etico e religioso nel senso che abbiamo precisato.»
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exponent of leftist Catholicism was jurist and politician Giuseppe Dossetti,
who became Vice Secretary of the DC in 1946. Like Moro, he was influ-
enced by Jacques Maritain’s Humanisme integral (1936). Maritain, though
regretting Marx’s atheism and acceptance of violence as a legitimate means
in the proletarian struggle, professed there was a large element of sincerity
in Marxism and socialism in general. He shared the Marxist aversion to the
destructive capitalist cult of individual enrichment, which he denounced
as the ineluctable consequence of the anthropocentric humanism that he
wanted to replace with integral or theocentric humanism. Maritain’s ideas
were useful to the Catholic left in Italy as a point of departure in the search
for an exit from Fascism. The Dossettiani, including Giuseppe Lazzati, Gior-
gio La Pira and Amintore Fanfani, stood in the vanguard of these
searchers. As Richard Drake indicates, «when Moro joined forces with the
group, he seconded strongly Maritain’s ideas about the necessary connec-
tion between political and social democracy and about the fundamental
importance of tolerance in political dealings with all adversaries. At the
same time, by stressing the necessarily laic nature of politics in a pluralistic
democracy, Moro distanced himself from some of the more exalted inter-
pretations of Maritain, particularly that of Dossetti.»56
However, Moro’s encounter with Dossetti reinforced many of his own
independently formulated ideas about politics and morality. Moro joined
Civitas Humana, a Catholic association of intellectuals. In Cronache sociali,
first published in May 1947 and which eventually became the journal of
this group, the Dossettiani criticized the centrist liberalism of De Gasperi,
arguing that under his leadership the DC became more than an anticom-
munist force representing US policy interests in Italy: «De Gasperi became
a problem [for the Dossettiani] primarily because the party secretary and
government leader did not envisage fundamental changes in Italy’s inter-
nal power relations; he sought to improve existing capitalist structures not
to replace them with anything more ethically advanced.»57
At the end of the forties, Dossetti abandoned politics to campaign for
the cultural change that would prepare Italy to accept a Christian political
program. By this time, Moro had joined the Iniziativa Democratica, a pro-
gressive political group within the DC that many former Dossettiani also
joined. Amintore Fanfani, who profited from the party crisis of 1953, was
the leader of this group. In 1947, De Gasperi made him minister of labor.
Fanfani remained a steadfast ally of Dossetti during the Constituent As-
56 Drake 1995, 11.
57 Drake 1995, 14.
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sembly, but after 1947 he rapidly assumed a moderate position on many
fundamental issues of foreign policy and reforms, and soon it became diffi-
cult to distinguish his stance from that of De Gasperi. After becoming par-
ty secretary in 1954, Fanfani controlled the party until 1959, continuing to
praise idealism while accomplishing few of the agricultural, fiscal and bu-
reaucratic reforms he had intended. During Fanfani’s years as party secre-
tary, political instability worsened: from 1953 to 1958 six governments fell.
By attempting to emulate his predecessor by centralizing party power un-
der his control, Fanfani antagonized a coalition of Christian Democrats
called the Dorotei (because they plotted against him at the convent of the
Sisters of Santa Dorotea in Rome). In 1959 he was deposed and Aldo Moro
became the new party secretary. Before entering into this office, it had al-
ready held the posts of minister of justice (1955) and minister of education
(1957). Moro was chosen by DC hierarchs because of his «unthreatening
presence, his image as a reverse Fanfani […]. They assumed that in this
position Moro, unlike his predecessor, would defer to them.»58
At the beginning of his secretarial office, Moro could not disappoint the
expectations of the party hierarchy. Moro experienced the breakdown of
Fanfani’s position as secretary and took no initiative that might disturb the
status quo. He moved from the left to the center in an attempt to mediate
the disputes between the party’s progressive and conservative factions; in
fact, it was the center-right Christian Democrats who had supported him
against Fanfani. However, Moro began to develop a more courageous poli-
tical program, which aimed to realize the «opening to the left» and the al-
liance with the Socialists that was much desired by the Dossettiani. The so-
called third generation of Christian Democratic leaders formed a new left
within the DC and began to pressure the party leadership for a political
understanding with Socialists. Giovanni Galloni, who in 1953 formed the
Sinistre di Base, emerged as an important political force after the elections
on 7 June of that year; but what pushed Moro to become the most impor-
tant interpreter of the political project first developed by the Dossettiani
and then relaunched by Sinistre di Base, was the ongoing social revolution
in Italy. The Marshall Plan had made an economic miracle possible, which
in less than a generation had transformed the largely agricultural Italy of
1945 into an industrial society. The industrial cities of the north under-
went violent expansion as millions of peasants left the land in the north
and south.59 This process led to what poet and filmmaker Pier Paolo Pa-
58 Drake 1995, 18.
59 See Zampagni 2000.
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solini described as an «anthropological mutation» of the Italian people.60
More than nine million Italians migrated between regions from 1955 to
1977, but the period of greatest movement overall came in the years 1958
to 1963, precisely when Moro became party secretary. Paul Ginsborg de-
scribes these years as «the beginning of a social revolution» during which
«Italy ceased to be a peasant country and became one of the major indus-
trial nations of the West.»61 During this period, labor disturbances in the
industrial triangle of Milan, Turin and Genoa grew more numerous and vi-
olent. At the DC’s Eighth Congress in 1962, Moro spoke for six hours on
the theme of Italy’s need for a «cautious union» between the PSI and the
DC.62 His language and rhetoric were all but simple, but his main argu-
ment was clear: the only alternative to an alliance with Socialists was an al-
liance with the historically discredited right, but, he argued, a frightened
form of conservatism would have been the worst possible choice for the
Christian Democrats. The Tambroni government had tried this strategy in
1959 with disastrous outcomes, including violent demonstrations and
strikes all over Italy that left ten people dead and dozens injured.
In 1963, Moro assumed the Prime Minister’s office for the first time—he
would become Prime Minister four more times: 1964, 1966, 1974, 1976—,
while Mariano Rumor became the DC’s secretary. In the elections of the
same year, Communists gained votes while the DC lost votes; for more
than a decade conservatives blamed Moro for the growing «Communist
threat». Moro was not only confronted with the growth of the PCI, which
was still considered an illegitimate party, and with criticism within his par-
ty, but was also particularly worried about the close ties between the far
right and military circles. He knew about the Piano Solo scheme of General
Giovanni de Lorenzo and other reactionaries, and their attempted coup of
1964. As Drake observes, «after becoming aware of De Lorenzo’s scheme,
Moro always had a weather eye out for right-wing plotters; they, in his
judgment, posed the greatest danger of all to the ship of state, precisely be-
cause they were on board and in charge of its security and navigation.»63
From here on, Moro became extremely cautious. He became famous for
his legendary stalling tactics and obfuscating rhetoric, becoming the undis-
puted master of the so-called strategia di logoramento, the DC’s notorious
ability to prolong debate and hold off legislative action for which he be-
60 See Battista 1999.
61 Ginsborg 1990, 212.
62 See Drake 1995, 21.
63 Drake 1995, 22.
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came a sort of archetype. Meanwhile, Communists continued to make
steady gains at the polls. After the elections of 1968, from which the So-
cialists emerged as the principal losers, Moro’s government fell from pow-
er. What Paul Ginsborg calls the «Era of Collective Action» began: «From
1968 onwards paralysis of above gave way to movement of below. There
followed a most extraordinary period of social ferment, the high season of
collective action in the history of the Republic.»64 In November 1967, large
student strikes and occupations had already erupted at Milan’s Catholic
University, and for months afterwards similar developments became regu-
lar occurrences in different parts of Italy. By the autunno caldo («hot au-
tumn») of 1969, student leaders had joined forces with militant factory
workers, emulating the French experience of the March 1968 protests in
Paris.65 Confronted with the country’s labor unrest, student protests and
political violence, Moro decided to adopt and promote the so-called strate-
gia dell’attenzione («strategy of attention»). On June 29, 1969, he spoke be-
fore the Eleventh Congress of the DC arguing that it had become necessary
to legitimize the PCI as an integral part of Italy’s democracy. Moro under-
stood the inclusion of the PCI in the majority as the only way to eliminate
the «anomaly» in Italian democracy (with respect to the other European
democracies), which was the lack of alternation between different blocs in
the government.66
On December 12, 1969, there was also the Piazza Fontana bombing,
which was initially attributed to anarchists but, as was fully ascertained by
the courts, was the work of the right-wing group Ordine Nuovo and is con-
sidered by many as the starting point of the anni di piombo («years of lead»)
and the strategia della tensione («strategy of tension»). It has largely been
proven that there were acts of obstruction implemented by state apparat-
uses aiming to hide the real perpetrators and probably the true master-
minds of the terrorist attack.67 In the draft report by the Commissione parla-
mentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individu-
azione dei responsabili delle stragi, published in 2000, US intelligence was ac-
cused of being responsible for inspiring the «strategy of tension» in which
the indiscriminate bombing of the public and the threat of a right-wing
coup were used to stabilize center-right political control of the country:
64 Ginsborg 1990, 298.
65 See Drake 1999, 71.
66 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 37.
67 See Bull Cento/Cooke 2013; Galli 2004, 7; Ginsborg 1990, 333–335; Formigoni
2016, 252.
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«those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organized
or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as
has been discovered, by men linked to the structures of United States intel-
ligence.»68 As Biscione observes, «the strategy of tension appears as the re-
sult of different strategies and components […]; there are several forces
that interact with each other […] with a common goal: to contrast the PCI
strategy.»69 As Aldo Moro himself wrote during the 55 days he was held
prisoner by the Red Brigades (BR): «With regard to the strategy of tension,
which for years caused bloodshed in Italy, even without achieving its politi-
cal goals, one cannot but point out that, alongside responsibilities that lie
outside Italy, there were indulgences and connivances by organs of the state
and by some sectors of the Christian Democracy.»70
The historical periodization of the anni di piombo—the formulation de-
rives from the Italian title given to Margarethe von Trotta’s movie Die
bleierne Zeit (Germany, 1981)—spans approximately from 1968 to 1983,
which has been described as the «crucible» of many of the political, social,
ideological and cultural problems accumulated in Italy since the end of the
World War II.71 Scholars generally indicate the bombing of a bank in Piaz-
za Fontana in Milan as the beginning of this period. This event was the be-
ginning of a long cycle of political violence: between 1969 and 1983 there
were more than 14,000 incidents of politically motivated violence, result-
ing in 374 deaths and more than 1170 injuries.72 In the 1970s, no fewer
than 597 terrorist groups (of both the left and right) were counted in
Italy.73 Between 1969 and 1975, mainly right-wing groups committed assas-
sinations and political acts of violence (95 percent of the assassinations be-
tween 1969 and 1973, 85 percent in 1974 and 78 percent in 1975).74 The
extreme left intensified its terrorist activities only later: almost 80 percent
of the deadly assassinations that occurred in the period between 1978 and
68 Quoted in Willan, Philip, «US ‹supported by anti-left terror in Italy›. Reports
Claim Washington Used a Strategy of Tension in the Cold War to Stabilize the
Centre-Right», The Guardian, 24.7.2000, 19.
69 Biscione 2012, 137.
70 Moro 1997a, 227; it.: «Per quanto riguarda la strategia della tensione, che per anni
ha insanguinato l’Italia, pur senza conseguire i suoi obiettivi politici, non pos-
sono non rilevarsi, accanto a responsabilità che si collocano fuori dell’Italia, in-
dulgenze e connivenze di organi dello Stato e della Democrazia Cristiana in alcu-
ni suoi settori.»
71 Antonello/O’Leary, 2009, 1.
72 See Jamieson 1989, 19–21.
73 See Townshend 2002, 68.
74 See Della Porta/Rossi, 1984, 25.
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1982 were attributed to the extreme left or the extreme left claimed respon-
sibility for them.75 As has been rightly observed, this period had an enor-
mous impact «upon so many aspects of Italian cultural life, tinting every-
day language, media communication, categories of historical understand-
ing and artistic representations of all kind.»76
Moro took the problem of terrorism with the utmost seriousness, since
he largely shared the left’s increasing concern about the danger posed by
neo-fascist intriguers. He tried to oppose both the right-wing and left-wing
terrorism of the seventies by working to deprive them of support in society.
The extremists frightened Moro so much that he vigorously renewed his
opening to Berlinguer, who, as we saw, was concerned about growing signs
of mass support for the far right as well as by the violent overthrow of Sal-
vador Allende’s left-wing government in Chile. Moreover, popular support
for the PCI was growing: it won 25.3 percent of the vote in 1963, 26.9 per-
cent in 1968, 27.2 percent in 1972, 33 percent in the 1975 regional and lo-
cal elections and 34.4 percent in 1976.77 While Moro’s strategy was initially
criticized by many leaders of the DC, as well as by the United States and
other NATO member countries, after the 1975 and 1976 elections, with the
PCI on the verge of becoming the leading party in the land, many other of
his party colleagues began to agree with him. Joined by Fanfani and An-
dreotti, Moro implemented the 1976 historic compromise with Enrico
Berlinguer from the PCI.
In an attempt to realize the historic compromise, Moro and Berlinguer
faced a number of obstacles. Many continued to oppose his political strate-
gy both in Italy and abroad. The United States in particular implacably op-
posed Moro’s strategy: «Even during the Jimmy Carter years the answer
was still ‹no› to the idea of compromising with the Communists. Demo-
cratic president or Republican, a most rigid orthodoxy prevailed in Wash-
ington on the subject of Italy’s Communist party.»78 In Italy, there were
those associated with the right wing of the DC who called Moro a «Marx-
ist» and accused him of wanting to give the country to the Communists.79
In reality, Moro certainly was not auguring real structural change in Italian
politics, since he was, after all, a Christian Democrat. The DC had been in-
volved in every one of Italy’s major scandals since the end of the war—the
75 See Rossi 1993, 96.
76 Antonello/O’Leary 2009, 1.
77 See Ginsborg 1990.
78 Drake 1995, 30.
79 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 37.
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Fiumicino Airport scandal, the Lockheed scandal, the Petrolio scandal, the
Propaganda 2 (P2) secret Masonic lodge scandal—and Moro always stoutly
defended his party against the charge that it was nothing but an engine of
corruption in Italian life.
On August 11, 1976, a new government under the leadership of Giulio
Andreotti gained the approval of the Chamber of Deputies. This govern-
ment was called governo di non-sfiducia (not no-confidence), because it was
based on the abstention of the opposition parties. The Communists and
Socialists were not part of the government, but they agreed not to cause its
downfall. In turn, the DC consulted them fully on its political program.
Andreotti’s government survived in this fashion until January 1978. An-
dreotti was certainly not the kind of politician that Berlinguer and more
generally the PCI appreciated. He was a conservative Catholic and a pupil
of De Gasperi, who since the birth of the First Republic had held practical-
ly every ministerial post. As Ginsborg highlights, Andreotti «had been Mi-
nister of Defense for many years, at a time when the secret services were
being infiltrated by the extreme right wing. […] Well-liked in the Vatican,
Andreotti was subtle and cynical; for the DC he was the ideal man for a
slow ‹logoramento› (‹wearing down›) of the Communists.»80
In contrast to Andreotti—who in the last four decades has been accused,
among other things, of being the éminence grise behind the P2 Masonic
lodge, and was tried (and absolved) for mafia association and for complici-
ty in the assassination of journalist Mino Pecorelli—Moro truly believed in
the feasibility and necessity of the Historic Compromise. The grande tessi-
tore (master weaver), as Italian political commentators often called him,
believed it possible to gradually perform the same operation on the PCI
that he had performed on the PSI in the sixties: he hoped to eventually
bring the Communists into the government without challenging the DC’s
state system. He knew that his policy involved some risks, but an even
greater risk would result from a do-nothing strategy. On February 28, 1978,
Moro addressed the Assembly of the Christian Democratic Senators and
Deputies, where he spoke about the party’s need for an understanding
with the PCI that would respond to a real social, economic and political
emergency.81
On March 16, 1978, just as he was going to the Chamber of Deputies to
discuss the confidence of the new government of Andreotti with the PCI
in the majority, Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the BR. Fifty-five days later
80 Ginsborg 1990, 378.
81 See Moro 1979, 374–391.
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he was found dead in the trunk of a car in the center of Rome. It is hard to
say if Moro’s political project would have had a certain success; what one
can say for sure is that with the death of Moro the entire Italian political
landscape underwent a radical transformation. Above all, for those who
had seen with their own eyes the advent and fall of Fascism, Moro’s assassi-
nation marked the end of an era of hope. As the liberal historian Arturo
Carlo Jemolo comments: «When I recall the many who shared with me the
great hopes of 1945 and the following years, I think that those who closed
their eyes in time to not see Italy in 1978 have been loved by God.»82
Emancipation and Political Violence in the «Years of Lead»
In 1969, publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli published a pamphlet entitled
Estate 1969, which can be considered the first enunciation of the inevitabil-
ity of the armed struggle for the «socialist revolution» in the post-war Ital-
ian context.83 This prophecy was implemented by the myth of the Resisten-
za tradita («betrayed Resistance»), the revival of the Gruppi di azione parti-
giana («partisan action groups») and the experiences of Vietnam, Cuba and
other minor guerrillas. The massacre at Piazza Fontana, interpreted by Fel-
trinelli in another essay as the confirmation that Persiste la minaccia di un
colpo di stato in Italia! («The Threat Of a Coup In Italy Persists!»), strongly
influenced the idea that in Italy there was a need for a return to arms to
form a more just and egalitarian society and to contrast capitalism and im-
perialism.84
The 1950s in Italy were characterized by economic development, patron-
age and anti-communism. The «patronization» of the state economy led to
the appointment of Christian Democrats to key positions in the growing
number of organizations entrusted with industrial and commercial devel-
opment, including state banks, welfare agencies, holding companies—such
as the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and the Ente Nazionale
Idrocarburi (ENI)—and economic reform agencies. Where the Christian
Democrats were unable to use the patronage system to obtain support, par-
ticularly in northern urban areas, repression was employed to limit the ex-
tent of political opposition. This was particularly visible in their harass-
ment of the working-class movement. Although the ban on free trade
4.3
82 Jemolo 1978, 301.
83 See Galli 2004, 8.
84 Feltrinelli, 2012.
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unions had ended after the end of Fascism, the government continued to
restrain their activities, which were seen as obstructive to economic
progress. As has rightly been noted, this repressive policy was part of a
«broader anti-Left strategy affecting the rights and livelihood of whole sec-
tors of the population within the exercise of an ‹informal dictatorship›.
This was in part a consequence of Italy’s strategic position as a member
country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bordering
along the Soviet bloc.»85 As I already mentioned, the Catholic Church also
played a significant role in limiting the influence of the left in Italian soci-
ety in return for the state’s support of its moral positions.
In spite of this repressive policy, the quality of life for most Italians im-
proved markedly during the post-war years. The number of occupied hous-
es increased by 50 percent between 1951 and 1971. At the start of the fifties
less than 8 percent of houses contained electricity, running water and
washing facilities; this nearly quadrupled to 30 percent a decade later.86
Many Italians were able to buy such household appliances as washing ma-
chines and fridges; cars became affordable mass commodities. Undoubted-
ly, the arrival of modern goods reflected the ability of many Italians to live
comfortably for the first time, but the initial beneficiaries were the middle
classes, while many working-class families did not benefit from moderniza-
tion until the sixties. The radical change in daily life in Italy was also deter-
mined by the great migration from the countryside to Italian cities. Many
immigrants, especially from the south, experienced a sense of alienation as
they abandoned their home communities and were forced to live in far
from ideal conditions. Even within the family, women continued to main-
tain a subordinate position, although, to some extent, the restrictions on
the lives of women continued to be eroded by the spread of mass educa-
tion and increasing literacy. Moreover, a higher number of Italians than ev-
er before were able to enjoy various forms of cultural entertainment (in-
cluding theatrical and cinema performances, concerts and spectator
sports).
The arrival of modern forms of cultural consumption revealed serious
tensions within Italian society between tradition and innovation. The rul-
ing classes and ecclesiastical hierarchy, while supportive of economic
progress, were fearful of the emancipating effects of the social and cultural
transformation that accompanied the boom. As Dunnage highlights, «dur-
ing the fifties Fascist legislation continued to be used to censor cinema
85 Dunnage 2002, 157.
86 See Dunnage 2002, 158.
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films, theatrical productions and newspaper publications. The state also at-
tempted to enforce rigid moral standards by prohibiting kissing in public
and waging war on the bikini. Likewise, the Christian Democrats saw the
new medium of television as a means of enforcing traditional mores and
anti-Communism, as the RAI (Radio Audizioni Italia) state broadcasting
company was regulated with a powerful system of internal censorship. The
Catholic Church backed the government in its cultural policy, capitalizing
on television for the purpose of transmitting religious programs, though
this was not without serious contradictions.»87
Following the repression of the fifties, there was greater institutional tol-
erance of civil rights and modern social and cultural practices in the early
sixties. There are several reasons for this evolution. First, the modernizing
reform from within the Catholic Church after the death of Pope Pius XII
moved in the direction of ending its interference in people’s electoral pref-
erences. Moreover, not only did important Catholic intellectuals begin to
publicly criticize the free play of market forces in society and to call for
greater social justice, but so did representatives of the Vatican’s hierarchy.
Second, the formation of a center left government, accommodating the
PSI, in 1963 facilitated the introduction of some social reforms including,
among other things, the introduction of a national social insurance and
health system, regional devolution and greater state economic planning in
order to overcome the north–south divide.
This change at the institutional level was also a response to pressure
from below, in particular to a growing sense of public intolerance towards
a corrupt government and repression. The press strongly contributed to
the development and diffusion of a critical attitude towards the political
class and it began to publish important investigations into political corrup-
tion as well as to address the negative social phenomena produced by the
economic boom. A growing movement toward change, which culminated
in the mass civil rights and union action towards the end of the sixties, be-
gan as a reaction to Fernando Tambroni’s formation of a Christian Demo-
crat government with the support of the neo-fascist Italian Social Move-
ment (MSI) and the Monarchists in the spring of 1960. The movement was
formed not only by those of the older generation defending the memory of
the Resistance but also by a large number of young people. Despite the de-
mand for greater political and social emancipation during the early sixties,
tension remained. The institutions were unable to follow the pace of eco-
nomic development and social transformation to which much of Italian
87 Dunnage 2002, 166.
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society aspired. Furthermore, the center left governing coalition failed to
implement most of the reforms it set out to achieve. This is in part at-
tributable to the attitude of the PSI, which failed to stand up to the Chris-
tian Democrats and began to imitate the clientelistic strategies of its main
coalition partner.
The educational reforms of the sixties strongly contributed to the explo-
sion of protests in Italian universities. Although it allowed hundreds of
thousands of children of the middle and working classes to have access to
education, it had grave inadequacies, in particular its failure to create social
equality. Access to upper secondary and higher education was facilitated as
a result of the reforms, but working-class students remained disadvantaged.
Many poor students were forced to work rather than attend university
classes due to limited financial assistance. Furthermore, the universities
failed to move away from their traditional elitism and were not restruc-
tured in order to handle higher numbers of staff members and the greater
demand for teaching space.88 Police brutality in suppressing riots and stu-
dent demonstrations also contributed to increasing tensions. Although
protest policing was generally less repressive in the sixties than in previous
decades, the number of deaths and injuries from police charges, bullets
and tear gas during student demonstrations, industrial strikes and land oc-
cupations escalated from the end of 1968.89
As already mentioned, in 1969 an alliance between students and workers
came into being. The industrial action of 1968 and 1969 was marked by an
increase in the number of participants. The scale and success of the indus-
trial strikes can be attributed to several factors: the worsening of working
conditions in the factories; the availability of cheap labor supplies, which
dried up in the mid-sixties with full employment, giving the working-class
greater leverage in its confrontation with the bosses than before; greater
educational opportunities which led to a more literate working-class; and
the negative social effects of urbanization and mass migration.90 Although
the mass of new workers had little experience with union action, the impe-
tus for revolt initially coming from highly politicized skilled workers
quickly spread to unskilled non-union sectors of labor. The protests de-
manded better pay, greater democracy within factories, the organization of
work and the reduction of health hazards and better social conditions.
During the early seventies the union battles spread beyond the initial sec-
88 See Ginsborg 1990, 298–304.
89 See Dunnage 2002, 173.
90 See Dunnage 2002, 175.
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tors of conflict, involving an increasing number of Catholic workers as
their union, the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL), began
to accept the new confrontational model of industrial relations.
The improvement of the working conditions in the factories and the
recognition of certain workers’ rights were undoubtedly the direct result of
the industrial action of the late sixties and early seventies: «In addition to
improvements in wages and work conditions and some protection against
arbitrary authority, the workers had reasserted the right to organize them-
selves as a collective body.»91 Legislation ratified Article 39 of the Consti-
tution, which guaranteed workers the right to form trade unions and enter
into collective labor contracts. Moreover, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Work-
ers’ Rights Statute) of 1970 secured a union presence at the company level
and allowed unions to take employers to court. However, the «hot au-
tumn» did not benefit all workers, since the smaller factories and com-
panies were largely unaffected, and their employees were not covered by
the Statuto, and neither were large numbers of women homeworkers. After
the international oil crisis of 1974, which set off severe inflation, the
protest movements began to concentrate on broader social concerns, trans-
posing the direct action strategies to the community at large (including the
organization of squatting to overcome housing problems and forms of au-
toriduzione to overcome rising prices, such as the non-payment of bus tick-
ets and electricity bills).92
In the second half of the seventies, the initiatives of the social move-
ments were gradually absorbed by the official left and taken up at higher
levels of union representation as part of the overall strategy of the institu-
tionalization of protest. During the years of the compromesso storico, the
union confederations supported a policy of wage restraint and fiscal auster-
ity in respect of Berlinguer’s belief that in return for its «sacrifices» the
working-class would achieve hegemony in Italian society. As Dunnage
notes, «though the unions gained institutional status as a result of this, the
grass roots clearly lost out as a result of the government’s failure to prevent
redundancies and control inflation.»93
A direct consequence of the demands of the worker and student move-
ments was the reformation of the cultural and media landscape. The years
of the «economic miracle» saw the nationalization of mass culture, particu-
larly with the advent of state-controlled national television. In the climate
91 Barkan 1984, 76.
92 Dunnage 2002, 178.
93 Dunnage 2002, 179.
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of the seventies, the state monopoly over the media was brought into
question and an anti-authoritarian shift allowed greater freedom of expres-
sion. In 1975, a new regulatory law reduced government control over RAI.
The influence of the DC was not totally removed but rather shared out
first with the PSI, which assumed control over the second state channel
(RAI 2), and then with the PCI, which was granted control over RAI 3
when it was introduced in 1979.
Specific issues that engendered the student movement were subsumed
in a general critique of the capitalist order. The cultural climate of the Chi-
nese and Cuban revolutions, as well as of the peace movement founded in
Italy in 1967 in protest against the Vietnam War, influenced many young
Italians. Students expressed a desire for an alternative lifestyle, which they
tried to put into practice by occupying universities and turning them into
revolutionary communes. Extra-parliamentary left weekly newspapers such
as Lotta Continua and Il Manifesto, both founded in 1969, began to chal-
lenge the national press over their representation of worldwide events. Not
only did Marxists play a central role in the movement, but so did radical
left-wing Catholics. In 1968, the extra-parliamentary intellectual journal
Nuovo Impegno noted that even the Catholic segment of the student move-
ment had become identified with illegal methods of opposing the academ-
ic status quo, accepting «the forms of struggle that the university Marxist
left had proposed.»94 While many members of the Roman Catholic lay as-
sociation Azione Cattolica deserted to the youth movements, several dissi-
dent Catholic organizations denounced the Church as an ally of the rich
and privileged. The radical priest Don Lorenzo Milani, who soon became a
reference figure of the movement of 1968, began to comment publicly on
the anti-Christian character of the socioeconomic system that exploited the
poor. As Drake observes, «his radical ideas did not originate in Marxist the-
ory, but from the message of the Gospel about the evil consequences for
mankind of cupidity.»95
Many of the so-called ultra-left groups grew largely in the northern in-
dustrial cities of Torino, Milano and Genova. These groups did not feel
represented by the PCI, which they considered merely a reformist party
that, seeking alliance with the DC, had betrayed the revolutionary cause.
Their early activities consisted of school occupations, the promotion of po-
litical strikes, the occupation of vacant houses and the purveyance of con-
troinformazione (counter-information). Groups like Lotta Continua and Au-
94 Quoted in Drake 2008, 454.
95 Drake 2008, 456.
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tonomia Operaia wanted to provide an alternative and subversive view of
factories, schools, the police, facts and events of international politics, and
of the worker and student movements provided by the established mass
media: «they sought to renovate political discourse by rejecting the bureau-
cratic jargon of the established media presentation of politics.»96
In the mid-seventies, violent action escalated as demonstrations ulti-
mately developed into armed combat with police. The question of violence
was also prominently debated in books, magazines, pamphlets and news-
papers. As we saw, some parts of state apparatuses and right-wing groups
promoted a strategy in order to create a tense climate. Thus, the question
of violence was already present in the Italian political consciousness and
imaginary, which is why «the ultraleft cannot be blamed for having intro-
duced violence into Italian society.»97 Moreover, it is highly probable that
one of the main goals of the «strategy of tension» was precisely to produce
a violent reaction within the worker and student movements for the pur-
pose of promoting public demand for law and order. For this reason, one
of the central questions that ultra-left groups debated in their ranks and in
their publications was: how could and should we oppose the violence pri-
marily used as a political instrument by right-wing groups and state appa-
ratuses?
As Wagner-Pacifici indicates, discussions on violence followed two dis-
tinct and opposed lines of reasoning. The first declared that violence pro-
duces irretrievable destruction and never social emancipation, brother-
hood, justice and equality. Nevertheless, a distinction was made between
legitimate and illegitimate violence in relation to the antifascist struggle.
For example, Lidia Menapace, in a preface to a collection titled On Vio-
lence. Politics and Terrorism: A Debate Within the Left, argued that while Fas-
cist violence was deliberately used as a means of exercising power and glo-
rified by Fascist propaganda, Resistance violence was the expression of a sit-
uation of necessity, a means to survive and to oppose the regime.98 The his-
torian Claudio Pavone makes a similar distinction by saying that Resis-
tance fighters did not give «violence a value, especially to bloody violence,
a liberating value as such», did not have «the aesthetic pleasure of killing»,
96 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 44.
97 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 45.
98 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 46.
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but acted out of necessity, responding to a moral duty.99 Moreover, writing
about the killing of Aldo Moro, Pavone claims that the BR were related to
a culture of violence as a value and identity—«I shoot therefore I am»—
which recalled the Fascist culture of death opposed by the Resistance.100
The second line of reasoning saw violence as an appropriate method of
struggle only if it was an expression of the will of the masses. Criticizing
the anti-violence front of the PCI–DC alliance, one Lotta Continua group
from Torino wrote in 1977:
It is necessary to specify that this ‹anti-violence front› has, as its prima-
ry goal, the political expropriation of the masses and is, from this per-
spective, allied to the class enemy who proposes the same object. We,
instead, must be ready to develop the capacity of the movement to
strike the enemy even with avant-garde action when these actions have
a real mass reference. And it is on the mass representativeness, on the
capacity and opportunity to develop politically and to develop the rev-
olutionary process that we judge violence and the determinate use of
offensive weapons.101
As Drake points out, this discursive legitimization of violence refers both
to Catholic and Marxist traditions. The already mentioned journal Nuovo
Impegno, for example, represented the Colombian priest and predecessor of
liberation theology Camilo Torres, who was killed in 1966 in a guerrilla at-
tack, as the «incarnation […] of the revolutionary priest/martyr who had
given soaring expression to the cause of uniting Catholicism and Marxism
against the capitalist oppressor of mankind.»102 The history of Lotta Contin-
ua reveals that there was a mutual influence between leftist Catholicism
and Marxism on both a theoretical and a practical level. A large compo-
nent of Catholics, with long experience as leaders in the student move-
ment, joined the leader Adriano Sofri in launching the autonomist move-
ment.
The real dilemma for ultra-left groups was how to evaluate the violence
of the BR. In the early seventies, various groups showed sympathy and ex-
pressed support for the BR and their actions. In defending the BR’s kid-
99 Pavone, Claudio, La Resistenza, 28.4.1980, paper delivered in the first cycle of
the seminar Etica e Politica of the Centro Studi Piero Gobetti, typewritten script,
7; quoted in Bidussa 2015, xviii.
100 See Pavone, Claudio, «Sparo, dunque sono. Il nodo della violenza», Il Manifesto,
6.5.1982, 7.
101 Quoted in Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 46.
102 Drake 2008, 463.
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napping of business executive Idalgo Macchiarini on March 3, 1972, Lotta
Continua declared: «We hold that this action belongs properly to the gener-
alized desire of the masses to conduct the class struggle on the terrain of
violence and illegality.»103 However, Lotta Continua would thereafter op-
pose most Red Brigades actions and, gradually abandoning the discourse
of legitimization of proletarian violence, focalized on the social questions
of the day: divorce, abortion, homosexual rights, school reform and aid for
the south.
The widespread justification of «revolutionary» violence by ultra-left
groups during the autunno caldo undoubtedly provided a framework with-
in which terrorism could develop. However, it must be highlighted that
the «strategy of tension» and right-wing terrorism played a key role in radi-
calizing the conflict and in provoking a violent reaction by the worker and
student movements. Between 1969 and 1980, extreme right-wing groups
were responsible for the majority of deaths and injuries caused by terrorist
attacks. Besides the Piazza Fontana massacre of December 1969, the right-
wing terrorist campaign included numerous train bombings, the most seri-
ous of which happened in 1974 and 1984 on the Bologna–Florence railway
line, and the bombing in August 1980 of Bologna station, which caused
the deaths of 85 people. Moreover, there are fundamental differences be-
tween the broad movement and the terrorist bands: «For all their faults,
the revolutionary groups realized that any transformation of Italian society
had to derive from action in civil society, from the building of a mass
movement, of changing popular consciousness. Success or failure was to be
measured in these terms alone. The terrorists, by contrast, by choosing to
work clandestinely and to use exemplary violent action, cut themselves off
from reality and put in its place their own invented world. Their arid com-
muniqués were the supreme example of abstract ideology replacing social
analysis.»104 The idea of a nascent revolution put forward by these move-
ments was thus extremely simplified and mythicized by the terrorists. The
terrorist groups developed, in line with structural changes within the so-
cial movements, an intensification of violence among a minority of actors
only: «the fundamentally open-minded and pluralistic nature of the protest
movements was replaced by an anti-democratic and totalitarian vision of
how to solve problems.»105 The increasing violence that characterized BR
103 Lotta Continua, «Comunicato di Lotta Continua: Il sequestro di Macchiarini,
dirigente alla Sit Siemens», 9.5.1972.
104 Ginsborg 1990, 362.
105 Dunnage 2002, 188.
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actions from the mid-seventies onwards, as well as their decision to go un-
derground, isolated the terrorists from working-class members of society,
though the attitude of the latter towards terrorism remained ambivalent.
The BR were undoubtedly the most active left-wing terrorist group in
Italy from the beginning of the seventies. Though representing only a mi-
nority of protest activists, the founder members of the BR played an im-
portant role in the mobilizations of 1968 and 1969 and began to organize
the lotta armata, the armed fight, between 1969 and 1970. The founders of
the BR came from diverse social and ideological backgrounds: Renato Cur-
cio and his wife Margherita Cagol were students at Trento university and
members of Maoist groups, while Alberto Franceschini was active in the
FGCI (the Communist youth movement) in Reggio Emilia. Many of the
first members had a strong Catholic background in common and were
from working-class or lower-middle-class families. Franceschini’s father
was a worker and antifascist, who was deported to Auschwitz, and his
grandmother was a leader of the peasant leagues.106
The first leaflet of the BR signed in the singular (Brigata Rossa) appeared
in Milan in April 1970. In October of the same year, the journal Sinistra
Operaia announced the creation of the BR as the avant-garde of the prole-
tarian struggle against capitalism. The early actions of the BR, from 1972
onwards, were no more than armed propaganda concentrated in Milan
and then Turin. In their first actions, BR members «only» beat and humili-
ated rightwing trade unionists, managers and foremen, principally in the
two Milanese factories of Pirelli and Sit Siemens; sometimes, they set their
cars on fire. In March 1972 they kidnapped, though only for 20 minutes,
the manager of Sit Siemens Idalgo Macchiarini. In early 1974, they an-
nounced an attack on «the heart of the state» for the first time.107 On 18
April they kidnapped the judge Mario Sossi, whom they viewed as a fanati-
cal persecutor of the working-class and student movement, and held him
prisoner for 35 days. Submitted to a «trial», Sossi was sentenced to death.
The BR, however, offered the state an option, that is, they demanded the
release of members of the organization XXII Ottobre, who would have ob-
tained a safe conduct in Cuba, North Korea or Algeria, in exchange for his
release. Paolo Emilio Taviani, Minister of the Interior, rejected the black-
mail; the court of Genoa offered to review the position of the detainees,
exploiting the possibilities offered by procedural rules, but prosecutor
Francesco Coco reiterated his «no» to any form of blackmail. The BR de-
106 See Franceschini/Buffa/Giustolisi 1988.
107 See Galli 2004, 61.
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cided to release Sossi without receiving anything in return. The magistrate
was released in Milan on May 23, 1974. Although they did not get what
they demanded, the action enabled the BR to achieve national notoriety.
Until the Sossi kidnapping, the BR had not killed anyone yet. The first
two murders claimed by the BR were committed on June 17, 1974, when
two members of the Italian Social Movement (MSI), Giuseppe Mazzola
and Graziano Giralucci, were killed during a raid on the MSI headquarters
in Padua. In October of the same year, one of the members of the BR
group who had attacked the MSI headquarters in Padua, Roberto Og-
nibene, killed Marshal Felice Maritano while trying to escape from the
Carabinieri. When, in June 1975, Margherita Cagol was killed in a skir-
mish with the police, the number of violent activities increased. This also
marked the moment of the dissolution of the first BR generation and the
formation of the second. As Wagner-Pacifici observes, «while the first gen-
eration had begun with pamphleting, burning cars, kneecapping that re-
sulted in the eventual return of the hostage and only toward the end be-
came involved in violent police skirmishes that resulted in deaths, the sec-
ond wave of BR members often shot to kill. Thus one of the first noted dif-
ferences was an increased level of violence and a military efficiency to go
with it.»108
Under the leadership of Mario Moretti, though he was a member of the
first generation, the BR started killing their targets and legitimized their
actions by representing their victims as absolute enemies of the working-
class. In June 1976, the BR killed the general public prosecutor of Genoa,
Francesco Coco, and two of his bodyguards in order to prevent the trial of
the founders of the organization, who had been arrested. The intensifica-
tion of violence coincided with declining levels of protest within society at
large, which enhanced a loss of faith in legal forms of collective behavior.
This led to the increasing bureaucratization and militarization of the BR,
which then began to assume the characteristics of a clandestine group:
«The organization is puritanical and sacrificial and the BR of Moretti tend
to regard clandestinity as a form of religious, ascetic practice. […] A
monastic organization is being recreated in paramilitary teams, obeying
the need […] to sacralize death and blood, not the death of the believer
but of the militant.»109
108 Wagner-Pacifici, Robin Erica, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama
(Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 52.
109 Bocca 1985, 138, 181; it.: «L’organizzazione è puritana e sacrificale e il brigatista
morettiano tende a considerare la clandestinità come una forma di vita religiosa,
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Towards the end of the decade, the BR reached their most violent phase.
They first understood themselves as the vanguard of the worker move-
ment, then turned to believing that, in the context of the Historic Com-
promise, the «bourgeois» state had assigned the task of controlling the
working-class to the trade unions. Trade union leaders promoting the His-
toric Compromise strategy within both the PCI and the DC became their
main targets. After the assassination of Aldo Moro, the actions of the BR
continued with regularity until February 1982. The killing continued and
increased throughout 1979 and 1980. However, they became more and
more isolated, and defections from their ranks grew. Moreover, General
Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa—who was assassinated by the mafia in Palermo
in 1982 under circumstances not yet fully clarified—was at last appointed
to coordinate the anti-terrorist offensive. In fewer than three years, the
group was detected and dispersed by Italian investigators with the aid of
several leaders under arrest, who decided to collaborate with the judicial
system. After the mass arrests, which took place in the late eighties, the
group faded into insignificance.110
In its final years, the BR became increasingly isolated from the rest of so-
ciety. In fact, the killing of Aldo Moro can be seen as the action by which
the BR marked their own end, or more generally, the decline of terrorism
in Italy. As we saw in the first chapter and will deepen in the next two, the
BR, after Moro’s abduction, demanded the liberation of imprisoned terror-
ists in exchange for the liberation of the Christian Democrat politician;
but the government, the PCI and the DC, as well as most of the established
media, immediately assumed an intransigent position. Ginsborg—whose
negative opinion about Moro becomes manifest when he writes that he
«wrote a series of anguished letters […], begging them to try to secure his
release»—supports the decision of no negotiation: «had Moro not been
killed but exchanged for one or more imprisoned terrorist, the BR would
have appeared both invulnerable and willing to compromise, with the re-
sult that their appeal would almost certainly have widened.»111
This statement by Ginsborg, who is undoubtedly one of the major and
more qualified scholars of modern and contemporary Italy, is to be reject-
ed for at least two reasons. First, the argument that the liberation of Moro
ascetica. […] Si ricrea una organizzazione monastica nelle squadre paramilitari
obbendendo al bisogno di […] sacralizzare la morte e il sangue, non più la
morte del credente ma del militante.»
110 See Galli 2004.
111 Ginsborg 1990, 385 (emphasis added).
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would have had the negative effect of legitimizing terrorism cannot be veri-
fied as it moves in the sphere of hypothetical history. Secondly, if one really
wants to reason in hypothetical terms, it would seem correct to argue that
the liberation of Moro could also have had the positive effect not only of
de-mythologizing and de-escalating the social conflict and political strug-
gle, but also of allowing the emergence of a different image, a different
conception of state apparatuses and their functions. In fact, hypothetical
engagement for the liberation of Moro could also have been perceived
through a certain media representation strategy as the demonstration that
the state and the major political parties were committed to the ultimate
goal of safeguarding individual human life. Assuming a position of intran-
sigence, the state, major political parties and the established media repro-
duced a certain image of the state and its functions, according to which in
exceptional situations a single life can be sacrificed for the security of soci-
ety. The position taken by Ginsborg, which at first sight might appear to
be a sort of ethical utilitarianism according to which Moro’s life had to be
sacrificed in order to save the lives of other citizens from future terrorist at-
tacks, is based on the assumption that the exchange of prisoners would
have necessarily endangered the safety of many Italians. The fact is that
many citizens were killed in spite of the government’s and the parties’ deci-
sion not to negotiate; we will never know what would have happened if
history had gone differently. However, what we can say with certainty is
that the thesis according to which negotiations for Moro’s liberation
would inevitably have had negative repercussions on Italian society and its
institutions is highly questionable.
There is a third reason for rejecting Ginsborg’s statement, which regards
the negative effects of Moro’s death. Aldo Moro’s assassination determined
not only the end of the popular support on which the BR and the project
of violent revolution still counted, but also the annihilation of the emanci-
patory movement with strong political participation that had developed
since the 1960s. The idea of an egalitarian and just society seemed contami-
nated, definitively delegitimized by the actions of groups such as the BR.
In the end, the process that led to the atomization of Italian society, sense-
less consumerism and growing individualism and the fetishization of com-
modities—a process that began with the economic boom—was able to
continue without obstacles. Moreover, Moro’s death marked the end of
that policy of solidarity inaugurated by the Christian politician. It does not
seem exaggerated to say that without Moro—and without Berlinguer, who
died in 1984—the concrete possibility of achieving the so-called third way
to form a democratic political model not subject to the unique thought of
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capitalism had become impossible. In the second half of the eighties, the
ideology called Craxism—from the name of Bettino Craxi, leader of the
PSI from 1976 to 1993 and Prime Minister from 1983 to 1987—was estab-
lished and supported privatization and liberalization, moving the PSI from
left-wing to center-left. Under Craxi, the PSI formed a coalition with the
DC and other moderate parties called Pentapartito, which for a while en-
sured them a stable majority with which to govern. When, after nation-
wide judicial investigations, the deep system of corruption at the base of
this coalition emerged, there was nothing left to stop the rise of Silvio
Berlusconi to power.
The Moro Case: History and Conspiracy
Almost four decades after the attack in via Fani on March 16, 1978, where
the BR killed the five bodyguards of Aldo Moro and then the Christian
Democrat politician 55 days later, there is not yet a definitive version, or a
generally recognized interpretation of what «really» happened. As written
by political scientist Giorgio Galli,
the kidnapping [of Aldo Moro] is a unique case not only in their [of
the BR] history, but in the entire history of guerrilla warfare in the
West […]. Interpretations of what happened include a wide range that
goes from ‹everything is clarified› […], with the BR as sole protago-
nists, to the idea of a conspiracy hatched by the CIA and managed by
the Italian P2, through to the appeal on the front page of the ‹Corriere
della Sera›, in which Franceschini argues that Moretti is in fact an un-
dercover CIA agent.112
It is practically impossible to mention, and even less so to summarize all
the inquiries on the circumstances of the kidnapping and murder of the
Christian Democrat politician. There is a permanently growing number of
different interpretations of documents and testimonies collected in the five
trials that were held at the Corte d’Assise of Rome, in the parliamentary
committees of inquiry that dealt with the affair and of other testimonies
and documents that have not been collected (and verified) in the trials or
commissions. The amount of evidence, testimonies, police reports, com-
4.4
112 Galli 2004, 106; Franceschini was one the historical leaders and founders of the
BR; Moretti was one of the BR leaders in the late 70s and one of the kidnappers
of Aldo Moro; P2 was a clandestine (after 1976) Masonic lodge.
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mission reports, photographs and ballistic analyses produced, collected,
cataloged and interpreted in four decades is enormous. In the court pro-
ceedings alone more or less 460,000 pages were produced.113 Even larger is
the amount of documents in the archive of the second parliamentary com-
mission of inquiry—the Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo
in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi,
established in 1988 and worked on until 2001—which amounts to a total
of about 1,500,000 pages. In addition to this mass of documents, there is a
comprehensive collection of 130 volumes of documents attached to the fi-
nal reports of the first commission—the Commissione parlamentare d'inchi-
esta sulla strage di via Fani, sul sequestro e l’assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terror-
ismo in Italia—, which was established in 1979 and concluded its work in
1983.114 It can be assumed that the third commission, which is called Com-
missione parlamentare di inchiesta sul rapimento e sulla morte di Aldo Moro
and officially began to work in May 2014, will also produce a considerable
amount of documents.
The reconstruction of the circumstances of Moro’s kidnapping, impris-
onment and assassination emerged in the five court proceedings, according
to which the Operazione Fritz—as the BR called the kidnapping—was con-
ceived, executed and completed only by the BR, is rejected by many jour-
nalists, historians and politicians. The theses and hypotheses expressed by
the various authors dealing with the Moro case are located between two
opposing poles: while some believe that there was a conspiracy hatched by
state institutions, organizations such as the Masonic lodge P2 and/or secret
services (either Italian or from other countries), others are convinced that
the BR acted without outside interference and without taking orders from
anyone. Over the years, an extensive number of hypotheses—more or less
plausible, imaginative and creative—emerged. A wide range of individuals
and groups has, from time to time, been accused of involvement in the kid-
napping, imprisonment and assassination.115
113 See Lofoco 2015, 9.
114 See Satta 2003, xix.
115 Various entities were accused of having helped—materially, logistically—or even
of being the real masterminds and instigators of the BR in the preparation and
execution of the operation: the Masonic lodge «Propaganda 2» (P2); the Italian
intelligence services Military Intelligence and Security Service (SISMI), Intelli-
gence and Democratic Security Service (SISDE), Executive Committee for Intel-
ligence and Security Services (CESIS); the Italian clandestine NATO «Stay Be-
hind» organization called «Gladio»; the United States of America and specifical-
ly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the USSR and specifically the Russian
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Hypotheses about an international conspiracy were already formulated
in 1978. In a parliamentary debate about the kidnapping and murder of
Aldo Moro, which took place on May 19, 1978, the Communist deputy
Ugo Spagnoli raised the question of a possible conspiracy. Christian Demo-
crat Vittorio Cervone repeated Spagnoli’s claim in another debate on the
Moro kidnapping four days later in the Italian Senate.116 In October 1978,
Leonardo Sciascia, who at that time was member of the Parliament for the
Radical Party, published a book entitled L’affaire Moro, in which he ques-
tions the official version. However, as we will see in chapter seven, he does
not argue that there was an international conspiracy to prevent Moro from
continuing his political project. Rather, he argues that part of the ruling
class and the state apparatuses took the opportunity to dismiss Moro. In
other words: he argues that there were no masterminds who directed the
BR, who instead acted according to their own will, but once they had kid-
napped Moro, several social actors worked to ensure that he would never
come out alive from the «people’s prison». Ultimately, Sciascia was first to
take the accusations Moro put forward in his letters seriously and assigned
the ultimate responsibility for Moro’s death to the government and the
major political parties. However, many of Sciascia’s fellow party members,
such as Emma Bonino, took a more radical position, underlining the thesis
of the Sicilian intellectual and accusing the United States, the CIA or other
NATO members of masterminding the kidnapping.117 There is, however, a
big difference between saying that national or international actors ordered
the kidnapping and assassination of Moro and saying that certain social ac-
tors acted, when Moro had already been kidnapped, in order to prevent his
possible release.
The first publication in the English language—Robert Katz’s Days of
Wrath (1980)—despite being characterized by an analytical accuracy absent
in Italian publications until then, replicated the investigative attempts al-
Committee for State Security (KGB); the German Red Army Faction (RAF); the
State of Israel and specifically its Institute for Intelligence and Special Opera-
tions (Mossad), and the criminal syndicate called ’Ndràngheta that was based in
Calabria. Very often, the conspiracy theories also point to a Machiavellian mind,
to a grande vecchio, which would have masterminded everything; among the
most often nominated individuals we find: the former US Secretary of State
Herny Kissinger; the former Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga, the former
president of the Council of Ministers Giulio Andreotti; and the former Venera-
ble Master of the clandestine lodge P2 Licio Gelli. See Hof 2013.
116 See Hof 2013, 238.
117 See Hof 2013, 238.
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ready widespread in Italy at that time to reconstruct the chronology of and
identify the main protagonists (and their responsibilities) in the Moro af-
fair. Katz excludes the possibility that there were foreign powers interfering
in the political management of the Moro case and claims that all decisions
«were made exclusively in Rome, determined rather less by the spirit of
democracy than the passing exigencies of domestic power politics». He also
adds that «interests of powers far bigger than Italy was hot breath on
Rome’s neck. At no time were the men in the via delle Botteghe Oscure
[the site of the headquarters of the PCI] unaware that Eurocommunism
was on trial both in Moscow and Washington, and not for a moment did
Christian Democracy forget the United States and Germany.»118
Politician and member of the first parliamentary commission of inquiry
Sergio Flamigni, who also dedicated many studies to the topic, vehemently
argued that Aldo Moro was killed because of his policy of openness to-
wards the PCI, since it was strenuously opposed by the US’ administration,
the Soviet nomenclature, NATO, the German, French and Israeli govern-
ments, and in Italy by the Masonic lodge P2 and the right wing of the
DC.119 In his first book, published in 1988, he advocates that Moro was be-
trayed by his former colleagues and by state officials. Also, as a member of
the Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sulla strage di via Fani, sul sequestro
e l’assassinio di Aldo Moro e sul terrorismo in Italia, he was one of the most
prominent people who suspected that the «mistakes» in the search for Mo-
ro did not occur accidentally.120 In his latest book, Flamigni writes about a
patto di omertà (pact of silence) made by terrorists with areas of apparatuses
of the Italian State and members of the right wing of the DC aimed at cov-
ering the accomplices in and the instigators of the crime.121
The former magistrate, and Moro’s brother Alfredo Carlo Moro, is skep-
tical of the thesis that the BR planned, organized and executed Moro’s ab-
duction without help and indicates more than twenty issues that remain
unexplained. Ultimately, he concludes that the BR were given direct or in-
direct help at many stages and that the full range of motives and responsi-
bilities has yet to be determined.122 In 1998, then President of the Repub-
lic, Luigi Scalfaro, supported this view, expressing his doubts in Parliament
that the real masterminds of the kidnapping had all been identified. In
118 Katz 1980, 315.
119 See Flamigni 1998, 178.
120 See Flamigni 1988.
121 See Flamigni 2015.
122 See Moro 1998.
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1998, historian Francesco Biscione proposed an interpretive scheme of the
Moro crime based on the hypothesis of the «double crime», according to
which the murder of the politicians was the result of a convergence of het-
erogeneous forces and that both international and national right-wing
groups, which wanted to defeat Moro’s political project, had contributed
to the elimination of the hostage.123
In 2000, Giovanni Pellegrino, who presided over the Commissione parla-
mentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individu-
azione dei responsabili delle stragi from 1994 to 2001, published a book in
cooperation with journalists Giovanni Fasanella and Claudio Sestieri,
which focuses on the thesis of the «double hostage». According to him, sev-
eral Italian and foreign secret services contacted the BR to obtain from the
terrorists all the secrets Moro had supposedly told his kidnappers.124 There
was not a double crime, Pellegrino argued, but rather a double hostage
inasmuch as the BR had not one but two sources of blackmail: the prison-
er’s life and his writings.
Ferdinando Imposimato who, as public prosecutor, investigated the Mo-
ro case, argues that Moro «had to die» because of his policy of openness
towards the PCI. In accordance with Cold War logic, Moro was a persona
non grata in the Italian political class and had to be eliminated in order to
preserve Italy’s position within NATO. In his latest book, Imposimato even
claims that the then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and Interior Minister
Francesco Cossiga knew where Aldo Moro was imprisoned—via Montalci-
ni in Rome—from the first days after the kidnapping. This thesis is based
largely on statements made by Giovanni Ladu, a Sardinian officer of the
Guardia di Finanza, who in 2009 said to Imposimato that he was a member
of a group of soldiers that oversaw the prison of via Montalcini from April
24, 1978, onwards. In 2012, another «witness» wrote a series of emails to
Imposimato maintaining that he was also a part of the soldier’s group that
controlled the prison. However, there are many inconsistencies in Ladu’s
statements and good reasons to believe that the one who wrote the emails
to Imposimato in 2012 was none other than Ladu himself, pretending to
be another person. In November 2013, the prosecutor Luca Palamara be-
gan to investigate Giovanni Ladu, accusing him of slander.125
Other authors are critical of these theses, arguing that the kidnapping
and killing of Aldo Moro is only and exclusively attributable to the BR.
123 Biscione 1998, 125–139.
124 Fasanella/Sestieri/Pellegrino 2000.
125 See Lofoco 2015, 139–142.
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Unlike those who are convinced of the existence of a conspiracy, a secret
international network or a «grand old man» who pulls the strings of histo-
ry, this second category of authors works in a less speculative and hypothet-
ical way, basing their theories on documents and testimonies whose relia-
bility is examined on the basis of factual evidence. Vladimiro Satta, the
archivist of the second Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry, is convinced
that there are no bigger mysteries to unravel concerning the Moro affair.126
In his dense and meticulous analysis of documents and records in the
archive of the Commission, he identifies only four minor questions that re-
main unanswered; questions, however, which according to him cannot
overturn the verdict reached by the five trials dedicated to the events.
Similarly, the already mentioned Giorgio Galli argues that there was not
a conspiracy and that the BR operated without the help of anyone. How-
ever, Galli also identifies five «dark spots never clarified».127 He supports
the thesis that the Italian intelligence services infiltrated the BR and moni-
tored their activities, but categorically denies that they were aware or even
the masterminds of the «Fritz operation». According to Galli, the reasons
for the kidnapping and killing of Moro cannot be found in international
political interests linked to the Cold War, but in the interests of the BR,
who kidnapped Moro in order to obtain political recognition. The BR
were not directed or helped by anyone, but rather acted according to their
own revolutionary plan, believing that kidnapping Aldo Moro was equiva-
lent to an attack on the «heart of the state», as they wrote in their
Risoluzione della Direzione Strategica delle Brigate Rosse, a sort of program-
matic manifest written and distributed in February 1978. In this docu-
ment, the BR identified the SIM—Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali—
as the common enemy of the proletarian class, which can only be de-
stroyed by the means of revolutionary violence:
In this historical phase, at this point in the crisis, the practice of revolu-
tionary violence is the only policy which has a real opportunity to ad-
dress and resolve the antagonist contradiction that opposes the
metropolitan proletariat to the imperialist bourgeoisie. At this stage,
the class struggle takes on, on the initiative of the revolutionary van-
guard, the shape of war.128
126 See Satta, 2003.
127 Galli 2004, 107.
128 Brigate Rosse, 1878f, 66; it.: «In questa fase storica, a questo punto della crisi, la
pratica della violenza rivoluzionaria è l’unica politica che abbia una possibilità
reale di affrontare e risolvere la contraddizione antagonista che oppone prole-
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All BR members who directly or indirectly participated in the action and
who talked about the goals pursued by Moro’s abduction in the proceed-
ings have repeatedly reiterated this position: Moro was merely a symbol of
Democratic Christian power, an exponent, among others, of the so-called
«Imperialist State of the Multinationals» and was among the most vulnera-
ble. According to their declarations, Moro was chosen after a series of as-
signments and checks that led to the discarding of other targets.
However, as historian Guido Formigoni observes, the hypothesis of
more sophisticated political intent behind the decision to abduct Moro
and not, for example, Francesco Cossiga or Giulio Andreotti, cannot be
discarded. In symbolic terms, the abduction was linked to the political
process of convergence between the DC and PCI: «Moro was the weaver of
a political operation which, paving the way for the dialogue between the
DC and the major component of the Italian left, aimed at stabilizing polit-
ics. […] Moro was basically among the very few Christian Democrats […]
(and perhaps the only one) capable of deeply linking strategy and tactics,
national and international dimension.»129 The BR’s goal was therefore not
only to block and contain the convergence process between the DC and
the PCI, but also to prevent its realization. According to Formigoni, they
believed that raising the level of the conflict in military terms would have
led the system to collapse from the inside, thus favoring a revolutionary sit-
uation with the idea of driving the proletarian masses to support the
armed struggle.
Moreover, Moro certainly had many enemies within his own party, state
apparatuses and international circles. In fact, «many of the secret service
leaders entrusted with the task of coordinating Moro’s rescue operation
were members of P2, which has been associated with the overall terrorist
‹strategy of tension› characterizing the seventies and eighties.»130 As also
Formigoni argues, the doubt remains that terrorist environments may not
be so isolated and autonomous in their determination: «Somehow their
choice and their behavior might have also been moved by some external
influence or force.»131 Formigoni also highlights that the parliamentary
commissions of inquiry and the trials of the BR have brought to light a se-
ries of conspicuous omissions, incomprehensible acts, inefficiencies, actual
tariato metropolitano e borghesia imperialistica. In questa fase la lotta di classe
assume, per iniziativa delle avanguardie rivoluzionarie, la forma della guerra.»
129 Formigoni 2016, 339.
130 Dunnage 2002, 189.
131 Formigoni 2016, 339.
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deviations in the investigation and strange coincidences, which definitely
helped the terrorists and prevented police forces from finding out where
Moro was imprisoned. The historian argues that a definitive judgment can-
not be given because of a lack of evidence, but that undoubtedly the Italian
State did not do everything it could to save Moro through the collaborative
work of the police, military and intelligence services.132
Other «mysteries» in the Moro case concern texts written by Aldo Moro
during his 55 days of captivity. In a recent study, Miguel Gotor examines
the letters of Aldo Moro using a sophisticated historical, philological and
cultural approach. Gotor criticizes the «interpretive shortcuts» taken by
most of the authors who have dealt with the Moro case. According to him,
it is simplistic to believe that Moro’s death was solely due to the actions of
a gang of criminals; but it is equally reductive to consider the kidnapping
and murder of the politician as the result of the actions of secret services or
occult power groups that operated according to a logic linked to the
geopolitical period of the Cold War. Gotor believes that, in order to under-
stand «why Italy was the only country in the world in which the student
movement of 1968 […] was gradually transformed into a violent conflict
with armed vanguards right and left», one has to insert the «Moro affair»
into the political, social and cultural context of post-war Italy.133 Gotor’s
enquiry tries to reconstruct this context and understand how the BR, the
government, Moro’s family and the collaborators acted by analyzing the
documents they produced.
The historian, who is also a member of the Commissione parlamentare di
inchiesta sul rapimento e sulla morte di Aldo Moro and a Senator of the
Democratic Party (PD), follows the same analytical process in the study Il
memoriale della Repubblica, which examines a series of texts Aldo Moro
wrote during his kidnapping to answer the interrogations of the BR.134
While the first study sought to reconstruct the strategies, intentions and ac-
tions of the main protagonists of the 1978 events, the writings of Moro in
this publication are the reference point for a broader historical reconstruc-
tion that aims to shed light on the power struggles, interests and policy
choices that determined the «crisis of the seventies».135 In particular, the
goal of this second study is to reconstruct the complicated and strange his-
tory of the discovery of Moro’s writings. In the so-called «people’s prison»,
132 See Formigoni 2016, 345.
133 Gotor, 2008a, xvi.
134 Gotor 2011.
135 Gotor 2011, 548.
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the politician not only wrote many letters, a part of which became public
during his imprisonment, but also a large series of texts and notes general-
ly referred to as Moro’s Memoriale. He almost certainly wrote a part of
these texts in response to the BR’s interrogation, while another part seems
to be the fruit of free autobiographical reflections or descriptions of his
own vision of recent Italian political history. It is not entirely clear why the
BR—the leader of the BR group that kidnapped and assassinated Moro,
Mario Moretti, claims that none of them realized the possible «political»
use of Moro’s papers136—did not disclose these materials during or in the
immediate aftermath of the sequestration, since they contain critical judg-
ments on the DC’s connection with the «strategy of tension». Moreover, in
these texts, Moro also illustrated quite clearly the goals and methods of this
strategy, mentioned implicitly the activity of the NATO stay-behind organi-
zation Gladio, and addressed the relations between international political–
military environments and internal political problems in Italy.
Gotor’s reconstruction also clearly demonstrates the existence of two se-
cret negotiations during Moro’s captivity. On the one hand, there was an
attempt by the Vatican, among whose protagonists were the priests Cesare
Curioni, Pasquale Macchi and Antonello Mennini, to negotiate with the
BR. On the other hand, there was an attempted negotiation involving the
Socialists Bettino Craxi, Claudio Signorile and Antonio Landolfi, the
member of Autonomia Operaia Franco Piperno, the journalist Lanfranco
Pace, and two members of the BR, Valerio Morucci and Adriana Faran-
da.137 Gotor believes that the actual holders of political authority during
Moro’s imprisonment—that is, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and Inte-
rior Minister Francesco Cossiga—were most likely aware of the two secret
negotiations. Moreover, Gotor feels Pellegrino’s hypothesis is plausible, ac-
cording to which the Italian government was betrayed at the last moment
by an «unfaithful agent», the one who was entrusted with the task of recov-
ering Moro’s papers in a dual secret negotiation also involving the release
of the prisoner:
In that circumstance, the intermediary may have not acted according
to Italy’s national interests […] but to a supranational dimension
linked to the ‹Cold War›, to a different level of loyalty imposed by the
logic of the opposing blocs. […] A logic that heavily influenced not
only the relations between the Soviet and Atlantic bloc, but also those
136 See Moretti 2000, 158–159.
137 See Gotor 2008, 260–273.
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between the north and south of the Mediterranean basin where Italy
was a hinge between two worlds, but also […] a giant geographic, po-
litical, military, commercial, and espionage pier, and a transit passage
for so much legal and illegal traffic that linked the Middle East’s trou-
bles to the geometries of Atlantic Europe.
However, Gotor believes that the thesis of a «dual state»—that is, the idea
of a parallel state that would have plotted to kill Moro—is not sustainable
since in Italy state authority was always weak, stratified and polycentric,
and thus unable to organize a secret complot. In fact, he adds,
public firmness and secret negotiation are the only possible condition
of the exercise of power in an emergency situation when the central
authority is fragile, without mutual trust and the place of an endemic
struggle between factions.138
As evidenced by this incomplete list of hypotheses and interpretations of
what happened in the spring of 1978, the Moro case remains the subject of
debate and its clarification is far from over. It is not possible and not even
the task of this study to defend a certain hypothesis or model of interpreta-
tion, since this would require a specific investigation of all the evidence,
clues and testimonies that have emerged in the last four decades. However,
one cannot but notice that there are studies of undoubted seriousness and
scientific rigor, such as those of Galli and Gotor, only to mention two,
which highlight a series of unclear points, omissions and deliberately
planted false leads which, for good reason, have led to the belief that even
today there are facts and information that are not in the public domain. It
is equally clear that the various assumptions of conspiracy or of dark or
missing elements were often used for certain political purposes and to le-
gitimize or delegitimize, and to accuse or to absolve institutions, political
groups, parties and individuals.139 That being said, it cannot be excluded
that members of state apparatuses, foreign and national intelligence ser-
vices and, more generally, social actors who did not belong to the BR, pur-
sued their goals, acting in a planned manner to determine the outcome of
the Moro case. The problem is that as long as no unmistakable evidence
emerges—if such evidence really exists—all that remains very hypothetical.
However, as I will show in the next two chapters, there is at least some-
thing that is not hypothetical and which can be demonstrated: during the
138 Gotor 2008, 273.
139 See Hof 2013, 232–256.
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55 days of Moro’s imprisonment, different social actors acted in concert,
giving shape to political and media campaigns in which the choice of not
negotiating with the BR to obtain Moro’s release was represented as neces-
sary for national security and, more generally, for the salvation of the state.
Moreover, I will prove that, although Moro categorically criticized the
«line of firmness» in his letters and refused to assume the role of a state
martyr, he was repeatedly represented as such. Further, in the next chapters
I will argue that the rhetoric of public firmness and the martyrological rep-
resentation of Aldo Moro were related to a state mythology in which the
conflict between state and terrorism assumed the connotation of a meta-
physical fight between good and evil. If Moro, as I believe, was not killed
with the direct—logistical, material—help or complicity of state apparatus-
es, the intelligence services or occult political groups, it is certain that dur-
ing his imprisonment most representatives of the government, major par-
ties and the established media produced a hegemonic discourse and
worked according to a strategy of representation, whose function was to
make Aldo Moro’s death morally and politically acceptable for public
opinion.
4.4 The Moro Case: History and Conspiracy
181
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Construction of a Willing Martyr
Opposing Narratives and Representations: Red Brigades Versus Italian State
Versus Aldo Moro
Virtually every one of the first Christian martyrologies reaches its climax in
the public arena of the games. These games had the function not only of
entertaining, but also of holding together a complex network of political,
religious, and social elements of the empire. As Paul Middleton observes,
«in the stadium, the power, justice, and glory of the empire were celebrat-
ed amid the spectacle of gladiator duels, wild beasts, and the execution of
criminals.»1 The games were thus a form of representation, glorification
and celebration of both the political power and the legal system, of both
the executive and legal authority. The trials, the fights with beasts, the exe-
cutions, the tortures inflicted upon the members of the Christian commu-
nities can be considered, from this point of view, to be part of this system
of practices, which enforced and glorified political authority and the exer-
cise of violence, which were experienced as both legal and legitimate.
Martyrological representations produced by the first Christian commu-
nities radically opposed these practices of the glorification and representa-
tion of power. The first Christian martyrologies did not refer to a system of
rules created and enforced through social or governmental institutions,
but to certain ethical norms and values, which were experienced and repre-
sented as not identical to the law in force. Since there was no organized
and legitimized institution to guarantee these norms and values and the
members of the Christian communities radically rejected the legislation
and the legitimacy of the authority that enforced and applied the law, one
can say that martyrological representations were initially anti-legal. How-
ever, what they implicitly or explicitly criticized was often not the legal sys-
tem as such, but the extra-legal effect of legitimization, challenging the
fundamental moral norms and values to which the legal system referred.
Describing the context in which Christian martyrologies emerged in for-
mal terms, we can distinguish between two opposite ways of representing
and narrating actions and events related to trials and their punitive, often
violent effects. The condition for the emergence of such different represen-
5
5.1
1 Middleton 2011, 58.
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tations is the presence of at least two large conflicting groups, one of
which controls political and juridical institutions and state apparatuses,
while the other does not. The situation can also be described in the follow-
ing way: there is a context of political struggle between two groups—be-
tween individuals who identify themselves with two symbolically and dis-
cursively constructed forms of social and/or political community—in
which the judicial authority enforced by one group brings to trial one or
more of the other group’s members. Both groups produce different narra-
tives referring to the actions and events related to the trial. The first narra-
tive has the function of legitimizing the decisions of the juridical authority
by referring to law and ethics, while the second one attempts to delegit-
imize these decisions by highlighting its oppressive and unethical charac-
ter.
Also in the socio-political context in which the kidnapping, imprison-
ment, and assassination of Aldo Moro occurred, two fronts were «contend-
ing» for legitimacy, which produced and implemented two opposing nar-
ratives: on the one hand, in their communiqués the Red Brigades (BR) rep-
resented Aldo Moro as the accused in a trial against the «Imperialist State
of the Multinationals» (SIM); on the other hand, representatives of the Ital-
ian government, of political parties and most parts of the media represent-
ed Aldo Moro first as a great statesman who embodied the best virtues and
characteristics of a brave and committed politician, then as a hostage at the
mercy of his kidnappers, and finally as a martyr who died for the salvation
of the Italian Republic. But here the situation is, in a sense, completely
overturned, insofar as here was a group, without political legitimacy and
which did not refer to an institutionalized legal system, implementing the
trial’s narrative. Conversely, representatives and supporters of the generally
recognized political authority and political groups produced martyrologi-
cal representations.
The implementation of the trial’s narrative by the BR was a result of
their self-understanding as the true avant-garde of proletarian revolution as
well as part of their propaganda strategy. They understood and represented
their actions as part of a legitimate trial, in which not only the behavior of
Aldo Moro, but of the representatives of the whole political system was in-
dicted. It is worth mentioning some of the answers given to journalist
Giorgio Bocca by those members of the BR who participated in the Fritz
operation. The journalist asked them why they decided to kidnap Moro
and what were the goals of the operation. Lauro Azzolini suggested one
reason—hate for the Christian Democracy (DC)—and three goals: to con-
vince the proletariat, through a demonstration of military power and effi-
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ciency, that revolution by means of violence was feasible; to understand,
through the interrogation of Moro, the structures of power; and to obtain
the recognition of political prisoners.2 In other words, for Azzolini the oper-
ation was, at the same time, a performance with an appellative function, a
means of acquiring otherwise inaccessible knowledge, and a political in-
strument to force the state to no longer deal with the BR as if they were a
group of criminals, but as a legitimate political group.
Other members of the terrorist organization summarized the operation’s
goal a little differently. The operation’s chief, Mario Moretti, emphasized
the appellative function of the operation, but minimized the intention of
discovering hidden truths or becoming aware of secret information:
Why Moro? Because he was, for almost two decades, the supreme exe-
cutor of power in Italy, because he was the demiurge of Bourgeois
power, present in mediations and in decisive choices. […] Someone
has tried to attribute to us interests and methods of interrogation that
we never had. The interrogations were secondary to the action. The im-
portant thing for us was not what Moro would have said, but what the
imprisonment would have moved, unleashed in the revolutionary area.
Do you really believe that we organized an operation of that kind, in
which we played our entire organization, to uncover the scandals of
the Christian Democracy? They were not really there to be uncovered;
all of Italy knew and is aware of them; they are, so to speak, routine,
normality.3
Another member of the operation, Valerio Morucci, stressed in particular
the objective of obtaining political recognition:
The ideological apparatus of the BR […] is reduced essentially into two
parts, rather a corollary, the SIM and the Second Republic. The SIM or
Imperialist State of the Multinationals or global capitalist super-gov-
2 See Bocca 1985, 205–206.
3 Bocca 1985, 206–207; it.: «Perché Moro? Ma perché sua era, da almeno vent’anni, la
suprema gestione del potere in Italia, perché era il demiurgo del potere Borghese,
presente nelle mediazioni e nelle scelte decisive. […] Qualcuno ha voluto attribuir-
ci interessi e metodi inquisitori che non abbiamo mai avuto. Gli interrogatori
sarebbero stati secondari all’azione. L’importante per noi non era ciò che Moro
avrebbe detto, ma ciò che il sequestro avrebbe smosso, scatenato nell’area
rivoluzionaria. Le pare che avremmo organizzato una operazione di quel tipo, in
cui giocavamo tutta la nostra organizzazione, per scoprire gli scandali democris-
tiani? Ma quelli non erano proprio da scoprire, l’Italia intera conosceva e li
conosce, sono, per così dire, routine, normalità.»
5 Construction of a Willing Martyr
184
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ernment, which Moro is the representative of in Italy as a leader of the
DC [Christian Democracy]. […] Starting from the false but dogmatic
premise that there is a SIM, everything must follow: Moro is the irre-
placeable pivot of the imperialist project, the DC cannot do without
him, the other parties cannot do without the DC; so the game is won
at the start, the state will be forced to deal, to pay a very high price.
The justicialist goal does not exist, the BR do not care to be told off by
Moro about the misdeeds of the DC […]. Moro was not doomed from
the start, but the price for his life was the political recognition of the
BR by the DC, from the DC in the first place as a guarantor of the SIM
and the other parties. […] What else would the exchange between the
political prisoner Moro and some of the political prisoners of the revo-
lutionary area have been if not a political recognition? Not their mere
release. That’s why the executive rejected the proposals of the Socialists
who wanted the release, but reaffirmed the absence of recognition.
[…] Pope Paul VI, UN Secretary Waldheim, and Arafat made recogni-
tions of that type, but the BR wanted the recognition of the DC.4
It is interesting to note that both Morucci and Moretti excluded a «justi-
cialist» intention, arguing that the goal was not to try Aldo Moro in order
to bring out the «misdeeds of the DC». But if this is true, why, in the first
communiqué issued by the BR on March 18, 1978, two days after the at-
tack in via Fani, did they explicitly write about a trial against Moro and the
DC?
4 Bocca 1985, 206, 220; it.: «L’apparato ideologico delle BR […] si reduce in sostanza
a due punti, anzi a un corollario, il SIM e la Seconda repubblica. Il SIM o stato im-
perialista delle multinazionali o supergoverno capitalistico mondiale, di cui Moro
è il rappresentante in Italia come leader della DC […]. Partendo dalla premessa fal-
sa ma dogmatica che esiste il SIM, tutto ne deriva: Moro è il perno insostituibile
del progetto imperialistico, la DC non può fare a meno di lui, gli altri partiti non
possono fare a meno della DC; dunque la partita è vinta in partenza, lo stato sarà
costretto a trattare, a pagare un prezzo altissimo. L’obbiettivo giustizialista non es-
iste, alle BR non interessa farsi raccontare da Moro le malefatte della DC. […] Mo-
ro non era condannato in partenza, ma il prezzo della sua vita era il riconoscimen-
to politico delle BR da parte della DC, da lei in primis come garante del SIM e degli
altri partiti. […] Che altro se non il riconoscimento politico era lo scambio fra il
prigioniero politico Moro e alcuni prigionieri politici dell’area rivoluzionaria? Non
la loro semplice scarcerazione. Ecco perché l’esecutivo respinse le proposte dei so-
cialisti che volevano la scarcerazione, mentre riaffermavano il no al riconoscimen-
to. […] Riconoscimenti di quel tipo di furono da parte del papa, paolo VI, dal seg-
retario dell’ONU, Waldheim, da Arafat, ma le BR volevano quello della DC.»
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It is necessary to extend and further deepen the trial against the regime
[…]. This is one of the directives by which the Movement of the prole-
tariat Offensive Resistance marches. […] Let it be clear then that with
the capture of Aldo Moro, and the trial in which he will be submitted
to a People’s Court, we do not intend to ‹end the match›, nor much
less to show off a ‹symbol›, but to develop a password by which the en-
tire Movement of Offensive Resistance is already measuring itself, to
make it stronger, more mature, more incisive and organized. We in-
tend to mobilize the vastest and most unified armed initiative toward
the ultimate development of the class war for communism; to carry
the fight to the Imperialist State of the Multinationals; to disarticulate
the structures, the projects of the imperialist bourgeoisie by attacking
the political–economic–military personnel who are its expression.5
What does organizing a trial in order «to develop a password» mean? Be-
hind this militaristic rhetoric lurks the idea of providing an example that
the «proletariat» or, more generally, the «people» could imitate. The BR
understood themselves as fighting in an avant-garde way, as a sort of prole-
tarian military elite who were «performing» a ritual trial whose main func-
tion was to appeal to the people to reinforce and reproduce the same ritual
structure of accusation, judgment and execution. They used judicial
rhetoric in the (perhaps unconscious) belief that it served to legitimize the
use of violence by making it appear as part of the truthful and meaningful
revolutionary process of liberation. The paradox of all this is that, to
achieve this effect, the BR sought the recognition of the DC, which for
them was equivalent to the so-called SIM; they wanted to be recognized as
a legitimate, although hostile, political force. In other words, they seemed
to believe that only through recognition of their political identity by the
state could the performance succeed, appealing to the people, who would
finally begin the «ultimate revolution».
5 Brigate Rosse 1978a, 35; it.: «Bisogna estendere e approfondire il processo al regime
[…]. È questa una delle direttrici su cui è possibile far marciare il Movimento di
Resistenza Proletario Offensivo. […] Sia chiaro quindi che con la cattura di Aldo
Moro, il processo al quale verrà sottoposto da un Tribunale del Popolo, non inten-
diamo ‹chiudere la partita› né tanto meno sbandierare un ‹simbolo›, ma sviluppare
una parola d’ordine su cui tutto il Movimento di Resistenza Offensivo si sta già
misurando, rendendolo più forte, più maturo, più incisivo e più organizzato. Inten-
diamo mobilitare la più vasta e unitaria iniziativa armata per l’ulteriore crescita del-
la guerra di classe per il comunismo. Portare l’attacco allo Stato Imperialista delle
Multinazionali. Disarticolare le strutture, i progetti della borghesia imperialista at-
taccando il personale politico-economico-militare che ne è l’espressione.»
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The BR, by staging a trial and using legal–procedural language in their
communiqués, tried to present themselves as a legitimate alternative to
state institutions. It was an attempt to reinforce a set of organized and reg-
ularized expressions, figures and activities related to official trials, namely
one of the central instruments for controlling and punishing an individu-
al’s behavior, as a procedure of prefiguration, that is: as an attempt to copy
established rhetorical forms and narrative patterns, which historically have
proved performatively effective. Although it may seem illogical, the BR
tried to replace the state apparatuses by copying and replicating their struc-
tures, practices, and semiotic and rhetorical forms. What is significant here
is a postscript at the end of the aforementioned first communiqué:
In relation to the trial in Turin, we have already said that the trial,
through which a Special Court wants to quash the Communist Revo-
lution, is nothing but a farce. Another trial is taking place in the coun-
try, in which the struggles of the proletariat against its imperialist ene-
my can be seen, which in the development of the Civil War for the
construction of a Communist Society, charges and tries the bour-
geoisie and its servants. […] We also consider all the imprisoned com-
munist fighters hostages in the hands of the enemy and we will treat
any retaliation or reprisal as what they are: war crimes.6
The rhetorical strategy adopted here operates with the distinction falsity/
authenticity: the trial in Turin, in which the historical BR leaders were ac-
cused, is represented as a «farce», an illegitimate political mise-en-scène, and
is contrasted to the «real» trial, in which the proletariat accuses and tries
the bourgeoisie. The attribution of truthfulness, which was exemplary of
their own «trial», is undoubtedly an attempt to increase their performative
efficacy through language and rhetoric.
The BR understood the trial against Aldo Moro and the DC as part of a
guerrilla strategy pursuing multiple goals. As a general purpose, they want-
ed to light the spark of the revolution. More concretely, they wanted to in-
terrupt the «long Communist march into the institutions» to affirm the
6 Brigate Rosse 1978a, 36; it.: «Sul processo di Torino. Abbiamo già detto che il pro-
cesso attraverso il quale un Tribunale Speciale vorrebbe liquidare la Rivoluzione
Comunista, non può che essere una farsa. Ben altro processo è in atto nel paese, è
quello che vive nelle lotte del proletariato contro il nemico imperialista, che nello
svilupparsi della Guerra Civile per la costruzione di una Società Comunista, mette
sotto accusa la borghesia e i suoi servi. […] Riteniamo inoltre tutti i combattenti
comunisti imprigionati, ostaggi nelle mani del nemico e sapremo trattare eventuali
ritorsioni o rappresaglie per quello che sono: crimini di guerra.»
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prospect of the revolutionary fight and lay the groundwork for their own
hegemony within the left. Moreover, they wanted to create contradictions
within the political forces. The fate of the hostage, Moretti said, depended
on the contradictions that would emerge in the political forces, and «the
execution of the prisoner was an eventuality that we could not discard» if
such contradictions did not emerge, as actually happened in the 55 days of
Moro’s imprisonment.7 According to Barbara Balzerani, another member
of the organization, for the BR there was a «war between two opposing
armies, that of the state that does not hesitate to kill to maintain the estab-
lished order and that of the ‹revolutionary avant-garde› that has decided to
respond to the level imposed by power.»8 After carrying out many attacks
in the previous year, in early 1978, terrorists tried to provoke neo-fascist en-
vironments with the murder of two members of the Italian Social Move-
ment (MSI). The violent reaction that ensued seemed to set up a situation
of civil war. In a similar way, with the abduction of Moro, they wanted to
spread the feeling that Italy was a country in disorder and without a gov-
ernment capable of governing, forcing the DC and other parties to reveal
their impotence or to react with authoritarian and anti-democratic mea-
sures.9
The BR’s trial rhetoric was thus inseparably tied to war rhetoric. The tri-
al of Moro and the DC took on the connotation of a war crimes trial. The
BR also justified the killing of Moro’s five bodyguards with war rhetoric.
In various testimonies released later on in prison, they spoke of their con-
cern to avoid killing innocent victims, such as locals, workers or by-
standers, but for the bodyguards the discourse was different: «One could
object that the life of a policeman is not less worthy than that of a child,
but that is another discourse. At that moment, we are at war with the state:
the clash is between Moro’s bodyguards and us. It is either us or them. If
we fail, our comrades die.»10 De facto, the killing of the bodyguards was
7 Moretti 2000, 117; it.: «L’esecuzione dell’ostaggio era una eventualità che non
potevamo scartare.»
8 Balzerani 1998, 74–75; it.: «[…] guerra tra due eserciti contrapposti, quello dello
Stato che non esita ad uccidere per mantenere l’ordine costituito e quello dell’
‹avanguardia rivoluzionaria› che ha deciso di rispondere sul terreno imposto dal
potere.»
9 See Giovagnoli 2009, 45.
10 Moretti 2000, 121–122; it.: «Si può obbiettare che la vita di un poliziotto non vale
meno di quella di un bambino, ma questo è un altro discorso. In quel momento
noi con lo stato siamo in guerra: lo scontro è tra noi e la scorta di Moro. O noi o
loro. Se sbagliamo muoiono dei compagni.»
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not accepted by most of those who, within the worker and student move-
ments and in general within the extra-parliamentary left, had so far sympa-
thized with the BR. As theater director and actor Marco Baliani observed,
the 55 days of Moro’s captivity were like a «watershed for an entire genera-
tion, my generation. It was as though in those days there came to maturity
a deep laceration that may have already existed, but only fully manifested
itself, became visible, in that moment.»11 This change within the worker
and student movements has been well recorded, albeit with a certain
amount of rhetoric, by L’Unità, who two days after the attack wrote that
«people hear that; they know that the assassinated carabinieri and agents
are their brothers; they are workers like us. The pain for this scattered
blood is deep and authentic among the people.»12
Most of the representatives of the state apparatuses and of the govern-
ment as well as of the majority of the press reacted to the BR’s trial narra-
tive by adopting and reinforcing the rhetoric and emplotment strategies
which, as we have seen, came to establish themselves as an alternative and
opposing way of representing and narrating a trial as early as from the first
century AD. We are here faced with a reversal of roles and language games:
Aldo Moro became the symbol of the body politic of the wounded nation,
the class and the political system on trial, the martyr who suffered and died
for the welfare and safety of the Italian Republic. In this martyrological
narrative, the BR are portrayed as an evil force, infernal beasts craving only
destruction and death.
Both trial and martyrological narratives had different strategies of appel-
lation and of construction of a political community. In fact, the struggle
between the two narratives is not only a struggle for the establishment and
propagation of a certain image of Moro—martyr vs. politician co-responsi-
ble for all the evil that happened in Italy after World War II—but also for
the hegemony over the concept of «people» and in general over the idea of
the body politic. The discursive effort to establish who the people are and
who is the legitimate representative of the people is based on what Chantal
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau describe as «constitutive exclusion», by which
all particular notions of inclusion are established.13 All forms of representa-
11 Baliani 2011, 27.
12 Spriano, Paolo, «La piazza e lo Stato», in: L’Unità, 18.3.1978, 1; it.: «La gente lo
sente, lo sa che i carabinieri e gli agenti assassinati sono suoi fratelli, sono lavora-
tori come noi. Il dolore per questo sangue sparso è profondo, autentico in mezzo
al popolo.»
13 See Mouffe/Laclau 1986.
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tion of political community are based on implicit or explicit lines of de-
marcation between an inside and an outside. So, when the BR, the politi-
cal parties, the media, the representatives of government and state institu-
tions make assertions about who the people are, there is always someone
who is excluded from this collective identity. As Judith Butler observes,
when the struggle over deciding who belongs to ‹the people› gets in-
tense, one group opposes its own version of ‹the people› to those who
are outside, those considered to threaten ‹the people›, or to oppose the
proposed version of ‹the people›. As a result, we have (a) those who
seek to define the people (a group much smaller than the people they
seek to define), (b) the people defined (and demarcated) in the course
of that discursive wager, (c) the people who are not ‹the people›, and
(d) those who are trying to establish that last group as part of the peo-
ple.14
This is exactly what happened within the discursive struggle for the hege-
mony over the representation of the events of spring 1978. The BR tried to
define «the people» as the Italian proletariat and themselves as the legiti-
mate revolutionary avant-garde who acted and spoke for this people, by ex-
cluding the representatives of the political parties in Parliament, judges,
police officers and other employees of the state apparatuses, and in general
all members of the so-called bourgeoisie. They did that through performa-
tive acts of delimitation, which took the forms of both linguistic and bodi-
ly performativity. In fact, the killings of Moro’s five bodyguards on March
16 and of Aldo Moro himself on May 9, like so many other political assassi-
nations and bombings, were not (only) military operations, but (especial-
ly) performances with which the BR wanted to demarcate themselves from
other groups of the parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary left. Their
message was: we are the only true revolutionary vanguard, because we not
only talk but are willing to and also capable of killing the enemies of the
people. And, as we have just seen, they also regarded their actions as exam-
ples to be given to the people, that is, as performances with which they ap-
pealed to the people to imitate them. From this point of view, the ultimate
line of demarcation that defined the BR’s idea of who is part of the people
and who is excluded, was not primarily the distinction between the work-
ing-class and bourgeoisie, but the distinction between those who had the
will to act violently and those who did not. But since each performance
can be interpreted by the public, other than as intended by the agents of
14 Butler 2015, 4.
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the performance itself, the BR issued their communiqués, that is, linguistic
performances, through which they tried to represent their actions not as as-
sassinations but as legitimate executions.
On the other side, the government and most of the media operated by
defining the BR as an actual and concrete emanation of a permanent and
omnipresent danger, a will of violence that threatened the political body of
the nation and that could potentially break out at any moment. Within the
mythical narrative of the nation-state, Aldo Moro assumed the role of the
martyr that is willing to sacrifice himself for the sake of the threatened
«people». To be willing to use violence to achieve its own ends, the state
must assume the monopoly on violence and even be willing to sacrifice its
own citizens; the individual body is an expendable commodity for the
wellbeing of the political body. Not only were the BR discursively exclud-
ed from the body politic, but so was anyone who challenged the hegemon-
ic narrative, even Aldo Moro himself. From the moment he began to write
in his letters that the state had to deal with the terrorists, he challenged
and criticized a series of ethical and political premises on which nation-
state mythology is based. Representatives of the government and institu-
tions as well as the majority of the media responded to this criticism with
discursive practices intended to deconstruct and cancel out Moro’s political
identity, in order to make him appear as an individual reduced to mere life,
de facto excluding him from the body politic. This argument will be deep-
ened further.
During the 55 days of Moro’s captivity, there were some attempts to rep-
resent and narrate what was happening in an alternative and subversive
way, challenging both the trial and martyrological narratives. In fact, not
all the social actors who were involved in this mammoth media spectacu-
larization of the kidnapping, imprisonment and assassination of Aldo Mo-
ro aligned themselves with either the rhetoric and emplotment strategies
of the BR on the one hand, or those of the political parties, the govern-
ment and most of the media on the other. What makes the case so interest-
ing is in fact that Aldo Moro himself tried to resist. Leonardo Sciascia
wrote that Aldo Moro, before being kidnapped and during his entire polit-
ical career, used language as a weapon because he was aware of «the Italian
and Catholic secret of how to disperse the new into the old, to use every
new tool to serve the ancient rules and, mainly, to produce negative knowl-
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edge of human nature, in negativity.»15 Well, after his abduction, stripped
of power, Aldo Moro tried to use the old to say something new or at least
to subvert what the ruling parties, the government and most of the media
were saying. From a formal point of view, Moro’s attitude resembles that of
Bartleby in Melville’s story, which, as we saw in chapter two, is summed up
in the formula I would prefer not to.16 In his letters, the Christian Democrat
politician used language units and rhetorical forms linked to martyrologi-
cal and trial narratives in a subversive way, trying to give a different conno-
tation to words like «people», «state», «guilt», «accusation», «judgment»,
«salvation», and so on. He reinforced semantic and rhetorical elements
used in both trial and martyrological narratives, but in a completely differ-
ent way. He, in some ways, assumed the role of a martyr but held it against
those who did not want, or at least did nothing, to save him.
Moro opposed the vision of man and politics that was operative in the
national state mythology. He inverted the logic of the «reason of state», ar-
guing that the state and its apparatuses lose all sense, all reason for being, if
their actions are not based on the ethical principle of the sanctity of hu-
man life. As we saw, he actually supported this conception of the state and
of human life in some of his academic writings and political speeches. In
the letters he wrote from the «people’s prison», he reaffirmed his convic-
tion, attempting not only to save himself, but to subvert and withstand a
dangerous ideology, which considers men to be means for political purpos-
es and mere life to be expendable, instead of looking at human life, speak-
ing in Kantian terms, as an end in itself. The words and sentences written
by Moro in captivity are like a crack in the wall of the hegemonic represen-
tations and narratives of what happened in the spring of 1978; they have
operated and still operate as examples and points of departure for a variety
of other representations and narratives that seek to react to, criticize and
deconstruct the dominant political ideology, the state mythology and dox-
ology.
I identified three different ways of representing and narrating the events
of 1978, three different uses of language units and rhetorical forms. All
three referred to the same events and emerged within the same general so-
cial, cultural and political context, but with different objectives and strate-
gies. All three revolve around the figure of Aldo Moro: Moro as a defen-
15 Sciascia 1978, 34; it.: «Il segreto italiano e cattolico di disperdere il nuovo nel vec-
chio, di usare ogni nuovo strumento per servire regole antiche e principalmente,
di una conoscenza tutta in negativo, in negatività, della natura umana.»
16 See Agamben/Deleuze 2012; Whyte 2009.
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dant accused of being the person most responsible for all the evils caused
by the capitalist and imperialist bourgeoisie in Italy; Moro as a martyr, to
be sacrificed for the safety of the Republic; and finally, Moro as a human
being to be saved. The first two of these narratives operate according to
mythological narrative mechanisms. They reduce the complexity of reality,
they divide humanity by resorting to the dichotomy of good versus evil,
they represent history as an eternal fight between state and mankind, be-
tween Leviathan and Behemoth. They are similar since they are based on
the same ideological paradigms, and they need each other to survive and
reproduce. The pseudo-messianic narrative of the BR does nothing more
than reverse and reinforce the interpretative and representative patterns of
the nation-state mythology, because it absolutizes and substantializes good
and evil, conceives violence as the engine of history and the only tool to
change it and, above all, understands the human being as an expendable
commodity. The BR regarded themselves as the inheritors of the Resis-
tance, as the fighters on the side of the oppressed, but instead they acted,
spoke, and wrote reproducing practices and narratives of oppression. Only
the third strategy of representation and narration breaks down and com-
pletely distances itself from the ideological paradigms and the oppressive
practices of nation-state mythology. It is able to offer resistance to the in-
strumental use of the martyr figure, to the legitimization of violence (both
that practiced by the state and by terrorist organizations), and to the absol-
utization of good and evil because it uses language and rhetorical forms
poetically (see chapter two). By defining these linguistic and discursive per-
formances as «poetic», I will argue that not only can art and poetry resist
hegemonic narratives, but rather that acratic and para-doxological discur-
sive practices, to be effective, must act as poetry and thus, in line with the
definition given by Agamben, bring to light the historicity of linguistic
forms that they use. Aldo Moro’s letters, as well as other media and social
actors who have been inspired by these letters, operate exactly in this way:
they expose and unmask the instrumental use of language, the rhetorical
mechanism through which signs and words are hypostatized so that repre-
sentations of non-discursive facts, events, and actions appear to be abso-
lutely correspond to reality. In other words, they oppose and radically re-
ject hegemonic political discourse through the disempowerment of its
rhetorical and linguistic tools and the deconstruction of its paradigms.17
17 I already mentioned in chapter two that the martyrological narrative pattern was
not the only one used to approach and give certain moral, historical and political
significance to the events of the spring of 1978. The interpretative model that
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The Image of Moro Before the Kidnapping
Aldo Moro was known, before the BR kidnapped him, especially for his
difficult language, which was often incomprehensible to those who were
not deep connoisseurs of the jargon used by the political and cultural elite
of the country. He was famous for his ability to defend the DC from cor-
ruption charges and scandals with very long and exhausting speeches in
Parliament. Since the end of the war, the DC leaders and parliamentarians
were perpetually involved in scandals.18 Further, the party was notorious
for the so-called strategy of logoramento (dragging-out), which consisted in
the endless prolongation of parliamentary debates and for holding off le-
gislative action. In 30 years of political supremacy (from the election of the
First Republican Parliament in 1948 to 1978) very few significant laws
were passed; for the most part, the laws that were successfully passed in
Parliament were known as leggine (little laws).19 Moro was one of the most
enduring leaders of the DC from the beginning of its supremacy. He was
Prime Minister five times (three times from 1964 to 1968 and twice from
1974 to 1976) and held many diverse political positions.20 In this long po-
litical career, he constantly played the role of the «defender to the bitter
end» of the DC. As observed by Wagner-Pacifici, «where Aldo Moro was an
archetypical Christian Democrat though was his natural proclivity toward
logoramento. Moro’s mode of logoramento was linguistic.»21
The writer, poet and filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini was probably one of
the first Italian intellectuals to criticize the instrumental use of language by
the DC and in particular by Aldo Moro. In an article published in the Cor-
riere della Sera in February 1975, which became popular as the «Article of
the Fireflies», he diagnosed the transition from a totally repressive political
regime founded on Fascists values—«the continuity between Fascist Fas-
5.2
shaped the Moro affair as a conflict between generations, as well as the narrative
modality of conspiracy based on the idea that the BR were puppets controlled by
obscure international political right-wing forces or a «grand old man», also played
a central role.
18 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 32.
19 One important reason, among others, for the failure of successful parliamentary
legislation was the different interpretation that the two major parties, the PCI
and DC, had of the Constitution. See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 33.
20 National Secretary of the Christian Democracy (1959–1964); Minister of Justice
(1955–1957); Minister of Public Education (1957–1959); Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs (1964–1974); President of the National Council of the Christian Democracy
(1976–1978).
21 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 34.
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cism and Christian Democratic Fascism is complete and absolute»—to a
uniquely and completely capitalist regime. Pasolini argued that the DC
had obtained an absolute majority in the 1948 elections through the votes
of the peasantry, managed by the Vatican, propagating the same values on
which the Fascist regime was already based: «the Church, Fatherland, fami-
ly, obedience, discipline, order, savings, and morality».22 These values were
«real» as they were rooted in the «agricultural and paleo-industrial» Italian
culture. This reality, he argued, got lost the moment when these values
were transformed into «national values», becoming a form of «atrocious,
stupid, and repressive state conformity: the conformity of Fascist power
and Christian Democratic power.»23 Through the industrial homologation,
Italians suffered a «mutation» that turned them into «degenerate, ridicu-
lous, monstrous, criminal people». The engine of this mutation is, accord-
ing to Pasolini, «the power of compulsive consumer behavior».24
The radical criticism that Pasolini moved through the political class is
that politicians had not noticed this mutation. It is at this point in his ar-
gumentation that the author addressed the «completely new language»
used by Moro:
The men of power of the Christian Democracy […] have not noticed
that it [the power] was ‹different›: incommensurable not only to them,
but to all forms of civilization. As always (see Gramsci), one could only
notice the symptoms within language. In the phase of transition—
namely ‹during› the disappearance of fireflies—the men of power in
the Christian Democracy quite abruptly changed their way of express-
ing themselves, adopting a completely new language (which is after all
as incomprehensible as Latin), especially Aldo Moro, who (for an enig-
matic correlation) appears as the least implicated of them all in the
22 Pasolini, Pier Paolo, «Il vuoto del potere», Corriere della Sera, 2.2.1975, 1; it.: «[…]
la Chiesa, la Patria, la famiglia, l’obbedienza, la disciplina, l’ordine, il risparmio,
la moralità.»
23 Pasolini, Pier Paolo, «Il vuoto del potere», Corriere della Sera, 2.2.1975, 1: it.: «Nel
momento in cui venivano assunti a ‹valori› nazionali non potevano che perdere
ogni realtà, e divenire atroce, stupido, repressivo conformismo di Stato: il con-
formismo del potere fascista e democristiano.»
24 Pasolini, Pier Paolo, «Il vuoto del potere», Corriere della Sera, 2.2.1975, 1; it.: «[…]
un popolo degenerato, ridicolo, mostruoso, criminale. […] il comportamento
coato del potere dei consumi.»
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horrible things that have been organized since ‘69 to the present day,
in an attempt, so far formally successful, to still retain power.25
There are at least three important things to highlight. In the first place, Pa-
solini referred to 1969, the year of the Piazza Fontana bombing, and more
or less explicitly suggested that according to him the leaders of the DC
were implicated in it. In doing so, he seemed at least to partially consider
the possibility of a political conspiracy, aimed at increasing the tension in
Italy to ensure the maintenance of power by the ruling class. Pasolini’s the-
sis falls partially into what I have previously called the narrative of conspir-
acy.26 The hypothesis that some members of the ruling class were implicat-
ed in some of the massacres that happened in Italy during the so-called
«years of lead» plays a central role in Italy’s cultural imaginary. The possi-
ble involvement of representatives of political parties, the government, the
military, etc. in the Moro case is still the subject of debate in the media and
in the new Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry. The Piazza Fontana
bombing and the role played during the event by the secret services, the
military apparatus and some representatives of the political class—last but
25 Pasolini, Pier Paolo, «Il vuoto del potere», Corriere della Sera, 2.2.1975, 1; it.: «Gli
uomini del potere democristiani […] non si sono accorti che esso era ‹altro›: in-
commensurabile non solo a loro ma a tutta una forma di civiltà. Come sempre
(cfr. Gramsci) solo nella lingua si sono avuti dei sintomi. Nella fase di transizione
– ossia ‹durante› la scomparsa delle lucciole – gli uomini di potere democristiani
hanno quasi bruscamente cambiato il loro modo di esprimersi, adottando un lin-
guaggio completamente nuovo (del resto incomprensibile come il latino): spe-
cialmente Aldo Moro: cioè (per una enigmatica correlazione) colui che appare
come il meno implicato di tutti nelle cose orribili che sono state organizzate dal
‘69 ad oggi, nel tentativo, finora formalmente riuscito, di conservare comunque il
potere.»
26 It should be said, however, that until now what happened in that period still re-
mains unclear and that, in some cases, the involvement of politicians and repre-
sentatives of the state apparatuses has been proven not only by historians, but also
by magistrates. As Anna Cento Bull and Philip Cooke pointedly observe, «there
exists very substantial circumstantial evidence pointing in the direction of their
[of part of the state apparatuses, especially secret service and parts of the armed
forces] involvement in neo-fascist terrorism, at least in the sense of aiding and
abetting their subversive activities and/or protecting them from persecution. An-
other suspicion is that the State did not do everything it could to fight left-wing
terrorism, allowing it some space to develop in order to keep the Communist Par-
ty at bay, since the latter’s gradual path to power was jeopardized by the emer-
gence of revolutionary groups to its left. […] In short, there are sufficient ele-
ments to argue that the behavior of the Italian State in fighting armed terrorism
has been relatively opaque and twisted» (Bull/Cooke 2013, xii).
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not least by Aldo Moro —are the subject of the Film Romanzo di una
strage (Marco Tullio Giordana, IT 2012). As I will highlight and discuss in
the seventh chapter, this film traces a fil rouge, suggesting a secret, obscure
but meaningful interconnection between the bombing of 1969 in Milan
and the killing of Aldo Moro in 1978.
Second, Pasolini draws attention to one of the basic premises of this in-
vestigation: the importance of the study of language in identifying and un-
derstanding historical, social, cultural and ideological transformations. His
reference to Gramsci is significant. As the founding member of the Italian
Communist Party (PCI), he considers language an ideological battle-
ground. Through a detailed analysis of the use of language, one can under-
stand the functioning of power mechanisms better: «For a literate and not
ideological bourgeois, it is important to remember again, with Gramsci,
that if the new Italian reality produces a new language, national Italian,
the only way to possess it and to make it your own is to know with abso-
lute clarity the national reality that produces it.»27 Pasolini had already ana-
lyzed Moro’s language in another article, commenting on a speech made
by him for the opening of a highway—the Autostrada del Sole—that took
place in February 1964. He argued that Moro «has instrumentalized the
highway’s inauguration to make a political appeal to Italians, telling them
something politically very sensitive: to cooperate in overcoming the econo-
mic situation and work together in theory and in practice, that is, to be
willing to accept personal sacrifices.»28 Moro’s speech was, in the analysis
and critique of Pasolini, the paradigm of an instrumental and «technologi-
cal» use of language. For the Italian poet and filmmaker, Moro’s speech ex-
emplified, within the language of official politicians, a loss of the prevail-
ing reference to Latin and emphatic classicism, which was replaced with a
reference to the efficiency of communicative language and technology. Not
without a certain amount of irony, in the «Article of the Fireflies» Pasolini
pointed out that this new language remained as «incomprehensible» as
27 Pasolini 1991, 23–24; it.: Per un letterato non ideologicamente borghese si tratta
di ricordare ancora una volta, con Gramsci, che se la nuova realtà italiana pro-
duce una nuova lingua, l’italiano nazionale, l’unico modo per impossessarsene e
farlo proprio, è conoscere con assoluta chiarezza quale è e cos’è quella realtà
nazionale che lo produce.»
28 Pasolini 1991, 17; it.: «Moro strumentalizza l’inaugurazione dell’autostrada per
fare un appello politico agli italiani, raccontando loro un fatto politicamente as-
sai delicato: quello di cooperare al superamento della congiuntura: cooperare
idealmente e praticamente, di essere, cioè, disposti ad affrontare dei sacrifici per-
sonali.»
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Latin. In other words, it was a new national, technical and instrumental
language that hid its own ideological function.
The third interesting point is that Pasolini seems to accuse but at the
same time also to absolve Aldo Moro, claiming that a) he, more than oth-
ers, was the demiurge of the new, incomprehensible political language and
that b) he was the least implicated among all of the DC leaders in the mas-
sacres and cases of corruption that took place in Italy in those years. He
seems to be saying that Aldo Moro was the proponent of a language that
has the function of concealing the misdeeds of the DC, but that he was not
responsible (or at least less so than others) for the misdeeds themselves.
This passage assumed an unsuspected significance after the kidnapping
and murder of Aldo Moro, being quoted and discussed in many articles
and other media referring to the Moro case. It has often been quoted by
those who advocate the theory of a conspiracy on a national or internation-
al scale as well as by those who interpret it as a sort of Pasolinian prophecy.
In L’affaire Moro, Leonardo Sciascia called attention to the prophetic
character of this article (which is today still the subject of academic studies
and debates).29 The Sicilian writer was particularly concerned by the use of
the formulation—placed between brackets by Pasolini—«for an enigmatic
correlation». According to Sciascia, in this short parenthesis «there is some-
thing like the premonition, like the prefiguration of the Moro affaire.»30
The thesis, or rather Sciascia’s impression, that the Moro case «had already
been written», and how that impression is connected to the idea of a pre-
figuration in Pasolini’s article, will be discussed in the seventh chapter.31
For the moment, I want to point out how the image of Moro depicted by
Pasolini before the kidnapping has affected the perception and representa-
tion of Moro after the kidnapping. Sciascia maintained that it is precisely
the fact that Moro, especially in the eyes of critics and enemies of the DC,
was «the least involved of all» which gave him «the incontestable and actu-
ally alleviating authority to speak on behalf of everyone: power along with
sacrifice.»32 He suggested that, precisely because Moro was after all an hon-
29 See Didi-Hubermann 2006.
30 Sciascia 1978, 16; it.: «[…] c’è come il presentimento, come la prefigurazione
dell’affaire Moro.»
31 Sciascia 1978, 24–25; it.: «Questo racconto […] [s]i adeguava all’invincibile im-
pressione che l’affaire Moro fosse già stato scritto, che fosse già compiuta opera
letteratia, che vivesse ormai in una sua intoccabile perfezione.»
32 Sciascia 1978, 36; it.: «Ma proprio l’essere meno implicato gli dava, su tutti nella
Democrazia Cristiana, l’incontrastabile e anzi alleviante autorità di parlare in
nome di tutti, potere e insieme sacrificio.»
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est politician and not interested in increasing his own personal power, he
could be the perfect apologist and defender of the DC’s policy. The writer
also seemed to suggest that he was kidnapped precisely for this reason. To
be the voice of the DC and as such the embodiment of its power made
him the natural and perfect target for the terrorist organization.
The importance of Moro as a defender of the DC is clearly visible if one
looks at the last speech that he delivered in Parliament. In this speech, he
defended two former ministers of the DC, Luigi Gui and Mario Tanassi,
from the accusation of being the recipients of bribes linked to the Lock-
heed scandal. The Lockheed scandal concerned serious cases of corruption
that took place in various countries in the 1970s, and in particular the
Netherlands, West Germany, Japan and Italy. Between 1975 and 1976, the
US Senate Church Committee (which investigated abuses in governmental
operations with respect to intelligence activities) discovered a widespread,
consolidated system of corruption practices in the export and sale of
weapons by the Lockheed Corporation. In Italy, the scandal involved the
delivery of Hercules C-130 aircraft, which had been received by the Air
Force since 1972. In 1976, many politicians involved in the negotiations
were accused of accepting bribes of billions of lire to promote the purchase
of the aircrafts. In fact, a 1969 letter by Lockheed’s lawyer was discovered
in February of the same year, in which he reported that two Italian minis-
ters and a certain «Antelope Cobbler» had requested and received bribes.
Rome’s prosecutor opened a judicial inquiry when the scandal broke in the
Italian press; in March Antonio Lefebvre, an Italian agent for Lockheed,
and General Duilio Fanali, the head of the Air Force, were arrested. Some
prominent politicians were also implicated in the charges, including the
former ministers Luigi Gui and Mario Tanassi.
As President of the DC, Moro spoke in Parliament to defend Gui and
Tanassi on March 9, 1977, thus exactly a year before the kidnapping. I want
to quote here the most significant passages of this speech, in order to en-
able the reader to get an idea of Moro’s language as well as of his role as
defender of the DC:
Prejudicial attitudes, rigid accusatory positions and the unavailability
of reflection unfortunately characterized, and it hurts to have to recog-
nize that, this debate. […] In these oratories the prosecution’s frame-
work has not occasionally, but intentionally expanded, reaching, be-
yond the men, the Party who led Italy for thirty years and is still today,
albeit its movements toward the left, in a dominant position and with
great responsibility. Its power is not an expression of a regime; it comes
not from coercion, but by consensus, by the strong awareness in public
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opinion of the importance of ensuring values and ways of life and of
the unacceptability of certain global alternative proposals. […] We are
accused of creating a square around Mr. Gui […]. This is not pure op-
portunity; it is not a calculation, a preliminary closure before a puri-
fying truth is accepted, which is suited to a democracy that needs to
have the courage to identify and to correct any deviation. We are in-
stead faced with a procedural step, which requires a yes or no from us
to an accusation. […] We should say that Gui is guilty […] and simi-
larly we should think about Mr. Tanassi. But we cannot come to recog-
nize this, neither implicitly nor explicitly, because of reasons of con-
science. Conscience, I say, and not utility—indeed, the political reason
may suggest a dilatory attitude. […] Even some of us have looked at
this liberating perspective. But we have thought a lot about it. It would
be like offering, for our party utility, for a Party alibi, a victim to the
reason of State. Thinking more deeply, we have given up [this possibili-
ty] and we did, as they say, create a square around Gui, because our
conviction is [his] innocence, because we only see suspicions and arti-
fices aimed at contesting a life of dignity, which before was never ques-
tioned, a life dedicated not to power games, not to party intrigues, but
to the cause of democracy and to the State. […] We find, in this po-
sition, the Christian Democracy united and with it we intend to de-
fend the Christian Democracy as a whole. […] To anyone who wants
to globally overwhelm our experience; to anyone who wants to carry
out a trial, moral and political, to be celebrated in the squares, as has
been said cynically, we respond with the strongest reaction and with an
appeal to public opinion that has not recognized in us a historical guilt
and has not wanted our strength decreased. We do not accept being
considered corrupt, because it is not true. […] Dear colleagues, you
have announced to us the process in the squares, we tell you that we do
not will accept being put before trial. If you have minimum wisdom,
[…] we firmly say to you to not underestimate the great force of public
opinion, which, for more than three decades, found its expression and
its defense in the Christian Democracy.33
33 Moro 1979, 350–354; it.: «Atteggiamenti pregiudiziali, rigide posizioni accusato-
rie, indisponibilità alla riflessione hanno caratterizzato purtroppo, duole doverlo
riconoscere, questo dibattito. […] In questi oratori poi il quadro dell’accusa si è,
non occasionalmente, ma intenzionalmente dilatato, fino a toccare, al di là degli
uomini, il Partito che ha guidato per trent’anni l’Italia ed è ancora oggi, pur negli
spostamenti di forza verso sinistra, in una posizione dominante e di alta respons-
abilità. Il suo potere non è un’espressione di regime; non nasce dalla coercizione,
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This speech illustrates well the political climate in Italy prior to the Moro
kidnapping. In the previous chapter, we saw that Moro—the grande tessi-
tore, as Italian political commentators often called him—wanted to bring
the PCI into the government without challenging the DC’s state system.
The intransigent defense of the DC in his last speech in Parliament un-
equivocally expresses this position and political strategy. Moro made it ex-
plicitly clear to the opposition parties, in particular the PCI, that there
would be no self-critical attitude among the DC, that no one could threat-
en the unity of the party and challenge its dominance in Italian politics.
Only under these conditions would the alliance with the PCI be possible.34
Moreover, with this speech Moro definitely acquired the DC’s internal le-
gitimacy as the party’s lawyer.35
ma dal consenso, dalla profonda consapevolezza, nell’opinione pubblica, di im-
portanti valori e modi di vita da garantire e dell’inaccettabilità di talune globali
proposte alternative. […] [C]i si accusa di fare quadrato intorno all’on. Gui […].
Non si tratta di pura opportunità; non si tratta di un calcolo, di una chiusura
pregiudiziale di fronte alla verità da accettare, una verità purificatrice e quindi
consona ad una democrazia che deve avere il coraggio di identificare e di correg-
gere ogni deviazione. Noi siamo invece di fronte ad una fase della procedura che
richiede da noi un sì od un no ad una accusa. […] Di coscienza, dico, e non già di
utilità, ché anzi forse la ragione politica potrebbe suggerirci un atteggiamento
dilatorio. […] Anche qualcuno di noi avrà guardato a questa prospettiva liberato-
ria. Ma si è pensato molto. Sarebbe stato come offrire, per la nostra utilità di Par-
tito, per un alibi di Partito, una vittima alla ragione di Stato. Pensandoci appunto
più a fondo, vi abbiamo rinunciato ed abbiamo fatto, come si dice, quadrato in-
torno a Gui, perché la nostra convinzione è l’innocenza, perché vediamo solo
sospetti ed artifici rivolti a contestare una vita di mai smentita dignità, una vita
dedicata non a giochi di potere, non ad intrighi di partito, ma alla causa della
democrazia ed al servizio dello Stato. […] In questa posizione troviamo unita la
Democrazia cristiana ed intendiamo con essa difendere la Democrazia cristiana
nel suo insieme. […] A chiunque voglia travolgere globalmente la nostra espe-
rienza; a chiunque voglia fare un processo, morale e politico, da celebrare, come
si è detto cinicamente, nelle piazze, noi rispondiamo con la più ferma reazione e
con l’appello all’opinione pubblica che non ha riconosciuto in noi una colpa stor-
ica e non ha voluto che la nostra forza fosse diminuita. Non accettiamo di essere
considerati dei corrotti, perché non è vero. […] Onorevoli colleghi, che ci avete
preannunciato il processo sulle piazze, vi diciamo che noi non ci faremo proces-
sare. Se avete un minimo di saggezza, […] vi diciamo fermamente di non sottova-
lutare la grande forza dell’opinione pubblica che, da più di tre decenni, trova nel-
la Democrazia cristiana la sua espressione e la sua difesa.»
34 See Ginsborg 1990, 379.
35 See Formigoni 2016, 320. Interestingly, a year later, in the «Memorial» written in
the «people’s prison», Moro criticized the position he took in this speech, admit-
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This speech also clearly shows how much political language was imbued
with trial rhetoric. The body of judgment to which Moro made several ref-
erences is «public opinion». This expression is used in a similar way to that
of «people», but with the difference that it particularly highlights the pub-
lic dimension of the «people»: public opinion is the expression of the peo-
ple as the only entity that has the right to observe, evaluate and judge the
political parties. The logic underlying the speech is also interesting. As
pointed out by Sciascia, Moro’s speech contains at least two syllogisms:
«the freedom and integrity of the country are intangible; Christian Democ-
racy represents the freedom and integrity of the country; Christian Democ-
racy is intangible» and «the unchanged electoral support shows that the
Christian Democrats are not guilty; Mr. Gui is a Christian Democrat; Mr.
Gui is not guilty.»36 The real core of the speech is not, however, the inno-
cence of Mr. Gui, but the innocence of the Christian Democrats as a party
that represents and defends «public opinion».
The passage in which Moro said that the DC was not willing to offer «a
victim to the reason of State» is particularly relevant for this investigation,
because it clearly presents elements of (anti-)sacrificial language and
rhetoric. In fact, there is considerable similarity between this sentence and
another present in Moro’s letter to Zaccagnini, written during his impris-
onment and published in newspapers on April 25, where he argued that
«with its inaction, […] in the name of reason of State, the state organiza-
tion condemns [me] to death and without too much thinking about it.»37
In both cases, Aldo Moro asserts individual rights (in the case of Gui, the
right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise; in its own case, the
right to life) over alleged national interests.
ting he underestimated «the expectation for justice of large parts of the country»
(Moro 1997d, 273).
36 Sciascia 1978, 36; it.: «[…] la libertà e l’integrità del paese sono intangibili; la
Democrazia Cristiana rappresenta la libertà e l’integrità del paese; la Democrazia
Cristiana è intangibile. Sillogismo da cui rampolla quest’altro: l’immutato con-
senso elettorale dimostra che la Democrazia Cristiana non ha colpa; l’onorevole
Gui è democtistiano; l’onorevole Gui non ha colpa.»
37 Moro 2008j, 100; it.: «Con la sua inerzia, […] in nome della ragion di Stato, l’or-
ganizzazione statale condanna a morte e senza troppo pensarci su.»
5 Construction of a Willing Martyr
202
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
16 March 1978: First Reactions to the Kidnapping
On the morning of March 16, Aldo Moro came out of his apartment in via
del Forte Trionfale in Rome to go to the Chamber of Deputies, where the
ratification debate on the fourth Andreotti government was due to begin.
As was his custom, he planned to stop along the way at the Church of San-
ta Chiara where he prayed every morning before going to Parliament. Wag-
ner-Pacifici observes that «in this daily personal voyage between the institu-
tions of the Church and the State, Moro, representing well his own person-
al and public history of institutional involvement, embodies the combina-
tion that his party claimed to represent on a grander scale.»38 Thus not on-
ly did the language he spoke contribute to cementing his image as the sym-
bolic embodiment of the DC, but so did his daily habits.
After the kidnapping and even more so after his death these images
changed. Moro’s usual route itself acquired a new meaning. If before it ex-
emplified the close relationship between the Church and the Italian State
that, since the end of World War II, had always characterized the DC’s gov-
ernment policy, from March 16, onwards it could be understood and rep-
resented as Moro’s path to martyrdom. There is a sort of topological sym-
bolism—the fact that every day Aldo Moro followed a path that started
from home (natural family) and, passing by the Church (Christian family),
took him to Parliament (political family)—that predisposes Aldo Moro as
an ideal subject to be portrayed as a martyr of both the Church and the
Italian State.
At about 9 a.m. in via Fani the two cars of Aldo Moro and of his escorts
were blocked by a group of terrorists who immediately opened fire, killed
the five bodyguards in a few seconds and kidnapped Moro (see figure 1).39
At 9.25 a.m. the second radio network interrupted its programs and aired
the first newscast on the attack:
We interrupt broadcasting for dramatic news that sounds incredible
and that, although it has not yet officially been confirmed, unfortu-
nately seems to be true. The President of the Christian Democrats, Mr.
5.3
38 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 62.
39 The precise mode of the attack, the operational details, the circumstances of pre-
vious and subsequent attacks, the responsibilities, the components of the terrorist
fire group, the possible presence of other components extraneous to the BR, and
the possibility of collusion and external aid are all aspects of the story debated
during the trials, in the parliamentary committees and in journalism, and are still
today the subject of great discussion and doubts.
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Aldo Moro, was kidnapped a short time ago in Rome by a terrorist
group.40
The rhetoric of «drama» became a leitmotif of the media’s representation
of political violence from the very beginning. At 10.10 a.m. a call came to
the news agency Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata (ANSA) in Rome,
claiming the attack was carried out by the BR. «We have kidnapped the
president of the DC Aldo Moro and eliminated his bodyguards, Cossiga’s
leather heads. Signed BR.»41 Other newsrooms in Turin and Milan re-
ceived phone calls in which the BR claimed responsibility for the attack
and nothing more. As Wagner-Pacifici has observed, the «unqualified na-
ture of this acknowledgment» was dramaturgically very effective, because it
left room for interpretation about the intentions of the terrorist group.42
This undoubtedly facilitated the emergence of the conspiracy narrative.
40 Quoted in Selva/Marcucci 2003, 8–9; it.: «Interrompiamo le trasmissioni per una
drammatica notizia che ha dell’incredibile e che, anche se non ha avuto finora
una conferma ufficiale, purtroppo sembra sia vera. Il Presidente della Democrazia
Cristiana, l’onorevole Aldo Moro, è stato rapito poco fa a Roma da un comman-
do di terroristi.»
41 Quoted in Imperi 2016, 46; it.: «Abbiamo rapito il presidente della DC Aldo Mo-
ro ed eliminato la sua guardia del corpo, teste di cuoio di Cossiga. Firmato,
Brigate rosse.»
42 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 63.
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The attack in via Mario Fani, Rome, March 16, 1978. The picture
shows the body of one of Aldo Moro’s five guards, Raffaele Iozzino,
lying on the ground.
In a special edition of the second television network’s news program (TG2)
at 10.01 a.m., the journalist Giancarlo Cercano informed viewers that in
Milan and Turin there were rumors, according to which, the fugitive Mario
Moretti, then head of the BR, was connected with foreign intelligence
agencies. In the same extraordinary edition, the television presenter Gian-
carlo Santalmassi reported the hypothesis that there could be links be-
tween the BR and the German Red Army Faction (RAF). The next edition
of TG2’s news broadcast reported that there were suspicions that some
members of the RAF may have been active in Italy. In the extraordinary
edition of the first television network’s news program (TG1), journalist
Bruno Vespa noted that «according to preliminary reports, the terrorists
used the same technique that was used in Germany against German indus-
PICTURE 1:
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trial President, Schleyer.»43 This shows that the hypothesis of an interna-
tional conspiracy by foreign intelligence services, as well as the possibility
of international collaboration between different terrorist groups, spread
quickly from the very beginning of the affair. The aforementioned special
edition of the TG1 also aired the TV report by journalist Paolo Frajese
filmed in via Fani shortly after the ambush. This service, in which the
viewer is confronted with the dead bodies of Moro’s bodyguards and the
cars riddled with bullets, has been shown in almost all the documentaries
about the Moro case and has strongly affected the way in which the event
has been memorialized visually.
At 10.20 a.m., in an emergency summit the parties of the parliamentary
majority agreed to reduce the parliamentary debate times to vote on the
fourth Andreotti government. Shortly after, the Unitary Trade Union Fed-
eration declared a nationwide general strike to be held in the afternoon in
piazza San Giovanni in Rome to publicly express the workers’ support for
the institutions and the Italian State. An extraordinary council of ministers
chaired by Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti established the first steps to-
ward the coordination of all police forces and the army, as well as to con-
vene the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security (Comitato interministeri-
ale per la sicurezza). Meanwhile, Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga estab-
lished a Technical-Operational Political Committee (Comitato politico tec-
nico-operativo), also called Crisis Management Committee (Comitato di ges-
tione crisi), which had the task to arrange an operational plan and to coor-
dinate investigations in the search for the terrorists and the hostage. Dur-
ing the 55 days, each transaction and any information had to come from
the Interior Ministry, including communications and outgoing news about
the developments in the investigation. The outgoing news, however, was
quite sparse and covered by strict secrecy.44
Moreover, Cossiga established two other committees: the Committee of
Information (Comitato informazione) and the Committee of Experts (Comi-
tato degli esperti). The first was composed of members of the secret service,
police and army and had the task of gathering and coordinating relevant
information to identify the kidnappers and to discover where Aldo Moro
was being held. The second was a smaller group composed of psychiatrist
Franco Ferracuti, psycho-graphologist Giulia Conte Micheli, military
43 Quoted in Imperi 2016, 47; it.: «Secondo le prime ricostruzioni, i terroristi hanno
usato la stessa tecnica che è stata usata in Germania contro il presidente industri-
ale tedesco, Schleyer.»
44 See Imperi 2016, 56–57.
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strategist Stefano Silvestri and the American adviser and expert on interna-
tional terrorism Steve Pieczenik. The existence of the Expert Committee
only became public in 1981, after the revelations made by Interior Minister
Cossiga to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry.45 The committee had
the task of trying to influence the press to minimize the effect of the BR’s
propaganda campaign and, above all, to de-enhance Moro’s image.46 In a
recent publication, Steve Pieczenik said his role in the Committee of Ex-
perts was to convince the Italian government to let Moro die, considering
it the only way to defeat the BR.47
The special editions of the afternoon news broadcast live images of the
union demonstration in piazza San Giovanni and the interventions of gen-
eral secretaries Luciano Lama (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro –
CGIL), Luigi Macario (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori – CISL)
and Giorgio Benvenuto (Unione Italiana del Lavoro – UIL). They all strong-
ly condemned the bombing, lined up alongside the institutions and con-
demned the attack, saying that the BR were «against the people». At the
same time, however, they expressed their opposition to any attempt to es-
tablish a special and exceptional law and a «police state».48 They therefore
reacted to some authoritarian ideas shared by conservative circles in Italian
politics. In fact, the leader of the Republican Party Ugo La Malfa, speaking
the same afternoon in the House of Representatives (Camera dei Deputati),
represented the situation as a «state of war» and demanded the establish-
ment of «exceptional measures of war». Giorgio Almirante, secretary of the
Italian Social Movement (MSI), went so far as to require the replacement
of Interior Minister Cossiga with a military official, the promulgation of
exceptional laws and the restoration of the death penalty.49 The govern-
ment, however, rejected these proposals. At the Chamber of Deputies,
Prime Minister Andreotti stated that the laws that were in force were suffi-
cient and that he was against the introduction of exceptional or extraordi-
nary laws. The proclamation of the state of emergency and the introduc-
tion of the death penalty were rejected. It was a conviction shared by most
representatives of the political forces that generalized repressive action, the
restriction of democratic freedoms, and the suspension of certain rights
45 See Flamigni 1988, 127–156.
46 See Formigoni 2016, 357–358.
47 See Amara 2009.
48 Special edition of the TG2, 17.03 p.m.
49 See Giovagnoli 2009, 46.
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would have widened sympathies with the BR, facilitating the civil war they
wanted to provoke.50
Despite major forces, the government decided not to introduce excep-
tional laws or to declare a state of emergency or of war; four days after the
kidnapping a series of measures hitherto blocked by many opponents were
adopted. The Parliament gave the police some of the powers that had been
taken away in previous years.51 In response to these measures, there was a
strong fear that citizens’ rights would be eroded and lead to a partial sus-
pension of democracy. The Corriere della Sera, though accepting the mea-
sures, expressed «bitterness» at the measures taken, and the famous consti-
tutionalist Stefano Rodotà criticized them harshly, defining them as «ex-
ceptional measures»: «We are scraping the bottom of the barrel […], we are
now moving on the very subtle ridge that divides constitutional legality
from the pure and simple use of authoritarian tools.»52 The jurist basically
argued that the measures decided by the Parliament and which were de-
clared to be not exceptional de jure were exceptional de facto. Beyond this
consideration, it should be pointed out that, from an operational point of
view, these measures did not help the police and magistrates to find out
where Aldo Moro was being detained or to capture members of the BR at
all. Only very slowly was more coordination between the police, Cara-
binieri and financial guard established. Investigators found it difficult to
organize their work, and the newspapers recorded daily examples of errors
and delays in the management of investigations. The impression that the
investigations did not lead to any concrete results was very widespread.53
Although the terrorists had not yet made any specific request, politicians
and journalists had already begun, on March 16, to discuss the hypothesis,
50 See Giovagnoli 2009, 49.
51 The main measures adopted were the following: the provisional arrest of crime
suspects for 24 hours; the immediate interrogation of the arrested without the
presence of a lawyer if done within one hour; phone interceptions decided by the
police without the permission of magistrates for an indefinite time; the abolition
of the investigative secret of magistrates and at the request of the Interior Minis-
ter; increased penalties for attacks on public facilities; the strengthening of the
great judicial sites. See La Stampa, «Le misure urgenti decise dal governo entr-
eranno in vigore da mezzanotte», 21.3.1978, 2.
52 Rodotà, Stefano, «Misure eccezionali», La Repubblica, 23.3.1978, 1–2; it.: «Si sta
raschiando il fondo del barile […], ci muoviamo ormai sul crinale sottilissimo
che divide la legalità costituzionale dal puro e semplice impego di strumenti au-
toritari.»
53 See Carbone, Fabrizio, «Prevenire subito», La Stampa, 21.3.1978, 1–2; Carraciolo,
Lucio, Un’inchiesta che sembra nata morta, La Repubblica, 25.3.1978, 4.
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which was considered very likely, that the BR would make a request to ex-
change Moro for some prisoners. During these days, the trial against Rena-
to Curcio, Alberto Franceschini and other members of the first generation
of the BR in Turin was proceeding. In the press and in the various parties,
the conviction that the BR would ask for the release of their comrades im-
mediately spread quickly. Their first communiqué, which was made public
on March 18, would deny these suspicions, but for two days that opportu-
nity was the focus of many discussions. Immediately, the voices opposed to
any negotiations prevailed and soon the government, most of the political
parties and the established media settled on what was to be called the «line
of firmness». We will address the issue of the debate on firmness vs. nego-
tiation in more detail later on. For now, I want to draw attention to the fact
that this rhetoric was intrinsically connected to a certain kind of represen-
tation of the relationship between the political body, nation-state and de-
mocratic government. This connection already emerges in an exemplary
manner in a speech given by the Prime Minister on the evening of March,
16. At 8 p.m., live from the seat of the government, television news aired
Andreotti’s «speech to the country»; I quote here the most significant pas-
sages:
The response that has occurred in Parliament […], but also in the
statements of all political groups and the response that has occurred all
over the country with massive demonstrations condemning the vio-
lence by men from all classes, who left factories, schools, offices, and
homes, constitutes a response of solidarity to a concept of republican
legality that is not rhetoric. […] But they must live somewhere, these
young people and these men and these women, who, unfortunately,
are allowing themselves to be mobilized for criminal acts of this kind.
There must be families that, in a not yet irreparable moment, can say a
word to them, to make them rethink the sad aggregation which they
are engaging in. I think […] that no one should lose sight of a goal
which does not conflict at all with what is called the firmness of the
State, which is nothing reactionary, nothing repressive, which is the af-
firmation of calm ordered life within Italian cities, especially the most
troubled. I think we should […] make a great appeal to the conscience
of non-violence. I think that is the worthiest way […] to respond to
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this terrible act, and it is certainly what, many years ago, Aldo Moro
taught us and for which he has always fought.54
This speech anticipated a discursive strategy that was reproduced and re-
peated continuously during the 55 days of Moro’s imprisonment, and even
afterwards. Besides that, it already contained some elements that predis-
pose and facilitate the emergence of the martyrological and sacrificial rep-
resentations of the political violence of the event, which were soon to
emerge and quickly spread in the Italian public space. There are at least
two aspects within the rhetorical structure of this speech that well illustrate
the way in which the government and most of the media reacted to the
kidnapping of Aldo Moro.
First, Andreotti’s speech referred to the response of the Parliament, of all
political groups and of the demonstrations of March, 16 in order to represent
Italy as a reunited country. In the Italian State, political parties and ordi-
nary people are represented as a single voice, a single body that gives a re-
sponse of solidarity. Not only do the divisions between the parties disappear,
but so do those between political representatives and represented citizens.
Moreover, the reference to men of all classes has, in particular, the function
of making class distinctions—a basic distinction in the rhetoric used by the
PC, left-wing media, by extra-parliamentary left-wing political groups as
well as by the BR and other terrorist organizations—secondary and irrele-
vant, since people were faced with «this terrible act». The difference be-
tween workers («who had left factories»), housewives, children, pensioners
and the unemployed («homes»), students («schools») and workers of the
54 It.: «La riposta che vi è stata in Parlamento […], ma anche nelle precise affer-
mazioni di tutti i gruppi politici e la risposta che vi è stata in tutto il paese con
manifestazioni imponenti di condanna della violenza da parte degli uomini ap-
partenenti a tutte le classi che avevano lascito le fabbriche, le scuole, gli uffici, le
case, costituisce una riposta di solidarietà ad un concetto di legalità repubblicana
che non è retorico. […] Ma vivranno in qualche parte questi giovani o questi uo-
mini o queste donne, purtroppo, che si lasciano mobilitare per azioni criminose
di questo genere. Vi saranno delle famiglie che possono in un momento ancora
non irreparabile dir loro una parola perché ripensino alla triste aggregazione nel-
la quale si vanno coinvolgendo. Penso […] che nessuno debba perdere di vista un
obbiettivo, che non contrasta minimamente con quella che si chiama fermezza
dello Stato, la quale non ha niente di reazionario, niente di repressivo, che è l’af-
fermazione della tranquillità di vita nelle città italiane specie quelle più turbate.
Io penso che noi dobbiamo […] fare un grande appello alla coscienza della non
violenza. Credo che sia questo il modo più degno […] di rispondere […] a questo
atto terribile, e certamente è questo che, in anni lontani, Aldo Moro ci ha inseg-
nato ed è questo per il quale si è sempre battuto.»
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middle class («office») is cancelled out rhetorically by Andreotti making
reference to the response given by «the people» demonstrating in the
squares. Such units of identification are replaced immediately with the
usual «identity marker» within the DC’s rhetoric: the family. In Andreotti’s
speech, the «great appeal» to the people is, first of all, an appeal to families;
there are no more differences between exploiters and the exploited, be-
tween the working-class and bourgeoisie, but only families equal to each
other.
Secondly, one cannot but note the rhetorical sophistication with which
the «firmness of the State» is connected with the aim of ensuring «tranquil-
ity in the Italian cities» and the «great appeal to non-violence». The firm-
ness of the state is thus represented as a necessary condition for the safety
of Italian society. But the most significant phrase, which reveals great fa-
miliarity with a strategic use of language, is the one where the principles of
firmness, republican legality and non-violence are represented as some-
thing that «Aldo Moro taught» to the Italian people. In relatively few sen-
tences, the Prime Minister, succeeded in creating a link between the policy
of firmness (which closed the door to any political negotiations even be-
fore the BR made a concrete request), the people’s will and Aldo Moro’s
will. In other words: Aldo Moro was called into action to defend the same
policy of firmness that, a little less than two weeks later, he was to criticize
in the first of his letters published by newspapers. The most rhetorical and,
in terms of performative efficiency, less successful part of the whole speech,
however, is another; namely when Andreotti argued that, «the response of
solidarity to a concept of republican legality […] is not rhetoric». Here the
Prime Minister took on an almost defensive position, as he foresaw criti-
cism of him being too rhetorical. A strategist of concealment should not
explain what he wants to hide: it is as if a thief, whose theft has not yet dis-
covered, was to go to the police saying, «I have not stolen». However, the
Prime Minister’s speech did two things: it constructed discursively a cer-
tain identity for «the people» and attributed a certain willingness to Aldo
Moro. The effectiveness of his speech became evident the following day,
when most of the newspapers employed analogous strategies of representa-
tion.
Framing «the People» and «the Enemy»: Construction of National Identity
Andreotti’s rhetoric was used in many articles that appeared in different
newspapers in the first days after the kidnapping. The topic that dominat-
5.4
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ed the newspapers on March 17 is obviously the ambush in via Fani, which
has been addressed in a range of subtopics: the dynamics of the abduction;
the killing of Moro’s five bodyguards; the debate in Parliament; the quick
passing of the new government; the reactions and stances of political par-
ties and of the newly elected government; the supposed intentions, strategy
and goals of the BR; the reactions of governments and newspapers from
other countries; and the emergency planning of the government. But by
far, the most foregrounded subtopic was the half-day national strike held
in several Italian cities; in particular, the rhetoric of the «response of the
country» dominated the headlines of the front pages:
 
L’Unità: Instant Response to the Kidnapping of Moro and to the Barbar-
ic Massacre of Five Bodyguards [subheadline]; Extraordinary Democrat-
ic Shout—The Italians Stand by in Defense of the Republic—The New
Majority Has Been Formed in Parliament [title]; In Many Cities, the
Workers Leave the Factories Even Before the Proclamation of the Gen-
eral Strike—Huge Crowds at Demonstrations—Intense Hunting in the
Capital for the Terrorist Group (Composed by Many People) Who At-
tacked the Cars of the President of the DC and of His Bodyguards with
Gunfire—One of the Killers Was Speaking German?—A Meticulously
Prepared Plan—The Debate in the House—Confidence in the New
Government Was Voted on Urgently [headline].55
 
Il Popolo: After the Infamous Assassination of the Bodyguards [subhead-
line]; Anguish for Moro [title]; Silence From the BR After the First
Statement in Which They Claimed Responsibility for the Kidnapping
and Murder—Unanimous Sorrow for the Victims of the Ferocious Am-
bush—The Direction of the DC Reunited Permanently—The Country
Reacts As One to This New Serious Challenge to Democratic Institu-
55 L’Unità, 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Immediata risposta al rapimento di Moro e al barbaro
eccidio di 5 agenti» [subheadline]. Straordinario sussulto democratico – Gli ital-
iani si stringono a difesa della Repubblica – Si è formata in Parlamento la nuova
maggioranza [title]. In molte città gli operai abbandonano le fabbriche prima an-
cora della proclamazione dello sciopero generale – Immense folle alle manifes-
tazioni – Serrata caccia nella capitale al commando (composto da molte persone)
che ha assalito a raffiche di mitra le auto del presidente della DC e della scorta –
Uno dei killer parlava Tedesco? – Un piano minuziosamente preparato – Il dibatti-
to a Montecitorio – Votata con urgenza la fiducia al nuovo governo [headline].»
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tions: General Strike and Large Demonstrations and Marches Through-
out Italy—Touching Messages of Solidarity to the Party [headline].56
 
Avanti!: Instant Popular Reaction to the Kidnapping of Moro and the
Killing of his Bodyguards [subheadline]; The Country Mobilized
Against Sedition [title]. Parliament Reacted by Voting for Confidence
in the Government—Millions of Workers Across Italy Demonstrate the
Firm Will to Defend the Republic—The Commitment of the Socialist
Party—Emotion and Outrage Around the World [headline]; Attack
Against Democracy [editorial].57
 
La Stampa: Grave Hours of the Republic for the Bloody Enterprise of
the BR [subheadline]; After the Massacre, No Trace of Moro—The
Country Has Stood Still: It Says No to Terrorism [title]; The Ambush of
the President of the Christian Democrats, Yesterday Morning Shortly
After 9 A.M., Committed by a Militarily-Trained Unit—Moro Had Just
Left Home in Monte Mario—The Terrorist Group Consisted of 12 Peo-
ple—The Killers Fired More Than 80 Shots at the Bodyguards and Then
Dragged the Leader to a Fiat 128 [headline]; There Can Be No Negotia-
tions with Terrorists [editorial].58
56 Il Popolo, 17.3.1978, 1, it.: «Dopo l’ignobile assassino degli uomini della scorta
[subheadline]. Angoscia per Moro [title]. Silenzio delle Brigate Rosse dopo il pri-
mo comunicato nel quale rivendicavano le responsabilità del rapimento e della
strage – Unanime cordoglio per le vittime del feroce agguato – La direzione della
DC riunita in permanenza – Il Paese reagisce compatto a questa nuova gravissima
sfida alle istituzioni democratiche: sciopero generale e grandi manifestazioni e
cortei in tutta Italia – Commosse testimonianze di solidarietà al Partito [head-
line].»
57 Avanti!, 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Immediata reazione popolare al rapimento di Moro e
all’uccisione degli agenti [subheadline]. Mobilitato il paese contro ogni eversione
[title]. Il Parlamento reagisce votando la fiducia al governo – Milioni di lavoratori
in tutta Italia manifestano la ferma volontà di difendere la Repubblica – L’impeg-
no del Partito Socialista – Emozione e sdegno in tutto il mondo [headline]. At-
tentato alla democrazia [editorial].»
58 La Stampa, 17.03.978, 1; it.: «Ore gravi della Repubblica per la sanguinosa impre-
sa delle Brigate rosse [subheadline]. Dopo il massacro, nessuna traccia di Moro –
il Paese si è fermato: dice no al terrorismo [title]. L’agguato al presidente della Dc,
ieri mattina poco dopo le 9, compiuto da un reparto addestrato militarmente –
Moro era appena uscito di casa a Monte Mario – Il commando era di 12 persone
– I killers hanno sparato oltre 80 colpi sulla scorta e poi hanno trascinato il leader
su una ‹128› [headline]. Con i terroristi non si tratta [editorial].»
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La Repubblica: No News on the DC Leader After the Massacre of His
Bodyguards [subheadline]. The Abduction of Moro—Italy Reacted—
General Strike, Confidence in the Government [title]. They Have
Struck the Heart of the State [editorial].59
 
Corriere della Sera: The Most Serious Political Crime of the Last Thirty
Years While the Crisis Was Finishing [subheadline]. Moro Kidnapped,
Five Bodyguards Massacred—The Country Rejects the Blackmail of the
‹BR› [title]. React with Strength [editorial].60
 
The language and rhetoric used here reveal an incredible similarity and
monotony of the reactions of the mass media. All six newspapers put em-
phasis on the fact that the country, Italy, Italians have reacted spontaneously,
succinctly, and unanimously. The spectacle of demonstrations received
much more attention than the attack in via Fani. As Wagner-Pacifici high-
lights, «the demonstrations were as (if not more) symbolically rich in their
presentation as was the kidnapping itself»; the performativity of the con-
certed bodies and flags in the strikes and demonstrations was used «to at-
tend to the rhetoric and symbolism of solidarity and success.»61
The newspaper that gave more coverage to the representation of the
demonstrations held in Rome, Milan, Turin and Bologna was the official
organ of the PCI. In a front-page article in L’Unità—accompanied by a pho-
tograph shot straight down of the demonstration in Rome—the descrip-
tion of the masses reached an almost epic timbre:
The image that Italy, the working-class, the grand masses of workers,
the young people, the students and all the people offered yesterday is
—we say it without rhetoric—an image that can be compared only to
other grave hours in our recent history, hours in which the popular
consciousness knew spontaneously how to respond to the reactionary
challenge, even before the trade unions and political parties’ appeals
59 La Repubblica, 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Nessuna notizia del leader dc dopo la strage della
sua scorta [subheadline]. Il rapimento di Moro – L’Italia ha reagito – sciopero
generale, fiducia al governo [title]. Hanno colpito il cuore dello Stato [editorial].»
60 Corriere della Sera, 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Il più grave crimine politico degli ultimi
trent’anni mentre si chiudeva la crisi [subheadline]. Moro rapito, cinque uomini
della scorta massacrati – Il Paese rifiuta il ricatto delle ‹Brigate Rosse› [title]. Rea-
gire con forza [editorial].»
61 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 104–105.
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had reached them. There was something that was reminiscent of July
14, 1948, the attempted assassination of Togliatti.62
There is an astonishing similarity between the rhetoric of this article and
that in the Prime Minister’s speech. Also here, the article (which is un-
signed) asserted its own non-rhetoricity. Moreover, several units of identity
are listed in a growing climax that begins with the category of the «work-
ing-class» and ends with the category of the «people». But in contrast to
Andreotti’s speech, here the central identity of unity (as pointed out by the
repetition) is that of «workers», which appear as the authentic expression of
the «people». There is also no reference to employees, to those who work
in offices (the bourgeois or middle class). This kind of representation func-
tions according to a slightly different mechanism than that operating in
the speech by Andreotti and more generally in the language and rhetoric
of the DC. While the family category is formally applicable to each individ-
ual—because each one is or was a member of a family—and therefore in-
cludes any individual (within the country), the category of worker, at least
in Communist jargon, is applicable only to those who work in factories or
in the fields. The sum of the families is quantitatively the people, while the
working-class exemplifies the category of people; at the climax of the cited
article, the worker becomes the paradigm of the people: «A paradigm en-
tails a movement that goes from singularity to singularity and, without
leaving singularity, transforms every singular case into an exemplar of a gen-
eral rule. […] The paradigmatic case [here: the worker] becomes such by
suspending and, at the same time, exposing its belonging to a group [here:
the people].»63
What is also interesting in the article cited last is the reference to the
failed attack on the historic leader and founding member of the PCI,
Palmiro Togliatti. The same comparison between the assassination attempt
of 1948 and the via Fani attack is proposed in an article on the second page
62 L’Unità, «Straordinario sussulto democratico», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «L’immagine che
L’Italia, la classe operaia, le grandi masse lavoratrici, i giovani, gli studenti, e tutto
il popolo hanno offerto nella giornata di ieri, è – lo diciamo senza retorica – una
immagine che trova riscontri soltanto nelle ore gravi della nostra storia recente,
quelle nelle quali la coscienza popolare ha saputo reagire alle sfide reazionarie
spontaneamente, d’istinto, prima ancora che le giungesse l’appello dei sindacati e
dei partiti. C’era qualcosa che ricordava il 14 luglio del 1948, l’attentato a Togliat-
ti.»
63 Agamben 2009, 22, 31.
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in the Corriere della Sera; here, the journalist Giulio Nascimbeni argued
that
[a]lso yesterday, like three decades ago, a shudder traveled through
Italy and for a few hours old spirits, old shadows, invaded people’s
thoughts. […] [W]ho remembers the events of July 1948, feels the
same bewilderment, as if the kidnapping of Moro and the killing of
his five bodyguards repurposed the image of an exasperated country
that can run all risks and yield to every temptation.64
Here again we are facing a prefiguration: a past event is called upon to rep-
resent and to make sense of another more recent event. But while in
Nascimbeni’s article the prefiguration is used to give a kind of tragic repre-
sentation of the Italian situation, bringing attention to the exasperation of
the country and the ever-present danger of «falling into temptation», in the
article in L’Unità it is used to demonstrate and authenticate the epic ability
of the Italian people to respond with courage, instinctively and organically
to events of political violence.
Another common element in many articles is the reference to flags in
the demonstrations.65 Journalist Giancarlo Fossi, in an article on the third
page of La Stampa, after the usual reference to «workers, employees, wom-
en, young people, pensioners, all visibly moved», drew attention to the
country’s unity, as exemplified by the proximity of the PCI’s «flags with
sickle and hammer» and DC’s «white flags with the crossed shield».66 The
same reference to «red flags and white banners with the crossed shield» can
64 Nascimbeni, Giulio, «Quando Pallante sparò a Togliatti», Corriere della Sera,
17.3.1978, 3; it.: «Anche ieri, come trent’anni fa, un brivido ha percorso l’Italia e
per qualche ora vecchi spiriti, vecchie ombre, si sono insinuati ne pensieri della
gente. […] Chi ricorda il luglio del ’48 avverte lo stesso smarrimento, come se il
rapimento di Moro e l’uccisione dei cinque uomini della sua scorta ripro-
ponessero l’immagine di un Paese esasperato che può correre ogni rischio, cedere
a ogni tentazione.»
65 See Silj 1978, 20.
66 Fossi, «Giancarlo, Roma: duecentomila lavoratori in piazza – Chiusi negozi e cin-
ema, scioperi revocati», La Stampa, 17.3.1978, 3; it: «Non solo la piazza era com-
pletamente gremita, anche le strade di accesso, per centinaia di metri, erano sti-
pate di operai, impiegati, donne, giovani, pensionati, tutti visibilmente com-
mossi, ma esasperati per il susseguirsi di atti criminosi, sempre più gravi, contro
la liberta personale e le istituzioni. Molte bandiere rosse con falce e martello,
molte le bandiere bianche con lo scudo crociato […].»
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be found in an article in the Corriere della Sera.67 Also, the organ of the PCI
praised the intermingling of red and white flags («Red and white flags are
waving in the cold wind on a livid day in March»).68 The PCI was in the
position of having to point out that its electorate had no connection with
nor sympathy for the ideology of the BR and that not only Communist
leaders such as secretary Enrico Berlinguer, but also the workers publicly
condemned the actions of the terrorist group. With the daily references to
student demonstrations against violence throughout the early months of
1978, which continued on into the months of Moro’s abduction, L’Unità
attempted to discard any proximity of the student movement to the BR. In-
terestingly, on the fifth page of Il Popolo the photographs of the crowded
piazza San Giovanni in Rome only showed white Christian Democrat
flags. Also, the headline «The Civil Protest Of the People With the DC»
does not highlight the workers’ participation.
All these modalities of representation had a precise function: the relegit-
imization of the political forces. It has been noted that they also had the
function of uniting the political forces and, more generally, of presenting
the unity and solidarity between the generations, social strata and classes.69
Although this is correct, it should also be noted that the two party newspa-
pers L’Unità and Il Popolo especially worked with different strategies to le-
gitimize their own party, above all through different ways of referring to
and framing «the people». Both parties responded to two different crises of
legitimacy: on the one hand, the PCI had to defend itself from the accusa-
tion that the BR were nothing but the children of the PCI; on the other,
the DC had to divert attention from the Lockheed scandal and present it-
self as the true target of the attack in via Fani.
Not all newspapers took part in this chorus of glorification of the «coun-
try’s response». The conservative newspaper Il Giornale wrote that the
demonstration in Rome was not a «politically unitary manifestation».70
Also, the journalist Giorgio Bocca, in an article on La Repubblica argued
that the demonstration in Milan expressed «a general rejection […] of ter-
rorism […] and a still strong difficulty in overcoming or settling deep po-
67 Corriere della Sera, «All’appello dei sindacati rispondono quindici milioni di Ital-
iani», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Bandiere rosse e vessilli bianchi con lo scudocrociato sven-
tolano sopra la marea di teste.»
68 L’Unità, «Straordinario sussulto democratico», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Sventolano al
freddo vento di una livida giornata di marzo bandiere bianche e rosse.»
69 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 107.
70 Quoted in Silj 1978, 21.
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litical differences in the name of a ‹union sacrée› of antiterrorism.»71 Boc-
ca’s observation is very interesting and also relevant from a theoretical
point of view, inasmuch as it draws attention to the fact that the rituality of
concerted bodies in the public space was not sufficient to «consecrate» na-
tional unification. It is only at the level of linguistic performance, of dis-
cursive representation of the demonstrations in the mass media, that this
sacralization was successful.72 Several intellectuals and journalists harshly
criticized the way the media reacted to the kidnapping. Giovanni Testori
denounced «the wave of rhetoric that has invaded television and newspa-
pers»73 and Franco Fortini declared that «[t]he eight to nine pages that the
newspapers devoted to the event» worried him «more than the abduction
itself.»74 Journalist Enzo Forcella also acknowledged the problem, but felt
the rhetoric necessary in order to «give back to the national community a
minimum level of unity and identity, that is, to reconstruct consensus
around some common values starting with the fundamental ones of sur-
vival and civil coexistence.»75
I already highlighted that each discursive construction of collective iden-
tity is based on the mechanism of constitutive exclusion. Sometimes this ex-
clusion is implicit and only emerges through analytical work, while other
times it is explicitly expressed in discursive practices. This is the case with
most of the representations of «the people» that appeared in the media in
the days following the kidnapping of Moro. Those who were excluded
from the national collective identity were obviously the BR. Wagner-Pacifi-
ci has observed that the BR were represented along three sets of markers,
«three separate, but interacting, oppositional pairs: indigenous versus for-
71 Bocca, Giorgio, «A Milano gli operai tornano in prima fila», La Repubblica,
17.3.1978, 9; it.: «[…] un rifiuto generale […] del terrorismo […] e una difficoltà
per ora forte a superare o a comporre le profonde differenze politiche nel nome
dell’‹union sacrée› antiterroristica.»
72 Wagner-Pacifici expresses this idea by referring to Victor Turner’s theory and ter-
minology: «[…] the predominant framing of the demonstrations was theatrical
and not ritual» (Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 111).
73 Quoted in Giovagnoli 2009, 103; it.: «[…] l’ondata di retorica che ha invaso la
televisione e i giornali.»
74 Quoted in Giovagnoli 2009, 104; it.: «Le otto-nove pagine che i quotidiani hanno
dedicato all’episodio mi preoccupano più del rapimento stesso.»
75 Forcella, Enzo, «Bandiere Rosse, Bandiere Bianche», La Repubblica, 24.3.1978, 6;
it.: «[…] ridare alla comunità nazionale un minimo di compattezza e d’identità,
cioè per ricostruire il consenso attorno ad alcuni valori comuni a cominciare da
quelli fondamentali della sopravvivenza e della convivenza civile.»
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eign, common criminal versus political criminal, left versus right.»76 As I
will now demonstrate, the first two of these strategies of representation
aimed to exclude the BR from the collective identity of the «Italian peo-
ple», while the latter aimed to link the BR and their ideology with the poli-
tical adversary in order to delegitimize it.
In the front-page headline of March 17, L’Unità wondered if «One of the
Killers Was Speaking German?», implicitly suggesting the possible connec-
tion between the BR and the RAF. The hypothesis on foreign interference
—namely that the BR had been helped or directed by foreign forces in
planning and/or carrying out the attack—made its way especially into the
milieu and the press of the radical and extra-parliamentary left. On March
17, the front page of Il Manifesto headlined:
The bloody kidnapping of Aldo Moro is the last act of a decade of mas-
sacres covered up by the state. Italy has been reduced to a frontier
country, a battlefield for secret services and shady interests. Workers
who take to the streets want to know where the roots of this degenera-
tion are. But today confidence was given to a government that is the
continuity of a past of silence and omertà [a code of silence].77
Also, Lotta Continua claimed that the attack was the result of «an internal
logic of international relations between states»78 and that there was «a di-
rect interdependence between BR and maneuvers with an international
character».79 According to the student and worker movements’ newspaper,
the kidnapping had the function of strengthening the opposite political
front, further compacting it with inevitable authoritarian outcomes, justi-
fied by a pressing «reason of state». For this reason, arguing that they
would never «choose between a murderous State and an identical form of
76 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 72.
77 Il Manifesto, «Il sequestro sanguinoso di Aldo Moro», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Il seque-
stro sanguinoso di Aldo Moro è l’ultimo atto di un decennio di stragi coperte dal-
lo stato. L’Italia è ridotta a paese di frontiera, campo di avventura di servizi segreti
e loschi interessi. Gli operai che scendono in piazza vogliono sapere dove sono le
radici di questa degenerazione. Invece oggi si è data la fiducia a un governo che è
la continuità di un passato di silenzio e omertà.»
78 Lotta Continua, «Rapito Moro, il gioco più pesante e sporco che sia mai stato
provato sulla testa dei proletari italiani», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…] una logica tutta
interna ai rapporti internazionali tra stati.»
79 Lotta Continua, «Lo Stato continua», 18.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…] una diretta interdipen-
denza tra BR e manovre a carattere internazionale.»
5.4 Framing «the People» and «the Enemy»: Construction of National Identity
219
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
terrorism»80, the newspaper demanded the opening of negotiations for the
liberation of Moro as early as in the first days of the kidnapping. There
were also those who understood the actions of the BR as inscribed in the
logic of the Cold War conflict. For example, a March 16 editorial by the
radio station Radio Città Futura, operated by the Movimento, affirmed that
Italy has become a country in which maneuvers are being conducted
by American and Soviet secret services, and those secret services of de-
pendent countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and then, natu-
rally, the Germans and Israelis and Arabs. That is, Italy has essentially
become a battlefield in which the secret services are operating with
their different interests.81
It was not only the media of the extra-parliamentary left that made a hypo-
thesis about possible foreign interference. One of the «evidences» used to
support or at least make the hypothesis appear plausible was the «efficien-
cy» of the BR in carrying out the attack in via Fani. Several journalists
found it suspicious that the BR had fired several shots without hurting Al-
do Moro, or that they not only got away with the hostage but had also cut
many telephones lines in the area in order to prevent the rapid arrival of
the police. In almost all the newspapers’ March 17 editions, there was an
article that underlined the precision with which the attack was carried out
and/or highlighted the similarities with the Schleyer case: «Analogies with
the Schleyer Case Pose Troubling Questions»; «Bonn—Overlooking the
Hypothesis That German Terrorists Have Also Acted in Rome»; «Bonn—
Kidnapped Like Schleyer»; «An Act Recalling the German Schleyer»;
«Twelve Killers for a Scientific Massacre»; «The Lightning Ambush».82 This
and other articles described a number of similarities with the Schleyer case
(the technique used in the kidnapping, namely the blocking of the first car
with another car; the fact that members of both terrorist organizations
were in prison at the time of the attack, etc.) as evidence of the possibility
80 Lotta Continua, «Non sarà un nuovo Stammheim», 17.3.1978, 10; it.: «Non sare-
mo costretti a scegliere fra uno Stato omicida e un terrorismo a lui identico.»
81 Quoted in Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 74.
82 Avanti!, «Le analogie con il caso Schleyer pongono inquietanti interrogativi»,
17.3.1978, 10; Corriere della Sera, «Bonn – Si affaccia l’ipotesi che a Roma abbiano
agito anche i terroristi tedeschi», 17.3.1978, 7; Sansa, Tito, «Bonn – Rapito come
Schleyer», La Stampa, 17.3.1978, 4; Cianciullo, Antonio, «Un’azione alla tedesca
che ricorda Schleyer», La Repubblica, 17.3.1978, 5; Mafai, Miriam, «Dodici killer
per un massacro scientifico», La Repubblica, 17.3.1978, 1; Spigarelli, Piero, «Il ful-
mineo aguato», Il Popolo, 17.3.1978, 1–2.
5 Construction of a Willing Martyr
220
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
of the participation of German terrorists or at least of outside help in the
attack (for example, in the form of military preparation in a training
camp).
Why were so many journalists not able to imagine that an Italian terror-
ist organization could organize and execute such an attack? The great con-
noisseur of Italian culture Leonardo Sciascia gave the best answer to this
question: «Of an institute that does not function, of a hospital in which pa-
tients are mistreated or in which there is no room, of a late train, of an air-
plane that does not take off, of a letter never arriving, of a party that fails,
the motto is always the exclamation: our things! […] The BR functions
perfectly: but (and the but is necessary), they are Italians. They are our
thing, whatever the relations they may have with revolutionary sects or for-
eign secret services.»83 The logic underlying the articles mentioned above is
as follows: the via Fani attack was executed with great efficiency; Italian
things are inefficient; so the attack must have been organized and carried
out under the direction or with the help of foreigners. Oreste Scalzone, a
leader of the radical left group Potere Operaio, gave the following explana-
tion on this strategy of exclusion, a strategy that has continued to this day:
«The only constant is this obstinate will to find some explanation that
proves that the BR are exogenous to this society, to the Italian situation of
class contradictions. The very power that terrorism reveals on this type of
society—one thinks on its use of information channels—becomes the very
source of the argument used to negate its independent, endogenous char-
acter.»84
The declaration of the exogenous character of the BR was not the only
strategy implemented in order to exclude the BR from the collective iden-
tity of the «Italian people». The second way of framing the terrorist organi-
zation was to declare them «common criminals» or «fanatics». In the afore-
mentioned speech by the Prime Minster Andreotti, the BR are already de-
picted as «common criminals». The day after, Il Popolo described the attack
in via Fani as a «ferocious assassination» and «a regurgitation of barbarism,
or the face of a new and ancient evil that has been afflicting the country
83 Sciascia 1978, 127–128; it.: «Di un istituto che non funziona, in cui si è maltrat-
tati o in cui non c’è posto, di un treno che ritarda, di un aereo che non parte, di
una lettera che non arriva, di una festa che non riesce, il suggello è sempre l’escla-
mazione: ‹cose nostre!› […] Le Brigate rosse funzionano perfettamente: ma (e il
ma ci vuole) sono italiane. Sono una cosa nostra, quali che siano gli addentellati
che possono avere con sette rivoluzionarie o servizi segreti di altri paesi.»
84 Deaglio/Menapace/Scalzone 1978, xxiii.
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for centuries: the hate, the perfidy, a cruel and criminal fanaticism.»85 The
newspaper dedicated the whole fourth page, entitled «Democracy Does
Not Give Up» (Non cede la democrazia), to the representation of the BR.
One of the articles on this page represented the terrorists as «lunatics», «fe-
rocious», «crazy madmen», «murderers», whose actions were nothing more
than a «cynical struggle, which is arrogant, inhuman in its ruthlessness,
and nourished by deep contempt for human values and life.»86 The news-
paper also quoted the telegram written by the Pope to Cardinal Poletti,
Vicar of Rome, in which Paul VI described the attack as an act of «inhu-
man ferocity that has affected people generously committed to the fulfill-
ment of their duty, bleeding once again the streets of this city, once a mas-
ter of civilization, now a helpless witness to barbaric rejuvenation.»87 An
analogous rhetoric had also already been used on March 17 by L’Unità, Cor-
riere della Sera and La Stampa, in which the BR are regularly described as
criminals.
As Alessandro Silj has pointedly noted, this kind of representation was
part of a strategy of depoliticization of the BR and the mythicization of the
event of political violence:
For years, the problem of the BR had been removed, relegating it to
the category of common criminality, madness, or at best, of textures es-
sentially extraneous to the Italian social fabric because they were ma-
neuvered by occult foreign powers. Now Aldo Moro was kidnapped.
Referring to the victim, one could not speak only of a political leader,
because that would be the equivalent of recognizing the BR’s action as
a political action, carried out by a political organization […]. So it be-
comes a necessity, since the BR are the ‹monster›, to sublimate the fig-
ure of Moro and to transform him into a ‹Hero› and a ‹Saint›. Only in
this way can these latest events be brought back to the scenario of ever,
85 Gilmozzi, Marcello, «Una guerra disperata», Il Popolo, 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…] fe-
roce assassinio, […] un rigurgito di barbarie, o il volto di un male nuovo ed anti-
co che da secoli travaglia il paese: l’odio, la perfidia, un fanatismo crudele e crimi-
nale.»
86 Cavedon, Remigo, «La ‹svolta› terroristica è nella logica delle BR», Il Popolo,
17.3.1978, 4; it.: «[…] squilibrati […] pazzi furiosi […] assassini […] feroci […].
[…] una lotta cinica, spavalda, inumana nella sua spietatezza, nutrita di profondo
disprezzo per i valori umani e la vita.»
87 Il Popolo, «Paolo VI: ‹profondo è il nostro dolore›», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…] dis-
umana ferocia, che ha colpito persone generosamente impegnate nell’adempi-
mento del proprio dovere, insanguinando ancora una volta le strade di questa
città un tempo maestra di civiltà, ora testimone impotente di rinata barbarie.»
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which is not political, but mythological, where there is no space for
the chiaroscuro and only those who choose a side in the battlefield can
have citizenship rights. [This is] [t]he great battle between good and
evil.88
The process of mythicization thus already began from the beginning of the
Moro case. Silj highlights that the public assessment of the BR was dialecti-
cally bound up with an assessment of the identity of Moro. The performa-
tivity of this mythicization is twofold: on the one hand, it allowed, as we
will deepen further, the justification of the «line of firmness», inasmuch as
it was impossible to negotiate with monsters and madmen; on the other
hand, it reinforced and sustained the myth of a society and a nation in per-
petual danger and battling with an absolute enemy, an enemy that has no
real political ends, but is just bent on chaos and destruction. Moreover, Silj
points out that Moro could not be identified only as a political leader, be-
cause then the conflict between the Italian State and the BR would have
appeared only as a political conflict (and therefore as historical and not
metaphysical). For this reason, Moro had to be transformed into a hero
and a saint. As I will show later, the sacralization and representation of Mo-
ro (more than as a saint and a hero) as a martyr was preceded by a proce-
dure of depoliticization, through which he was excluded from the political
sphere, deprived of political identity and his life reduced to mere life.
Not all social actors deployed a strategy aimed at excluding the BR from
the political body in order to stress an alleged national unity. For the right
of the political spectrum, the BR were nothing but the children of the PCI.
Ultraconservative parties referred to the BR as «Communist terrorists».89
Similarly, the Minster of Public Education Giovanni Galloni, a member of
88 Silj 1978, 29; it.: «Per anni il problema delle BR era stato rimosso, relegandolo nel
novero della criminalità comune, della follia, o nella migliore delle ipotesi di
trame essenzialmente estranee al tessuto sociale italiano perché manovrate da oc-
culte centrali straniere. Ora Aldo Moro è stato rapito. Riferendosi alla vittima,
non si può parlare soltanto di leader politico, perché ciò equivarrebbe a ri-
conoscere l’azione delle BR come un’azione politica, eseguita da un’organiz-
zazione politica […]. Ecco dunque la necessità, se le BR sono il ‹mostro›, di subli-
mare la figura di Moro per farne l’‹Eroe› e il ‹Santo›. Soltanto in questo modo è
possibile ricondurre gli ultimi avvenimenti nello scenario di sempre, che non è
politico, bensì mitologico, in cui non c’è spazio per i chiaroscuri ma può avere
diritto di cittadinanza soltanto chi non rifiuta la scelta di campo. La grande ten-
zone fra il bene e il male.»
89 See Morcellini/Avallone 1978, 445.
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the DC, raised the issue of the «Stalinism» of the BR.90 The attitude of the
Communists and the left in general was obviously different. The PCI as
well as many people and groups of the extra-parliamentary left claimed
that the leftist, international, pro-proletarian position taken by the BR was
«nothing but rhetoric». The historian and journalist Leo Valiani, a former
Communist, wrote that the problem with these young fanatics was their
«lack of political and economic culture» and that «never before has the va-
lidity of the historical opposition of the true Marxists and, of course, of
Liberal Democrats and Christian Democrats to terrorism been so clearly
confirmed.»91 Valiani thus did not deny the «Italianness» of the BR, nor
did he represent them as beasts or crazy people, but considered them to be
just too stupid to understand and participate in political life. The exclusion
of them from political life goes hand-in-hand with the inclusion of the
PCI, the DC and other parties like the Italian Republican Party or the Ra-
dical Party within the spectrum of legitimate political actors.
Another very widespread form of representation, especially within the
media of the left, was the accusation of Fascism: «the accusation of
‹Catholic messianism›, which had been at the center of the PCI’s former
critique of the BR, now receded as the ‹Fascism› of the BR was ‹discovered›
in the mid and late seventies.»92 This kind of representation also appeared
during the 55 days of Moro’s imprisonment, as is perfectly exemplified by
the headline of an article in L’Unità: «The Language of Freda [a Fascist ter-
rorist] and That of the BR.»93 In short, a part of the right represented the
BR as Communists, while a part of the left represented them as Fascists (or,
in the case of Valiani, as too stupid for politics). As Wagner-Pacifici ob-
serves, each one «chose its line of attack on the basis of its own particular
sense of the best strategy to use to assert its own legitimacy.»94 This type of
representation, however, remained minor to those who glorified the unity
of the country and represented the BR as entities outside of the national
political body.
90 See Roggi, Enzo, «La segreteria DC conferma la linea dell’intesa democratica»,
L’Unità, 30.3.1978, 8.
91 Valiani, Leo, «La democrazia ha altre armi per difendersi», Corriere della Sera,
20.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…] mancanza di cultura politica ed economica […]. Mai come
in questo caso si conferma la validità dell’opposizione storica degli autentici
marxisti e, naturalmente, democratici liberali e dei democratici cristiani al terror-
ismo.»
92 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 84.
93 L’Unità, «Il linguaggio di Freda e quello delle BR», 27.4.1978, 1.
94 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 86.
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Sociologist and journalist Francesco Alberoni gave perhaps the most in-
teresting representation of the BR, describing them as a sort of sect of fa-
natics, which combined Marxist ideology with the religious topos of the
apocalypse:
There is a revolutionary Marxist nucleus in the country […]. They
dream of a revolutionary apocalypse, from which a proletarian revolu-
tion will emerge. It is a theological–religious conception of politics
present in Russia before the Revolution, in Spain, in South America,
but also in the farthest past. In Italy, this idea has been adopted by
some student groups disappointed by the fact that 1968 had no revolu-
tionary outlet, […] disappointed by the success of a moderate party
such as the PCI, […] by all that has not led to what their ultimate de-
sire is: the bloodbath, the apocalypse from which a new wonderful
world should emerge. The BR are the organized point of this army of
the apocalypse. The mindset of the terrorists is that of the soldier of an
army that fights against all that is earthly. Because for them the world
is absolute evil and must be annihilated by the purifying fire of a rev-
olution.95
Alberoni excludes the BR from political life by underlining their religious
fanaticism. Unlike Valiani, he does not believe that it is their stupidity that
prevents them from legitimately participating in political life, but their
specific eschatological conception of history. They do not believe in
progress and democratic debate, but in the mythical struggle between
good and evil that will only be brought to an end in the final battle. If Al-
beroni is right, we could say that there were two conflicting but only ap-
parently antithetical mythologies, inasmuch as they converge at least on
95 Alberoni, Francesco, «L’esercito dell’apocalisse», Corriere della Sera, 19.3.1978, 3;
it.: «Esiste nel paese un nucleo marxista rivoluzionario […]. Essi sognano
un’apocalisse rivoluzionaria da cui emergerà poi una rivoluzione proletaria. È una
concezione teologico-religiosa della politica presente in Russia prima della
Rivoluzione, in Spagna, in Sudamerica, ma che ritroviamo anche nel più lontano
passato. Da noi in Italia si è fatta strada in alcuni gruppi studenteschi delusi dal
fatto che il 1968 non ha avuto uno sbocco rivoluzionario, […] delusi dal successo
di un partito gradualista come il PCI, […] da tutto ciò che non ha portato a quel-
lo che è il loro ultimo desiderio: il bagno di sangue, l’apocalisse da cui dovrebbe
emergere un nuovo mondo meraviglioso. Le Brigate Rosse sono la punta organiz-
zata di questo esercito dell’apocalisse. […] La mentalità dei terroristi è quella del
soldato di un esercito che combatte contro tutto ciò che è terreno. Perché per
loro il mondo è il male assoluto e deve essere annientato dal fuoco purificatore
della rivoluzione.»
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one point: the representation of the conflict as an absolute struggle be-
tween good and evil. Just as the death of Aldo Moro was sacralized as a sac-
rifice for the salvation of the state, violence was sacralized and legitimized
by the BR because it was motivated by a political cause that we could call
metaphysical, a cause that they experienced as transcending history. The
BR «adorned themselves with the sacred vestments of the Resistance fight-
ers […] as missionaries following their own sacred tradition.»96 Once
again, we are faced with a prefiguration, namely the legitimization of ac-
tions by reference to past actions that have been memorialized and legit-
imized by history and enjoy general political recognition. Just as violence
in the Resistance was legitimated by the necessity of defeating Fascism, rev-
olutionary violence is experienced as legitimated by the necessity of defeat-
ing capitalism.
Finally, there is a fourth mode of representation of the BR that cannot
be put on the same level as the three previous modes, as it does not follow
the mechanism of discursive inclusion/exclusion aimed at creating a na-
tional collective identity, but rather wants to draw attention to the prob-
lem of identity itself. This is the representation that frames the political
conflict as a conflict between generations. The journalist and co-founder
of Il Manifesto Rossana Rossanda was probably the social actor who most
vehemently called attention to the fact that the BR were not at all out of
Italian reality. Rossanda used the image, which became famous, of the
«family album».97 The journalist pointed out that the language and
rhetoric of the BR had much in common with those used in the past by
PCI militants, particularly during the period of resistance to Fascism. The
BR, in fact, used the Resistance’s terminology to describe and justify their
actions.
Wagner-Pacifici describes the Resistance as a root paradigm, which stood
for courage undeterred by an invasion, sacrifice, necessary and legitimate
violence, and antifascism.98 During the 55 days and also after, references to
the Resistance were continually made by the PCI, such as for example by
Enrico Berlinguer, who the day before Moro’s body was found in via
96 Pacifici refers here to Denis Donoghue, who has noted that the Irish Republican
Army, in a very similar way to the BR, tried to sacralize their own actions by tak-
ing «possession of the entire Republican tradition from the Rising of 1798 to the
Fenians and the Man of Easter Week in 1916» (Donoghue, Denis, «The Hunger
Strikes», The New York Review of Books, 22.10.1981, 29, quoted in Wagner-Pacifici
1986, 158).
97 Rossanda, Rossana, «L’album di famiglia», Il Manifesto, 2.04.1978, 1.
98 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 169–175.
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Catani wrote that «the road of unity is the only just road, the only one ca-
pable of strengthening democracy, of rendering invincible the Republic
born out of the Resistance.»99 The BR challenged exactly this kind of repre-
sentation, in which the democratic and republican state appears the true
goal of the Resistance. According to them, the PCI had betrayed the revo-
lutionary spirit of the Resistance by coming to terms with the enemy. They
understood themselves as the true heirs of the Resistance, as the brigades
of a new resistance. Even the mass movement that they dreamed of was
called, in the «Resolution of the Strategic Directorate of the BR» that ac-
companied the fourth communiqué, the «Proletarian Offensive Movement
of Resistance».100
When Rossanda noticed the similarity between the BR’s language and
Communist language during and after the war, her goal was not to de-
nounce an alleged link between the PCI and the BR, but rather to put into
perspective the political vacuum left by Gramsci’s and Togliatti’s party,
who, after having fought the Christian Democracy as an expression of capi-
talism for decades, now «no longer knows how to define [it], whether as a
friend or an enemy.»101 In other words, the problem at stake was the collec-
tive identity not of the nation, but of the left, and more precisely of those
who still felt attached to the cause of the struggle against capitalism. The
young leftists felt betrayed by the generation of their fathers and mothers,
as they idealized the generation of their grandparents and grandmothers,
who had fought in the Resistance.102 To weaken the BR’s appellative poten-
tial and that of other terrorist organizations, Rossanda argued, the PCI and
extra-parliamentary left had to distance themselves from the DC and re-
turn to «traditional» values of the anti-capitalist struggle.
The problem of the left’s identity crisis found expression in the slogan
«neither with the State nor with the BR», which spontaneously emerged on
the morning of March 16 at a student meeting at the Faculty of Political
Science in Rome, where Aldo Moro was holder of the Chair of Institutions
99 Berlinguer, Enrico, «Berlinguer al popolo e agli elettori», L’Unità, 8.05.1978, 1;
it.: «[…] la via dell’unità è l’unica giusta, l’unica che può rendere forte la
democrazia, invincibile la Repubblica nata dalla Resistenza.»
100 Brigate Rosse 1978f, 95.
101 Rossanda, Rossana, «L’album di famiglia», Il Manifesto, 2.03.1978, 1; it.: «[…]
non si sa più bene come definire, se avversario o amico.»
102 The theme of the generational conflict had already been introduced by Pasolini
in 1973, when the journal Nuovi Argomenti described Left Extremism as a rebel-
lion of children against fathers, who rewrote the romance of their grandfathers
engaged in Resistance; see Pasolini 1973.
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of Law and Criminal Procedure. With this slogan, the students expressed
their opposition to the violent methods used by the BR, but at the same
time they signaled that they did not want to take the side of the DC, as the
PCI did. As Lotta Continua wrote in an article entitled «It Will Not Be a
New Stammhein» (in reference to the prison where some terrorists of the
German Rote Armee Fraktion died in 1977), a part of the left did not want
«to be forced to choose between a homicidal state and a form of terrorism
identical to it.»103 In that sense, the students’ slogan meant refusal of both
terrorist and institutional violence. From this line, the support for the ne-
gotiations for the exchange of prisoners and the salvation of Moro would
then be developed.
The Image of the Coming Martyr
Immediately after the attack in via Fani, the image of Moro underwent a
transformation. Aldo Moro was no longer represented primarily as one of
the most important leaders of the DC, but became the people’s leader, the
symbol of a wounded nation, attacked by a band of barbarous, ferocious
and crazy assassins. He thus ceased to be only a collective figure and be-
came the embodiment of the collective itself.
According to Wagner-Pacifici, in Italy there is nothing like a national
collective identity but rather «several different collectivities»; this is the rea-
son why «the ‹target› [of the attack] was alternately identified as the heart
of the State, the Historic Compromise, Democracy, the Christian Demo-
cratic Party, the Communist Party, the Republic, the Institutions of the
State, and […] the Mass Media.»104 Too many divisions along political, reli-
gious, cultural, geographical and institutional boundaries, whose roots
partly extend deep into history, hinder the formation of a stable national
collective identity. Thus, from the beginning, different social actors consid-
ered the kidnapping of Aldo Moro an attempt to challenge the different
collectives to which they belonged or, more precisely, with which they
identified. Many Catholics saw it as a criminal act against the values repre-
sented by the DC; others, especially many non-parliamentary radical left-
ists, saw it as an attempt to delegitimize the student and worker move-
ments. The Communists privately understood the primary target of the BR
5.5
103 Lotta Continua, «Non sarà un nuovo Stammhein», 17.3.1978, 14; it.: «Non sare-
mo costretti a scegliere tra uno Stato omicida e un terrorismo a lui identico.»
104 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 89.
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to be their delegitimization, while Christian Democrats were convinced
that the real target was the DC. But despite these different understandings
of the concrete target, both parties publicly presented the attack as an at-
tempt to destroy Italian collectivity. Both party newspapers and indepen-
dent newspapers, as we have seen, described the target with terms which,
in different ways and combinations and with different nuances, all refer to
an alleged national collective identity: Italy, country, state, republic, demo-
cratic institutions, republican institutions, etc. For a relatively short period
of time, namely for the duration of Moro’s imprisonment and a little fur-
ther, different social actors and political groups seemed to put aside ideo-
logical conflicts and different visions of politics and society to join in a
rhetoric of national unity. Nevertheless, the perception that a certain par-
ticular collective, and not the whole nation, had been attacked never com-
pletely vanished. This tension between particular collectivities and the con-
certed construction of national identity, as well as the related forms of rep-
resentation, determined the way in which the media represented Aldo Mo-
ro during his 55-day imprisonment.
The construction of this national identity is intrinsically linked to the
transformation of Moro’s image into a symbol, the embodiment of collec-
tivity. After March 16, Moro’s incomprehensible speeches were reinterpret-
ed as demonstrations of his cultivated and sophisticated legislative work.
His strategy of exhausting opponents was transformed into humble pa-
tience: «Moro: His Style Is Tolerance» is the title of an article by journalist
Enzo Biagi in the March 17 edition of the Corriere della Sera.105 Among the
most commonly used adjectives to describe the politician, we find words
such as melancholic, stationary, hieratic, honest, thoughtful, mild, lucid,
solitary, persuasive, serene, sad, cautious, slow, reticent, contradictory, pes-
simistic, optimistic, Christian, proud, elusive, tolerant, patient, spiritual.
Between March 17 and 21, Italian journalists resorted to almost all of the
resources of Italian vocabulary.
The title of the fifth page of the March 17 edition of La Stampa, de-
scribed Moro as «One of the Most Prestigious and Human Figures»106; on
the same page, Stefano Reggiani wrote that
[…] his figure is like his character, an evanescent moment (his closed
eyes, his slow pronouncement, which was affected by his disease, as
one could see in one of his last appearances on TV); a moment later
105 Biagi, Enzo, «Moro: Il suo stile è la tolleranza», Corriere della Sera, 17.3.1978, 3.
106 La Stampa, «È una delle figure più prestigiose ed umane», 17.3.1978, 5.
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the figure is firm, characterized by the meticulous oratory of the con-
gresses and by the white stain of his hair, as if it would be a predeter-
mined originality. 107
In an article entitled «Aldo Moro Is the ‹Weaver› of the New Italian Reali-
ty» published the next day, the leader of the Italian Republican Party Gio-
vanni Spadolini described Moro as «the most foreign to slogans, to the sug-
gestions of myths or contingent infatuations, among the Christian
Democrats.»108 On March 19, in an editorial entitled «The Assassins Like
Judges», the newspaper defined Moro as «one of the great statesman of our
time» and expressed the trust that «by the strength of his spirit and the
height of his civil and religious faith, he will overcome [the ordeal], even
in the fragility of his health and of all that is human, while remaining him-
self.»109
La Repubblica gave a lot of coverage to the reactions of Moro’s family
and of Christian-Democrats, with often dramatic titles like «A Family in
Anguish but ‹with Aldo’s Reserve›» or «‹It Is as If They Kidnapped Our
Dad›, and in the DC in Milan Anger Explodes».110 In an editorial in the
March 17 edition, the image of Aldo Moro was not yet transformed. In
fact, he was described as a man who
for twenty years represented the DC’s democratic continuity. With all
his sluggishness, his delays, his mistakes, he is the man who trans-
formed the party from centrism to the alliance with Socialists before,
107 Reggiani, Stefano, «Aldo Moro, lo statista degli equilibri difficili», La Stampa,
17.3.1978, 5; it.: «[…] la sua figura è come il suo carattere, un momento evanes-
cente (gli occhi socchiusi, la pronuncia lenta e impacciata dalla malattia come si
vide in una delle sue ultime apparizioni in tv, un attimo dopo ferma, inchiodata
all’oratoria puntigliosa dei congressi e alla macchia bianca dei capelli, come a
una prestabilita originalità.»
108 Spadolini, Giovanni, «Aldo Moro è il ‹tessitore› della nuova realtà italiana», La
Stampa, 18.3.1978, 3; it.: «[…] uno dei democristiani più estranei alle parole
d’ordine, alle suggestioni dei miti o delle infatuazioni contingenti.»
109 La Stampa, «Gli assassini come giudici», 19.3.1978, 1; it.: «È toccata ad Aldo Mo-
ro, uno dei grandi statisti del nostro tempo, una prova tremenda, ma alla quale
confidiamo che egli, per la forza del suo spirito e per l’altezza della sua fede
civile e religiosa, possa sovrastare [una prova tremenda], pur nella fragilità della
sua salute e di tutto quanto è umano, rimanendo ogni attimo sé stesso.»
110 Mori, Anna Maria, «Una famiglia nell’angoscia però ‹col riserbo di Aldo›», La
Repubblica, 17.3.1978, 6; Pansa, Gianpaolo, «‹È come se avessero rapito nostro
padre› e nella DC di Milano esplode la rabbia», La Repubblica, 17.3.1978, 7.
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and to the parliamentary majority with the PCI today […]. He is today
the hub of a complex yet still uncertain situation, still fluid […].111
Despite Aldo Moro being identified as a DC man, the editorial is entitled
«They Have Struck the Heart of the State». Here the tension between Moro
as a party representative and as a representative of the whole political body
is particularly manifest. The newspaper was able to represent him simulta-
neously as a symbol of the DC and of the state because, on the one hand,
he is identified as the real weaver of the Historic Compromise and, on the
other, because since 1948 the DC had ruled interruptedly: Aldo Moro was
the DC and the DC was the Italian State.
The Communist hagiography is also very interesting. As Alessandro Silj
pointedly notes, Aldo Moro was transformed into «an archangel of democ-
racy whose virtues far surpass the rare mistakes.»112 Although the Commu-
nist newspaper did not represent Moro as the embodiment of the nation, it
began a campaign of glorification of the politician’s virtues. The journalist
Mario Meloni, better known under the pseudonym Fortebraccio, in refer-
ence to an episode of 1954113, wrote on the first page of the March 17 edi-
tion of L’Unità:
We, despite rejecting his invitation, cannot forget, nor have we ever for-
gotten, with how much delicacy, and with how much regard and even
respect, he was able to address us with his authoritative exhortation.
And there was, in his words, a profound melancholy and a sort of se-
cret solidarity: we felt that we were in front of a man who understood
and in whose mind there was no intent to overpower others.114
111 La Repubblica, «Hanno colpito il cuore dello Stato», 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Aldo Mo-
ro rappresenta da vent’anni la continuità democratica della DC. Con tutte le sue
lentezze, i suoi ritardi, i suoi errori, è l’uomo che ha trasferito il partito dal cen-
trismo all’alleanza coi socialisti prima, e alla maggioranza parlamentare col PCI
oggi […]. È oggi il punto di cerniera di una situazione complessa ancora incerta,
ancora fluida […].»
112 Silj 1978, 31.
113 In 1954, Moro attempted to dissuade the author of the article, who was then his
party colleague, from making a hostile statement about the signing of the Treaty
of the European Union.
114 Fortebraccio, «Uno che ha capito», L’Unità, 17.3.1978, 1; it: «Noi, che pure resp-
ingemmo il suo invito, non possiamo dimenticare, né mai abbiamo dimentica-
to, con quanta delicatezza, e con quanto riguardo e addirittura rispetto seppe
rivolgerci la sua pur autorevole esortazione. E c’era, nelle sue parole, anche una
malinconia profonda e una sorta di segreta solidarietà: sentimmo che avevamo
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The same March 17 edition also published the speech held the day before
in Parliament by the secretary of the PCI Enrico Berlinguer, in which he
spoke of an «attack carried out with calculated determination against one
of the most eminent personalities of Italian politics, against a statesman
profoundly committed to the democratic cause.»115 Two days later, in an
editorial Berlinguer identified the target of the attack in via Fani to be
democracy, rather than the state:
It has been stated that Aldo Moro was abducted to attack a symbol,
among the most powerful, of this efforts aimed at preventing political
and institutional detachment. But beyond Moro as a person […] they
wanted to attack the whole Italian democracy. […] It is the greatest
conquest of the people that is threatened. […] The democratic regime
and the Italian Constitution are decisive and inalienable achievements
of the popular movement.116
Here, the attack on Aldo Moro becomes an attack on the people, on the
popular movement that gave birth to democracy. But Berlinguer did not
go so far as to identify, as other newspapers did, Aldo Moro with democra-
cy or the Italian State (or both). Moro is represented as being a representa-
tive of democracy, not the embodiment of democracy. Evidently, the PCI
secretary tried to get rid of those who recognized Moro’s status as a symbol
of the whole of democracy, to avoid making the DC appear as the political
target of the BR. For Berlinguer, the DC was not the true defender of
democracy; it was the popular movement.
For the DC’s Il Popolo, after the kidnap Aldo Moro became the true soul
(and mind) of the party as well as the embodiment of the country. Alfredo
Vinciguerra described Moro as the «DC’s most prestigious leader» and as
«the man of State: the political point of reference for the large majority of
di fronte un uomo che capiva e nell’animo del quale non trovava posto alcun
sentimento di sopraffazione.»
115 L’Unità, «Berlinguer: Assicuriamo al Paese l’impegno unitario e tenace del PCI»,
17.3.1978, 1.
116 Berlinguer, «Enrico, Unità e rigore», L’Unità, 17.3.1978, 1; it.: «Si è affermato che
Aldo Moro è stato rapito proprio per colpire un simbolo, tra i più significativi,
di questo sforzo teso a impedire lo scollamento politico e istituzionale. ma al di
là della persona di Moro […] si è voluto colpire l’insieme della democrazia ital-
iana. […] È la conquista più grande del popolo che viene minacciata. […] Il
regime democratico e la Costituzione italiana sono conquiste decisive e irrinun-
ciabili del movimento popolare.»
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Italians.»117 On the same page, another article commented on an article
that Moro published in 1977 and in which he wrote about terrorism and
violence. The journalist argued that in this article
the portrait of a man, as well as of a politician and a statist, emerges,
who, with his own life, has committed himself to the peace and the
common good of all citizens, whom he understood not as abstract en-
tities but, in his Christian sensibility, as brothers.118
Two things have to be emphasized about this article. First, it characterizes
Moro as someone who devoted his whole life to his political commitment.
Moro is represented not simply as a politician that does politics like a job,
but someone for whom politics is a vocation. The martyrological represen-
tation of his death is somehow anticipated here: precisely because Moro
had devoted his life to the common good, he would accept sacrificing him-
self for the defense of the citizens, the Republic and its democratic institu-
tions. Secondly, the relationship between Moro and the Italian citizens is
described in terms of a familial communion. The political body comes to
assume an explicit Christian connotation here, since the relationship be-
tween the citizens and the politician Aldo Moro is represented as a com-
munity of brothers; the Italian State is metaphorically signified as a family.
The media construction of a certain image of Aldo Moro the day after
his abduction is entirely centered on his habits, character traits, rhetoric,
and political strategy, as well as on his role and function within the DC.
They are all constructions of an image in the absence of a real image of Al-
do Moro’s body. The aesthetic dimension, the corporality of Moro, did not
play a decisive role yet. This changed starting from March 18 when televi-
sion and special newspaper editions published the BR’s first communiqué
(after the kidnapping), accompanied by a photograph of Moro portrayed
in the «people’s prison» (see figure 2). The seizure of the Christian Demo-
crat politician and its possible consequences thus became an unequivocal
reality. As we saw, the communiqué declared the beginning of the trial of
Aldo Moro in front of a «people’s court». The photograph of Aldo Moro
117 Vinciguerra, Alfredo, «Come salvare il paese», Il Popolo, 17.3.1978, 3; it.: «[…]
leader più prestigioso della DC […]. […] uomo di Stato: il punto di riferimento
politico per la stragrande maggioranza degli italiani.»
118 Giuntella, Paolo, «Così disse condannando la violenza», Il Popolo, 17.3.1978, 3;
it.: «Ne emerge un ritratto d’uomo, oltre che di politico e di statista, impegnato
con la propria vita per la pace e il bene comune di tutti i cittadini, sentiti non
come una entità astratta, ma nella sua sensibilità cristiana, come fratelli.»
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gave credibility to the communiqué as it proved that Aldo Moro was alive
and actually a prisoner of the BR.
PICTURE 2: Aldo Moro in the first Polaroid issued by the Red Brigades.
On March 19, the six papers examined here all dedicated their front-page
titles to the news of the diffusion of the photograph. The only exception
was the Communist newspaper, which focused on the «emotion» of the
citizens during the funeral of the five dead bodyguards held the day before.
Only in the sub-headline is it reported that «Criminals Make Contact by
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Sending the Photo of Moro».119 It is also the only newspaper that did not
mention the trial in its headline. All six newspapers reproduced the pic-
ture, albeit in different sizes: L’Unità only reserved 2.8% of the front-page
surface for the photograph, while the Corriere della Sera reserved 14.1% for
it (see figure 3).120 In L’Unità Moro’s picture appeared under the title «A
Tortured Man» and the text at the side emphasized that the newspaper had
been «forced to reproduce it […] out of a chronicle duty», but that it was
doing so «with the reproach of someone touching a document handled by
professional assassins. These are beasts, who are even hard to compare with
Fascists.»121 The image of Moro was then commented on as follows:
Look at this photo. It is the image of a man whose kidnappers promise
to martyrize him in one of those tragic farces which they call trials in
order to prolong the challenge to Italian democracy and the honor of
this Republic.122
The term «martyr» here makes its first explicit appearance. Not surprising-
ly, after this mention of the coming martyrdom of the Christian Democrat
politician, the newspaper explained to the reader who «the people» were:
They dare even, these beasts, to write in their messages the word ‹peo-
ple›. What have they got to do with the people? The people are good,
they are human, they are right. The people gathered yesterday around
the coffins of the assassinated policemen and Carabinieri. They ask to
be released from terrorist gangs. They want to live and progress in
peace.123
119 L’Unità, «Commossi funerali dei cinque assassinati – I criminali si fanno vivi in-
viando la foto di Moro», 19.3.1978, 1.
120 See Silj 1978, 12.
121 L’Unità, «Un uomo torturato», 19.3.1978, 1; it.: «L’animo con cui siamo costretti
a riprodurre – per un dovere di cronaca – la foto di Aldo Moro nelle mani dei
suoi carcerieri e molto triste. Lo facciamo con il ribrezzo di chi tocca un docu-
mento maneggiato da assassini di mestiere. Queste sono belve che è perfino dif-
ficile paragonare ai fascisti.»
122 L’Unità, «Un uomo torturato», 19.3.1978, 1; it.: «Guardate questa foto. È l’im-
magine di un uomo che i suoi rapitori si ripromettono di martirizzare, in una di
quelle tragiche farse cui danno il nome di processi; e ciò per fare durare più a
lungo la sfida alla democrazia italiana e all’onore di questa repubblica.»
123 L’Unità, «Un uomo torturato», 19.3.1978, 1; it.: «Osano persino, queste belve,
scrivere nei messaggi la parola ‹popolo›. Che cosa c’entrano essi con il popolo? Il
popolo è buono, è umano, è giusto. Il popolo si è raccolto ieri intorno alle bare
degli agenti e dei carabinieri assassinati. Chiede di essere liberato dalle bande
terroristiche. Vuole vivere e progredire in pace.»
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PICTURE 3: Front page of the Corriere della Sera, March 19, 1978.
On pages 1, 2, 4, 10 and 11 of L’Unità, the «unity of the people» is further
underlined with the reproduction of photographs showing the masses that
appeared at the funeral or in the vigils held in several Italian cities. The sac-
rifice of Moro’s escort, as well as his coming martyrdom, are, in the
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rhetoric adopted by the Communist newspaper, the events around which a
united Italy would be reborn. In the Corriere della Sera editorial, the marty-
rological representation is subtler and less obvious, but perhaps for this
reason more effective. In fact, the editorialist uses the instrument of prefig-
uration in such a way that Aldo Moro appears as a modern-day Jesus Christ
and his imprisonment as a modern passion:
The camera has reproduced him, in front of the banner of the BR,
with that composed and thoughtful expression for which he is known.
There is no trace of fear, nor even a burst of pride, of challenge, which
is always a way, albeit virile, to suppress and overcome agitation and
turmoil. Even a layman can understand that only someone who be-
lieves, and who is truly at peace with its conscience, may find the
strength to look in such an unmistakable way at those who do not
know what they are doing. […] Moro will need a great deal of courage
to maintain, in the coming days, in his photos that will be duly sent to
newspapers and television companies, that composite and thoughtful
expression. […] Today the Christian Democrats, like all Italians, can
only look at this photo, this highest lesson in dignity, firmness and
style.124
This article is particularly interesting for three reasons. First, it contains a
direct quotation from the Bible through which an analogy between the
suffering of Jesus a few moments before dying on the cross and the suffer-
ing of Aldo Moro is constructed. Just as Jesus, in Luke’s gospel (Luke 23,
34), asks the Father to forgive the Roman soldiers because they do not
know what they do, in the photograph’s interpretation by editorialist Gian-
franco Piazzesi, Aldo Moro seems to ask forgiveness (to whom?) for the
BR’s actions only through his look and expression. The crucial point of
this prefiguration, its strategic function, lies in the fact that everyone
124 Piazzesi, Gianfranco, «Stoica dignità», Corriere della Sera, 19.3.1978; 1; it.: «La
macchina lo ha riprodotto, dietro lo striscione delle BR, con quella espressione
composta e pensosa che più gli è consueta. Non c’è traccia di paura, e neppure
un soprassalto di orgoglio, di sfida, che è sempre un modo, seppur virile, di
reprimere e di vincere l’agitazione e il turbamento. Proprio un laico può capire
che soltanto chi crede, e chi è veramente in pace con la sua coscienza, può
trovare la forza di guardare, in quel modo inconfondibile, coloro che non sanno
quello che fanno. […] Moro avrà bisogno di un grandissimo coraggio per man-
tenere, anche nei prossimi giorni, nelle sue fotografie che saranno fatte puntual-
mente pervenire ai giornali e alla Tv, quella espressione composta e pensosa. […]
Oggi i democristiani, come tutti gli italiani, possono soltanto guardare a quella
fotografia, a quella altissima lezione di dignità, di fermezza e di stile.»
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knows the bloody end of Jesus in the Gospel’s narrative. With this analogy,
Aldo Moro’s death is not only anticipated, but is loaded with metaphysical
meaning, appearing as something that has already been written and cannot
be avoided. In fact—here we come to the second point—for Piazzesi the
hostage is able to look at his kidnappers in that way, in the way Jesus
looked at his torturers, only because he is a man of faith who is at peace
with his conscience and his destiny. The man of faith can look at them this
way because he does not fear what he knows will happen. In this represen-
tation, Moro seems to commit his spirit to the hands of the Father, as Jesus
does in Luke’s narrative; here he becomes the true heir of the Christian
martyrs. Finally, Piazzesi, by referring to Moro’s expression in the photo as
the highest lesson in dignity, implicitly appeals to the reader to learn from
the martyr, to take him as an example to imitate. The editorial thus repro-
duces and applies the mechanism of interpellation, which in the third
chapter we identified as a central performative force of martyrological nar-
ratives: Just as martyrs, through their own death, imitate the Passion of
Christ, viewers of martyrdom are called to imitate the martyr, to live and
die with the same courage and dignity. We find an analogous representa-
tion of Moro as an example to imitate in the pages of Il Popolo, where Rug-
gero Orfei, an important representative of the Christian Associations of
Italian Workers (ACLI), writes that «the suffering of Aldo Moro is a collec-
tive and national witness, a lesson that no one can evade.»125
The representatives of the DC also praised the exemplarity of Moro as a
prisoner figure. As La Stampa reported, the party vice-secretary Giovanni
Galloni said that «it really impressed us to see him with a serene and
melancholy look in such difficult circumstances. The impression that we
Christian Democrats had [looking at the photograph] is of serenity and
greatness of mind.» The image is even interpreted as an appeal to «keep
our strength in mind and to be worthy of the firmness and serenity shown
by Aldo Moro.»126 In other words, for Galloni the image is an appeal to re-
main firm in the strategy of non-negotiation. The performative force of the
image was also stressed by senator Adolfo Sarti, who said that, «if the BR
125 Orfei, Ruggero, «La sofferenza di Aldo Moro è collettiva e una testimonianza
nazionale alla cui lezione nessuno deve sottrarsi», Il Popolo, 19.3.1978, 4.
126 La Stampa, «Emozione, speranza alla sede della DC. Zaccagnini: Moro ne esce
esaltato», 19.3.1978, 3; it.: «[…] ci ha veramente impressionato il vederlo con lo
sguardo sereno e malinconico in una circostanza tanto difficile. L’impressione
che noi democristiani ne abbiamo ricavato, è di serenità e grandezza d’animo.
[…] Dobbiamo mantenere la nostra forza d’animo e per essere degni della fer-
mezza e della serenità dimostrata da Aldo Moro.»
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were susceptible subjects, they would be annihilated by this image of no-
bility, by his malicious irony, by his unobtrusive and extraordinary intelli-
gence.»127 Finally, the party secretary Benigno Zaccagnini described the
photo as «an exaltation of the DC, its function, and an exaltation of Moro’s
political and moral figure», transforming it into a party icon.128
In an article by Lietta Tornabuoni in the Corriere della Sera, the photo-
graph is interpreted as a sort of violation of the secrecy and sacredness of
the body. In fact, the journalist stresses that Moro «has a very strong sense
of privacy. He never took off his jacket in public: the picture that shows
him in a shirt already seems a sort of violation, the only pictures of him in
a bathrobe, swimsuit or sweater are those of holidays stolen with a long
lens; clothes are his natural way of presenting himself.»129 The photograph
is portrayed as profanation of the political figure of Moro, of his public im-
age, through which he is exposed in his nakedness. Nevertheless,
Tornabuoni expresses optimism when she writes that «in prison, if he is
left in mental and physical integrity, he can hardly suffer self-deception. In
addition to the aid that can give him his religious faith, it is more likely
that his powerful Superego will be even strengthened and stimulated by
his consciousness of being in an extraordinary situation, by the conviction
of the importance that his behavior can have for Christian Democracy and
for the Country, by the proud challenge of living up to his self-vision, fac-
ing the toughest ordeal.»130 Moro’s psyche and body, his religious faith and
his condition in captivity, his inner convictions and the exceptionality of
127 La Stampa, «Emozione, speranza alla sede della DC. Zaccagnini: Moro ne esce
esaltato», 19.3.1978, 3; it.: «Se le Brigate rosse fossero soggetti ragionevoli sareb-
bero annientate da questa immagine, dalla nobiltà di chi vi è ritratto, dalla sua
malinconica ironia, dalla sua non occultabile e straordinaria intelligenza.»
128 La Stampa, «Emozione, speranza alla sede della DC. Zaccagnini: Moro ne esce
esaltato», 19.3.1978, 3; «Mi pare che sia una esaltazione della DC, della sua fun-
zione, e un esaltazione della figura politica e morale di Moro.»
129 Tornabuoni, Lietta, «Nelle mani delle BR un prigioniero fragile e fortissimo»,
Corriere della Sera, 24.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…] ha un senso molto forte della riservatez-
za. Non si è mai tolto la giacca in pubblico: la fotografia che lo mostra in cami-
cia è già sembrata una sorta di violazione, le sue uniche immagini in accappa-
toio, in costume da bagno o in maglione sono quelle delle vacanze rubate con il
teleobbiettivo; i vestiti sono il suo naturale modo di presentarsi.»
130 Tornabuoni, Lietta, «Nelle mani delle BR un prigioniero fragile e fortissimo»,
Corriere della Sera, 24.3.1978, 1; it.: «Nella prigionia, se gli è lasciata la padronan-
za mentale e integrità fisica, difficilmente Moro può soffrire di smarrimento di
sé. Oltre all’aiuto che può dargli la sua fede religiosa, è più probabile che il suo
fortissimo Superego risulti ancora rafforzato e stimolato dalla coscienza di
trovarsi in una situazione straordinaria, dalla convinzione dell’importanza che il
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being reduced to a mere bodily presence will thus allow him to resist for
the good of the country. Though not explicitly mentioned, the rhetoric
used leaves little doubt as to what the «toughest ordeal» is: Aldo Moro will
have to live up to the figure from which his party takes its name: as Christ
on the cross, he will have to face the ordeal of death. Tornabuoni implicitly
says what Gustavo Selva and Eugenio Marcucci, in a chronicle of Moro’s
55-day imprisonment published in May 1978, explicitly say in the section
on Easter Day:
It is a bitter Easter: the tragedy of Moro […] is a symbolic expression of
the condition in which we find our country. After the sacrifice of five
servants of the State […] the most prestigious and best-known political
leader of Italy is spending Easter in a ‹prison of the people› […]. Aldo
Moro will be able to revive with his religious faith the meaning of the
Resurrection, a symbol of peace and real liberation even in this terrible
ordeal.131
The newspaper that made the most use of the prefiguration of Christology
to represent and narrate the captivity of Moro was Il Popolo. On March 21,
on page five the newspaper published several interventions by Catholic in-
tellectuals under the overall title «The Courage to Say ‹No› to Violence—
The Strength of Reason». In an article accompanying these interventions,
journalist Alfredo Vinciguerra argued that «the wave of violence» in Italy
was caused by nihilism, the Feuerbachian conception of mankind, the log-
ic and anthropology of Darwinism and Marxism. To «save the country»,
the author continued, a secular «sense of duty» would not be enough, since
a «new religious sense of life» was needed; indeed, «only a sense of moral
order based on the religious, sacred meaning of things and life excludes
opportunities for dealing with the cancerous reasons for violence.»132 The
interventions by Catholic intellectuals echoed the article and described
suo comportamento può avere per la Democrazia cristiana e per il Paese, dalla
sfida orgogliosa di mostrarsi all’altezza della propria idea di sé nell’affrontare la
prova più difficile.»
131 Selva/Marcucci 1978, 33; it.: «È una pasqua amara: la tragedia di Moro […] è
un’espressione emblematica della condizione in cui si trova il nostro paese.
Dopo il sacrificio di cinque servitori dello Stato […] il leader politico più presti-
gioso e più noto d’Italia trascorre la pasqua in una ‹prigione del popolo› […].
Aldo Moro saprà rivivere con la sua fede religiosa il significato della Resur-
rezione, simbolo di pace e di reale liberazione anche in questa terribile prova.»
132 Vinciguerra, Alfredo, «Le mani armate di cuori disarmati», Il Popolo, 21.3.1978,
5; it.: «C’è da chiedersi […] se possa bastare ‹un nuovo senso del dovere› a salvare
questo Paese […], o se non sia necessario soprattutto un nuovo senso religioso
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Moro as the spiritual leader of this religious conception of life and the
world. Leone Piccioni, professor of contemporary literature at the Universi-
ty of Rome, wrote that «the serene and firm face of Moro is the symbol of
the truth of the Christian message and the freedom that he witnesses»,
while Romolo Pietrobelli, then National President of Azione Cattolica, ar-
gued for the necessity of being «able to re-emerge with force and sacrifice
for a reconstruction [of the values that are at the bottom of civil conscious-
ness], which are increasingly needed: the civil values of freedom, democ-
racy, consistency, tolerance, discretion, that in Aldo Moro, as they are in a
few believing politicians, are accompanied by a deep Christian inspira-
tion.» But the most interesting intervention was that of Francesco Grisi,
President of the Italian Writers Free Trade Union, who wrote that
[…] our choice is that the State cannot negotiate with the BR. The
painful eventual death of Moro, killed by the BR, signifies the everlast-
ing quality of his testimony in the golden dawn of liberty. Often, im-
molation precedes the resurrection of the truth. […] Maybe for Moro
there is, yes, the problem of the Communist Party but, above all, there
is the problem of the communion of the saints. The discourse is meta-
physical, theological, even if it is apparently political and constitution-
al. In this sense, Moro is a Pascalian intellectual in the line of an out-
datedness [inattualità] of history. It seems strange that the man who is
most involved in our history in Italy is actually the most ‹disen-
gaged›.133
In this article, Moro is already operating in a metaphysical and metahistor-
cial sphere: his anticipated death is transcended into a vague absolute truth
and functions as a sort of rite of passage from the early world to the commu-
della vita […]. Solo un ordine morale fondato sul senso religioso, sacrale, delle
cose e della vita esclude ogni possibilità di appiglio alle cancerose ragioni della
violenza.»
133 Grisi, Francesco, «La figura di Moro va al di là del rapporto con la cronaca: il
suo discorso è metafisico e teologico», Il Popolo, 21.3.1978, 5; it.: «[…] la nostra
scelta è che lo Stato non può trattare con i brigatisti rossi. La dolorosa eventuale
morte di Moro ucciso dai brigatisti significa la sua perennità di testimonianza
nell’albo d’oro della libertà. Spesso la immolazione precede la risurrezione nella
verità. […] Forse per Moro c’è si il problema del partito comunista ma c’è il
problema, soprattutto della comunione dei santi. Il discorso è metafisico, teo-
logico, anche se apparentemente sembra politico e costituzionale. In questo sen-
so, Moro è un intellettuale pascaliano nella linea di una inattualità della storia.
Sembra strano che l’uomo che è più impegnato nella nostra storia in Italia sia
l’uomo più ‹disimpegnato›.»
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nity of the saints in paradise. Here Moro is, therefore, already represented
as a homo sacer, as someone who, despite still living, is excluded from the
sphere of human life and has already begun to participate in the sacred
sphere of the community of saints. Moro is already a martyr: the only
thing missing to make his martyrdom definitive is the «immolation» that
precedes the «resurrection of the truth». Moro is symbolically already in
the sacred sphere, but his body is materially still present in the physical,
profane world. In order to complete the process from the profane to the
sacred, only one thing is missing: he must be killed.
The event’s prefiguration as a passion reached its peak on Easter Day. On
page four, the Corriere della Sera summed up the period of time that had
elapsed since the day of the kidnapping in an article titled «Ten Historical
Days of Passion».134 In this article, it is not so much the terminology nor
the rhetorical formulas (except for the title), but rather its structuration in
ten sections, summarizing the ten days since the attack in via Fani, which
seems to tacitly evoke the idea of a sort of Via Crucis of Moro. However,
rhetorical excess is achieved in another article by the writer, playwright
and art critic Giovanni Testori, which was published on the first page of
the same newspaper. Although there is no explicit reference to the abduc-
tion of Aldo Moro, the event is clearly the hidden fulcrum on which each
phrase and word rotates:
These are the dull, scorching days of hatred; days without visions and
without light in the darkness; they are also the days of indifference,
which fill the most arid and most disgraceful filth with hatred and
darkness. […] The more the dark [buio] and darkness [tenebra] in-
crease, the more a society blinded by the chains of profit and, together,
by the chains of the private matter of God increase and multiply the
impetus towards that indifference; as if profit and material, capitalist
secularism and Marxist secularism could not offer to the dark [buio]
and darkness [tenebra] an answer other than their total elusion. […]
What I am trying to say is certainly against the possibility that we will
find the strength to pronounce the word we need most. […] When
will we decide to break the chains and to lift the slab of the tomb
where we persist in being closed? Hope: this is […] the word that
weeps most under our elusions and our abdications. […] The difficulty
lies in accepting it, in taking it, in bringing it to light, in letting it in-
134 Martinelli, Sergio, «Dieci storici giorni di passione», Corriere della Sera,
26.3.1978, 4.
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vade us all and entirely. Then from its derelict and moaning tremor,
like that of someone who has been forgotten for a long time, [hope]
will increase, grow in us and with us, and it will be like the banner
that one day rose from the grave where the crucified Son of Man was
closed. […] At a certain point in history, Calvary is no longer nego-
tiable; […] to ascend it with the hope and love is necessary so that
peace and justice will be revealed in the end […], it is necessary to not
abdicate, but to put our life in relation to the supreme Otherness that
we have wrecked, insulted and on which we have spat, and that, de-
spite everything and [passing] through the pain, still dare to call us
with the words, tears and moanings of betrayed and forgotten righ-
teousness, hope and love.135
More than an article from an independent newspaper in 1978, this text ap-
pears at times to be an apocryphal of the New Testament. The use of oppo-
sitional metaphors such as light and darkness recalls to mind some pas-
sages of the First Epistle of John, the fourth of the Catholic epistles, in
which the author reminded his addressees that Jesus Christ «is the atoning
sacrifice for our sins» (1 John 2:2), that «whoever claims to live in him
135 Testori, Giovanni, «Il bisogno della speranza», Corriere della Sera, 26.3.1978, 1-2;
it.: «Sono i giorni cupi e roventi dell’odio; i giorni senza sguardi e senza luce
nelle tenebre; sono altresì i giorni dell’indifferenza che, dell’odio e delle tenebre,
risulta la filiazione più arida e più turpe. […] Più il buio e le tenebre aumen-
tano, più una società accecata dalle catene del profitto e, insieme, dalle catene
della materia privata di Dio accresce e moltiplica le spinte verso quella indif-
ferenza; come se profitto e materia, laicità capitalista e laicità marxista non
sapessero offrire al buio e alle tenebre altra risposta che la loro totale elusione.
[…] Quello che sto cercando di dire va certo contro la possibilità che si trovi la
forza di pronunciare la parola di cui abbiamo più bisogno. […] Fino a quando
non ci decideremo anche noi a rompere le catene e a sollevare la lastra del sepol-
cro in cui ci ostiniamo a star chiusi? La speranza; è questa […] la parola che più
piange sotto le nostre elusioni e le nostre abdicazioni. […] La difficoltà sta
nell’accettarla, nell’assumerla, nel portarla alla luce, nel lasciarsene investire tutti
e interi. Allora dal suo tremito belante e derelitto, come di chi è stato troppo a
lungo dimenticato, essa balzerà, crescerà in noi e con noi e sarà come lo stendar-
do che, un giorno, s’è alzato dalla tomba dove era stato chiuso il figlio crocefisso
dell’Uomo. […] A un certo punto della storia, il calvario non è più rinviabile;
[…] per salirlo con la speranza e l’amore necessari affinché alla sua fine s’apra
quella pace e quella giustizia […], bisogna non abdicare, ma porre la nostra vita
in relazione a quella suprema Alterità che abbiamo sconciato, sputato e bestem-
miato e che, malgrado tutto, proprio attraverso il dolore, osa ancora chiamarci
con le parole, le lacrime e i belati della giustizia, della speranza e dell’amore tra-
diti e dimenticati.»
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must live as Jesus did» (1 John 2:6), that «darkness is passing and the true
light is already shining» and that «anyone who claims to be in the light but
hates a brother or sister is still in the darkness» (1 John 2:9). The text also
reminded readers that the apocalyptical time had already begun: «this is
the last hour, and as you have heard that the antichrist is coming, even
now many antichrists have come. This is how we know that it is the last
hour» (1 John 2:18). Christians know that they live in the last hour, be-
cause many antichrists are there, that is, those who deny that «Jesus is the
Messiah», that deny «the Father and the Son» (1 John 2:22). The text ex-
horted to «not love the world» (1 John 2:15) with earthly motives but to
love the Father and stresses that «anyone who loves God must also love
their brother and sister» (1 John 4:21). Similarly, Testori stressed that the
days of 1978 were «days of hatred». Testori’s antichrists are the liars who,
because of their «Marxist» or «capitalist secularism», are concerned only
with «profit» and «matter» and deny the «light» that comes from the cruci-
fied «Son of Man» (the expression appears 81 times in the Koine Greek of
the four Gospels). Days of hatred will come to an end, according to Testori,
only when people accept the necessity to live «in relation to the supreme
Otherness» and that «Calvary is no longer negotiable». One can hardly not
see here a tacit reference to the situation of Moro, who is exhorted to ac-
cept the Calvary that will open the doors to the realization of justice and
peace. Testori seems to implicitly say that in order to overcome the days of
hatred, one must not only live as Jesus, but also be willing to die like Jesus.
In an article published in Il Popolo, the Jesuit theologian and political sci-
entist Bartolomeo Sorge wrote explicitly what Testori had only alluded to.
In fact, the exhortation to accept martyrdom could hardly be more obvi-
ous:
The liberation and salvation of man are realized […] according to the
shocking logic of the Easter event. Christians of all ages bear witness to
it. Also today. […] Like Christ, they are destined to revive the world of
the mystery of a death that paradoxically leads to life […] of a self-sacri-
fice that even when it is the fruit of obstinate hate becomes a supreme
demonstration of love. […] ‹It is necessary that the Christ bear these
sufferings to enter into his glory› (Luke 24:26). So even today, in the
light of Easter, Christians learn what their destiny is. […] At this Easter
of 1978, we need to deepen this meaning of the death and resurrection
of Christ. […] One cannot help but suffer with those who weep for the
loss of five innocent lives, heroic victims of duty and of absurd bar-
barism. […] One cannot help but be worried about the fate of he who
is in the hands of unconscionable people, only craving, in the delirium
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of lucid madness, to trample and to deconsecrate the values of civic co-
existence, to humiliate the dignity of man, to dishearten the State. This
Easter reminds us that hatred is defeated at the start, because ‹the
Beast› has already been won by the One who is ‹the Strongest› (Luke
11:21). […] By virtue of the ‹power of resurrection›, suffering results in
an indomitable moral force […]. From proof comes the unity of con-
sciousness around the values that must be firmly defended—with life,
if necessary—so that the new world that has already begun grows in
justice and peace.136
Unlike the text by Testori, here the reference to the attack in via Fani and
Moro’s captivity is explicit. On the Easter Day of 1878, the author reminds
Christians that they are called to «bear witness» to «the death that paradox-
ically leads to life». One can be worried about the situation of Moro but,
after all, in the light of Easter Day Christians should know «what their des-
tiny is». So should Moro who, as a Christian, do nothing but accept that
his destiny is to sacrifice his life for the defense of «the new world that has
already begun». It is the world in which the state guarantees and enables
civic coexistence and the «dignity of man». But, as the author argues, Chris-
tians should not fear this destiny, because they know that «the Beast» has
already been defeated. The text does not specify who is «the Beast» and
who is «the Strongest», but given the analogical construction, it seems clear
136 Sorge S.J., Bartolomeo, «Potenza della Risurrezione», Il Popolo, 26.3.1978, 1; it.:
«La liberazione e la salvezza dell’uomo si realizzano […] secondo la logica scon-
volgente dell’evento pasquale. I cristiani di ogni tempo ne rendono testimonian-
za. Anche oggi. […] Come Cristo, essi sono destinati a far rivivere dinanzi al
mondo il mistero di una morte che paradossalmente porta alla vita, […] d’un
sacrificio di sé che anche quando è frutto d’un odio lucido e ostinato si trasfor-
ma in una prova suprema d’amore. […] ‹Bisogna che il Cristo sopportasse queste
sofferenze per entrare nella sua gloria› (Lc 24.26). Così, anche ai giorni nostri,
nella luce di Pasqua il cristiano apprende qual è il suo destino. […] In questa
Pasqua 1978 abbiamo particolare bisogno di approfondire questo significato del-
la morte e della resurrezione di Cristo. […] Non si può non soffrire con chi pi-
ange cinque vite innocenti, vittime eroiche del dovere e d’una barbarie assurda.
[…] Non si può non trepidare per la sorte di chi è in mano di gente senza co-
scienza, bramosa soltanto, nel delirio d’una lucida pazzia, di calpestare e di dis-
sacrare i valori d’ogni convivenza civile, di umiliare la dignità dell’uomo, di
avvilire lo Stato. Il ritorno di Pasqua ci ricorda […] che l’odio è sconfitto in
partenza, perché ‹la Bestia› è già stata vinta da Colui che è il ‹Più-Forte› (cfr. Lc
11, 21). […] In virtù della ‹potenza della risurrezione›, la sofferenza si traduce in
forza morale indomabile […]. Dalla prova nasce l’unità delle coscienze rette in-
torno ai valori che è necessario difendere con fermezza – con la vita, se occorre –
affinché il nuovo mondo, che è già iniziato, cresca nella giustizia e nella pace.»
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who assumes these roles in 1978: the BR are «the Beast», while the Italian
State is «the Strongest». The author therefore proposes a sort of theologi-
cal–political reading of the events through which the BR/Italian State con-
flict assumes a metaphysical connotation. In the thinking of Carl Schmitt,
the Leviathan-state is understood as an absolutely necessary entity to
counter the Behemoth-Beast, a satanic and demonic force whose purpose is
to destroy society and civil coexistence, to annihilate human dignity and to
realize a state of perpetual civil war, of war of all against all.137 Only within
this mythological and theological–political framework can the death of Al-
do Moro appear as absolutely necessary, since his salvation, which could
only be achieved by negotiation with «the Beast», would amount to a de-
feat for the Italian State and a victory for anarchic chaos. Through the use
of martyrological prefiguration, the author makes such death appear to be
bearable, if not desirable, even for the one who has to die because it is
death that paradoxically leads to life.
We have seen so far how, even in the first 10 days after his abduction, a
transformation of Moro’s image began, through which he was more and
more removed from the profane sphere of life and history. Aldo Moro was
stylized as the symbol of a nation wounded and threatened by a gang of
crazy assassins, beasts and/or fanatics. The conflict between the BR and the
Italian State was represented as a perpetual war between good and evil. His
imprisonment was prefigured as a passion, which would lead to the salva-
tion of the Italian State and with it of the Italian society. Such representa-
tions, as I will discuss in the next chapter, were intrinsically linked to the
attempt to justify the line of firmness. The argument that negotiations
with the BR would endanger the institutions and national security alone
would not have been enough to make Moro’s death acceptable. It was nec-
essary to make Moro’s sacrifice appear not only as inevitable and necessary,
as an event that was part of the divine plan, but as a voluntary decision by
Moro himself. But at the end of March 1978, something happened that se-
riously questioned this kind of representation: the BR issued Aldo Moro’s
first letter, in which the Christian Democrat politician expressed his prefer-
ence for negotiation and rejected the «line of firmness». The anti-martyr’s
137 See Schmitt 1996, 21–22: «According to Hobbes, the quintessential nature of
the state of nature, or the behemoth, is none other than civil war, which can on-
ly be prevented by the overarching might of the state, or the leviathan. It follows
that one of the monsters, the leviathan ‹state›, continuously holds down the oth-
er monster, the behemoth ‹revolutionary people›. […] the leviathan is ‹the only
corrective› for the behemoth. The absolutism of the state is, accordingly, the op-
pressor of irrepressible chaos inherent in man.»
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voice went against all expectations, requiring a new rhetorical and discur-
sive approach, a new strategy of representation.
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Moro’s Voice and its Annihilation
Sanctity of Human Life
On March 16, several social actors had already taken a stand against the
possibility of undertaking negotiations for the release of Moro, thus form-
ing what was called the «party of firmness». Their refusal was immediate,
despite the absence of any mention of negotiations in the communiqué of
the Red Brigades (BR) in which they claimed responsibility for the attack.
On March 17, the director of the Italian second national radio station Gus-
tavo Selva reported that «Carlo Donat-Cattin [then vice-secretary of the
Christian Democracy (DC)] […] has justly said that no blackmail could or
would be accepted from the BR.»1 The following day, in a meeting of the
leadership of the DC, the position of the party in case of a negotiation re-
quest was discussed. The nearly unanimous decision of the party was nega-
tive. Interviewed by the Corriere della Sera, the Christian Democrat Luigi
Granelli said that «it is clear that there are fundamental values on which
we can only be inflexible. And there is, on the other hand, the salvation of
a human life that is always unrenounceable. How to reconcile these two re-
quirements depends on the circumstances in which this eventuality should
be configured.»2 Thus, as early as in the immediate aftermath of the via
Fani attack, the situation is described in terms of a moral dilemma, in
which the state has to decide between fundamental values and the salvation
of human life. Although Granelli seemed to be considering it possible to
find a line of action that could reconcile the defense of both values (the
values of the state and the value of human life), the party majority had al-
ready decided that the «sense of the state» had to prevail. The Italian Com-
munist Party (PCI) also immediately took on an uncompromising pos-
ition, as is exemplified by all the editorials of L’Unità published from
March 27 onwards during the duration of Moro’s imprisonment. The
6
6.1
1 Quoted in Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 129.
2 Russo, Giovanna, «La direzione Dc discute la linea da tenere nel caso di un ricatto»,
Corriere della Sera, 18.3.1978, 2; it.: «È chiaro che ci sono valori fondamentali su cui
non si può che essere inflessibili e c’è, dall’altra parte, la salvezza di una vita umana
che è sempre un dovere irrinunciabile. Come conciliare queste due esigenze
dipende dalle circostanze in cui questa eventuale ipotesi dovesse configurarsi.»
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Communists, who for the first time after thirty years felt part of the gov-
ernment and not the opposition, all wanted to prove that they could be a
legitimate government party and willing to defend the state from its ene-
mies. They also felt compelled to distance themselves from the BR to avoid
being accused of being too indulgent with those who referred to the same
or similar cultural and ideological backgrounds.3
In the first communiqué issued on March 18 and published by newspa-
pers the day after, the BR made no reference to the possibility of an ex-
change of prisoners and wrote that their goal was to «unify the revolution-
ary movement» and to try Aldo Moro, «the political godfather and the
most faithful performer of the directives imparted by imperialist powers.»4
The absence of a request for the exchange of prisoners resulted, halting for
a short period of time the debate on the question of firmness and negotia-
tion. On the day of the communiqué’s publication, Gianfranco Piazzesi
wrote that «the Christian Democrats will not be subjected to the harsh
dilemma between the protection of the dignity of the State and the death
of its leader.»5 In the following days, the media debate focused mainly on
the question of what the BR wanted to achieve with the so-called «people’s
trial». One of the founders of the organization, Renato Curcio, in the
courtroom of the Torino trial said that «the trial will be held, and very seri-
ously, somewhere else. […] We will try the entire DC. Moro is in the hands
of the proletariat.»6 Curcio summarized what the members of the strategic
direction of the BR wrote in the first communiqué: since the bourgeois
state was illegitimate, the Torino trial was a farce; the real trial would be
held in the «people’s prison». The response of political parties and of the
established media was to immediately discredit this trial as a farce too. Al-
most all newspapers printed the word «trial» in quotation marks every
time they referred to the trial in the «people’s prison». As Wagner-Pacifici
notes, «the Torino trial and Moro’s ‹people’s prison› trial confronted each
other as mirror images. […] By reciprocally denying reality to each other,
these protagonists were asserting their claim to be the only legitimate au-
thority. […] The simultaneity of these two major trials was noted and ex-
3 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 132–133; Giovagnoli 2009, 87–88.
4 Brigate Rosse 1978a, 34–35; it.: «[…] unificare il movimento rivoluzionario […].
[…] il padrino politico e l’esecutore più fedele delle direttive impartite dalle cen-
trali imperialiste.»
5 Piazzesi, Gianfranco, «Stoica dignità», Corriere della Sera, 19.3.1978. 1; it.: «[…] i
notabili democristiani non saranno sottoposti al duro dilemma fra la tutela della
dignità dello Stato e la morte del proprio leader.»
6 Quoted in Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 242.
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ploited by the press as the constant comparative assessments bolstered the
no-negotiators case».7
The problem of the exchange of prisoners and with it of the declared in-
compatibility of the «reason of state» with the possibility of negotiating for
the salvation of Aldo Moro began to be discussed again in the media in the
final days of March, when the BR began to deliver letters written by Aldo
Moro. During his kidnapping, Moro wrote at least 97 messages in letters,
last wills and notes. As reconstructed by historian Miguel Gotor, these
texts became public at three different moments, within 12 years. The first
part of the letters became public during his 55 days of imprisonment;8 a
second part was discovered in a BR hideout on October 1, 1978, in via
Monte Nevoso in Milan by the special antiterrorist nucleus led by General
Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa; finally a third part was casually discovered on
October 9, 1990, behind a panel of chalk by a worker during some of the
renovations of the house in the same apartment where the previous find-
ing had taken place.9 In the hideout in via Monte Nevoso, a set of texts and
notes written by Moro containing the answers to the interrogation to
which he was subjected by the kidnappers, as well as a series of reflections
on the last thirty years of Italian history was also found. Researchers and
journalists refer to such writings with the programmatic name «Memori-
al». Several studies have been carried out on the texts written by Moro dur-
ing his imprisonment, and many perplexities have been expressed, though
7 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 240.
8 Twenty-six letters were definitely delivered by the BR during Moro’s 55 days of im-
prisonment. Sixteen were addressed to political and institutional personalities. One
letter was addressed collectively to the DC. The Democratic Christian politician
also wrote a letter to Paul VI, which was delivered to the Vatican on April 20, 1978,
and made public by Giulio Andreotti on May 23, 1980. Aldo Moro also sent eight
letters to his wife Eleonora, which were published for the first time in 1979 in the
book L’intelligenza e gli avvenimenti by the Aldo Moro Foundation, and one to
Nicola Rana, Moro’s university assistant and collaborator from 1955 on. According
to Gotor, two other letters, of which the originals are still missing, were certainly
delivered because Moro’s wife recalls having them in her hands: these are the letters
to Luigi Cottafavi, head of the UN’s representation for Europe in Geneva and UN
Deputy Secretary-General, and that to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.
Thus, according to Miguel Gotor, the letters delivered by the brigades rise to twen-
ty-eight. There are also at least eight letters, which Gotor believes were successfully
delivered, despite the fact that recipients have always denied it. See Gotor 2008b,
223–235.
9 See Gotor 2008a, xix-xx.
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not yet fully clarified, on the circumstances in which they were discov-
ered.10 In this study, I do not treat the issue of the discovery of the letters
and the so-called «Memorial»; instead, I focus specifically on the eight let-
ters published during Moro’s imprisonment.11
The first of Moro’s letters, addressed to Interior Minister Cossiga, be-
came public on March 30, 14 days after the attack in via Fani. The letter
was accompanied by the third communiqué, in which the BR wrote that
«the practice of revolutionary violence is the only policy that has the real
chance to challenge and resolve the antagonistic contradiction that oppos-
10 See Arlati/Magosso 2003; Barbagallo 2008; Bocca 1978; Flamigni 1997; Gotor
2008b; Gotor 2011; Di Sivo 2013.
11 The letters published during the 55 days of Moro’s sequestration are the follow-
ing. The first letter was delivered to the addressee Francesco Cossiga, Interior Mi-
nister, on March 29 and published on March 30. The BR submitted the photo-
copy of the manuscript to the following newspapers: Il Messaggiero, Radio Onda
Rossa, Corriere della Sera, Secolo XIX, and Gazzetta del Popolo. The second letter, ad-
dressed to Benigno Zaccagnini, Secretary of the DC, was delivered to Nicola
Rana (a colleague of Aldo Moro) on April 4 and published on April 5. The BR
submitted the photocopy of the manuscript, along with their fourth commu-
niqué and the «Risoluzione della Direzione Strategica delle Brigate Rosse», to the
Italian news Agency ANSA and to the newspapers La Repubblica, Secolo XIX, Il
Lavoro, Il Messaggero, La Stampa and Gazzetta del Popolo. The third letter was deliv-
ered on April 10 and published on April 11. It addressed Paolo Emilio Taviani;
however, the Christian Democrat Senator was not really the recipient of the letter
but the person to whom the considerations made by Moro in the interrogation
are addressed. This is a sort of report given by the prisoner during the interroga-
tions, the only part of the so-called «Memorial» that the BR divulged during and
after the capture of Moro. The terrorists provided a photocopy of the manuscript
attached to their fifth communiqué to the newspapers La Repubblica, Il Messagero
and La Stampa. The fourth letter was delivered to the addressee Benigno Za-
ccagnini on April 19 and published April 22 in La Repubblica. The fifth letter was
found, following an anonymous call, by the editor of the afternoon newspaper
Vita sera, together with a copy of the eighth communiqué, on April 24 and pub-
lished on April 25. The sixth letter was delivered in April to Corrado Guerzoni
and Nicola Rana, who handed over a photocopy of the manuscript to Fabio Is-
man, a journalist from Il Messaggero, who published it on April 29. This letter
does not address a specific recipient, but the DC as a whole. The seventh letter
was delivered to the addressee Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Italian Socialist Par-
ty, on April 29 and published in the Corriere della Sera by the will of the recipient
on May 1. The eighth and last letter that was published during Moro’s captivity
was delivered to the President of the Italian Republic Giovanni Leone on April 29
and published on May 4 in the main Italian newspapers. See Moro 2008a; Bocca
1978.
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es the metropolitan proletariat and the imperialist bourgeoisie.»12 The BR
showed little interest in establishing a relationship with the institutions or
parties and argued that «the interrogation […] continues with the full co-
operation of the prisoner». Although, as they themselves wrote, the prison-
er had asked them if he could «write a secret letter», and they decided to
publish it, «since nothing is hidden from the people».13 Already in this let-
ter, Moro harshly criticized the line of firmness adopted by the ruling par-
ties, particularly by the DC, and proposed an alternative interpretation—
compared to what the newspapers wrote and what the BR probably al-
lowed him to read—of the «reason of state»:
It is out of the question—I was told with great clarity—that I am con-
sidered a political prisoner, subjected, as President of the Christian De-
mocracy, to a trial to ascertain my thirty-year responsibility […]. I have
to think that the serious charge that is being made against me is ad-
dressed to me as a qualified exponent of Christian Democracy as a
whole, in the management of its political line. All of us in the leading
group are involved in this and it is our collective action that is under
charge and for which I have to answer. In the circumstances described
above, beyond any humanitarian considerations, which also cannot be
ignored, the reason of State comes into play. Above all, this reason of
State in my case means […] that I am under a full and uncontrolled
domain, subjected to a popular trial […], that I am in this position
having all the knowledge and sensibilities that derive from long experi-
ence, with the risk of being called or induced to speak in a way that
may be unpleasant and dangerous in certain situations. Furthermore,
the doctrine that kidnapping must not profit [the kidnappers], […]
does not stand up in the political circumstances, where it causes incal-
culable and certain damage not only to the person but to the State.
The sacrifice of innocents in the name of an abstract principle of legali-
ty, while an undeniable state of necessity mandates saving them, is un-
acceptable. […] Let God enlighten you for the better, avoiding you get-
12 Brigate Rosse 1978b, 43; it.: «[…] la pratica della violenza rivoluzionaria è l’unica
politica che abbia la possibilità reale di affrontare e risolvere la contraddizione an-
tagonistica che oppone proletariato metropolitano e borghesia imperialista.»
13 Brigate Rosse 1978b, 42–43; it.: «[…] l’interrogatorio […] prosegue con la com-
pleta collaborazione del prigioniero. […] [Il prigioniero] ha chiesto di scrivere
una lettera segreta […]. Gli è stato concesso, ma siccome niente deve essere
nascosto al popolo ed è questo il nostro costume, la rendiamo pubblica.»
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ting bogged down in a painful episode, upon which many things
could depend.14
Moro’s message to Interior Minister Cossiga and to the government in gen-
eral is clear: if you do not work for my release, I may be forced to say
things, which could be dangerous for the state and its institutions.15 The
politician stressed that the trial did not concern his person in particular,
but the DC in general. Since the trial was about thirty years of government
with his own party in power, the «reason of state» came into play. Accord-
ing to Moro, it was in the interest of the state to work for his release, re-
14 Moro 2008b, 7-8; it.: «È fuori discussione – mi è stato detto con tutta chiarezza –
che sono considerato un prigioniero politico, sottoposto, come Presidente della
D.C., ad un processo diretto ad accertare le mie trentennali responsabilità […].
Devo pensare che il grave addebito che mi viene fatto, si rivolge a me in quanto
esponente qualificato della D.C. nel suo insieme nella gestione della sua linea po-
litica. In verità siamo tutti noi del gruppo dirigente che siamo chiamati in causa
ed è il nostro operato collettivo che è sotto accusa e di cui devo rispondere. Nelle
circostanze sopra descritte entra in gioco, al di là di ogni considerazione umani-
taria che pure non si può ignorare, la ragione di Stato. Soprattutto questa ragione
di Stato nel caso mio significa […] che io mi trovo sotto un dominio pieno ed
incontrollato, sottoposto ad un processo popolare […], che sono in questo stato
avendo tutte le conoscenze e sensibilità che derivano dalla lunga esperienza, con
il rischio di essere chiamato o indotto a parlare in maniera che potrebbe essere
sgradevole e pericolosa in determinate situazioni. Inoltre la dottrina per la quale
il rapimento non deve recare vantaggi, discutibile già nei casi comuni, dove il
danno del rapito è estremamente probabile, non regge in circostanze politiche,
dove si provocano danni sicuri e incalcolabili non solo alla persona, ma allo Sta-
to. Il sacrificio degli innocenti in nome di un astratto principio di legalità, men-
tre un indiscutibile stato di necessità dovrebbe indurre a salvarli, è inammissibile.
[…] Che Iddio vi illumini per il meglio, evitando che siate impantanati in un do-
loroso episodio, dal quale potrebbero dipendere molte cose.».
15 There was much discussion about what Moro could have revealed to his prison-
ers, especially concerning NATO-related secrets, and it has been hypothesized
that the interrogation of the prisoner aroused many concerns in the political class
about the military «secrets» that Moro could reveal. In fact, in the so-called
«Memorial» found in via Monte Nevoso, there is a note that could refer to Glad-
io, the Stay-behind NATO operation in Italy, which in 1978 was still secret and
whose existence became public only in 1990, when, just a few weeks after, the sec-
ond discovery of parts of the «Memorial» was revealed by Prime Minister Giulio
Andreotti (see Moro, 1997e). The BR, however, did not use Moro’s revelations
and said, posteriorly, that they were not able to appreciate the reference to this
topic. (see Moretti 2000, 159; Braghetti/Tavella 1998, 109). Their interests, how-
ever, were different and the main purpose of the interrogation seemed to be to
confirm the relationship between the so-called «Imperialist State of the Multina-
tionals» and the DC (see Giovagnoli 2009, 115–116).
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gardless of humanitarian considerations, that is, regardless of the value of
its personal life, because what he might say to the BR would seriously jeop-
ardize the DC and the Italian State. Here Moro’s argumentative strategy is
totally in line with his speech held in March 1977 in defense of Gui and
Tannassi: He appealed to interior minister Cossiga and other party repre-
sentatives to prevent his trial going ahead before the so-called people’s court,
in the same way as he had firmly opposed the trial in the squares of the two
former ministers. The Moro who wrote this letter was still the party’s and
state’s man, for which the trial of his person was equivalent to a trial of his
own party, which in turn was equivalent to a trial of the state. It is signifi-
cant that Moro, as he had said that Gui did not have to be a victim to im-
molate himself for the welfare of the party, warned the government and his
party not to sacrifice him in the name of an abstract principle of legality.16 In
other words, Moro drew attention to the scapegoat mechanism—the sacri-
fice of a single victim acting as a substitute for the (alleged) guilt of a col-
lective—and pointed to two reasons, one politico-juridical, the other
politico-ethical, for not allowing the mechanism to be realized: first, be-
cause the reason of state required negotiations for the liberation of the pris-
oner, since his revelations in an interrogation could have had negative con-
sequences for the party and the state and, secondly, because the state would
fail to fulfill its mandate to guarantee the life and wellbeing of a citizen,
especially if it was an innocent citizen. In this first letter, negotiations for
16 Legal arguments against the possibility of the exchange of prisoners had triggered
the debate on the question of firmness and negotiations since the first day of the
kidnapping. As early as on March 16, Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga and Mi-
nister of Justice Francesco Paolo Bonifacio immediately excluded the possibility
of an exchange. The press stressed that the existing legislative system did not leave
any discretion to the executive in granting bail to prisoners awaiting trial, such as
Curcio and other members of the BR under trial in Turin (see Conso, Giovanni,
«Scambio Moro-BR nonsenso giuridico», La Stampa, 20.3.1978, 2). In addition,
the judgment of the Court of Cassation in relation to the Sossi case (the magis-
trate Mario Sossi was kidnapped and then released by the BR in 1974; on this oc-
casion, the terrorists had requested, without success, the exchange of prisoners)
and the Legge reale of 1975 also precluded the judiciary from granting provisional
freedom in cases of serious crimes. The Minister of Justice had the power to sus-
pend the execution of the sentence, but only if the sentence was already definitive
and only under precise conditions provided for by law. In short, it was almost im-
possible to legally accept an exchange request without a specific legislative inter-
vention to change standards. It is likely that Aldo Moro came to know or imag-
ined that this kind of argument would have been brought in favor of the line of
firmness, and for this reason he warned Cossiga not to insist on «abstract princi-
ples of legality» (see Giovagnoli 2009, 88).
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Moro’s liberation are described as the only way to guarantee the wellbeing
of both the collective and the individual.
The argumentative strategy remained largely the same in the second let-
ter that became public, on April 5, which was addressed to Benigno Za-
ccagnini. Here Moro warned the Secretary of the DC to «assume the re-
sponsibilities that are both individual and collective», reinforced his status
as a «political prisoner» and urged the party not to discuss in terms of «ab-
stract law (though there are norms about the state of necessity) but on a
level of human and political openness, if it is not possible with realism to
give the only possible positive solution to my situation, proposing the lib-
eration of prisoners on both sides, attenuating to the attention in the con-
text of a political phenomenon.»17 Otherwise, he added, «the inevitable
consequences will fall on the Party and the people.»18 The prisoner stressed
once more that he was being charged for responsibilities that should be
shared collectively by the whole party. He again emphasized the necessity
of a human and political solution and drew attention to the state of necessi-
ty, provided for by the Italian criminal code Art. 54, according to which a
person should not be held liable for his or her actions, in relation to a
crime that was committed to save himself or herself or others from actual
danger of serious injury.19
The first two letters undoubtedly had some content written on the indi-
cations of the terrorists, and revealed a situation of partial and distorted in-
formation about what was happening outside the prison, a situation in
which Moro depended on how much the BR wanted to communicate with
him. They cannot be considered devoid of his specific intentions. As the
historian Guido Formigoni writes, Moro was convinced that «his abduc-
tion had drastically crushed the state’s order and that only his release could
have healed the wound, while a rigid refusal of contacts would simply rep-
17 Moro 2008c, 13-14; it.: «[…] assumere le responsabilità che sono ad un tempo in-
dividuali e collettive […]. Sono un prigioniero politico. […] Si discute qui, non
in astratto diritto (benché vi siano le norme sullo stato di necessità), ma sul piano
dell’opportunità umana e politica, se non sia possibile dare con realismo alla mia
questione l’unica soluzione positiva possibile, prospettando la liberazione di pri-
gionieri di ambo le parti attenuando l’attenzione nel contesto proprio di un
fenomeno politico.»
18 Moro 2008c, 14; it.: «[…] le inevitabili conseguenze ricadranno sul Partito e sulle
persone.»
19 Article 54 of the Italian Criminal Code states: «Non è punibile chi ha commesso
il fatto per esservi stato costretto dalla necessità di salvare sé o altri dal pericolo
attuale di un danno grave alla persona, pericolo da lui non volontariamente
causato, né altrimenti evitabile, sempre che il fatto sia proporzionato al pericolo.»
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resent a formal defense of a fake order already failed. […] Certainly, the
idea that he ‹yielded› to the jailers in a human and anti-heroic attempt to
save his own life must be discarded […]. Simply, once again he […] tried to
conduct politics in the name of his ideals and his vision of things.»20 When
Moro wrote these letters, he could not have known that the BR would have
made them public and certainly could not have imagined with how much
monotony, unity and repetition most parts of the media, political parties
and various public personalities would react to his letters. From March 30
onwards, the process of depoliticizing Aldo Moro—the operation «Moro is
not Moro»—began.
On April 10, the BR published the fifth communiqué and the third «let-
ter» by Moro, which is actually to be considered a part of the «Memorial»,
in which the prisoner harshly criticized the Christian Democrat politician
and Senator Paolo Emilio Taviani. In fact, he had written a very angry pas-
sage about the former minister, who a few days earlier had publicly denied
that Moro himself, at the time of the kidnapping of the magistrate Mario
Sossi, had spoken against the refusal to engage in negotiations (in the letter
to Zaccagnini published on April 5, Moro had written that he had always
been in favor of negotiations and that he had said this to Taviani and Gui
during Sossi’s captivity). We thus know that, from a given moment on,
Moro was aware that some of his letters had become public. The BR want-
ed to demonstrate that the interrogation was proceeding and that the pris-
oner was making revelations and expressing judgments that could put the
government and the DC in serious difficulty.21 From this moment on, the
general perception was that Moro’s writings (the writings of the prisoner
during the trial and perhaps even any documents he had kept in the bags
which he had with him on the day of the kidnapping) could play an im-
portant role. These materials had become part of a complex form of man-
agement of the hostage: Moro and his writings became a «double
hostage».22 In the passage on Taviani, Moro again referred to both political
20 Formigoni 2016, 354.
21 See Formigoni 2016, 356.
22 According to Senator Giovanni Pellegrino, Chairman of the Commissione parla-
mentare d’inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione
dei responsabili delle stragi from 1996 to 2001, after the publication of the text on
Taviani «the institutional apparatuses, not only Italian, but also [of other] western
and eastern [countries], began to perceive that Moro was saying or could say
things of great interest to the BR. That is to say, when they understood that the
Red Brigades had a ‹double hostage› in their hands: Moro and the secrets he
knew» (Fasanella/Sestieri/Pellegrino 2000, 165; see also Gotor 2008b, 272).
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and humanitarian reasons for negotiations, and recalled that other coun-
tries had shown more «reasonable flexibility» in managing similar situa-
tions. Moro was questioning the reasons for Taviani’s denial and for such
inflexibility on the part of the government and the political parties, and
wondered if there was maybe foreign «influence»: «Is there an American
and German influence, perhaps, in keeping firm against me?»23
On April 15, the BR announced that the trial was over and that the pris-
oner had been sentenced to death. In the sixth communiqué, they declared
that Moro had said nothing that the «proletarians» did not already know.
This statement was probably only formal and aimed at causing a reaction
in the parties and among public opinion. However, the decision was prob-
ably communicated to the prisoner. During this time, he wrote a series of
letters, which were not published during his imprisonment, that were very
affectionate and addressed to family and friends. He instructed his wife,
Eleonora, to freely decide on the funeral honors and added: «Take care of
yourself and try to be as calm as you can. We will meet again. We will be
together again. We will be together in love again.»24
On April 17, Amnesty International issued a press release, reporting that
people close to Aldo Moro and his family had contacted the organization
and that it was willing to try to get in touch with the kidnappers to pave
the way for negotiations. Amnesty International reinforced its opposition
to the death penalty, arguing that executions for political coercion, both by
governments and by anyone else, are equally unacceptable.25 The Secretari-
at of the DC defined Amnesty International’s position very positively, stat-
ing that it had responded to the wish expressed by the party in the days be-
fore. Caritas Internationalis also took a similar position, saying it was avail-
able to intervene with its own humanitarian methods.
On April 18, a false communiqué announced the death of the DC leader
by «suicide», indicating the Lago della Duchessa (the Duchess Lake), in the
mountains of the province of Rieti, as the place where the body of Moro
could be found. Security forces made this false communiqué with the help
of a forger; it was a mise-en-scène constructed, according to some, to force
the BR to prove that the hostage was alive and, according to others, to test
23 Moro 2008e, 43; it.: «Vi è forse, nel tenere duro contro di me, un’indicazione
americana e tedesca?»
24 Moro 2008g, 63; it.: «Tu curati e cerca di essere più tranquilla che puoi. Ci rive-
dremo. Ci ritroveremo. Ci riameremo.»
25 See Imperi 2016, 92.
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the reactions that Moro’s death would produce among the public.26 Moro
himself, in a note in the «Memorial», described the fake communiqué and
the reaction of the media as a «big macabre edition on my execution.»27
On April 20, the BR published the seventh, and real, communiqué, in
which they accused «Andreotti and his accomplices» of the «macabre mise-
en-scène.»28 The communiqué was accompanied by the second Polaroid
photo, where Moro was pictured with a copy of the April 19 edition of La
Repubblica (see figure 4). In this communiqué, the kidnappers openly took
positions for the «liberation of Communist prisoners» for the first time,
presenting it as the only chance for Moro’s salvation, while also calling an
ultimatum of 48 hours.29
26 See Lofoco 2015, 99–102; Flamigni 1997, 38, 335; Manca 2008, 117; Biscione
2012, 59–60.
27 Moro 1997b, 319; it.: «[…] macabra grande edizione della mia esecuzione.» It is
interesting to note that in this brief text Moro criticized the Italian press and jour-
nalism in general, observing that the country was dominated by five or six news-
papers, which in the days of his captivity again demonstrated «how easy it is to
monopolize the market of opinions» [it: «[…] come sia facile chiudere il mercato
delle opinoni»].
28 Brigate Rosse 1978c, 126; it.: «[…] Andreotti e i suoi complici […] macabra messa
in scena.»
29 Brigate Rosse 1978c; it.: «[…] liberazione di prigionieri comunisti.»
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The Polaroid attached to the seventh communiqué of the Red
Brigades showing Aldo Moro with a copy of the newspaper La Re-
pubblica of April 19, 1978.
After the diffusion of the seventh communiqué, the debate on firmness vs.
negotiation flared up again, and a minority «party for negotiation» began
to oppose the «party of firmness». As early as on April 19, a group of peo-
PICTURE 4:
6.1 Sanctity of Human Life
259
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ple «close to the family» had written an appeal published in Lotta Contin-
ua, claiming that «every man has the right to life» and asking «a non-fideist
and fetishist defense of the […] prerogatives and functions» of the state.30
Among the many signatories there were leaders of Azione Cattolica, the As-
sociazioni Cristiane Lavoratori Italiani (ACLI) and the Federazione Universi-
taria Cattolica Italiana (FUCI), unionists, priests, some bishops, some left-
ists, Italian intellectuals such as Norberto Bobbio, foreign intellectuals
such as Heinrich Böll and Pauolo Freire, and theologians such as Marie-
Dominique Chenu and Jürgen Moltmann.31 On April 20, the Secretary of
the PSI spoke in favor of the negotiations. Moro himself considered the
position very important and wrote to Craxi and several other people in the
following days.32 He also wrote a second letter to the Pope (the first one
was written around April 8; though scholars believe it was delivered, it was
not disclosed during Moro’s captivity), asking him again to adopt a pos-
ition in favor of negotiations. This letter was not made public during Mo-
ro’s captivity.33
During those days, there were at least two attempts, which were however
destined to fail, to open negotiations with the BR. Paul VI initiated the
first attempt and, through his secretary Monsignor Pasquale Macchi, mobi-
lized all of the responsible prison chaplains to try and enter into contact
with the BR. The hypothesis was to offer a large sum of money, maybe 10
billion lire.34 Apparently, the government tolerated the initiative, since all
party leaders gave the green light to Andreotti.35 At some point, linking
this agreement with the possibility of exile for a member of the BR not yet
imprisoned was even hypothesized. However, the initiative failed because
of internal divisions in the Roman Curia and above all the inability to
build an effective channel of communication with the kidnappers.36 On
the morning of April 22, Radio Vaticana interrupted the programs to read
Paul VI’s appeal to the «men of the BR». A special edition of L’Osservatore
Romano published the passage of the appeal, in which the Pope asked the
BR to release Moro «simply, without conditions».37 According to some in-
30 Lotta Continua, «Un appello», 19.4.1978, 1; it.: «[…] per ogni uomo il diritto alla
vita […] una difesa non fideistica e feticista delle […] prerogative e funzioni.»
31 See Lotta Continua, «Le adesioni all’appello», 20.4.1978, 1.
32 See Formigoni 2016, 364–365.
33 See Moro 2008h, 68–69.
34 See Formigoni 2016, 364–365.
35 See Giovagnoli 2009, 137.
36 Forlani 2014.
37 Quoted in Imperi 2016, 108.
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terpretations, this formulation was added to the message, which the Pope
wrote straight off during the night, on the advice of the government and
especially of Andreotti. That Moro was aware of the Pope’s message is
demonstrated by a letter to his wife, delivered on May 5, in which he
wrote, in the certainty that he would soon die: «The Pope did ever so little;
perhaps he will feel guilty.»38 The second attempt to open negotiations was
initiated by some exponents of the Socialist Party along with the leaders of
Autonomia Operaia. The hypothesis was to make a «humanitarian act» of
state clemency for a detainee to pressurize the kidnappers into liberating
Moro. But this initiative was severely criticized by the press and representa-
tives of both the PCI and the DC.39
On the same day as the BR published their seventh communiqué, they
delivered three of Moro’s letters to Moro’s wife: one, already mentioned,
was adressed to the Pope, one to his wife and one to Zaccagnini. In the lat-
ter, which was published in the newspaper La Repubblica on April 22 as re-
quested by Moro, the prisoner radicalized his appeal:
Is it possible that you all agree on wanting my death for an alleged rea-
son of State as some lividly suggest, almost as a solution to all the
problems of the country? […] If this crime would come to pass, it
would open up a terrible spiral that you could not face. You would be
overwhelmed. It would open a rift with the humanitarian forces that
still exist in this Country. It would open, unmistakably, despite first ap-
pearances, a fracture in the party that you could not contain. […] I tell
you clearly: for my part, I will not absolve and I will not justify anyone.
[…] I remind you, and I remind all the political forces, that the Repub-
lican Constitution, as the first sign of novelty, has abolished the death
penalty. With your own inertia, insensitivity and blind respect for the
reason of State, by doing nothing to prevent [the death penalty], you
would reintroduce it, as a matter of fact, into our legislative system.
Here, in the democratic Italy of 1978, in Beccaria’s Italy, as in past cen-
turies, I am condemned to death. That the sentence is executed de-
pends on you. […] If you do not do something, it will be written as a
dreadful page in the history of Italy. My blood would fall on you, on
the party, the Country. […] May God enlighten you, dear Zaccagnini,
and enlighten the friends to whom I address a message of despair. Do
not think of the few cases in which it [the State] has done right [fol-
38 Moro 2008m, 178; it.: «Il Papa ha fatto pochino. Forse ne avrà scrupolo.»
39 See Formigoni 2016, 365; Silj 1978, 129–158.
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lowing the rules of law], but of the many resolved according to the
rules of humanity […]. If pity prevails, the Country is not finished.40
The crucial point in these statements is not so much the explicit and radi-
cal rejection of the line of firmness, but rather the fact that Moro himself
used an anti-sacrificial rhetoric, which was a sort of counterpart to the one
that emerged after his death. In his representation of the event—moreover,
of an event that had yet to happen!—the state was identified as the agent of
the sacrificial action. Moro here took the roles of a judge and of an accuser.
This line of conduct by the government and the ruling parties was judged
incompatible with the rules of humanity. The core of these values was, for
Moro, piety. Thus, in his letters a distinction and a rupture emerged be-
tween the legal, abstract principles of the state and another kind of higher
values. Only if the state gave up the former and accepted the latter would
the country be safe. According to the Christian Democrat politician, the
law could not be the foundation of the legitimacy of the Italian State, but
only the extra-legal, universal value of the sanctity of human life. Using the
formula «my blood shall be upon you», an evident allusion to the Bible—
Leviticus 20—Moro cursed all those who continued to support the line of
firmness. The sacrifice wanted by the government here becomes sacrilege,
an act that desacralizes and delegitimizes its political authority.
40 Moro 2008i, 72; it.: «È possibile che siate tutti d’accordo nel volere la mia morte
per una presunta ragion di Stato che qualcuno lividamente vi suggerisce, quasi a
soluzione di tutti i problemi del paese? […] Se questo crimine fosse perpetrato, si
aprirebbe una spirale terribile che voi non potreste fronteggiare. Ne sareste tra-
volti. Si aprirebbe una spaccatura con le forze umanitarie che ancora esistono in
questo Paese. Si aprirebbe, insanabile, malgrado le prime apparenze, una frattura
nel partito che non potreste dominare. […] Io lo dico chiaro: per parte mia non
assolverò e non giustificherò nessuno. […] Ricordate, e lo ricordino tutte le forze
politiche, che la Costituzione Repubblicana, come primo segno di novità, ha can-
cellato la pena di morte. Così, cari amici, la si verrebbe a reintrodurre, non facen-
do nulla per impedirla, facendo con la propria inerzia, insensibilità e rispetto
cieco della ragion di Stato che essa sia di nuovo, di fatto, nel nostro ordinamento.
Ecco, nell’Italia democratica del 1978, nell’Italia del Beccaria, come in secoli pas-
sati, io sono condannato a morte. Che la condanna sia eseguita, dipende da voi.
[…] Se voi non intervenite, sarebbe scritta una pagina agghiacciante nella storia
d’Italia. Il mio sangue ricadrebbe su voi, sul partito, sul Paese. […] Che Dio ti il-
lumini, caro Zaccagnini, ed illumini gli amici ai quali rivolgo un disperato mes-
saggio. Non pensare ai pochi casi nei quali si è andati avanti diritti, ma ai molti
risolti secondo le regole dell’umanità e perciò, pur nelle difficoltà della situ-
azione, in modo costruttivo. Se la pietà prevale, il Paese non è finito.»
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Moro was not the only one to refer to the sanctity of human life. In fact,
this «root paradigm» was also handpicked by the Socialist Party and the
various groups on the Italian radical left.41 Communists and Christian
Democrats also alluded to this value, when they gave their verbal approval
to actions they ambiguously referred to as «humanitarian initiatives» taken
to save Moro. But this approval was always followed by the specification
that nothing, not even the intrinsic value of Moro’s life, could cause the
government to give in to the request for negotiations. On the contrary, the
advocates of negotiations emphasized the relevance of the sanctity of hu-
man life by claiming that they were against any form of the death penalty.
Two days after the publication of the appeal for the liberation of Moro,
Lotta Continua reaffirmed its opposition to the line of firmness arguing
that
the killing of Aldo Moro is against all the reasons for the struggle in
which we are engaged. Because we are opposed to the death penalty,
wherever it is applied and however it is justified […]. Because we are
radically and irreducibly averse to this state, which in death, in war and
in fear seeks to force what it does not have, the authority it does not
have, the legitimacy that it does not have. […] Why has no newspaper
published the text of the appeal […]? […] Here is the paradox of a state
that, while delegating humanitarianism to the ‹operating institutions›
such as the Red Cross or Amnesty International, has no other concern
than that […] to hold the family of Aldo Moro hostage, to impose on
individual exponents the role of Abraham sacrificing Isaac.42
Like Moro, Lotta Continua described the line of firmness as a death sen-
tence, which transforms the people involved into sacrificers. The compari-
son with the sacrifice of Isaac has the function of highlighting the sacrile-
gious nature of the line of firmness. The state and the parliamentary par-
41 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 182.
42 Manetti, Clemente, «Scandalo e silenzi», Lotta Continua, 20.4.1978, 1; it.: «L’ucci-
sione di Aldo Moro è contro tutte le ragioni della lotta in cui siamo impegnati.
Perché siamo contro la pena di morte. Dovunque sia applicata e comunque venga
giustificata. […] Perché siamo radicalmente e irriducibilmente e avversi a questo
stato, che nella morte, nella guerra e nella paura cerca la forza che non ha, l’au-
torità che non ha, la legittimazione che non ha. […] Perché nessun giornale, nes-
suno, ha pubblicato il testo dell’appello […]? […] Qui sta il paradosso di uno sta-
to che, mentre delega l’umanitarismo alle ‹istituzioni addette› come la Croce
Rossa o Amnesty International, altra preoccupazione non ha se non quella […] di
tenere in ostaggio la famiglia di Aldo Moro, di imporre ai singoli esponenti il
ruolo di Abramo che sacrifica Isacco.»
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ties are considered illegitimate, because they did not act according to the
moral imperative that no life should be spent. The state, unlike God, is
willing to sacrifice one of its own children. Interestingly, one of the jour-
nalists from Lotta Continua demonstrated that he had perfectly understood
the mechanism of martyrological representation when he wrote that «in
Christian Democracy, a corpse is being sought to be martyred—the first
martyr of the party», adding further: «The BR […] should realize that [if
they kill Moro] they would only repeat an April 18, 1948.»43 The journalist
referred here to the elections of April 1948, when the DC gained extraordi-
nary electoral success. In other words, the journalist predicted that the pos-
sible killing of Moro would have had the effect of reinforcing the DC—
what actually happened in the administrative elections of May 14 and 15,
1978, less than a week after Moro’s death (by the way, we are again facing a
prefiguration, which in this case is twofold: on the one hand, there is the
analogy between Moro and Isaac and, on the other hand, between the po-
litical situation of April 18, 1948 and that of April 18, 1978). However, the
lucid analysis by the Lotta Continua journalist did not prevent Lucio Lom-
bardo Radice from declaring in L’Unità just three days later that since
Christian martyrs refused to save their lives by [refusing] to burn in-
cense in offering to divinized emperors; [similarly], citizens of the Free
Italian Republic […] cannot recognize the dignity and equality of in-
terlocutors to the enemies of their democratic institutions, in order to
avoid the Republic’s ruin.44
There is something bitterly ironic about a Communist declaring in a Com-
munist newspaper that the citizens of the Republic have to act similarly to
Christian martyrs, in order to defend the Republic. Especially when one
considers that Moro was transformed into a martyr of both the DC and the
Italian State and, above all, given that the one who was about to die, re-
fused to assume the role of a martyr. It is total confusion of languages.
On April 24 the BR issued their eighth communiqué in which they de-
manded the release of 13 detainees, including members of the terrorist
43 Lotta Continua, «In cerca di un martire», 18.4.1978, 1; it.: «Nella DC si cerca un
cadavere da rendere martire – il primo martire del partito», «Le BR […] si ren-
dano conto che non farebbero altro che ripetere un 18 aprile 1948.»
44 L’Unità, «Una dichiarazione di Lucio Lombardo Radice», 21.4.1978, 3; it.: «I mar-
tiri cristiani rifiutavano di salvare la loro vita bruciando incensi agli imperatori
divinizzati; I cittadini della libera Repubblica italiana […] non possono ri-
conoscere dignità e parità di interlocutori ai nemici delle loro istituzioni demo-
cratiche, proprio per non pagare il prezzo della rovina della Repubblica.»
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group XXII Ottobre, the founders of the BR and other members of the orga-
nization recently arrested and on trial in Turin. The communiqué clearly
stated that only the exchange of «political prisoners», «only an immediate
and positive response by the DC and its government, unequivocally given
and concretely implemented, will allow the release of Aldo Moro». It also
stressed that «humanitarian appeals» as well as the government’s attempt
to involve Caritas in possible mediation were useless.45 In short, what they
wanted was not money, not secret negotiations: what they sought most of
all was official recognition as a political organization with a legitimate
cause, and they understood the exchange of prisoners as a way of obtaining
this recognition: «the paradoxical situation of the BR was precisely what
they were depending upon, they were rejecting the illegitimate to bring
about their own legitimation.»46 When captured by the police, the BR
members always declared themselves political prisoners, as if they expected
that the relevant Geneva Conventions would apply to their cases. They
knew that in cases of a state negotiating with enemies the contending par-
ties usually appealed to the generally recognized laws of war, as provided
by the combined declarations of the various Geneva Conventions.47 The
paradox of the BR’s strategy thus resided in the fact that they wanted to
gain political recognition on the basis of international conventions signed
by states, which they considered illegitimate. They wanted the state to rec-
ognize the state of war and to treat the detained members of their organi-
zation as prisoners of war.
Along with the eighth communiqué, the BR issued a letter by Moro,
again addressed to Zaccagnini, which was published in many newspapers
on April 25. In this letter, Moro wrote that initiatives of «generic humani-
tarian character» served no purpose and that «politically the theme is not
that of human piety, but of the exchange of some prisoners of war (war or
guerrilla warfare, as you want), […] as highly civilized countries (almost
universally) do, where exchange is practiced not only for objective humani-
tarian reasons, but for the salvation of innocent human life.»48 For Moro,
therefore, the salvation of the individual was not a humanitarian issue
45 Brigate Rosse 1978d, 132; it.: «[…] prigionieri politici […] solo una risposta im-
mediata e positiva della DC e del suo Governo, andata senza equivoci, e concreta-
mente attuata potrà consentire il rilascio di Aldo Moro.»
46 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 154.
47 See Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 155–175.
48 Moro 2008j, 99; it.: «[…] generico carattere umanitario […] politicamente il tema
non è quello della pietà umana, pur così suggestiva, ma dello scambio di alcuni
prigionieri di guerra (guerra o guerriglia come si vuole), come si pratica in paesi
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(therefore, purely moral), but a political choice. The move touched on a
topic of important political philosophy, as he argued, the state had the task
of safeguarding an individual’s life. He thus tried to re-politicize his own
«bare life», to reintroduce it into the profane sphere of politics. We will
come back to this point later. As in the previous letter, Moro again as-
sumed the role of the judge, especially accusing, not to say cursing, the
DC:
I repeat: I will not absolve nor justify anyone. No political or moral
reason can push me to do so. […] Christian Democracy should not be-
lieve that its problem finishes with the elimination of Moro. I will still
be here as an irreducible point of contention and alternative, to pre-
vent others doing with Christian Democracy what is being done today.
For this reason, for an obvious incompatibility, I ask that neither State
authority nor party men participate in my funeral.49
These are the words of a man who had already come to know he would be
dead soon. Saying «I will still be here», Moro presented himself as a politi-
cal and moral authority who would survive his own death, an authority
that would be the reference point for generations to come. But it is not the
authority of a martyr who wants to be imitated; on the contrary, it is the
authority of someone who opposed a certain kind of hegemonic discourse,
of someone who has attempted to subvert a certain kind of representation
of the event and tried to offer an alternative kind of representation.
On April 29, Il Messaggero exclusively published a letter from Moro, this
time addressed to the DC as a whole. Here Moro seems to have already ac-
cepted that he will die. The text has the character of a testament:
[…] even with my many faults, I think I have lived with hidden gen-
erosity and fragile intentions. I die, if my party decides so, in the full-
ness of my Christian faith and in the immense love for an exemplary
family that I love and hope to watch from heaven. […] But this blood-
bath will not be good for Zaccagnini, nor for Andreotti, neither for
altamente civili (quasi la universalità), dove si scambia non solo per obbiettive ra-
gioni umanitarie, ma per la salvezza della vita umana innocente.»
49 Moro 2008j, 100; it.: «Ripeto: non assolverò e non giustificherò nessuno. Nessuna
ragione politica e morale mi potranno spingere a farlo. […] Non creda la D.C. di
avere chiuso il suo problema, liquidando Moro. Io ci sarò ancora come un punto
irriducibile di contestazione e di alternativa, per impedire che della D.C. si faccia
quello che se ne fa oggi. Per questa ragione, per una evidente incompatibilità,
chiedo che ai miei funerali né autorità di Stato né uomini di partito.»
6 Moro’s Voice and its Annihilation
266
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
the DC nor for the Country: each one will bear their own responsibili-
ty. I do not want around me, I repeat, the men of power. I want close
to me those who really loved me and will continue to love me and pray
for me. If all this is decided, God’s will will be done. But no one re-
sponsible can hide behind the fulfillment of an alleged duty. Things
will be clear, will all be clear soon.50
Here it is no longer the politician Aldo Moro who speaks, but the man and
the Christian Aldo Moro. He expresses his hope of getting to heaven and
repeats his last will with regard to his funeral. Power and love are the two
opposing metaphysical forces the prisoner seems to see at work in the
world: only one of them, he declares, has the right to participate in the rite
he hopes will lead him to the other world. In a letter that was not pub-
lished and was found only as a copy of a manuscript in October 1990, Mo-
ro wrote to his wife:
Dearest, I would like to have the faith that you and Grandma have, to
imagine the choirs of angels that will lead me from earth to heaven.
But I’m a lot cruder. I have only understood in these recent days what
it means to add our own suffering to the suffering of Jesus Christ for
the salvation of the world. And now, my sweetest bride, I embrace you
with all my heart and hold on to you with our beloved sons and
daughters, hoping to stay with you forever. A tender kiss, Aldo.51
This is the only explicit reference to the Passion of Christ that we can find
in the letters by Moro though, in another letter to his wife, Aldo Moro had
50 Moro 2008k, 143–144; it.: «[…] pur con le mie tante colpe, credo di avere vissuto
con generosità nascoste e delicate intenzioni. Muoio, se cosi decide il mio partito,
nella pienezza della mia fede cristiana e dell’amore immenso per una famiglia es-
emplare che io adoro e spero di vigilare dall’alto dei cieli. Ma questo bagno di
sangue non andrà bene né per Zaccagnini, né per Andreotti, né per la DC, né per
il Paese: ciascuno porterà la sua responsabilità. Io non desidero intorno a me, lo
ripeto, gli uomini del potere. Voglio vicino a me coloro che mi hanno amato
davvero e continueranno ad amarmi e pregare per me. Se tutto questo è deciso,
sia fatta la volontà di Dio. Ma nessun responsabile si nascondi dietro l’adempi-
mento di un presunto dovere. Le cose saranno chiare, saranno chiare presto.»
51 Moro 2008f, 60; it.: «Carissima, vorrei avere la fede che avete tu e la Nonna, per
immaginare i cori degli angeli che mi conducano dalla terra al cielo. Ma io sono
molto più rozzo. Ho solo capito in questi giorni che vuol dire che bisogna ag-
giungere la propria sofferenza alla sofferenza di Gesù Cristo per la salvezza del
mondo. […] Ed ora dolcissima sposa, ti abbraccio forte con tutto il cuore e
stringo con te i nostri figli e i nipoti amatissimi, sperando di restare con voi cosi
per sempre. Un tenerissimo bacio, Aldo.»
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already used the term «Calvary».52 Faced with an awareness of death, Aldo
Moro tried to make sense of the events through the prefiguration of the
Passion. Thus, even Moro was convinced, at some point, that it is necessary
to add our own suffering to the suffering of Jesus Christ. Does this imply that in
the end Aldo Moro agreed to assume the role of a martyr? Only if we could
ask him, could we give a definitive answer to that question. But one thing
is certain: if this is really a case of acceptance of martyrdom, it is certainly
not martyrdom for the state. In fact, Moro did not write that it is necessary
to suffer for the salvation of the Italian State, or of the Italian Republic, but
for the salvation of the world. If the concept of martyrdom here plays some
role then it is a concept that rejects any kind of theological–political instru-
mentalization.
Reduction to Bare Life
We have so far seen that Aldo Moro refused to adopt the role of state mar-
tyr. The Italian public became aware of that on March 30, when Moro’s
first letter was published, though he did not know it. As Wagner-Pacifici
notes, «many of the protagonists, including the Communists, the Christian
Democrats, the established mass media, and the Catholic church hierarchy,
would have preferred an eventual self-sacrifice on the part of Aldo Moro.
In this version, Moro would have recognized his symbolic destiny and will-
ingly have donned the martyr’s mantle.»53 This is exactly what many social
players wrote and hoped for before the publication of the first letter. But
from March 30 onwards, Moro’s voice from the «people’s prison» hindered
the martyrological representation and narrative, which until then had been
forming and consolidating itself smoothly. As we have seen, Moro had al-
ready been discursively excluded from the profane sphere of political life,
and his transition to the community of saints was considered only a matter
of time. Moro had already been consecrated, had already become homo sac-
er, and as such he could not return to life in the profane sphere of public
and political life. But the voice that rose from the «people’s prison» con-
trasted with this kind of representation, showing that Moro was not only
alive but still intent on participating in political life. At this point, it be-
came necessary to develop strategies that could undo that voice. Thus be-
6.2
52 Moro 2008d, 31.
53 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 218.
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gan the process of removing the public and political character of Aldo Mo-
ro.
On March 30, the newspapers seemed to all agree: the letter to Cossiga
was written under conditions of torture, under the effect of drugs, or both.
L’Unità wrote that the letter «comes from the bottom of a den, from the
darkness of a cell where a man with no chance of defense, isolated from
any contact that is not that of the kidnappers, in their complete mercy, has
been suffering a physical and psychological inhumane siege for days.»54
The following day, in the editorial of the same newspaper one could read
that
No one had any doubts. The letter by Moro […] was written in a state
of moral and physical constraint that removes any authenticity and
hence every meaning and value to things that are said [inside]. And
that is not the case only for yesterday’s correspondence […], it is also
true for other documents compiled with the same calligraphy that, un-
fortunately, we still have to expect from the kidnappers.55
The editorial of the Corriere della Sera argued similarly, asking rhetorically:
Who wrote this letter? Did Aldo Moro, president of the Christian De-
mocracy, statesman, the largest mediator and inspiration for Italian po-
litics, cautious strategist, write it? Or did Aldo Moro write it, but was
reduced to impotence by cruel imprisonment, isolated, perhaps
stunned in his own psychic control by drugs or something else?56
Newspapers began to distinguish between Moro the politician and Moro
the prisoner, as if they were not the same person. The Moro that wrote this
54 Gambescia, Paolo, «Una tragica lettera di Moro», L’Unità, 30.3.1978, 1; it.: «[…]
arriva dal fondo di un covo, dal buio di una cella dove un uomo senza possibilità
di difesa, isolato da qualsiasi contatto che non sia dei rapitori, in loro completa
balia, subisce ormai da giorni un assedio fisico e psicologico inumano.».
55 L’Unità, «Fermezza», 31.3.1978, 1; it.: «Nessuno ha avuto dubbi. La lettera di Mo-
ro […] è stata scritta in uno stato di costrizione morale e fisica tale da togliere og-
ni autenticità e quindi ogni significato e valore alle cose che vi si dicono all’inter-
no. E ciò non vale solo per il messaggio di ieri […], vale anche per altri documen-
ti compilati con la stessa calligrafia che, purtroppo, dobbiamo ancora aspettarci
dai rapitori.»
56 Corriere della Sera, «Ma la Repubblica non sarà mai loro prigioniera», 30.3.1978, 1;
it.: «Chi a scritto questa lettera? L’ha scritta Aldo Moro, presidente della DC,
statista, massimo mediatore e ispiratore della politica italiana, cauto stratega? O
l’ha scritta ancora Aldo Moro, ma ridotto all’impotenza da una crudele prigionia,
isolato, forse stordito da droghe o altro nel suo stesso controllo psichico?»
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letter could not have been the one that they all knew and, above all, he
could not be the political figure that in the days before most newspapers
had praised as the best or the most important Italian statesman. Moro’s let-
ter was even compared to political suicide: «In short, Moro, in exchange
for his physical salvation, would subscribe, with an unacceptable distinc-
tion between people kidnapped by common criminals and people kid-
napped by political criminals, his political suicide. And that is exactly what
prevents us from accepting or even believing [what is written in the let-
ters].»57
Also, the issue of calligraphy—friends, family, and acquaintances as well
as experts had confirmed immediately that it was actually that of Moro—
was debated over and over in articles. The most interesting thing for this
study (and which seems to come from a grotesque novel) is an article on
the front page of the Corriere, in which an «expert graphologist» interprets
the letter to Cossiga as follows: «In writing the word ‹legality›, Moro
flipped the pen up as if the term had been imposed on him. So I deduce
that, instead, he intends to sacrifice himself and that he rejects the ex-
change.»58 While the front page assumed that Moro was sending encrypted
messages and that he was still psychologically unbroken, the third page al-
ready reported Moro’s annihilation with the headline «Isolation, Drugs,
Extended Wake. This Is How Personality Is Annihilated.»59 The thesis that
Moro wrote under torture or under the influence of drugs was also backed
up in articles published in La Repubblica, La Stampa, Avanti! and L’Unità.60
La Repubblica published an interview with magistrate Mario Sossi titled:
57 La Repubblica, «Quelle parole non sono le sue», 30.3.1978, 1; it.: «Moro, insom-
ma, in cambio della sua salvezza fisica, sottoscriverebbe, con una inaccettabile dis-
tinzione tra rapiti della criminalità comune e rapiti della criminalità politica, il
proprio suicidio politico e di statista. Ed è proprio questo che ci ripugna di ac-
cettare o anche solo ritenere verosimile.»
58 Munzi, Ulderico, «Nascosti due messaggi fra le righe delle pagine scritte dal pri-
gioniero», Corriere della Sera, 31.3.1978, 1; it.: «Nello scrivere la parola ‹legalità›
Moro ha fatto volare la penna verso l’alto come se il termine gli fosse stato impos-
to. Quindi io deduco che, invece, intende sacrificarsi e che nel suo intimo rifiuta
lo scambio.»
59 Chierici, Maurizio, «Isolamento, droga, veglia prolungata. Ecco come si annienta
la personalità, Corriere della Sera, 31.3.1978, 3.
60 See De Luca, Fausto, «Parole scritte sotto tortura», La Repubblica, 30.3.1978, 1;
Pace, Giovanni Maria, «Tortura dura e raffinata ma senza l’uso di droga», La Re-
pubblica, 31.3.1978, 5; Avanti!, «Forse Moro è stato drogato», 31.3.1978, 14; Rizzo,
Aldo, «Una linea ferma», La Stampa, 31.3.1978, 1; La Stampa, «Quali farmaci pos-
sono usare le BR su Moro», 31.3.1978, 2; L’Unità, «Moro poteva essere sotto l’effet-
to di un ipnotico», 31.3.1978, 2.
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«In the People’s Prison Psychological Violence Causes Death to Be De-
sired.»61 The only ones who, in the two days of March 30 and 31, are un-
willing to make the assumption that Moro is plagued or delusional is that
of the Socialists, which is interesting because it was the only parliamentary
party that in the coming days officially argued for negotiations. Inter-
viewed at the party congress in Turin, the Socialist deputy Enrico Manca
expressed, like so many others, doubt that Moro’s letter was entirely spon-
taneous, but added: «However, it seems to me that the questions that he
poses, the choices he asks for are real. And they have to be evaluated with a
lot of political sensibility.»62
Except for a few very rare voices, the reaction of the media and of the
political parties to the first letter was to represent Moro as plagued by the
BR, which is why the arguments for negotiations were not taken seriously.
One of these rare voices was that of journalist Carmine Pecorelli, founder
and director of the press agency and magazine Osservatore Politico, who was
killed in Rome a year after Moro’s kidnapping. Pecorelli was one of the
first to explicitly claim that Moro’s kidnapping had been organized by a
«lucid superpower» with «the primary goal […] of moving the Communist
Party out of the area of power […] since it is the common interest of the
two world superpowers to mortify the rise of the PCI, that is, of the leader
of Eurocommunism, of Communism aspiring to become democratic and
democratically guide an industrial country.»63 In an article of April 4, 1978,
Pecorelli criticized the line of firmness and described it as dictated by those
who wanted to «sacrifice» Moro:
Aldo Moro will be sacrificed on the altar of the reason of State. Of
which State? Unable to administer justice, unable to defend its citizens,
61 Saba, Antonio, «Nel carcere del popolo la violenza psicologica fa desiderare la
morte», La Repubblica, 31.3.1978, 4.
62 Bocca, Giorgio, «Al centro del dibattito c’è quel ‹prigioniero›», La Repubblica,
31.3.1978, 2; it.: «Mi pare però che le domande che pone, le scelte che chiede
siano reali. E andranno valutate con molta ponderatezza politica.»
63 Pecorelli, Carmine, «Il Paese si può e si deve salvare», Osservatore Politico, 2.5.1978,
reprinted in: Flamigni 2006, 290-291; it.: «L’agguato di via Fani porta il segno di
un lucido superpotere. La cattura di Moro rappresenta una delle più grosse oper-
azioni politiche compiute negli ultimi decenni in un Paese industriale, integrato
nel sistema occidentale. L’obiettivo primario è senz’altro quello di allontanare il
Partito comunista dall’area del potere nel momento in cui si accinge, all’ultimo
balzo, alla diretta partecipazione al governo del Paese. È un fatto che si vuole che
ciò non accada. Perché è comune interesse delle due superpotenze mondiali mor-
tificare l’ascesa del Pci, cioè del leader dell’eurocomunismo, del comunismo che
aspira a diventare democratico e democraticamente guidare un Paese industriale.»
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incapable of punishing the dishonest and speculative, unable to offer
prospects to the Country, lacking command and moral authority, this
State is only standing today by renewing the macabre ritual of human
sacrifice. The very ones who today have refused to save Moro’s life are
the same ones that yesterday denigrated Germany and Israel for refus-
ing to engage in negotiations with Palestinian terrorists; they are the
same ones who applauded the German CDU, who were willing to ne-
gotiate for [the liberation of] Lorenz. So why not negotiate for [the lib-
eration of] Moro? Who benefits from [the line of] no negotiation?64
Pecorelli, who took Moro’s first letter seriously because he believed the po-
litician was warning his party and the government that he could reveal in-
formation about secret international operations against the Communist
threat, thus represented Moro as a scapegoat, chosen to renew the state.
When the second letter became public, the strategy adopted by the es-
tablished media to depoliticize Moro, went a step further. In an interven-
tion at the Chamber of Deputies, Prime Minster Andreotti said that Mo-
ro’s letter «was materially written by Aldo Moro but is not morally ac-
countable to him.»65 The speech was reproduced in full by Il Popolo and
quoted widely by L’Unità. The editorial in La Repubblica described Moro as
a puppet, pointing out that «it is not through having a puppet that [the
BR] can talk to a nation.»66 In the same newspaper, journalist Sandro Viola
wrote that «in the gloomy atmosphere of the people’s prison, the states-
man, the political leader, no longer exists. […] That impression of mastery
—of the self and of the situation—still emerging in the letter to Cossiga a
64 Pecorelli, Carmine, «Alla riscoperta dello Stato», Osservatore Politico, 4.4.1978,
reprinted in: Flamigni, 2006, 265; it.: «Aldo Moro sarà sacrificato sull’altare della
ragion di Stato. Di quale Stato? Incapace di amministrare la giustizia, incapace di
difendere i cittadini, incapace di punire disonesti e speculatori, incapace di offrire
prospettive al Paese, privo di autorità di ordine e di morale, questo Stato oggi si
tiene in piedi solo rinnovando il macabro rituale del sacrificio umano. Quelli
stessi che oggi hanno rifiutato di salvare la vita a Moro, sono gli stessi che ieri in-
veivano contro la Germania e contro Israele rei di non voler trattare con i terror-
isti palestinesi; sono gli stessi che hanno plaudito alla DC tedesca disposta a
trattare per Lorenz. Perché allora non trattare per Moro? A chi giova non
trattare?»
65 Manfalotto, Rosario, «Andreotti alla Camera: ‹Non si può patteggiare con gente
che ha le mani grondanti di sangue›», Corriere della Sera, 5.3.1978, 2; «La lettera a
Cossiga è stata materialmente scritta da Aldo Moro ma non è moralmente a lui
ascrivibile.»
66 La Repubblica, «quelle parole non sono credibili», 5.4.1978, 1; it.: «Non è attraver-
so ha un fantoccio che [le Brigate Rosse] possono parlare con una nazione.»
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week ago, has disappeared»; the title of the article did not leave room for
interpretations: «In 20 Days They Killed a Leader».67
The day that the note from the «Memorial» in which Moro criticized
Paolo Emilio Taviani was published, the reaction of the press was practical-
ly unanimous. In La Repubblica Sandro Viola, in an article titled «A Dis-
torted Voice from the ‹People’s Prison›», wrote that «what stands out […] is
the fall of Moro, the weakening of his every capacity to maintain the role
that the long political career, the many duties of the State had been con-
ferred upon him in those decades.»68 Along the same lines, La Stampa de-
scribed Moro as «a man who is psychologically destroyed, abandoned,
available to compromises dictated by isolation and fear, […] a prostrate
person, fallen into a state of psycho-physical dissipation.»69 Another article
in the same newspaper argued that Moro had been «reduced to an ob-
ject.»70 The Corriere della Sera, in turn, wrote that Moro’s words «sound like
a denial of the best part of his political personality» and on the second
page a headline declared: «Here Is the Text of the Note on Taviani. Friends:
An Unrecognizable Moro».71
In Corriere della Sera, Gianfranco Piazzesi adopted another kind of repre-
sentation, which could be described as an attempt to «infantilize» the
hostage.72 He quoted a study by the US think tank Rand Corporation and
compared Moro’s situation with that of a helpless child (after first compar-
ing it with the situation of partisans during the Resistance against Fas-
cism):
67 Viola, Sandro, «In 20 giorni hanno ucciso un leader», La Repubblica, 5.4.1978, 1;
it.: «Nella cupa atmosfera del carcere del popolo, lo statista, il leader politico non
esistono quasi più. […] Quell’impressione di padronanza – die sé e della situ-
azione – che ancora emergeva nella lettera a Cossiga d’una settimana fa, è scom-
parsa.»
68 Viola, Sandro, «Una voce stravolta dal carcere», La Repubblica, 11.4.1978, 1; it.:
«Quel che risalta […] è la caduta dell’uomo Moro, l’indebolimento di ogni capac-
ità di mantenere il ruolo che la lunga carriera politica, le tante cariche dello Stato
gli avevano conferito in quei decenni.»
69 Carbone, Fabrizio/Mazzocchi, Silvana, «Doppio ricatto, contro lo Stato e la
famiglia», La Stampa, 11.4.1978, 1; it.: «[…] un uomo psicologicamente distrutto,
abbandonato, disponibile a compromessi dettati dall’isolamento e dalla paura,
[…] una persona prostrata, caduta in uno stato di sfacelo psico-fisico.»
70 La Stampa, «Una cieca violenza», 11.4.1978, 1; it.: «[…] ridotto a oggetto.»
71 Valiani, Leo, «Noi, nelle carceri del fascismo», Corriere della Sera, 11.4.1978, 1; it.:
«[…] suonano come una la negazione della parte migliore della sua personalità
politica»; Corriere della Sera, «Ecco il testo dello scritto su Taviani. Gli amici: ‹Un
Moro irriconoscibile›», 11.4.1978, 2.
72 See Silj 1978, 171.
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During the Resistance, many Italians subjected to psychological stress
at least equal [to that of Moro], and even to physical torture, were able
to cope without fear of their abusers. […] The total physical depen-
dence of the hostage on the kidnappers often brings him to a state of
total psychological introjection. In other words, he finds himself in the
same situation as that of a baby who needs help and who, given this
fact, identifies with his parents. Like a baby, the hostage ends up iden-
tifying with his kidnappers.73
Alessandro Silj rightly noted that this infantilization of the hostage was the
logical counterpart of the bestialization of the BR: «Animals and babies, as
is known, don’t engage in politics. Rather they are only capable of inspir-
ing horror or pity.»74 With regard to the first part of the quoted article, it is
important to notice that the comparison with Resistance partisans was of-
ten used during the 55 days of Moro’s captivity: before the publication of
the first letter, in positive terms to make Moro look like a sort of modern
partisan, and after, in negative terms to basically represent him as a coward.
Through the comparison between the letters by Moro and those of a man
of the Resistance who was condemned to death, the Catholic Moro was ac-
cused «of not having accepted dying, of having failed to perform a ‹beauti-
ful death›, of not being able to drink the Socratic-partisan hemlock, of not
having accepted martyrdom.»75
A few days after, Piazzesi—who on March 13, a few days before Moro’s
abduction, still described Moro as «our most authoritative and profound
statesman» and the «supreme mediator of all Italian parties»76—continued
his own campaign of delegitimizing the politician by writing that:
In no case, however, will he [Moro] still be the Christian Democrat
leader of greater authority and prestige, nor the sure point of reference
for all other parties, starting with the Italian Communist Party. […]
73 Piazzesi, Gianfranco, «La forza della dignità», Corriere della Sera, 7.4.1978, 1; it.:
«Durante la Resistenza molti italiani sottoposti a uno stress psicologico almeno
pari [a quello di Moro], e anche a torture fisiche, seppero fronteggiare in maniera
impavida il loro aguzzini.» The day before, also in La Repubblica Moro’s writing
was described as «infantile, elementary», see Carraciolo, Lucio, «Il giorno più lun-
go», La Repubblica, 6.4.1978, 2.
74 Silj 1978, 162.
75 Gotor 2008b, 191.
76 Piazzesi, Gianfranco, «Aldo Moro: il suo ritratto è nei promessi sposi», Corriere
della Sera, 13.3.1978, 3; it.: «[…] il nostro più autorevole e profondo statista. […]
il supremo mediatore di tutti i partiti italiani.».
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Saying this, we do not intend to make any judgment on the way the
president of the Christian Democracy is enduring the trial to which he
has been subjected. We only find, with realism equal to bitterness, that
certain wounds inflicted by the kidnappers and the prisoners will nev-
er be completely remedied.77
Fortebraccio expressed his disappointment with Piazzesi’s article in L’Unità,
defining it as «absolute foolishness and ruthless cruelty» and asserting that
the journalist from the Corriere wanted to «anticipate […] a sentence that
the jailers themselves have not yet pronounced.»78 But confronted with
Moro’s letter to Zaccagnini, published on April 22, Fortebraccio also
changed his mind and described the prisoner as «a man morally and psy-
chologically destroyed, […] a Moro diametrically opposite to what we have
always known.»79 Even more explicit was Indro Montanelli, who in the
April 12 edition of Il Giornale wrote that Moro, «as a political man, disap-
peared on March 16.»80
The process of de-politicizing Moro continued after the publication of
two letters addressed to Zaccagnini on April 22 and 25. The leader of the
Republican Party Giovanni Spadolini, who, in an article titled «I Defend
the Image of Moro», argued that
it was necessary to oppose from the beginning and with firmness the
attempt to ‹interpret› in any sense the letters extorted to Moro in the
hell of the prison. […] [For the BR] the moral demolition of Moro’s
character […] is even more important than his physical elimination.81
77 Piazzesi, Gianfranco, «La tregua», Corriere della Sera, 14.4.1978, 1; it.: «In nessun
caso, però, egli sarà ancora il leader democristiano di maggiore autorità e presti-
gio, né tantomeno un sicuro punto di riferimento per tutti gli altri partiti, a com-
inciare dal PCI […] dicendo questo non intendiamo avanzare un giudizio qualsi-
asi sul modo in cui il presidente della Dc sta superando la prova a cui è stato sot-
toposto. Ci limitiamo a constatare, con un realismo uguale soltanto all’amarezza,
che certe ferite inflitte dai rapitori e dai carcerieri non potranno mai essere del
tutto rimarginate.»
78 Fortebraccio, «Ci vada piano», L’Unità, 15.4.1978, 1; it.: «[…] una assoluta insen-
satezza e di una spietata crudeltà»; «[…] anticipare […] una sentenza che i
carcerieri stessi non hanno ancora pronunciato.»
79 Fortebraccio, «Quello vero», L’Unità, 23.4.1978, 1; it.: «[…] un uomo moralmente
e psicologicamente distrutto, […] un Moro diametralmente opposto a quello che
abbiamo sempre conosciuto.»
80 Quoted in Silj 1978, 179; it.: «[…] come uomo politico, è scomparso il 16 marzo.»
81 Spadolini, Giovanni, «Difendo l’immagine di Moro», La Stampa, 27.04,1978, 1;
it.: «Bisognava opporsi fin dall’inizio, e con decisione, al tentativo di «inter-
pretare» in qualunque senso le lettere estorte a Moro nell’inferno del carcere. […]
6.2 Reduction to Bare Life
275
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The image Spadolini claimed to defend was that of Moro as a political fig-
ure, that is, before he was abducted on March 16. According to the Repub-
lican politician, it was wrong to even try to understand the Moro of the let-
ters, because he was no longer the same person. As reported by La Repub-
blica, the DC was of the same opinion; in fact, within the party it became
normal to distinguish between
a Moro-Dr. Jeckill, that is, the leader that we all know, and Mr. Hyde,
that is, the man who has fallen ‹under the full and uncontrolled domi-
nation› of his jailors, a different and opposite human being, a man of
revenge and death in contrast to the demiurge capable of broader and
bold political openings, in the most difficult of situations.82
To explain Moro’s dual nature, on the same day, the Corriere della Sera
interviewed a psychologist who explained that «social deprivation, that is,
isolation from one’s own kind, can cause a personality split.»83 On April
25, the day on which Italy celebrates its liberation from Fascism, a docu-
ment was signed by more or less fifty personalities from within the
Catholic world, claiming that the letters were not authentic. Il Popolo pub-
lished this document the following day, indicating that it had been signed
by «old friends of Aldo Moro», which affirmed that
 
1) The Aldo Moro we know, who with his spiritual, political, and ju-
ridical vision contributed to the drafting of the Republican Consti-
tution, is not present in the letters addressed to Zaccagnini, which
were published as [if they were] his: they constitute an attempt to
destroy Moro’s physiognomy […].
2) The irreparable guilt for an eventual, absurd murder falls only on
the perpetrators of the murder: the BR cannot pretend to blame
La demolizione morale del personaggio Moro […] è perfino più importante della
sua eliminazione fisica.»
82 De Luca, Fausto, «Ma chi scrive quelle lettere?», La Repubblica, 26.4.1978, 1–2; it.:
«[…] un Moro-dottor Jeckill, insomma il leader da tutti conosciuto, e mister
Hyde, cioè l’uomo caduto ‹sotto il pieno e incontrollato dominio› dei suoi
carcerieri, umo diverso e opposto, uomo della vendetta e della morte contrappos-
to al demiurgo capace delle più ampie e audaci aperture politiche, nelle situ-
azioni più difficili.»
83 Medail, Cesare, «Non scrive così per paura», Corriere della Sera, 26.4.1978, 1; it.:
«[…] è la deprivazione sociale, cioè l’isolamento dai propri simili, che può deter-
minare uno sdoppiamento di personalità.»
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others for the death sentence, which the Italian State does not rec-
ognize as applicable in any case, on others.84
 
In the already quoted letter addressed to the DC, published on March 29,
Moro expressed his disappointment at this document, as drawn up by his
self-declared «friends»:
It is true: I am a prisoner and I am not in a happy state of mind. But I
have not undergone any coercion nor am I drugged, I write in my own
style, I have my usual handwriting. But I am, they say, someone else
and I do not deserve to be taken seriously. Therefore, in response to my
arguments they do not even answer. […] And I must say that I was
deeply saddened (I would not have believed it possible) by the fact that
some friends, such as Bishop Zama, the lawyer Veronese, G.B. Scaglia
and others, without knowing or imagining my suffering, which is not
disconnected from lucidity and freedom of spirit, have doubted the au-
thenticity of what I was upholding, as if I were writing under the
duress of the BR. How can one explain this endorsement of the claim
of my non-authenticity?85
It may be that Moro posed the right question because, in the reactions to
the latter letter, the conviction that the letters by Moro were not authentic
84 Il Popolo, «Vogliono distruggere la figura di Moro», 26.4.1978, 3; it.: «1) L’Aldo
Moro che conosciamo, con la sua visione spirituale, politica e giuridica che ne ha
ispirato il contributo alla stesura della stessa Costituzione repubblicana, non è
presente nelle lettere dirette a Zaccagnini, pubblicate come sue: esse costituiscono
un tentativo di distruggere la fisionomia di Moro […]. 2) L’irrimediabile colpa
per un eventuale, assurdo omicidio ricade soltanto sugli esecutori materiali e gli
organizzatori dello stesso: le Brigate Rosse non possono illudersi di scaricare su
altri il peso della condanna a morte che lo Stato italiano non riconosce applica-
bile in nessun caso.»
85 Moro 2008l, 140–141; it.: «È vero: io sono prigioniero e non sono in uno stato
d’animo lieto. Ma non ho subito nessuna coercizione, non sono drogato, scrivo
con il mio stile per brutto che sia, ho la mia solita calligrafia. Ma sono, si dice, un
altro e non merito di essere preso sul serio. Allora ai miei argomenti neppure si
risponde. […] E devo dire che mi ha profondamente rattristato (non lo avrei cre-
duto possibile), il fatto che alcuni amici, da Mons. Zama, all’avv. Veronese, a G. B.
Scaglia ed altri, senza né conoscere né immaginare la mia sofferenza, non disgiun-
ta da lucidità e libertà cli spirito, abbiano dubitato dell’autenticità di quello che
andavo sostenendo, come se io scrivessi su dettatura delle Brigate Rosse. Perché
questo avallo alla pretesa mia non autenticità?»
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began to waver, though the support for the line of firmness remained prac-
tically unanimous. The Corriere della Sera argued that
It is pointless to try to determine if Moro really wants the things he
writes. The important thing is that the BR want them, otherwise they
would not deliver their letters. […] [I]t is undeniable that the messages
signed by Aldo Moro contradict all the values for which he had fought
until March 16: How can the jealous guardian of Christian Democra-
cy’s pride […] rage at his party to the point of endangering his sur-
vival? […] There is, on the one side, a man who desperately and hu-
manly invokes salvation, while out there are men who must seek the
salvation of a whole national community.86
La Stampa said practically the same thing, arguing that
Whatever the genesis of the writings may be—free, forced, drugged,
negotiated between those who dictate and who write—[…] they are
certainly responsive and functional to the strategy and tactics of the
BR. If Moro is the author, the BR are the de facto editors.87
L’Unità, on the other hand, did not change its strategy of representation,
continuing to argue that the person who wrote the letters was no longer
Aldo Moro:
We are facing another testimony of depersonalization of a man by his
captors. […]. That’s why this letter does not come from Moro, but
from its perpetrators. […] [It] would be really too offensive to judge a
man who is no longer master of himself. […] What is, in fact, the
essence of the request formulated in the letter? […] It is the recogni-
86 Scardocchia, Gaetano, «Si intravvede fra le righe un’inquietante domanda», Cor-
riere della Sera, 30.4.1978, 2; it.: «È inutile cercare di stabilire se Moro vuole
davvero le cose che scrive. L’importante è che le vogliano le BR, altrimenti non
recapiterebbero le sue lettere. […] [È] innegabile che i messaggi firmati da Aldo
Moro contraddicono tutti i valori per i quali egli si era battuto fino al 16 marzo:
[…] Come può il geloso tutore dell’orgoglio DC […] infierire sul suo partito fino
al punto da metterne a repentaglio la stessa sopravvivenza? […] C’è da una parte
un uomo che disperatamente e umanamente invoca la salvezza, mentre fuori ci
sono uomini che devono cercare anche la salvezza di tutta una comunità
nazionale.»
87 Zucconi, Vittorio, «Le lettere: Strategia BR e resistenze di Moro», La Stampa,
30.4.1978, 2; it.: «Quale che sia la genesi degli scritti – libera, coatta, drogata, ne-
goziata fra chi detta e chi scrive – […] essi sono certamente rispondenti e funzion-
ali alla strategia e alla tattica delle brigate rosse. Se Moro ne è l’autore, comunque
le BR ne sono gli editori.»
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tion of their status as combatants, it is the capitulation of the demo-
cratic State, the leak, through which all the disruptive drives can come
out, until reaching chaos.88
In short, after a long process in which Moro was represented as tortured,
drugged, freakish, infantile, depersonalized, weak, morally and psychologi-
cally dead, with a double personality and much more, on April 30, what
had so far been submerged under a tide of rhetoric, finally began to be-
come explicit: regardless of the authenticity or inauthenticity of the letters
by Moro, he had to be sacrificed for the salvation of the democratic state,
the Italian Republic and national unity. As we have seen, almost all parlia-
mentary parties, with the participation of almost all of the media, had al-
ready decided from the beginning that there would be no negotiations to
save Moro. From this point of view, Moro’s letters were only obstacles to
overcome. Despite the use of different rhetorical and representative strate-
gies, they all sought to ban and remove Moro, the Moro of the letters, from
the public and political space.
The obstacles were overcome through the distinction between a public
Moro, a symbol of both the party and the Italian State, and a private Moro,
the person kidnapped by the BR and robbed of the ability to communicate
and to act in the public space. Evidently, the BR were primarily responsible
for the annihilation of Moro’s right to act and to express himself. It would
be very naive to think that Moro, inside the «people’s prison», could have
said and written what he wanted. There are also factual findings which
prove that the BR censored him, deciding which letters to publish and
which to not, probably also forcing Moro to rewrite and reformulate deter-
minative sentences and passages.89 We also know that, at least initially, they
made him believe that his letters would not become public and thus he
could write confidentially to politicians, friends and family. But parliamen-
tary political parties, primarily the DC and the PCI, and most of the estab-
lished media were equally responsible for having delegitimized and de-
88 L’Unità, «Il Loro disegno», 30.4.1978, 1; it.: «Siamo di fronte a un’altra testimoni-
anza di spersonalizzazione di un uomo da parte dei suoi carcerieri. […] Ecco
perché questa lettera non viene da Moro, ma dai suoi aguzzini. […] sarebbe vera-
mente troppo offensivo voler far carico di certi giudizi a un uomo non più
padrone di sé, e pensare di fare dei suoi scritti un qualsiasi uso politico. […] Qual
è, infatti, in sostanza, la richiesta che si formula nella lettera? […] È il riconosci-
mento ad essi dello status di combattenti, è la resa, quindi, dello Stato democrati-
co, la falla attraverso la quale possano rovesciarsi tutte le spinte disgreganti, fino
al caos.»
89 See Gotor 2008b, 185–389.
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politicized first the letters, declaring them as inauthentic, and then the
prisoner himself, representing him as a weak man, interested only in his
own salvation.
Resuming Giorgio Agamben’s reflections on the concept of «bare life»,
we can define the reduction of Moro to a purely private character, with no
longer any right to speak, such as the annihilation of the faculty of having
«the logos by conserving [the living being’s] own voice in [the polis]». If the
«politicization of bare life» is «the metaphysical task par excellence» by
which «the humanity of living man is decided», then we can define the
rhetorical, narrative and discursive strategy adopted by the media and po-
litical parties during the Moro case as the de-politicization of bare life, by
which the humanity of the living is denied.90 Agamen’s homo sacer theory
allows us to shed light on the rhetorical, narrative and discursive process
through which Aldo Moro was excluded from the political community.
This theory predisposes the conceptual apparatus through which it is possi-
ble to understand and to explain the functioning, the performativity and
effectiveness of the discursive practices, the representative forms by which
the Moro case was framed during and after the 55 days of his imprison-
ment. Aldo Moro was consecrated to the sacred sphere as early as his ab-
duction, when the government decided not to undertake the path of nego-
tiation. As we have seen, in the first two weeks of his imprisonment, that
is, before the first letter was published, Aldo Moro had already been raised
to the status of a mythical figure, a paladin of democracy and a collective
symbol of national unity. On Easter Sunday, through the employment of
the rhetorical tool of prefiguration, his sacrifice for the state was placed in
relation to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, thus constructing a meaningful
analogy between the salvation of the state and the salvation of the world.
Conversely, the BR were represented as a demonic force devoted only to
the achievement of chaos and the destruction of society. The BR thus took
on the role, in what actually appears to be a Schmittian theological–politi-
cal narrative, of the Behemoth-beast that the Leviathan-state must stop at
all costs, while Aldo Moro became the voluntary martyr willing to die for
the salvation of the state. Another thesis by Agamben seems to find confir-
mation here, namely that «what are secularized, today, are essentially escha-
tological concepts.»91
Moro thus already belonged to the sacred sphere, and the only thing left
of him in the profane world was a mere body without a voice, flesh that
90 Agamben 1998, 8.
91 Agamben 2015a, 67.
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simply had to cease to live. But then something unexpected happened: Mo-
ro made use of his voice in an attempt to re-politicize himself, to return to
the public and political sphere. And it is here that what Alessandro Silj has
defined «a massive operation of institutionalized falsification», whose only
function was to silence Aldo Moro, becomes operative.92 It is important to
be accurate: Agamben defines homo sacer as one who can be killed but not
sacrificed. If, at first glance, this definition does not seem to match the Mo-
ro case, a closer look reveals the heuristic value of the homo sacer theory. In
fact, what was the «line of firmness» adopted by the government and the
political parties within it, as well as by the larger part of the media, if not a
nihil opstat, a declaration that nothing hindered the killing of Moro, name-
ly its exclusion from the sphere of the law? Article 2 of the Italian Constitu-
tion, where it is written that La Repubblica riconosce e garantisce i diritti invi-
olabili dell’uomo, was declared invalid for Moro, the prisoner of the BR.
What is at stake is obviously not the impunity of the BR, the perpetrators
of the homicide, but of those who allowed, or at least who did nothing, to
prevent the murder. If it is thus correct to say that the state of exception
was not actually declared de jure—basically with the argument that this
would have meant recognizing a war and the BR as a political foe—it was
actually applied de facto. Although it was only for a single person, the
rights guaranteed by the Italian Constitution were suspended.
As Paolo Heywood argues, the political strategy adopted during the Mo-
ro case proves that two apparently incompatible paradigms of governance,
sovereignty and governmentality, can coexist.93 Governmentality involves
those kinds of practices whose goal is the preservation of law through regu-
larized and rational techniques of government, such as courts, prisons, and
social services, whilst sovereignty involves practices, such as torture and
capital punishment, which are always implemented for the preservation of
the sovereign power itself, not of law. This distinction calls to mind the dis-
tinction made by Walter Benjamin between violence which is lawmaking
and violence which is law-preserving.94 The lawmaking violence is that ex-
ercised, for example, during revolutions, through which a new form of po-
litical order and with it a new legislative system is established. But it is also
the violence exercised to counter a revolution in order to preserve the state.
This is the violence exercised by the sovereign in the state of exception,
which «neither preserves nor simply posits law, but rather conserves it in
92 Silj 1978, 184.
93 See Heywood 2009.
94 See Benjamin 1995.
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suspending it and posits it in exempting itself from it.»95 Or, in Foucault’s
terms, it is the illegal violence that is legitimized with reference to the «rea-
son of state»:
There will be times when raison d’Était will no longer make use of […]
laws due to a pressing and urgent event and must out of necessity free
itself from them. In the name of what? In the name of the State’s salva-
tion.96
The particularity, the exemplarity of Moro’s case lies in the fact that the
state allowed others to kill Moro, thus allowing a group to exercise
sovereign violence, a group that was convinced instead of exercising revolu-
tionary violence to destroy the old political order and establish a new one.
From this point of view, we can say that in this case, sovereignty resided in
the hands of a non-state group, permitting those statesmen with the re-
sponsibility for the less problematic (as they are legal) techniques of disci-
pline and law-preserving violence to «conceal [their] savage and sovereign
violence» by projecting «themselves as mere maintainers of the law, as if
the very invocation of legality, however perverted, can make them appear
legitimate and respectable.»97
But how can one explain the second part of the definition, according to
which the homo sacer cannot be sacrificed? Did the Italian press not repeat-
edly claim that Moro had to be sacrificed for the salvation of the Italian
State? This is where the enormous potential for the ideological construc-
tion of the state martyr figure lies: the state cannot be the agent of the sac-
rifice, because by it being so, the dark bond between biopolitics and
thanatopolitics, «the capacity [of supreme power] to constitute oneself and
others as life that may be killed but not sacrificed» would become mani-
fest.98 Here, the function of martyrological rhetoric is precisely to hide this
dark bond, transforming the victim of violence into the voluntary agent of
his or her own sacrifice. Since the sovereign power cannot sacrifice «bare
life», the construction of the figure of the martyr becomes very useful. This
kind of martyrology is none other than a state mythology, whose purpose
is the concealment of sovereign power over «bare life». At this point, we
can describe the practical and representational strategies adopted by the
government, by major parliamentary parties and by the established press as
95 Agamben 1998, 64.
96 Foucault 2009, 262.
97 Hansen 2006, 282.
98 Agamben 1998, 101.
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a strategy of double concealment. Both the externalization of sovereign pow-
er and the sacralization of Aldo Moro are ways of concealing the power
over «bare life». From this point of view, the figure of the martyr appears to
be an indispensable tool, or at least a very useful one, for the legitimization
of dominant power structures. In fact, as noted by Michel Foucault,
power is tolerable only on the condition that it masks a substantial
part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own
mechanisms. Would power be accepted if it were entirely cynical? For
it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to its op-
eration.99
The homo sacer theory allows us to further put into perspective a funda-
mental paradox within modern law and politics, a paradox that deter-
mined the political management and influenced the media representation
of the Moro case. This paradox concerns the relation between the two dog-
mas of the «sanctity of human life» and the «reason of state». As we have
seen, on April 19 Lotta Continua published an appeal for the release of Mo-
ro, which claimed the primacy of the right to life of every single individu-
al. Indeed, practically all social actors publicly acknowledged the presence
of this paradigm. In fact, the advocates of the line of firmness «generally
introduced their positions by first rhetorically asking: what is more sacred
than human life?»100 One has only to read the editorials of the newspaper
editions of April 21 to become aware of the rhetorical and argumentative
monotony with which the line of firmness was defended without abandon-
ing the proclamation of the right to life. The Corriere della Sera wrote that
«every chance of saving a human life should be […] explored rigorously»
but at the same time that «one cannot give in to blackmail, this was and
remains obvious to everyone.»101 La Repubblica posed the problem as a
dilemma in which, however, the choice was clear: «It is about sacrificing a
man’s life or losing the Republic. Unfortunately, for democrats the choice
does not allow any doubt.»102 Similarly, L’Unità asked rhetorically: «Who
[…] can be so inhumane as to not want with all his or her strength, the life
99 Foucault 1978, 86.
100 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 186.
101 Corriere della Sera, «La Repubblica non si baratta», 21.4.1978, 1: it.: « […] ogni
possibilità di salvare una vita umana va […] esplorata fino in fondo […]. Non si
può cedere al ricatto, questo era e resta ovvio per tutti.»
102 La Repubblica, «Sacrificare un uomo o perdere lo Stato», 21.4.1978, 1; it.: «Si trat-
ta di sacrificare la vita di un uomo o di perdere la Repubblica. Purtroppo, per i
democratici la scelta non consente dubbi.»
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of the president of the DC to be saved? […] Let us reflect well, […] while
maintaining the most intransigent rejection, what is defended is the very
basis of freedom and democracy.»103 Even more explicit was La Stampa,
which claimed that «nothing is more sacred than human life» but that «we
are not so foolish as to ignore that the very strict defense of the law, which
is decisive to its violation in any way, is the only true and valid defense of
the life of all citizens.»104 The motivations given by the various editorialists
were essentially all based on the same premise, namely that negotiations
would affect national security: the state cannot negotiate with an organiza-
tion that is not political, but criminal (Corriere della Sera); the notion of a
«state of war» cannot be accepted because, among other things, it would
simply give the state’s repressive apparatuses the right to suspend constitu-
tional guarantees against the BR (La Repubblica); if we accept negotiating
today, we will be forced to make deals in future as well (L’Unità); if we sur-
render this time, we will open the way for new blackmail (La Stampa).
In the last days of April, the media also discussed the initiative of the So-
cialist Party a lot—which from the beginning was presented as «humanitar-
ian»—and the appeals of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the
Pope, and the Caritas; practically all agreed that a «humanitarian» attempt
to save Moro was acceptable, but «political» negotiations were not.105 Ev-
eryone knew, however, that the BR would not free Moro because of a few
so-called «humanitarian appeals», as they explicitly wrote in the seventh
communiqué. The distinction between humanitarianism and politics had
no other function than to conceal the structure of the sovereign exception,
namely that exactly because Moro’s life was «sacred», it was excluded from
the political sphere and it was no longer the task of the state to defend
it.106 According to Agamben,
103 L’Unità, «Il prezzo vero», 21.4.1978, 1; it.: «Chi […] può essere così disumano da
non volere con tutte le sue forze che la vita del presidente della DC venga salva-
ta? […] Riflettiamoci bene, […] mantenendo il più intransigente rifiuto, ciò che
si difende sono le basi stesse della libertà e della democrazia.»
104 La Stampa, «Perché lo Stato non può piegarsi a degli assassini», 21.4.1978, 1; it.:
«[…] nulla è più sacro della vita umana. […] non siamo tanto sprovveduti da
ignorare che appunto la difesa rigida della legge, un no deciso di violarla in al-
cun modo, rappresentano la sola difesa vera e valida della vita di tutti i cittadi-
ni.»
105 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 186.
106 Very significant in this regard is the editorial, titled «God Forgives but Caesar
Punishes», written by the editor and co-founder of La Repubblica Eugenio Scal-
fari after the above-mentioned appeal by the Pope. Here Scalfari said more or
less explicitly that Moro’s life was now in the hands of God because «Caesar
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the separation between humanitarianism and politics that we are expe-
riencing today is the extreme phase of the separation of the right of
man from the rights of the citizen. In the final analysis […] humanitar-
ian organizations […] can only grasp human life in the figure of bare
or sacred life, and therefore, despite themselves, maintain a secret soli-
darity with the very powers they ought to fight.107
The fundamental paradox of modern politics, and which is at the core of
the distinction between humanitarianism and politics made during the
Moro case, is that of a state that guarantees constitutionally-based human
rights but at the same time acts as a sovereign nation-state with the de-
clared task of guaranteeing national security. From this point of view, the
dogma of the sacredness of life manifests itself in all its ambiguity. What in
the contemporary world is declared «sacred» is the «bare life» excluded
from the political sphere. As Walter Benjamin already wrote almost a cen-
tury ago:
However sacred man is (or that life in him that is identically present in
earthly life, death, and afterlife), there is no sacredness in his condi-
tion, in his bodily life vulnerable to injury by his fellow men. What,
then, distinguishes it essentially from the life of animals and plants?
[…] Finally, this idea of man’s sacredness gives grounds for reflection
that what is here pronounced sacred was according to ancient mythical
thought the marked bearer of guilt: life itself.108
Moro’s guilt was to still be alive and, while he had already been declared
sacred, to have tried to return to the political sphere, to have said «no, I
would prefer not to» to the demand of dying for the state.
must administer the law and God knows how to command with prayer. Neither
Caesar nor God deal with sinners, because the first punishes them, the second
forgives them and—if he can—saves them.» See Scalfari, Eugenio, «Dio perdona
ma Cesare castiga», La Repubblica, 23.4.1978, 1-2; it.: «Cesare deve amministrare
con la legge e Dio sa comandare con la preghiera. Né Cesare né Dio trattano
con i peccatori, perché il primo li castiga, il secondo li perdona e—se può—li
salva.»
107 Agamben 1998, 133.
108 Benjamin 1995, 299.
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The finding of Aldo Moro’s body in the trunk of a Renault 4 in via
Catani, Rome, May 9, 1978.
Grand Finale: Consolidation of the State Martyr
On May 9, 1978, Aldo Moro was killed by the BR and abandoned in the
hood of a car in via Caetani, in the center of Rome (see figure 5). As one of
the members of the BR commando said, the choice to leave the corpse in
via Caetani, halfway between the headquarters of the PCI and the DC, had
a clear symbolic meaning: «the revolutionary front says no to the DC–PCI
agreement.»109 Four days earlier, they had spread their ninth and final
communiqué, announcing the execution of the judgment:
Craxi’s so-called ‹humanitarian proposals›, whatever they are, since
they exclude the release of the thirteen seized comrades, are only ma-
neuvers for throwing dust into people’s eyes, and are part of those
power games, party or electoral interests, which do not concern us.
The only clear thing is that, on the exchange of prisoners, the position
PICTURE 5:
6.3
109 Bocca 1985, 230; it.: «[…] il fronte rivoluzionario dice no all’accordo DC e PCI.»
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of the PSI is the same, full rejection, of the DC and its government,
and that is enough for us. […] Thus, we conclude the battle that began
on March 16, by executing the sentence to which Aldo Moro was con-
demned.110
At 12.13 p.m. on May 9, a member of the BR telephoned Franco Tritto,
one of Moro’s assistants at the University in Rome, indicating the location
where the police would find the body. RAI was not the first to arrive in via
Caetani; it was a small private television broadcaster, the GBR, the only
one filming the scene. The images taken by operator Valerio Leccese, as
well as Gianni Giansanti’s photo, showing the corpse lying in the Renault
4 trunk from above, are the only existing visual proof of the finding of Mo-
ro’s body.111 The symbolic power of the image was immediately perceiv-
able: it displayed Moro as the dead «body of the state», naked life surround-
ed by policemen and the Carabinieri, symbolically representing state appa-
ratuses, and journalists, representing the media dispositive that shaped and
framed the event. Those images «returned» Moro’s body to the public
space, the body that had been absent for 55 days. The public had only seen
Moro in the two Polaroid photos distributed to the media by the BR, but
both were used in order to perform an operation of degradation and dele-
gitimization conducted on two fronts: on the one hand, the BR wanted to
humiliate the politician as the symbol of the DC’s power, while on the
other hand, the government, major parties and established media used the
photos to deprive Moro of his public image. The images of via Caetani
have a different quality, because they no longer show bare life in its killabil-
ity, but simply and brutally the dead body of a person. Artist Marco
Baliani describes the impression he had when he saw the images of via
Caetani as follows: «They fired machine guns, a burst as he stood there in
pajamas and undershirt looking like he’d just woken up, like some old Ro-
man retiree.»112 Baliani’s words highlight the bizarre transformation that
the politician’s image underwent in the 55 days of his imprisonment: Mo-
110 Brigate Rosse 1978e, 144; it.: «Le cosiddette ‹proposte umanitarie› di Craxi,
qualunque esse siano, dal momento che escludono la liberazione dei tredici
compagni sequestrati, si qualificano come manovre per gettare fumo negli oc-
chi, e che rientrano nei giochi di potere, negli interessi di partito od elettorali,
che non ci riguardano. L’unica cosa chiara è che sullo scambio dei prigionieri la
posizione del PSI è la stessa, di ottuso rifiuto, della DC e del suo governo, e
questo ci basta. […] Concludiamo quindi la battaglia iniziata il 16 marzo, es-
eguendo la sentenza a cui Aldo Moro è stato condannato.»
111 See Imperi 2016, 155.
112 Baliani 2011, 24.
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ro was kidnapped as a symbol, as a simulacrum of power, and was killed as
a man, like any ordinary sixty-two-year-old man. On March 16, the BR kid-
napped a man with a strong public image, a man considered by public
opinion and by the BR themselves to be one of the highest representatives
not only of the DC but of sovereign power. However, they involuntarily
helped the government, established media and government parties to de-
prive Moro of his symbolic power and to reduce him to bare life. They did
not realize that Moro’s absence would not put the balance of power in
trouble, but that on the contrary it favored Moro’s political opponents, and
that the same icon of power would be stripped of any authority, aban-
doned by the party, the government, and left at the mercy of terrorists,
who, misjudging the successive evolutions of the struggle, killed a man
who had become uncomfortable for the men of power. The BR’s choice to
leave the body inside a car trunk in the middle of Rome was not a casual
one: they wanted to show that they were capable of striking at the «heart of
the state». They thought that by killing Moro they could show that power
can be defeated. They thought of killing the symbol, but paradoxically, by
killing a man, they created a symbol. When they killed him, they uninten-
tionally paved the way for the definitive establishment of Moro as a state
martyr, the symbolic body of the nation. As Valeria Verdolini pointedly
observes, «the symbol surpassed the body, the body assumed value and dig-
nity only in the moment it moved toward the symbol.»113
Shortly before 6 p.m., Moro’s family published a statement:
The family wants the precise will of Aldo Moro to be fully respected by
state and party authorities. This means: no public event or ceremony
or speech; no national mourning. Nor state funeral or memory medal.
The family closes in silence and asks for silence. History will judge the
life and death of Aldo Moro.114
Moro’s last will was not respected. For more than a month Moro had been
declared a coward, a weakling, a man reduced to an object, a man unwor-
thy of the heritage of the Resistance, and now that Moro was finally dead,
everything that had been written and said seemed to be erased from mem-
113 Verdolini 2006, 68.
114 Quoted in Imperi 2016, 145; it.: «La famiglia desidera che sia pienamente rispet-
tata dalle autorità di stato e di partito la precisa volontà di Aldo Moro. Ciò vuol
dire: nessuna manifestazione pubblica o cerimonia o discorso; nessun lutto
nazionale. né funerali di stato o medaglia alla memoria. La famiglia si chiude
nel silenzio e chiede silenzio. Sulla vita e sulla morte di Aldo Moro giudicherà la
storia.»
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ory. In a moment, Moro assumed the state martyr role that the media and
most parliamentary political parties had decided he had to assume from
the beginning: «The beatification process, which began on March 16, de-
clared invalid the doubts and reservations expressed in the previous few
weeks and came, shortly after May 9, to its inevitable conclusion.»115 The
first aspect of this beatification process to point out is the rhetoric of unifi-
cation. As had already happened on March 17, all the newspapers praised
the unity of the people. Here are the main headlines of the newspapers:
 
L’Unità: The Fierce Crime of the BR Wounds the Civil Consciousness of
All Italians [subheadline]. The Assassination of Moro—Italy Has
Stopped Suddenly Like on March 16—Millions of Men Mobilized
Against Eversion [title].116
Il Popolo: Pain and Anger Unify Italy [subheadline]. Aldo Moro Assassi-
nated [title].117
L’Avanti: The Italian People [Have to] React Firmly to the Brutal Assassi-
nation of Aldo Moro [subheadline]. Democrats All Unified—We De-
fend the Republic [title].118
La Stampa: The BR Have Ended the Crime, Which Started in Via Fani
With Barbaric Ferocity [subheadline]. Moro Murdered—Millions of
Italians Take to the Streets [title].119
La Repubblica: The Corpse Found in a Car a Few Meters From the DC
and PCI Headquarters [subheadline]. The Assassination of Moro—The
Country Reacts to the BR’s Challenge [title].120
115 Silj 1978, 185.
116 L’Unità, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «L’efferato crimine delle BR ferisce la coscienza civile di
tutti gli italiani [subheadline]. L’assassinio di Moro – L’Italia si è fermata di
colpo come il 16 marzo – Milioni di uomini mobilitati contro l’eversione» [ti-
tle].»
117 Il Popolo, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Dolore e sdegno uniscono l’Italia» [subheadline]. Al-
do Moro assassinato [title].»
118 Avanti!, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Il popolo italiano reagisca con fermezza al brutale as-
sassinio di Aldo Moro [subheadline]. Uniti tutti i democratici – Difendiamo la
Repubblica [title].»
119 La Stampa, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Le BR hanno concluso con barbara ferocia il crim-
ine iniziato in via Fani [subheadline]. Moro assassinato. Milioni di italiani scen-
dono in piazza [title].»
120 La Repubblica, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Il cadavere ritrovato in un’auto a pochi metri
dalle sedi della Dc e del Pci [subheadline]. L’assassinio di Moro – Il paese
reagisce compatto alla sfida BR [title].»
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Corriere della Sera: Assassinated by the BR and Left in a Car in the Cen-
ter of Rome [subheadline]. The Killing of Moro [title].121
 
The Corriere della Sera was, therefore, the only newspaper to not place an
emphasis on the unitarian response of the people in its main headline (see
figure 6). This is probably because the newspaper was interested in putting
all the focus on Aldo Moro’s sacrifice as an appeal for the Italian Repub-
lic’s rebirth, a sort of second Risorgimento. In the editorial entitled «He
Died so That the Republic Lives», editor Franco Di Bella argued that:
For this Italian State, which has not succumbed to the blackmail of the
negotiations, Moro sacrificed his life. Now the State, which has de-
fended itself by not giving in, has a commitment to honor: to the mar-
tyr, to Italians and to itself. […] The Republic must regain its strength
and must restore, without emotional reactions, but with the firmness
of the dark hours, the law of a civil society that mourns its own mar-
tyrs but also knows, dry-eyed, not to forgive: on behalf of those who
for thirty years continued to work and sacrifice for a worthy and civi-
lized country.122
121 Corriere della Sera, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Assassinato dalle Brigate Rosse e lasciato su
un’auto nel centro di Roma [subheadline]. Il delitto Moro [title].»
122 Di Bella, Franco, «È morto perché questa Repubblica viva», Corriere della Sera,
10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Per questo Stato italiano, che non ha ceduto al ricatto delle
trattative, Moro ha sacrificato la sua vita. Ora lo Stato che si è difeso non ceden-
do, ha un impegno da onorare: verso il martire, verso gli italiani e verso se stes-
so. […] La Repubblica deve ritrovare la sua forza e deve ripristinare, senza
reazioni emotive, ma con la fermezza delle ore buie, la legge di una società civile
che piange i suoi martiri ma poi sa anche, a ciglio asciutto, non perdonare: in
nome di chi per trent’anni ha continuato a lavorare e a sacrificarsi per un paese
degno e civile.»
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PICTURE 6: Front page of the Corriere della Sera of May 10, 1978.
Here Moro is explicitly represented as the agent of his own sacrifice and,
therefore, as a voluntary martyr. The martyrdom of Moro assumes the con-
notation of a testimony and an appeal to future generations: you must be
willing to die for the defense of the state. Like all of the other newspapers,
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the Corriere della Sera also recorded the reactions of the DC politicians, es-
pecially of Secretary Benigno Zaccagnini, who said: «I think of what Aldo
Moro was for all of us, for Christian Democracy, his faith in freedom, illu-
minated by his extreme sacrifice.»123 Sacrifice for the state and sacrifice for
the DC coincide with each other. Here the polyvalence and openness to re-
signification of the concept of sacrifice becomes manifest, inasmuch as it
was used to indicate both Moro’s sacrifice for the Republic and his sacrifice
for the party on the same day and in the same newspaper. Furthermore,
the newspaper reported different reactions coming from the Vatican me-
dia, for example that of Radio Vaticana, which asserted that it could not
find the proper words to describe Moro’s assassination, but that the
wickedness of the criminals conferred an «almost sacrificial value» to the
crime.124 The newspaper even reported the reaction of Swiss Confeder-
ation President Willi Ritschard, who said that «President Moro […] has
fallen [as a] martyr of democracy»125 and in an article with the headline
«Today’s History Has Roots in Far-off Crimes. That Day We Remembered
How the Mateotti Martyrdom Began», the rhetorical instrument of prefig-
uration is once again used to include Moro’s death in a sort mythical un-
derstanding of history as a universal struggle between good and evil forces,
where violence happens in cyclical rhythms.126 The journalist Walter Toba-
gi reused the prefiguration the following day in an article called «From
Matteotti to Moro: Two Crimes Against Democracy. A Martyr That Failed
to Stop the Plots of Fascism».127
On page three, La Stampa published the reactions of several intellectuals
and public personalities, including Cardinal Michele Pellegrino, Luigi Fir-
po, Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Norberto Bobbio, and Giovanni Conso. The
123 Padellaro, Antonio, «14,30: la disperazione entra nel palazzo di piazza del
Gesù», Corriere della Sera, 10.5.1978, 4; it.: «Penso a quello che Aldo Moro è stato
per tutti noi, per la democrazia cristiana, la sua fede nella libertà, illuminata dal
suo estremo sacrificio.»
124 De Santis, Fabrizio, «Il dolore di Paolo VI dopo l’inutile appello – Il giornale
vaticano: Dall’orrore alla speranza», Corriere della Sera, 10.5.1978, 5; it.: «un val-
ore quasi sacrificale»
125 Barino, Mario, «Berna – Le BR hanno sbagliato i loro calcoli», Corriere della Sera,
10.5.1978, 10; it.: «Il presidente Moro […] è caduto martire della democrazia.»
126 Tobagi, Walter, «Storia di oggi che ha radici in delitti lontani. Quel giorno ricor-
dammo come ebbe inizio il martirio di Matteotti», Corriere della Sera, 10.5.1978,
8.
127 Tobagi, Walter, «Da Matteotti a Moro: due delitti contro la democrazia – Un
martirio che non riuscì a fermare le trame del fascismo», Corriere della Sera,
10.5.1978, 6.
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main headline on the page is «The Sacrifice That No One Will Forget».
Cardinal Pellegrino—one of the signatories of the document who denied
the authenticity of Moro’s letters—wrote an article titled «The Death of the
Innocent Mysterious Plan of God», saying that
Aldo Moro has disappeared before our eyes, but lives on in the grateful
memory of the true Italians, of those who seek justice, freedom, and
solidarity inspired by love. Aldo Moro taught us by word and example,
to live and fight for these ideals, he teaches us, through his sacrifice, to
remain steadfast in our faith, to hope against hope, even at this mo-
ment, one of the darkest and saddest, not only for his family and for
his friends, but for Italy, for the big family of mankind. […] God is our
father and does not abandon us. It seemed that on the cross he had
abandoned his Son, the innocent who expiated the sins of us all. But
the sacrifice of Christ was our salvation. The sacrifice of those who suf-
fer with Christ is, in the mysterious design of God, fruitful for our
brothers.128
The sacrifice for the salvation of the world is here, once again, compared to
the sacrifice for the salvation of the Italian collective. Moro is represented
as a martyr that imitates Christ in his Passion, a Passion that must serve as
an example for other martyrs to come. The Republican Luigi Firpo also
represented Moro’s death through recurring biblical images, referring to
an Old Testament narrative:
Moro is ideally connected, with this heartbreaking outcome, to those,
like him innocent, who fell at his side. […] We have to proclaim loudly
and clearly that their blood was not shed in vain. It cries revenge in the
presence of God, awakens the dormant consciences, nourishes the firm
128 Pellegrino, Michele, «La morte dell’innocente disegno misterioso di Dio», La
Stampa, 10.5.1978, 3: it.: «Aldo Moro è scomparso ai nostri occhi, ma vive nella
memoria riconoscente dei veri italiani, di quanti cercano la giustizia, la libertà,
la solidarietà animata dall’amore. Aldo Moro, che ci ha insegnato con la parola e
con l’esempio, a vivere e a lottare per questo ideali, ci insegna, con il suo sacrifi-
cio, a mantenerci saldi nella fede, a sperare contro ogni speranza, anche in
questo momento, uno dei più bui e più tristi, non solo per la sua famiglia e per i
suoi amici, ma per l’Italia, per la grande famiglia degli uomini. […] Dio è padre
e non ci abbandona. Sembrava che sulla croce avesse abbandonato il suo Figlio,
l’innocente che espiava per noi tutti colpevoli. Ma il sacrificio di Cristo fu la
nostra salvezza. Il sacrificio di chi soffre con Cristo è, nel misterioso disegno di
Dio, fecondo di bene per i nostri fratelli.»
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intentions, and marks both perpetrators and instigators with the mark
of Cain.129
The rhetoric of blood and revenge, the mark of Cain: the conflict BR ver-
sus Italian State takes on a mythical connotation where the blood of inno-
cents legitimizes the violence of the avenging and uncompromising state
needed to defeat the wicked. In his article, Arturo Carlo Jemolo also re-
curred to the biblical archetype of the brother enemy, but in a slightly dif-
ferent way. He wrote that «there is nothing to be ashamed of […]; I do not
know of any people in history that were purely heroic […]. In the face of
such a perfect organization, I also think that special laws are useless; or
they should be such […] that my conscience says: no. It would be a propter
in vitam, vivendim perdere causam. I prefer to die like Abel than live like
Cain.»130 This passage is quite twisted because it begins by implicitly justi-
fying Moro’s letters, saying that not everyone can be brave, then continues
by arguing that no special laws (the author means laws that are probably
not in accordance with certain constitutional articles) should be made to
facilitate the capture of the BR, because this would be inconsistent with
democratic consciousness, and finally declares that it is better to die for a
cause than to live as a traitor. In a few lines, the author thus succeeds in
justifying the line of firmness and in representing Moro as a coward, who
did not die with dignity for the cause of the state but who, through a vio-
lent death, turns into Abel, the innocent victim.
The philosopher, jurist and historian Norberto Bobbio, who had signed
the appeal published in Lotta Continua, saw the assassination of the politi-
cian as an event in the face of which all citizens had the duty to identify
with the Republic:
Now the dilemma ‹either with the BR or with the State›, which puts
on the same level a gang of criminals and millions and millions of Ital-
129 Firpo, Luigi, «Feroci e senza un futuro», La Stampa, 10.5.1978, 3: it.: «Moro si
ricongiunge idealmente, con questo esito straziante, a quelli, come lui innocen-
ti, che caddero al suo fianco. […] Si proclami alto e forte che il loro sangue non
è versato invano. Esso grida vendetta al cospetto di Dio, risveglia le coscienze as-
sopite, alimenta i fermi propositi, segna gli esecutori e i mandanti con il mar-
chio di Caino.».
130 Jemolo, Arturo Carlo, «Adesso è indispensabile essere un popolo unito», La
Stampa, 10.5.1978, 3: it.: «Non c’è […] da vergognarsi […]; non conosco nella
storia alcun popolo composto tutto di eroi. […] Di fronte a una organizzazione
così perfetta penso io pure che leggi speciali siano inutili; o dovrebbero essere
tali […] che la mia coscienza dice: no. Sarebbe un propter vitam, vivendi
perdere causam; preferisco Morire come Abele che vivere come Caino.».
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ians who recognize themselves, despite everything, in the State, is no
longer tolerable […]. Today, more than ever, we feel the need to be
united around our Republic.131
The jurist and future minister Giovanni Conso wrote an article in which,
by quoting and decontextualizing some passages of one of Moro’s mono-
graphs on criminal law, tried to prove that Moro, at least the Moro before
March 16, had always held the view that «The Interests of the State Must
Always Have Priority Over Individual Ones»:
To disregard the subjective profiles of law means transforming human life
into strange and tough social mechanics of actions and reactions where every
light of humanity is gone, dazzled. The law and the State must ensure
that, in the conflict of motives that pushes someone to act, every citi-
zen gives prevalence to the motif corresponding to the objective voice
of ethics, having social needs as a measure. All this does not detract
from the fact that the interest protected by criminal laws always refers
to the State, the sole and true passive subject of the crime. From this
perspective, private individual interest remains devoid of direct protec-
tion. There is therefore no subjectification of the criminal form in favor of
the individual, but a sublimation of the individual interest in the sphere of
public interest. A sublimation that can lead to sacrifice.132
131 Bobbio, Norberto, «Per lo Stato democratico», La Stampa, 10.5.1978, 3: it.: «Ora
non è più tollerabile il dilemma né con le Brigate rosse né con lo Stato, che
pone sullo stesso piano una banda di criminali e milioni e milioni di italiani che
si riconoscono nonostante tutto nello Stato […]. Mai come oggi sentiamo il do-
vere di stringerci attorno alla nostra Repubblica.»
132 Conso, Giovanni, «Il giurista Aldo Moro: ‹Gli interessi dello Stato devono essere
prioritari su quelli individuali›», La Stampa, 10.5.1978, 3: it.: «Prescindere dai pro-
fili soggettivi del diritto significa trasformare la vita umana in una strana e dura mec-
canica sociale di azioni e di reazioni, dove ogni luce di umanità è spenta, abbagliata.
Diritto e Stato debbono far si che, nel conflitto dei motivi che spingono ad
agire, ogni cittadino dia prevalenza al motivo corrispondente alla voce oggettiva
della eticità avendo come metro le esigenze sociali. Tutto ciò non toglie che l’in-
teresse tutelato dalle leggi penali faccia sempre capo allo Stato, unico e vero
soggetto passivo del reato. In questa prospettiva l’interesse privato individuale
resta privo di una tutela diretta. Non esiste, quindi, una soggettivazione della forma
penale a favore del singolo, ma una sublimazione dell’interesse individuale nella sfera
degli interessi pubblici. Una sublimazione che può portare fino al sacrificio.» [The
passages in italics are quotations from Moro’s book L’antigiuridicità penale (Paler-
mo: Priulla, 1947)].
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Conso thus distorted Moro’s juridical studies to construct the jurist and
politician as a voluntary martyr. Moro would never have said that the «ob-
jective voice of ethics», which for him was natural law understood from a
Christian point of view, is equal to the positive law of the state. The second
quotation is completely distorted, since Conso insinuated that Moro con-
sidered the interests of the state to be equivalent to public interest, which
is simply not true. In fact, Moro had always had a pluralistic view of civil
society and was convinced that «man is not only a singularity, not only an
individual, but he or she is society in its various forms, a society that is not
fulfilled by the state.»133 He was firmly convinced that «the problem of
law’s sociality has to be resolved in a positive sense, and the rediscovered
legal ethical essence of every ordinance, including that of the state, poses
[…] delicate problems regarding the relationship between the various or-
dinances, which all implement, for the part that concerns them, all human
ends in the light of one supreme ethical law.»134 Aldo Moro, in other
words, supported the primacy of the dignity of the person as a social being,
and placed emphasis on the irreducibility of the person to the political
body.135 So Conso, by placing social interests and the interests of the state
on the same level, not only distorted and overwhelmed Moro’s juridical–
ethical thought, but also strategically avoided answering the simple
question: how exactly would the exchange of prisoners endanger the social
sphere? What he could not or did not want to say was that the power inter-
ests of parties, primarily of the DC, were in danger.
Meanwhile, Eugenio Scalfari replied to Socialist Giuseppe Saragat, who
the previous day had said that «beside [Moro’s] corpse there is the corpse of
the First Republic, which has not been able to defend the life of the most
generous political man in the country». The director of La Repubblica criti-
cized this formulation by writing that the words of Saragat would «become
133 Moro said this during the session of the Commission for the Constitution (Com-
missione per la Costituzione) of March 24, 1947, which was in charge of elaborat-
ing and proposing the draft of the Constitution of the Italian Republic; quoted
in Bobbio 1980, 25; it.: «L’uomo […] non è soltanto singolo, non è soltanto indi-
viduo, ma è società nelle sue varie forme, società che non si esaurisce nello sta-
to.»
134 Moro 2006, 149; it.: «Il problema della socialità del diritto ha da essere risoluto
in senso positivo e la ritrovata essenza etico giuridica di ogni ordinamento ivi
compreso quello statuale, mentre fa vedere in più concreta luce la società
umana, pone […] delicati problemi di rapporto fra i diversi ordinamenti, che at-
tuano tutti, ciascuno per la parte che ad esso competa, tutti i fini umani nella
luce di una sola suprema legge etica.»
135 See Bobbio 1980, 7–26.
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reality only if we all fail to face the work of re-establishing the first [Re-
public], the one that was born of anti-fascism, resistance and the union of
democratic forces.»136 Here Moro’s body becomes a metaphor of the politi-
cal body, which according to Saragat died with Moro, but in Scafari’s text
it assumes the meaning of a starting point for a new beginning: the death
of the individual, the resurrection of the political body. The newspaper
also published the message of President of the Republic Giovanni Leone,
who again explained to the public who the BR really were: «the beasts […]
did not even hear the cry that the whole of humanity called out, asking for
the liberation of this man.»137 Like other newspapers, La Repubblica pub-
lished some articles dedicated to the biography and personality of the as-
sassinated politician. Reading the article by Corrado Augias, one almost
has the impression it is a text of Christian hagiography:
The thinness exhausted physically, the difficulties of an almost indeci-
pherable syntax, and the imprint on the face of mysterious suffering
are the external data that […] had made of him an almost oracular
stature. […] His physiognomy, which in the past had characteristics of
southern and small-bourgeois bonariety, was marked by age, with al-
most hieratic traits. He walked slowly, reclining his head slightly, talk-
ing without raising his voice, almost reluctantly.138
L’Unità, besides focusing on the united reaction of «the people», empha-
sized the bestiality and inhumanity of the BR, which, «by using coercive
136 Scalfari, Eugenio, «Contro il terrore le leggi della Repubblica», La Repubblica,
10.5.1978, 1-2; it.: «‹Accanto al suo cadavere c’è anche il cadavere della prima Re-
pubblica che non ha saputo difendere la vita del più generoso uomo politico del
paese.› […] Quello che Saragat teme e che taluno forse si augura, che cioè il 9
maggio le BR ci abbiano consegnato il cadavere della prima Repubblica, può di-
ventare realtà solo se tutti insieme non affronteremo l’opera di rifondare la pri-
ma, quella nata dall’antifascismo, dalla Resistenza e dall’unione delle forze
democratiche.»
137 La Repubblica, «Messaggio di Leone al paese», 10.5.1978, 2; it.: «Le belve […]
non hanno ascoltato neppure il grido che l’umanità intera ha lanciato perché
quest’uomo fosse liberato.»
138 Augias, Corrado, «Quell’apparente paradosso della sua azione politica», La Re-
pubblica, 10.5.1978, 11-12; it.: «La magrezza estenuata del fisico, le difficoltà di
una sintassi quasi indecifrabile, l’impronta sul volto di una sofferenza miste-
riosa, cono dati esteriori che […] avevano fatto raggiungere alla sua figura una
statura quasi oracolare. […] La sua fisionomia, che ebbe in anni lontani caratter-
istiche di bonarietà meridionale e piccolo-borghese, s’era andata segnano, con
l’età, di tratti quasi ieratici. Camminava con lentezza, il capo leggermente recli-
no, parlava senza mai alzare la voce, quasi con riluttanza.»
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means that we are uninformed about, but which we can imagine, have
martyred a man, devastated his mind, tried to use him cynically against his
own ideas, against his dearest friends and the party.»139 The newspaper of
the DC was instead completely focused on praising the political and hu-
man figure of Aldo Moro, who
is not dead and cannot die, because he has paid the highest price for
his ideal of a democracy that is tolerant and open to novelty. […] Aldo
Moro has paid with his life […] a huge tribute of pain and blood to a
cause in which, today more than ever, all Italian people can and must
recognize themselves. That is why we are certain that all Italian people
will act […] to eradicate the mortal cancer of terrorism from its
body.140
Even more explicit was Alfredo Vinciguerra, who described Moro as the
«master and martyr of liberty», who «is alive in the people’s conscience.»141
Alongside Vinciguerra’s article, was an article headlined «So the Pope Has
Lived the ‹Passion› of Moro», which described the reactions of the Vati-
can.142 On May 11 Il Popolo, like La Stampa had already done the previous
day, published the reactions of intellectuals and public figures under the
main headline «Lections of Martyrdom». The most explicit martyrological
representation was probably the one given by historian Gabriele De Rosa,
who wrote that the BR «have not returned to the Country the dead body
of Aldo Moro, but the living body of a martyr, the greatest martyr of the
139 Reichlin, Alfredo, «Perché l’hanno ucciso», L’Unità, 10.5.1978, 1; it.: «Usando
mezzi coercitivi che non conosciamo, ma che possiamo bene immaginare, han-
no martoriato un uomo, ne hanno devastato la mente, hanno cercato di usarlo
cinicamente contro le sue stesse idee, contro i suoi amici più cari e il partito.»
140 Il Popolo, «Il prezzo più alto», 10.5.1978, 1; it.: « […] non è morto e non può
morire, proprio perché egli ha pagato il prezzo più alto a questo suo ideale di
una democrazia insieme tollerante ed aperta fiduciosamente alle novità. […] Al-
do Moro ha pagato con la sua vita […] un tributo enorme di dolore e di sangue
ad una causa nella quale, mai come oggi tutto il popolo italiano può e deve ri-
conoscersi. Per questo siamo certi che tutto il popolo italiano saprà reagire […]
per estirpare dal proprio corpo il cancro mortale del terrorismo.»
141 Vinciguerra, Alfredo, «Un paese folgorato», Il Popolo, 10.5.1978, 3; it.: «Maestro e
martire della libertà […] è vivo nella coscienza comune.»
142 Narducci, Mario, «Così il papa ha vissuto la passione di Moro», Il Popolo,
10.5.1978, 3.
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modern history of the Italian and European democracy.»143 Here Aldo Mo-
ro assumed not only the role of a martyr of the Italian State, but of all the
European states or, more precisely, of the European community itself. So
wrote Sandro Caputo in an article headlined «The First Statesman Martyr
of the Free European Community».144
We find this kind of representation in a speech given on the same day in
Strasbourg by the President of the European Parliament, the Christian
Democrat Emilio Colombo:
Dear colleagues, we now want to commemorate Aldo Moro, who was
barbarously sacrificed. […] The upper hand has retained an ice-cold,
calculating, incomprehensible brutality, which has turned his captivity
into sacrifice and martyrdom. […] Moro was sacrificed for the very
ideals for which he fought as a lecturer, as a politician, and as a states-
man during his long, laborious, often controversial, but certainly fruit-
ful years. […] The Italian Constitution bears, especially in the section
about the fundamental rights of man and of the citizen in a democrat-
ic society, the stamp of that Christian personalism, which influenced
his conception of man, of society and of the state.145
Here, the victim is described as a defender of fundamental rights. Death it-
self takes on the meaning of a real witness to the moral truth of those
rights. This death is the «price» that Moro (and with him the whole na-
tion) «pays» for his commitment to fundamental rights. Moro is to some
extent simultaneously a Christian martyr and a state martyr, inasmuch as
the basic values of Christianity and those at the heart of the Italian Consti-
tution are considered similar, if not identical. Moreover, there is another
very significant aspect to highlight: in Colombo’s speech, it is impossible
to identify exactly who the intended agent of the sacrificial act is. There is a
passage that, perhaps more than others, clarifies this lack of clarity. Colom-
bo said that «incomprehensible brutality […] has turned the captivity into
sacrifice and martyrdom.» This formulation clearly has a strategic function,
since it allows the speaker to make use of the rhetoric of martyrdom and
143 De Rosa, Gabriele, «Il suo nome è impresso a caratteri indelebili nella coscienza
civile di tutti i popoli amanti della libertà»», Il Popolo, 11.5.1978, 5; it.: «Le
Brigate rosse non hanno restituito al Paese il corpo morto di Aldo Moro, ma il
corpo vivo di un martire, del più grande martire della storia moderna della
democrazia Italiana e europea.»
144 Caputo, Sandro, «Il primo statista martire della libera Comunità europea», Il
Popolo, 10.5.1978, 7.
145 Colombo 1978, 5–6.
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sacrifice without explicitly naming an agent. The BR are obviously the on-
ly agents of such brutality; however, in Colombo’s speech they are not real-
ly addressed as the sacrificers of Moro. It is brutality, violence itself, which
here qualifies the event as martyrdom. Detached from the intentionality of
the subjects, the event of violence itself acquires a metaphysical connota-
tion. It becomes a metaphysical force that acts in history, conferring a tran-
scendental meaning to what has happened. An almost Manichean concep-
tion of history seems to be operative here, according to which a cosmic
force—evil—operates in the world and determines the fate of a whole na-
tion.
On May 11 two topics dominated media headlines: the commemoration
in parliament and the private funeral in Torrita Tiberina. The newspapers
described how the family buried Moro «silently» and «secretly» and report-
ed that representatives of the DC and of the Church had unsuccessfully
tried to persuade the family to allow a public funeral.146 Despite the fami-
ly’s statement, a public ceremony was held on May 13 in the Archbasilica
of St. John Lateran in the absence of Moro’s body. Zaccagnini, according
to La Repubblica, justified the decision by saying that «the Moro family has
to be understood. Moro, however, was one of the country’s leaders, his
public character belongs to the DC and the nation.»147 Similarly, the Com-
munists’ argument was that the family had to respect the needs of the col-
lective and popular sentiment, because Moro belonged to Italy.148 As Wag-
ner-Pacifici observes, «the representatives of the newly installed govern-
ment, the major political parties, the established mass media, and the hier-
archy of the Catholic Church enacted and attended public ceremonies of
reconciliation. These ceremonies were to symbolize Italy’s reunification,
made possible by Moro’s sacrifice.»149 All of the most important political
personalities, delegates of a hundred countries, and the Pope participated
in the funeral. Compared with what the newspapers wrote in the days lead-
ing up to it, the Pope’s prayer at the end of the rite was not full of martyro-
146 Pansa, Gianpaolo, «Moro sepolto in silenzio», La Repubblica, 11.5.1978, 4;
L’Unità, «La famiglia l’ha sepolto in silenzio nel paesino dove amava rifugiarsi»,
11.5.1978, 2; Fedi, Giuseppe, «D’improvviso la famiglia lo ha seppellito in segre-
to», La Stampa, 11.5.1978, 1.
147 Pansa, Gianpaolo, «Moro sepolto in silenzio», La Repubblica, 11.5.1978, 4; it.:
«La famiglia Moro va compresa. Moro, tuttavia, è stato uno dei leader del paese,
il suo personaggio pubblico appartiene alla DC e alla nazione.»
148 See Katz 1980, 147.
149 Wagner-Pacifici 1986, 208.
6 Moro’s Voice and its Annihilation
300
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
logical rhetoric but above all concerned the endurance of pain caused by
death and the hope of eternal life:
Lord, listen to us! […] You have not heard our supplication for the
safety of Aldo Moro, for this good, gentle, wise, innocent man and
friend; but You, Lord, did not abandon his immortal spirit, marked by
faith in Christ, which is resurrection and life. For him, for him, Lord,
listen to us.150
For La Stampa, that prayer had not only a religious but, above all a political
significance, inasmuch as
for the men of the Italian government, rigid assertors of a democratic
law that is the only defense for all citizens (even when the price is the
life of a friend, brother, master), the comfort of the papal magisterium
is extremely important, no less than the fraternal presence of the dele-
gations of one hundred nations.151
Journalist Igor Man described the crowd and the flags outside of the Arch-
basilica in order to highlight, again, the people’s and the parties’ unity:
Outside the basilica, in the square […] white, red, and green flags
hoisted by young Republicans flutter in the wind. There are fifty thou-
sand laymen and believers, mute and moved, standing or kneeling.
There are some who are weeping but even some who are cursing the
‹executioners and assassins› […]. Fifty thousand people: policemen,
Carabinieri, soldiers, villagers, workers and the unemployed, people of
ancient wards, women and children, young and old people, all togeth-
er gathered to reflect, to pray, to curse.152
150 La Stampa, «Il discorso del Papa», 14.5.1978, 1; it.: «Signore, Ascoltaci! […] Tu
non hai esaudito la nostra supplica per la incolumità di Aldo Moro, di questo
uomo buono, mite, saggio, innocente ed amico; ma Tu, o signore, non hai ab-
bandonato il suo spirito immortale, segnato dalla fede nel Cristo, che è la risur-
rezione e la vita. Per lui, per lui, Signore, ascoltaci.»
151 La Stampa, «Solidarietà umana e politica», 14.5.1978, 1; it.: «Per gli uomini del
governo italiano, rigidi assertori di una legge democratica che è la sola difesa per
tutti i cittadini (anche quando il prezzo sia la vita di un amico, fratello, mae-
stro), il conforto del magistero papale è di altissima importanza, non meno della
presenza fraterna delle delegazioni di cento nazioni.»
152 Man, Igor, «Paolo VI e i delegati di cento paesi al solenne rito funebre in Latera-
no, La Stampa, 14.5.1978, 1; it.: «Fuori dalla basilica, nella piazza […] garriscono
il vento bandiere bianche bandiere rosse, e quelle verdi issate dai giovani repub-
blicani. Laici e credenti sono in cinquantamila, muti e commossi, che in piedi,
chi in ginocchio. C’è chi piange man anche chi impreca contro i ‹boia assassini›
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In their commentary on the funeral, the editorialist of Il Popolo wanted to
emphasize «which» Moro was commemorated on May 13: «In a recent
speech, one of the last he made, Aldo Moro underlined the ‹extreme pas-
sion› with which he has lived out his political commitment, which is the
DC’s commitment. […] It is to this Moro that yesterday we said good-
bye.»153 People must therefore forget the Moro of the letters: only the man
who with «extreme passion» devoted himself to politics is worthy of being
remembered. In the Corriere della Sera, journalist Fabrizio de Santis argued
that the ceremony in the Archbasilica «is not the funeral of Aldo Moro, be-
cause the funeral was celebrated in silence last Wednesday […], but the cer-
emonial tribute to the memory of a statesman who remained the victim of
a national tragedy, the witness of faith overwhelmed by barbarism.»154
From outside the Archbasilica, another journalist reported that «when the
Pope defines Moro as a ‹good, wise, gentle› man, elderly ladies shout:
‹Holy, Holy!› Then they receive the blessing.»155 The popular worshiping of
Moro as a secular and religious martyr had definitely begun.
The state funeral for Aldo Moro seems to have the analogous function of
the funeral per imaginem as described by Agamben, namely the rite in
which a wax effigy or «colossus» takes the place of the missing corpse of
the sovereign. Addressing the rite of the image in the Roman imperial
apotheosis, Agamben argues that
the death of the emperor (despite the presence of the corpse, whose re-
mains are ritually burned) frees a supplement of sacred life, as in the
case of the man who survived consecration, must be neutralized by
means of a colossus. Thus, it is as if the emperor had in himself not
[…]. Cinquantamila persone: poliziotti, carabinieri, soldati, borgatari, operai e
disoccupati, popolino dei rioni antichi, donne e bambini, giovani e vecchi, tutti
insieme raccolti a riflettere, a pregare, anche a maledire.»
153 Il Popolo, «L’ultimo addio per un ‹giusto›», 14.5.1978, 1; it.: «In un recente discor-
so, uno degli ultimi discorsi da lui pronunciati, Aldo Moro sottolineava l’‹es-
trema passione› con cui egli ha vissuto in ogni momento il suo impegno politi-
co, che è l’impegno della DC. […] È a questo Moro che ieri abbiamo detto ad-
dio.»
154 De Santis, Fabrizio, «Attorno al Papa si è trovato unito tutto il mondo politico
italiano», Corriere della Sera, 14.5.1978, 2; it.: «Non è il funerale di Aldo Moro,
perché il funerale fu celebrato in silenzio mercoledì scorso […], ma il doveroso
omaggio funebre alla memoria di un uomo di stato rimasto vittima di una
tragedia nazionale, di un testimone della fede travolto dalla barbarie.»
155 Corriere della Sera, «Bandiere bianche, rosse, verdi», 14.5.1978, 1; it.: «Quando il
pontefice definisce Moro come un uomo ‹buono, saggio, giusto›, le vecchiette
gridano: ‹Santo! Santo!› Poi ricevono la benedizione.»
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two bodies but rather two lives inside one single body: a natural and a
sacred life. The latter, regardless of the regular funeral rite, survives the
former and can only ascend to the heavens and be deified after the
funus imaginarium. […] We find ourselves confronted with a bare life
that has been separated from its context and that, so to speak surviving
in death, is for this very reason incompatible with the human world.
[…] For the emperor, the double funeral makes it possible to fasten on-
to the sacred life, which must be gathered and divinized in the
apotheosis. […] For the sovereign, death reveals the excess that seems
to be as such inherent in supreme power, as if supreme power were, in
the last analysis, nothing other than the capacity to constitute oneself and
others as life that may be killed but not sacrificed.156
Despite Moro’s body not being replaced by a colossus, the funeral in the
absence of his mortal remains also had the function of neutralizing a sup-
plement of sacred life. In fact, since Moro had previously been reduced to
bare life by annihilating his public image, that is, his image as a sovereign
statesman, it was necessary to reconsecrate him as the sovereign-martyr
who had sacrificed his life for the salvation of the nation-state. Precisely be-
cause Moro was reduced to a bare life that can be killed but not sacrificed,
it became necessary to perform a funeral that was a performance of conse-
cration.157 Only after this performance could Moro definitely be wor-
shipped as a sovereign-martyr. The BR only killed Aldo Moro; the Italian
State had to consecrate him in order to let him ascend to the heaven of
state mythology. The representatives of the constituted power could not af-
ford to allow Moro, after all that he had written, to become the paladin of
criticism of the function of power. From the naked life to which he was re-
duced, the natural life that was buried two days earlier in Torrita Tiberina,
Moro had to reassume the role of the sovereign. The media campaign dur-
ing his imprisonment had progressively separated Moro from his context,
his public life form, thus transforming him into a homo sacer, that is, this
strange life that lives outside both the sacral and profane spheres. The dou-
ble funeral of Moro—public and private—seems to fulfill the need to «fas-
ten onto the sacred life, which must be gathered and divinized». The state
ritual turned Moro the homo sacer, the liminal figure of the political–juridi-
cal system, into Moro the sovereign, the nation’s political body. The public
funeral basically had the function of hiding the symmetry between the
156 Agamben 1998, 100–101.
157 See Heywood 2009.
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body of the homo sacer and the body of the sovereign, which, as Agamben
argues, is at the very heart of modern political order: every life is dispens-
able, also and above all the life of someone who, for a certain amount of
time, represented sovereign power.
Major political parties, representatives of the government and most parts
of the established media thus tried to take possession of Aldo Moro and to
establish his memorialization as the sovereign-martyr who sacrificed his
life for the state’s and society’s salvation. However, not everyone accepted
the hegemonic and doxological representation of the funeral. Despite the
main headline on the first page of La Repubblica—«Moro’s Funeral Closes
the Most Dramatic Chapter of the Republic»—expressing the will to break
with the past and look to the future, Scalfari’s editorial gave a very different
and less optimistic interpretation of the funeral, arguing that:
The country, in that immense and naked basilica, was not there. The
people, with their passion and spontaneity, were absent, just as absent
were the widow and the children of the deceased. The protagonist of
that funeral was only the Institution, through its ancient and recent
representatives, Catholics and secularists, Christian Democrats and
Communists, who arrived together at this fatal destination. […] It is
difficult to understand what has gone on in the minds of those presi-
dents, of those ministers, of those chamberlains of Catholic Power
[…]. One thing is certain: between their past and their future there is a
dead man, one of them, their guide. That dead man will weigh on ev-
eryone and it will not be easy to get rid of him.158
This article anticipated a sense of aversion to the ritual and discursive
practices used to construct a state martyr figure, which would continue to
persist and partly spread over the years to come. Scalfari’s article represent-
ed Moro’s death more as a sacrilege than a sacrifice, the funeral more as a
profanation than a sacralization of the memory of the politician. In this ar-
158 Scalfari, Eugenio, «Lo sgomento dopo 30 anni di potere», La Repubblica,
14.5.1978, 1-2; it.: «Il paese, in quell’immensa e nuda basilica, non c’era. Il Popo-
lo, con le sue passioni e la sua spontaneità, era assente, così come assenti erano
la vedova e i figli dello scomparso. Protagonista di quella messa funebre era
soltanto l’Istituzione, attraverso i suoi rappresentanti antichi e recenti, cattolici e
laici, democristiani e comunisti, arrivati insieme a questo fatale appuntamento.
[…] È difficile capire che cosa si è passato nell’animo di quei presidenti, di quei
ministri, di quei ciambellani del Potere cattolico […]. Una cosa è certa: tra il
loro passato e il loro futuro c’è un morto, uno di loro, la loro guida. Quel morto
pesa su tutti e non sarà facile liberarsene.»
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ticle, the impression of an unbridgeable distance between Moro’s figure
and the man of power begins to emerge. The Moro of the letters acts like a
ghost that profanes the mechanism of the glorification of power, a voice
that from the hereafter will continue to say: I do not belong to you.
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Memorialization Practices and Memory Struggle
Contested Memory and Practices of Memorialization in the Public Space
Collective memory, particularly what Aleida Assmann calls «political
memory», is not simply the sum or condensate of a series of individual
memories, but something which is made by institutions and larger social
groups with the aid of memorial signs. Through memorial signs, such as
monuments, museums, commemoration rites and ceremonies, groups and
institutions are able to frame and reframe collective identities. According
to Assmann, political constructions of memory consist of three main char-
acteristics. First, they tend towards homogeneous unity and self-contained
closure. Second, they are «emplotted» in a narrative that is emotionally
charged and conveys a clear invigorating message. Third, they are anchored
in material and visible signs as well as in performative actions, which peri-
odically reactivate individual memories and enhance collective participa-
tion.1 As Biljana Menkovic argues, these materials and visible signs are
manifestations of practices of the mythological narration of past events.2
Peter Reichel calls this the «politicization of memory», which began with
the French Revolution, the emancipation of the bourgeoisie and the emer-
gence of nation-states.3 War memorials are the most common public mon-
uments. They are found in cities and villages, especially those commemo-
rating the victims of the Second World War. It thus seems that there is a
significant link between political violence and practices of memorializa-
tion. Reinhard Koselleck defines this memorialization of events of political
violence as the new «political death cult of modernity», which serves for
the legitimization of nation-states and the construction of national collec-
tive identities.4
In Italy, many memorials commemorate the two key moments of mod-
ern Italian history, the Risorgimento and the Resistenza. In the fourth chap-
ter, we saw that in both historical contexts the rhetoric of sacrifice and
martyrdom was quite diffuse. The use of such rhetoric is documented by
7
7.1
1 See Assmann 2010, 42–43.
2 See Menkovic 1999, 1–3.
3 See Reichel 1995, 21–27.
4 Koselleck 1999, 11.
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memorial signs that can be found in different Italian regions and places. It
is useful to consider a few examples. In Mantova, via Chiassi, there is a
plaque that commemorates the men condemned to death by hanging in
the city between 1852 and 1855 by the general governor of Lombardia-
Veneto, Major General Josef Radetzky. The plaque states: «In this house,
challenging the death, in the night of 2 August 1850, the martyrs of
Belfiore and their comrades united to conspire against Austrian oppres-
sion».5 In Matelica, in the province of Macerata, there is a plaque that com-
memorates the partisans who died during the war in the town’s territory as
follows: «In the twentieth anniversary of the Resistance, the city of Matel-
ica, remembering [this experience], immortalizes on this stone the martyrs
of the partisan struggle».6 Similarly, in Ancona there is a large marble
block located at one of the main and most visible access points to the city,
in the port area, dedicated to «the fallen and the martyrs of the Resis-
tance».7 In some cases, there is no need for the terms «martyr» or «martyr-
dom» to appear to perceive the presence of a martyrological or at least sac-
rificial conception of death. This is the case of a plaque located in the
Cimitero monumentale della Certosa di Bologna, which states:
Partisan city faithful to ancient traditions did not want to be subjected
to the arrogance of the German invader and with the pure blood of
thousands of his youngest children, with its houses destroyed in epic
diurnal fighting sustained with weapons taken from the enemy, was at
the forefront of the unequal struggle and insurrection that in the radi-
ant daybreak of April 1945 led the fatherland to the conquest of its
freedom.8
Resistance here is clearly conceived as a patriotic struggle against invaders,
where the «blood» of the «children» assumes the connotation of a material
witness, which can be understood as an appeal to future generations for
the defense of the freedom of the «fatherland». Some memorial signs trace
5 It.: «In questa casa sfidando la morte la note del 2 novembre 1850 si unirono a con-
giurare contro l’oppressione austriaca i martiri di Belfiore e i loro compagni.»
6 It.: «Nel ventennale della Resistenza la città di Matelica memore immortala sulla
pietra i martiri della lotta partigiana.»
7 It.: «Ai caduti e ai martiri della Resistenza.»
8 It.: «Città partigiana fedele alle antiche tradizioni non volle soggiacere alla pre-
potenza del Tedesco invasore e col sangue purissimo di migliaia dei suoi figli mi-
nori con le sue case distrutte ed in epici diuturni combattimenti sostenuti con le
armi sottratte al nemico fu all’avanguardia nell’impari lotta e nell’insurrezione che
nell’alba radiosa dell’aprile 1945 portò la patria alla conquista della sua libertà.»
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a fil rouge between the struggle for Italian unification and the partisan Re-
sistance, such as a plaque located on the old street walls of Frascati, in the
province of Rome, which is dedicated «to the Resistance that heroically
here marked the second Risorgimento on September 10, 1943».9 Another
interesting plaque that is located in the village of Ceppo, in the province of
Teramo, where in 1943 there was a battle between partisans and German
soldiers, commemorates the fallen of the two nations as martyrs; the
plaque states:
Here the battle faded; the prodigy was accomplished on September 25,
1943 in fraternity of arms with Yugoslav patriots and allied soldiers, ar-
tisans of Teramo, who were poor of means [but] not of courage, defeat-
ed powerful German forces. Established in the 39th anniversary of the
victorious day, this monument perpetuates the memory sanctified by
the blood of martyrs and the fallen in the Resistance of Teramo.10
As shown in the previous chapters, sacrificial and martyrological represen-
tations were widely used during and immediately after the 55 days of Mo-
ro’s imprisonment. It is not surprising, then, that some memorial signs
commemorating Aldo Moro also reproduce such rhetoric and language.
This is perfectly exemplified by a memorial dedicated to the «memory of
Aldo Moro and the fallen soldiers of via Fani» situated in the Apulian city
Brindisi and erected in June 1980. The monument was commissioned in
1979 by the municipal administration to artist Marcello Avenali and situat-
ed in the center of the roundabout at the north entrance of the city. The
website brindisiweb.it provides the following description of the monu-
ment:
An anti-rhetorical sculpture, in balance with the chosen environment,
set on the verticality of two adjacent bands of steel in modular slabs,
both 12 meters high, which attract, reflect, move the light, and which
diverge to the point where, perpendicularly, a group of stylized birds
fly, as if it were pushed by a thin red line. The idea that life denied by
violence nourishes the vitality of freethinking was a guide in the defi-
9 It.: «Alla Resistenza che eroicamente qui segnò il 10 settembre 1943 il secondo
Risorgimento.»
10 It.: «Qui divampò la battaglia si compì il prodigio il 25 settembre 1943 in frater-
nità d’armi con patrioti Jugoslavi e soldati alleati artigiani di Teramo, poveri di
mezzi non di valore volsero in fuga possenti forze germaniche eretto nel XXXIX
anniversario della vittoriosa giornata questo monumento vuole perpetuarne il ri-
cordo santificato dal sangue dei martiri e caduti della resistenza teramana.»
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nition of that twisted and broken tree, of that flight that quickly moves
from red blood.11
This description uses a metaphorical reference to blood to signify Moro’s
death as a sort of sacrifice for the defense of freedom of thought. Similarly,
another website refers to the red line as «the symbol of the victim’s blood»
and stylizes birds as a «symbol of the ideals that despite the violence and
death fly high».12 Moreover, this rhetoric was also used in the plaque at the
bottom of the monument:
Beyond the ephemeral time of the violent [people], Brindisi remem-
bers Aldo Moro, gentle martyr—powerful mind—his blood spilled to
forge future destinies for a free and worthy Italy.13
Less explicitly martyrological, but still interesting for the analytical pur-
pose of this study, is the bust of the Christian Democrat statist that was
erected in Bari in Piazza Aldo Moro. One of the streets facing the square
was called via Martiri di via Fani, thus representing Moro’s bodyguards as
martyrs. The engraving on the stone that holds the bust reproduces a pas-
sage from a speech that Aldo Moro gave on March 20, 1976, during the
13th Congress of the Christian Democracy (DC), in one of the most diffi-
cult moments of his political career. Here, he was confronted with a gov-
ernment crisis (the Italian Socialist Party had just moved away from the
majority and had returned to the opposition), strong criticisms of the gov-
ernment and the party (the Lockheed scandal had just broken out), and in-
11 It.: «Una scultura anti-retorica, in equilibrio con l’ambiente prescelto, impostata
sulla verticalità di due fasce affiancate di acciaio in lastre modulari, due superfici
alte 12 metri, che attirano, riflettono, muovono la luce, divergono in alto nel
punto in cui, perpendicolarmente, prende il volo un gruppo di stilizzati uccelli,
come sospinto da una sottile linea rossa. L’idea che la vita negata dalla violenza
alimenti la vitalità del pensiero libero fu di guida nella definizione di quell’ al-
bero contorto e squarciato, di quel volo che muove rapido dal rosso del sangue.»
http://www.brindisiweb.it/monumenti/monumento_aldo_moro.asp (accessed
August 20, 2017).
12 It.: «Il monumento è caratterizzato dal movimento sinuoso delle due parti di cui
è composto, rappresentanti l’albero della vita squarciato e al suo interno una linea
rossa, simbolo del sangue delle vittime e gli uccelli stilizzati simbolo degli ideali,
che nonostante le violenze e la morte volano in alto.» http://www.brundarte.it/20
14/05/07/monumento-a-virgilio-e-uno-sguardo-al-patrimonio-monumentale-conte
mporaneo/ (accessed August 20, 2017).
13 It.: «Sull’effimero tempo dei violenti, Brindisi leva in ricordo Aldo Moro, martire
mite – mente potente – sangue sparso a forgiare destini futuri per un Italia libera
e degna.»
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ternal party conflicts caused mainly by its policy of openness toward the
Italian Communist Party (PCI). The plaque reproduces only a short pas-
sage of this speech, which, as with many of Moro’s speeches, is quite long:
This country will not be saved, the great season of rights will be
ephemeral, if a new sense of duty does not emerge in Italy.14
Extracted from the full text of the speech, this phrase completely loses the
meaning it held in its original context, at least for those who did not hear
or read the speech. Given that the appeal to duty during Moro’s 55 days of
prison was above all used by those who appealed to the raison d’État—the
duty of not accepting negotiations with the BR—one cannot but notice
that the sentence is implicitly used to make Moro’s sacrifice appear as the
ultimate fulfillment of his duty. There is no doubt that the sentence here
assumes an instrumental and non-critical function. Moreover, on the side
of Moro’s bust, there is a second stone that reproduces the speech by the
Pope from April 21, 1978, which, as we saw, implicitly endorsed the «line
of firmness» adopted by the government. In Moro’s speech, within the
context in which it was originally held, the sentence was not an appeal to
the «reason of state». On the contrary, Moro spoke of the «disruptive force
of youth and the right of revolutionary succession» that initiated a «process
of liberation», which «can be neither disputed nor circumvented with false
promises».15 In other words, he called for the recognition of the demands
of social justice—for example, the demand for full «recognition of wom-
en’s value, […] of their true independence and equality»—which for years
had been expressed by young people, primarily by the student move-
ment.16 Moreover, Moro requested the recognition of «the radically new
weight that workers have in social organizations, their incomprehensible
right to be not a mere tool.» Finally, he said without half measures that
Faced with this [social] blossoming, politics must be aware of its lim-
its, ready to bend over this new reality, which takes away the rigidity of
State reason, to give to [this new reality] the breath of man’s reason.
14 Moro 1979, 337; it.: «Questo Paese non si salverà, la grande stagione dei diritti
risulterà effimera, se non nascerà in Italia un nuovo senso del dovere.»
15 Moro 1979, 336; it.: «Chi può ignorare la forza dirompente della gioventù ed un
diritto di successione rivoluzionaria che non può essere né contestata né aggirata
con false promesse?»
16 Moro 1979, 336; it.: «Chi può negare che il riconoscimento del valore della don-
na, della sua originalità, della sua ricchezza, la sua reale indipendenza ed
uguaglianza, siano un problema non eludibile a questo punto cruciale dello
sviluppo storico?»
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[…] The law must be restored to its universal character, so that not on-
ly the law, but rights in their balance, together, prevail, as it is just, in
social life. It is not about returning to the old and unbearable con-
straints, which sacrifice the person to a monstrous deity that does not
deserve sacrifices. […] A long-suffering historical experience brings to
light the revolutionary claims of rights. But no society advances, no so-
ciety achieves its goals, the most radical, of justice if the strict voice of
consciousness and authentic sense of community do not place people
in the right relationship of social solidarity. This country will not be
saved, the great season of rights will be ephemeral if a new sense of du-
ty does not emerge in Italy.17
Moro’s speech therefore addressed the universality of rights and appealed
for the recognition of the ethical primacy of human rights and justice over
the «reason of state». That Moro explicitly appealed to his party to not sac-
rifice the person to the state, to that deity that Hobbes called Leviathan, is
significant, since it demonstrates that he was well aware of the function of
state mythology. There is no trace of this critique of the rhetoric of the
«reason of state» left in the monument erected in Bari. Moro’s words were
extracted and decontextualized in such a way as to reverse, or at least to si-
lence, its intended meaning.
Maybe the most important memorial sign is the one that was erected in
via Caetani, the same place where Aldo Moro’s body was found. On the
first anniversary of the statesman’s death, Moro was commemorated
through the erection of a plaque that states:
On the morning of May 9, 1978, fifty days after his barbaric abduction,
Aldo Moro’s bullet riddled body was found in this place. […] His sacri-
fice, coldly wanted with inhuman ferocity by those who tried in vain
17 Moro 1979, 336–337; it.: «Di fronte a questa fioritura la politica deve essere con-
scia del proprio limite, pronta a piegarsi su questa nuova realtà, che le toglie la
rigidezza della ragione di Stato, per darle il respiro della ragione dell’uomo. […]
Al diritto va restituito il suo carattere universale, sicché non solo il diritto, ma i
diritti nel loro equilibrato insieme prevalgano, com’è giusto, nella vita sociale.
Non si tratta di tornare alla vecchia e insostenibile costrizione, che sacrifica la per-
sona ad una mostruosa divinità che non merita sacrifici. […] Una lunga sofferta
esperienza storica porta alla luce le rivendicazioni rivoluzionarie dei diritti. Ma
nessuna società avanza, nessuna raggiunge i suoi traguardi, i più radicali, di gius-
tizia, se la voce rigorosa della coscienza ed un senso autentico della comunità non
collochino le persone nel giusto rapporto di solidarietà sociale. Questo Paese non
si salverà, la grande stagione dei diritti risulterà effimera, se non nascerà in Italia
un nuovo senso del dovere.»
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to prevent the implementation of a brave and far-sighted program for
the benefit of the entire Italian people, will remain as a warning and
an instruction to all citizens for a commitment to national unity in jus-
tice, peace, in national progress.18
On the same day, another plaque was erected in via Fani, which commem-
orated the death of Moro’s bodyguards as follows:
In this place […] five men loyal [fedeli] to the State and democracy
were killed with cold ferocity while fulfilling their duty.19
As Ruth Glynn and Giancarlo Lombardi observe, «although both plaques
were dedicated on the same day, only in the case of via Caetani is the date
of the plaque’s erection the anniversary of the death that occurred there.
Despite the fact that it was mounted on the anniversary of Moro’s death,
nothing in the wording of the via Fani plaque acknowledges the connec-
tion between the deaths it commemorates and that of the statesman ab-
ducted in the same location. In neither case is it acknowledged that those
who died were victims of terrorism. In via Fani, the use of the passive voice
constructs the deaths as resulting from the actions of unacknowledged
forces. […] Reference to the BR is equally absent from the plaque in via
Caetani, where abstract wording dehistoricizes the death commemorated
therein by depriving it of concrete agents.»20 According to Glynn and
Lombardi, the phrase «by those who tried in vain to prevent the imple-
mentation of a brave and far-sighted program for the benefit of the entire
Italian people» is intended to suggest that the BR were perhaps not the on-
ly ones responsible for Moro’s death, but rather that some other «forces»
were involved in the assassination. Furthermore, they argue that the
memorial sign in via Caetani constructs the assassination as an assault on
the Italian people as a whole. I agree with this interpretation and would
add that this de-historicization serves not only to suggest the possible in-
volvement and responsibility of obscure forces, but also contributes to the
18 It.: «Cinquantaquattro giorni dopo il suo barbaro rapimento, venne trovato in
questo luogo, la mattina del 9 maggio 1978, il corpo crivellato di proiettili di Al-
do Moro […]. Il suo sacrificio freddamente voluto con disumana ferocia da chi
tentava inutilmente d’impedire l’attuazione di un programma coraggioso e
lungimirante a beneficio dell’intero popolo italiano resterà quale monito e inseg-
namento a tutti i cittadini per un impegno di unità nazionale nella giustizia, nel-
la pace, nel progresso nazionale.»
19 It.: «In questo luogo […] cinque uomini fedeli allo Stato e alla democrazia sono
stati uccisi con fredda ferocia mentre adempivano il loro dovere.»
20 Glynn/Lombardi 2012, 6.
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mythicization of the event, which assumes the connotation of the outcome
of a cosmic, metahistorical battle between good and evil. Reiterating a
rhetorical strategy previously used during the 55 days of Moro’s imprison-
ment, those who were responsible for his death are dehumanized: they
craved death with «inhuman ferocity». Moreover, this also demonstrates
that suggesting the possible involvement of forces and actors other than
the BR—that is, the uncritical and superficial reference or implicit allusion
to alleged conspiracies—only supports a mythical conception of violence
and political conflicts.
Both via Fani and via Caetani serve as key places of annual commemora-
tive practices on March 16 and May 9 (see figures 7 and 8). Glynn and
Lombardi rightly point out that «over the years, the nature of commemo-
ration has changed, with significant anniversaries and more recent years
witnessing ever greater institutional representation» and that «the hierarch-
ical importance of the via Caetani site has been maintained throughout.»
Moreover, they draw attention to the fact that each place «has attested to
deep divisions between institutions and the family members of the victims,
who have tended to absent themselves from the official events.»21 In fact,
Moro’s family has always sustained, even in recent times, that the master-
minds of the kidnapping were not all identified, accusing members of the
DC and the government, particularly Francesco Cossiga and Giulio An-
dreotti, of being responsible for Moro’s death.22 As previously mentioned
in the fourth chapter, in 1998 Luigi Scalfaro, then President of Italy, en-
dorsed the view of Moro’s family as well as many historians, politicians
and journalists, saying that the members of the BR were only the material
performers of the attack, but that others were the real masterminds. Inter-
estingly, after Scalfaro’s intervention and during his presidency, the an-
niversaries of Moro’s death became occasions for politicians to appeal to
national reconciliation, which in 2008 culminated in the designation of 9
May as the «Memory Day for the Victims of Terrorism».23 David Moss
rightly addresses the presence of conflicting practices of memorialization,
observing that, «while Moro himself is now memorialized across Italy in
annual commemorations, and in the large number of streets, schools and
political cultural associations named after him, these external forms of re-
21 Glynn/Lombardi 2012, 6.
22 See Senzani, Fiorenza, «‹Per Moro non potevamo trattare.› Andreotti replica al
figlio dello statista. Cossiga: non leggerò il suo libro», Corriere della Sera,
15.10.2007, 21.
23 See Glynn/Lombardi 2012, 8.
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membrance are not accompanied by a consensual collective memory of the
significance of his life and death.»24 As an emblematic example of this ten-
24 Moss 2009, 168.
Sergio Matterella, 12th President of Italy, in via Fani, Rome, on
the 40th anniversary of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the
killing of his guards, March 16, 2018.
: Sergio Matterella, 12th President of Italy, in via Caetani, Rome,
on the 37th anniversary of the assassination of Aldo, May 9, 2015.
PICTURE 7:
PICTURE 8
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sion between memorialization practices and unresolved collective memory,
Moss points to a controversy that emerged in 1985 when a statue of Moro
was erected in his birthplace, Maglie, representing him with a copy of
L’Unità under his arm. Criticism of this statue, which is clearly intended to
symbolize Moro’s policy of openness toward the PCI, was also recently ex-
pressed.25
At each anniversary of the kidnapping and assassination of Aldo Moro,
the «Moro case» was and still is widely covered by the media. Despite news-
papers focusing mainly on the trials, the work of parliamentary commis-
sions, and the declarations and «revelations» of former members of the
Red Brigades (BR), as well as on different conspiracy theories, sacrificial
and martyrological language and rhetoric continue to reappear. The word-
ing «the martyrdom of Aldo Moro» or «the sacrifice of Aldo Moro» reap-
pears in many articles describing the commemorative rituals held in via
Caetani or via Fani, but generally these articles do not express any judg-
ment on the government’s choice to adopt the «line of firmness». There
are, however, some exceptions: to give just an example, in the editorial of
the March 16, 1988, edition of La Repubblica, entitled «The Martyr Who
Refused to Become a Symbol», the journalist Enzo Forcella argued that
[Moro’s] sacrifice has served to overcome the abyss opened by terror-
ism, to restore a minimum of dignity to a shaky state and trust in the
laws and moral values that must support any national community. It is
a sacrifice, however, that the sacrificial lamb has refused. Until the last,
as you know, Moro refused the role that destiny gave him, he did not
accept becoming a symbol. The prisoner was right, as were those who
did not accept yielding to terrorist blackmail, even at the cost of letting
him die. There were, and are, two irreconcilable reasons. This is the
topos of all the contradictions, the catastrophe that has transformed
the slaughter of an eminent political man and his guards into a great
tragedy, one of the rare, authentic tragedies of contemporary politics.26
25 See Mieli, Paolo, «Moro non voleva allearsi col PCI – Un compromesso (non)




26 Forcella, Enzo, «Il martire che rifiutò di divenire un simbolo», La Repubblica,
19.3.1988, 1; it.: «Il suo sacrificio è servito a superare il baratro aperto del terroris-
mo, a restituire un minimo di dignità a uno Stato traballante e di fiducia nelle
leggi e nei valori morali che devono sostenere qualsiasi collettività nazionale. È
un sacrificio, però, che l’agnello sacrificale ha rifiutato. Sino all’ultimo, come si
7.1 Contested Memory and Practices of Memorialization in the Public Space
315
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Forcella iterates here the tragic representation of the event already
widespread in 1978, by which Moro’s death is represented as an inevitable
event, something dictated by destiny. Within this tragic narrative, the fig-
ure of the scapegoat and the figure of the martyr can coexist, because the
will of the martyr, otherwise a condition sine qua non for the allocation of
the martyr role, does not matter, since destiny determines historical events.
Four decades after the events of 1978, this kind of uncritical justification
of the line of firmness «had come to be questioned by almost all Italians,
in the context of a generalized change of attitude towards ‘reason of state’
on the one hand and the ‘right to existence’ on the other.»27 As Piero Fassi-
no, the former leader of the Democratic Left political party, expressly stat-
ed in 2007 after Italian journalist Daniele Mastrogiacomo was kidnapped
in Afghanistan: «Moro’s story has admonished us to consider that there is
no reason of State that justifies the sacrifice of life. Perhaps we had to ne-
gotiate even then. Moro’s life was just as important as that of Mastrogiaco-
mo.»28 The process that led to this change was long and largely promoted
by «mediatic reworking of the statesman image»; as Pezzini demonstrates
in her important essay, the «recuperation» of Moro’s image was traced on
television by Sergio Zavoli’s Notte della Repubblica (IT, Rai 2, 1990),
while his «symbolic resurrection» was epitomized in Marco Bellocchio’s
film Buongiorno, notte (IT, 2003).29 However, before we turn our atten-
tion to cultural productions that specifically work with images or, more
precisely, with moving images, it is necessary to analyze the literary inter-
ventions of three important Italian writers, which, in different ways, chal-
lenge and overcome hegemonic representations and institutional practices
of memorialization, and that anticipate the reworking of Moro’s image by
television and cinema.
sa, Moro ha rifiutato il ruolo che gli assegnava il destino, non ha accettato di
trasformarsi in simbolo. Aveva ragione il prigioniero, avevano ragione coloro che
non hanno accettato, pur di salvarlo, di cedere al ricatto terrorista. Erano, e
restano, due ragioni inconciliabili. Questo è il topos di tutte le contraddizioni, il
punto di catastrofe che ha trasformato l’eccidio di un eminente uomo politico e
della sua scorta in una grande tragedia, una delle rare, autentiche tragedie della
politica contemporanea.»
27 Pezzini, 2012, 139–140.
28 Mazzocchi, Silvana, «Impossibile trattare per Moro, nel mirino c’era anche il
PCI», La Repubblica, 31.3.2007, 15; it.: «La vicenda di Moro ci ha ammonito ha
considerare che non c’è ragione di Stato che giustifichi il sacrificio di una vita.
Forse bisognava trattare anche allora. La vita di Moro era importante come quella
di Mastrogiacomo.»
29 Pezzini 2012, 136.
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Literary Interventions
Critiques of the hegemonic and doxological representation of Moro’s
death were expressed even before his death. Claudio Martelli, referring to
those who denied the authenticity of Moro’s letters, observed just over a
week before the politician’s assassination that «they seem to be more con-
cerned with Moro’s ‹memory› than with his life and discuss the interpreta-
tion of a style and a life that has not yet been lost.»30 Moreover, a few days
after his death, the author of A Clockwork Orange Anthony Burgess ob-
served that the process aiming at constructing the official memory of Mo-
ro’s kidnapping and assassination had already begun and warned the Ital-
ian people «not to transform Moro into a saint». He also mentioned the
interesting example of Charles I of England, who, after being executed by
Oliver Cromwell, was canonized by the Anglican Church. This was a big
mistake, Burgess argued, since through his glorification as a martyr the
English conservative party became a theocracy. He expressed the hope,
though a bit sarcastically, that this would not happen in Italy: «Christian
Democrats in Italy will certainly not want to allow themselves to earn the
collective aura of their boss’ martyrdom!»31
Italo Calvino also intervened in an article published in the Corriere della
Sera a week after the discovery of Aldo Moro’s corpse in via Caetani. Here,
the famous writer basically supported the line of firmness put forward by
the government, major political parties and the established media, since
If Moro was kidnapped in order to upset the institutions of the Repub-
lic, the action, whoever contributed to inspiring it, could only have
been solved in the way it was solved. They wanted to eliminate Moro
as the man of the difficult balance between the DC and the PCI. But
[they wanted] not to kill him immediately to prevent his last political
operation from being consecrated by his martyrdom. Then begins the
7.2
30 Martelli, Claudio, «Perché non credere a quelle lettere?», Corriere della Sera,
1.5.1978, 3; it.: «Costoro sembrano più preoccupati della ‹memoria› di Moro che
non della sua vita, e si disputano l’interpretazione di uno stile e di una vita che
non è ancora perduta.»
31 Quoted in Silj 1978, 187; it.: «Dobbiamo badare bene a non fare di Moro un san-
to. […] I democratici cristiani dell’Italia non vorranno certamente consentire a sé
stessi di guadagnarsi l’alone collettivo del martirio del loro capo!»
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most perverse phase of the jailers’ work: to use Moro against himself,
against his party, against the line pursued up to that point.32
Calvino directly addressed the topic of martyrology, but seems to exclude
the possibility that Moro, as actually happened, could be represented as a
state martyr despite the content of his letters. He also believed that Moro
would have died anyway regardless of the policy adopted by the govern-
ment and parties. Moreover, he did not see any metamorphosis in the let-
ters, or any change of perspective between the Moro before and the Moro
after March 16, 1978. In fact, he argued, «what Moro wanted or had to
write in the sense of taking distance from the men of his party seems to be
studied so as not to harm anything or anyone, which is why it can be said
that Moro basically remained a party man until the end.»33 However, he
stated, «it was clear that Moro renounced his public image and assumed
that of a family man, who was only interested in returning home.»34 Final-
ly, although he did not seem to assign any responsibility to the govern-
ment, major parties or the established media for Moro’s death, he uncondi-
tionally expressed his conviction that the BR’s action helped the DC above
all:
[…] it is certain that the Red Brigades, inarticulate and fierce, while
threatening Christian Democracy in the physical existence of their
cadres, paradoxically guarantee them a kind of moral immunity, they
help to postpone the examination of the responsibilities and faults
[colpe] accumulated in thirty years of government and sub-govern-
ment, [thus] which was called the ‹process› to the DC too quickly, but
32 Calvino 1995a, 2339; it.: «Se Moro è stato sequestrato per sconvolgere le isti-
tuzioni della Repubblica, l’azione, chiunque abbia concorso ad aspirarla, non
poteva avere altra soluzione di quella che ha avuto. Volevano togliere di mezzo
Moro, come uomo del difficile equilibrio tra DC e PCI. Ma non ucciderlo subito
per evitare che la sua ultima operazione politica risultasse consacrata dal suo mar-
tirio. Comincia allora la fase più perversa del lavoro dei carcerieri: usare Moro
contro sé stesso, contro il suo partito, contro la linea portata avanti fin là.»
33 Calvino 1995a, 2341; it: «[…] quel che Moro ha voluto o ha dovuto scrivere nel
senso di una presa di distanza dagli uomini del suo partito, sembra studiato in
modo da non danneggiare niente o nessuno, cosicché si può ben dire che Moro è
restato fino in fondo essenzialmente un uomo di partito.»
34 Calvino 1995a, 2340; it: «[…] è stato chiaro che Moro rinunciava alla sua immag-
ine pubblica e assumeva quella di un uomo di famiglia cui interessa solo che lo
lascino tornare a casa.»
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which in reality means in particular the possibility of overcoming a se-
rious crisis and the expulsion of the disease, of ex novo recovery.35
According to writer and literary critic Marco Belpoliti, this passage relates
to Calvino’s theory of power and violence and is based on the idea that
«sacrifice is a sublimatory process and a mythical or mystical experience.»
His arguments, Belpoliti notes, are similar to those of René Girard, «who is
also Frazer’s debtor for the figure of the scapegoat.»36 Calvino refers to
James George Frazer in an article entitled Il potere intercambiabile («The In-
terchangeable Power»), written in 1974, in which he addresses the resigna-
tion of Nixon following the Watergate scandal. Calvino resumes the Eng-
lish anthropologist’s theory of power, according to which in «primitive cul-
tures» the reigning king was sacrificed as soon as he showed a decline in
power in order to not break the balance between the natural cycle and the
social cycle, fertility and social organization. In Calvino’s reading of Frazer,
power has a cost proportionate to the privileges related to it. In this sense,
he understands the assassination of Moro as a natural outcome, the inevita-
ble cost to pay for power. Moreover, in Calvino’s thought the sacrifice of
the king is nothing but a moment within the cycle through which power
renews itself.37
This point of view leads him, in the final part in the article about Moro,
to conceive good and evil as two opposing forces, both necessary in the
great cosmic balance, and to reject the idea that goodness mingles with
evil:
There is a philosophical process that is called dialectics, which consists
in reversing the positive into the negative. But I do not believe in di-
alectics. I think that evil is nothing but evil. The accumulated Italian
vices have led to the monstrousness of the Moro crime. This will result
in more evil, which will be fought as evil, if possible, and reflected as
evil, in any case. There is also a story of the good, mixed with the evil,
but fundamentally separate, that one day may prevail for a lucky com-
35 Calvino 1995a, 2342; it.: «[…] è certo che le Brigate rosse, inarticolate e feroci,
mentre minacciano la Democrazia Cristiana nell’esistenza fisica dei suoi quadri,
le garantiscono paradossalmente una sorta di immunità morale, contribuiscono a
rimandare l’esame delle responsabilità e delle colpe accumulatesi in trent’anni di
governo e sottogoverno, quello che troppo in fretta fu definito il ‹processo› alla
DC, ma che in realtà vuol dire soprattutto possibilità di superamento di una crisi
grave, d’espulsione della malattia, di ripresa ex novo.»
36 Belpoliti 2001, 103.
37 See Belpoliti 2001, 101.
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bination of objective circumstances, and also a little for our will and
intelligence. Maybe.38
Calvino basically says that he does not believe that the sacrifice of Moro
can produce positive effects, that evil cannot produce something good,
which is why his interventions can be considered a critique of sacrifice.
However—and this is the key point—since he «naturalizes» sacrifice, con-
ceiving it as related to the natural disposition of man towards violence, he
finally conceives the sacrifice of Moro as a «cynical necessity», since «every
powerful man knows that high commanders are exposed to the danger of
violent death, so that the death of Moro, though it is execrable, confirms in
a negative way the bond that unites death and exercise of power.»39 In oth-
er words, Calvino remains imprisoned in a mythological conception of his-
tory, as he basically conceives violence as intrinsically interlinked with exer-
cising power, which guarantees and maintains social order.
Calvino’s understanding of the relationship between power and sacrifice
as indivisible and interdependent is also addressed in an article published
in November 1978, in which he criticizes Leonardo Sciascia’s L’affaire Mo-
ro, arguing that
The killing of a politician is a very serious fact […]; but we know that
those who hold high positions of power are exposed to violent deaths
[…], even in the most powerful and civil countries; this responds to a
very ancient tradition that connects death with exercising power, and
one cannot presume that this tradition will be interrupted in the very
near future. […] One can take the ‹test of firmness of the country› for
good, as does the official version of the facts with apologetic intent,
and so does Sciascia with critical intent. I am more pessimistic, […] as
I believe that the hope of a happy ending was an illusion that it would
be more pitiable not to cultivate.40
38 Calvino 1995a, 2343; it.: «C’è un procedimento filosofico che si chiama dialettica
che consiste nel rovesciare il negativo in positivo. Ma io non credo nella dialetti-
ca. Credo che dal male non venga altro che male. I mali italiani accumulati han-
no portato alla mostruosità del delitto Moro. Ne deriverà altro male, che andrà
combattuto in quanto male, se possibile, e pensato come male, comunque. C’è
anche una storia del bene, necessariamente mescolata a quella del male, ma
sostanzialmente separata, che potrà un giorno riavere il sopravvento, per un fortu-
nato concorso di circostanze obbiettive, e anche un po’ per nostra volontà e intel-
ligenza. Forse.».
39 Belpoliti 2001, 103.
40 Calvino 1995b, 2349–2352; it.: «L’uccisione di un uomo politico è un fatto gravis-
simo […]; però sappiamo che chi ricopre alti posti di potere è esposto a morti vi-
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L’affaire Moro by Leonardo Sciascia is the most quoted and discussed text
which addresses the events of spring 1978. The author describes the book
as a «pamphlet»; the introduction, which Belpoliti describes as «one of the
most beautiful pages of the entire post-war Italian literature»41, discusses a
central topic in the author’s entire literary work: the relationship between
literature and the search for truth. «Literature […]—Sciascia writes in Nero
su nero—is the most absolute form that truth can take.»42 Indeed, among
the first chapters of L’affaire Moro, there is a concentration of literary refer-
ences, among them references to Jorge Luis Borges, author of the short sto-
ry Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote («Pierre Menard, Author of the
Quixote»), which is written in the form of a literary review or critical piece
about Pierre Menard, a fictional eccentric twentieth-century French writ-
er.43 According to Sciascia, Borges was inspirited by Miguel de Unamuno’s
attempt to «rewrite» Cervantes masterpiece in his Vida de Don Quijote y
Sancho (usually translated in English with «Our Lord Don Quixote»). Re-
ferring to Borges, Sciascia argues that any work of «copying» a certain se-
quence of words, even if the copy exactly reproduces the original, has a dif-
ferent signification than the sequence of words had in its original context
or appearance. The Sicilian author points out that in the seventeenth cen-
tury the assertion according to which history is «the mother of truth», as
seen in Cervantes’ Don Quixote, was a «mere rhetorical eulogy of history».
The same assertion, rewritten in the nineteenth century assumed a com-
pletely different connotation, since it could now be understood as indicat-
ing the idea that history does not contain the truth, but is rather the origin
of truth. In other words, the sentence was now expressing the belief that
historical research is not research into truth but its foundations. The same
change in meaning happened with what was said and written during or in
the immediate aftermath of Moro’s kidnapping and assassination. Sciascia
provides the example of a description of Moro’s interrupted path to parlia-
olente […], anche nei paesi più potenti e civili; questo risponde ad una tradizione
antichissima che collega la morte all’esercizio del potere e non è presumibile che
questa tradizione si interrompa nel prossimo avvenire. […] Si può prendere per
buona la prova di fermezza del paese, come fa la versione ufficiale dei fatti con
intenti apologetici e come fa Sciascia con intenti critici. Io sono più pessimista
[…] pensando che la speranza di un lieto fine era un’illusione che sarebbe stato
più pietoso non coltivare.
41 Belpoliti 2001, 3.
42 Sciascia 1991, 834; it.: «La letteratura […] è la più assoluta forma che la verità pos-
sa assumere.»
43 See Borges 2000, 88–95.
7.2 Literary Interventions
321
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ment the day of March 16 and emphasizes that such a description com-
pletely changed the meaning within only half a year (the approximate du-
ration separating March 16 from the drafting of L’affaire Moro):
The center of gravity has shifted: from Mr. Moro […] to the Chamber
of Deputies, where Mr. Moro’s absence would quickly produce what
his presence difficultly would have achieved: namely the calmness and
the concordance that allowed the approbation of the fourth govern-
ment chaired by Mr. Andreotti without any debate. The drama of the
abduction has been replaced […] by the drama that the absence of Mr.
Moro from Parliament, from political life, is more productive—in a
certain direction—than his presence.44
After a few months, Sciascia argues, the relationship between words and
things, acts and events changed, because the changed historico-political
setting allowed for understanding words differently. In fact, after a few
months it became clear that Moro’s death had facilitated the consolidation
of a certain type of government: not the government wanted by Moro, but
Andreotti’s government. His absence from politics was not productive in
the direction wanted by Moro, but in the direction wanted by his political
enemies. This conception of the performativity of language is fundamental
to an understanding of Sciascia’s hermeneutical approach to Moro’s letter,
the BR’s communiqués and to the hegemonic discourse produced by the
government and established media. Sciascia continually works to acquire
even fragmentary elements in an attempt to reconstruct the «truth» by ex-
trapolating details from language, form and style.
According to Sciascia, «Moro and the affair seem to have been generated
by a certain type of literature.»45 Moreover, as already mentioned in the
fifth chapter, he argues that Pasolini, when he wrote that Moro was the
«least implicated of them all», already prefigured the «Moro affair» in 1975.
The Sicilian author is particularly interested in Pasolini’s expression «for an
44 Sciascia 1978, 26; it.: Si è come spostato il centro di gravità: dall’onorevole Moro
[…] alla Camera dei deputati dove l'assenza dell'onorevole Moro avrebbe rapida-
mente prodotto quel che la sua presenza difficoltosamente avrebbe conseguito: e
cioè quell’acquietamento e quella concordia per cui il quarto governo presieduto
dall’onorevole Andreotti veniva approvato senza discussione alcuna. Al dramma
del rapimento si è come sostituito […] il dramma che l’assenza dell’onorevole
Moro dal Parlamento, dalla vita politica, è più producente – in una determinata
direzione – della sua presenza.»
45 Sciascia 1978, 27; it.: «Allo stesso modo che don Chisciotte dai libri di cavalleria
errante, Moro e la sua vicenda sembrano generati da una certa letteratura.»
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enigmatic correlation»; in fact, he argues, «in this brief parenthetical ele-
ment […] there is something like the premonition, like the prefiguration
of the ‹Moro affair›. Now we know that the ‹correlation› was a ‹contradic-
tion›: and that Moro paid for it with his life.»46 Correlation is the relation-
ship between two elements. What then is the enigmatic correlation affect-
ing the Sicilian author? On the one hand, there is the correlation between
power and sacrifice, which will be discussed later. On the other, there is
the correlation between language and things, acts or events.47 Sciascia be-
lieves that literature has a privileged relation with «truth», because litera-
ture has the power to bring to light the correlation between language and
things, act or events that, in different hermeneutic and pragmatic contexts,
produce meaningfulness. In other words, literature uncovers the truth of
the radical exteriority and contingency of language.
Before discussing the results of Sciascia’s analysis, we need to reject from
the outset the thesis according to which the Sicilian author is a dietrologo,
namely one who advocates conspiracy theories.48 In fact, Sciascia does not
argue that the assassination of Moro happened with the direct complicity
of secret services, the government or occult organizations. Though he does
not exclude a priori the possibility of such complicity, his thesis is another:
the action of the BR responded to the interests of a certain political class
that wanted to maintain (or increase) its power and for which the absence
of Moro was more productive than its presence. In fact, he argues, despite
the BR’s efficacy in planning and executing the attack in via Fani,
The Red Brigades […] are Italian. They are our thing [cosa nostra],
whatever the relations they may have with revolutionary sects or secret
services of other countries. […] Their reason of being, their function,
their ‹service› are solely in the shift of force relations: and of the forces
that are already there. And to not shift them much, one has to add.
Shifting them in the sense of ‹changing everything to change nothing›
[…]. [It is] thus an operation of pure power. Which can only be carried
out in that area between political parties where, in the shelter of ideo-
logical winds, power now lives.49
46 Sciascia 1978, 16; it.: «In questo breve inciso c’è un presentimento, come la prefig-
urazione dell’affaire Moro. Ora sappiamo che la ‹correlazione› era una ‹contrad-
dizione›: e che Moro la pagata con la vita.»
47 See Belpoliti 2001, 8.
48 See Gotor 2008b, 192–195.
49 Sciascia 1978, 128–130; it.: «Le Brigate Rosse […] sono italiane. Sono una cosa
nostra, quali che siano gli addentellati che possono avere con sette rivoluzionarie
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Sciascia therefore does not say that the BR were directed by someone, but
rather that their activities suited certain political interests, since they pre-
pared the ground for the legitimization of the political and institutional
status quo as absolutely necessary for the security and safety of Italian soci-
ety. With «operation of pure power», the author does not intend to indi-
cate a form of improbable direct complicity with the BR, but rather ex-
plain how Moro’s kidnappers could operate with such great ease, why
there was so much negligence with the investigations into finding Moro’s
prison, why the government spread a false communiqué, and finally why,
from the outset, the government assumed an uncompromising position
with regard to negotiations.
The capital error of the BR, Sciascia argues, was that they did not realize
that their action produced the opposite effect of their intentions: to stop
the political alliance between the PCI and the DC. They chose Moro pre-
cisely because «he was the creator of the return, after thirty years, of the
Communist Party to the governing majority.»50 In other words, they want-
ed to imprison the highest representative of power, because they thought
they could throw the entire Italian political system into crisis. It is worth-
while, at this point, to compare Sciascia’s reflections with what was written
by a great Italian writer about the BR, Umberto Eco. In an article pub-
lished in La Repubblica on March 23, 1978, and republished in a collection
of his texts in 1983, the famous semiotician lucidly analyzes the language
and ideology of the BR one week after Moro’s kidnapping, arguing that
We must have the courage to say that this ‹delusional› message [the
BR’s first communiqué] contains a very acceptable premise and trans-
lates […] a thesis that all European and American culture, from the
students of the 1968 movement to the theorists of the Monthly Review,
as well as the leftist parties have long been repeating. So if there is a
‹paranoia›, it is not in the premises, but […] in the practical conclu-
sions that they draw from these premises. […] [N]o one can deny that
global planetary policy is not determined by individual governments
o servizi segreti di altri paesi. […] La loro ragion d’essere, la loro funzione, il loro
‹servizio› stanno esclusivamente nello spostare dei rapporti di forza: e delle forze
che già ci sono. E di spostarli non di molto, bisogna aggiungere. Di spostarli nel
senso di quel ‹cambiar tutto per non cambiar nulla› […]. Operazione di puro
potere, dunque; che si può soltanto svolgere in quell’area interpartitica in cui, al
riparo dai venti ideologici, il potere ormai vive.»
50 Sciascia 1978, 131; it.: «[…] è stato l’artefice del ritorno, dopo trent’anni, del parti-
to Comunista nella maggioranza di governo.»
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but rather by a network of productive interests (and we can even call it
a network of multinationals) […].51
The BR’s mistake thus did not lie in their premise, but in the analysis of
the function of power and the way they decided to counteract it:
The confused idea that drives terrorism is a very modern and very capi-
talist principle (with respect to which classical Marxism was unpre-
pared) of the theory of systems. Large systems have no head, no protag-
onists, and are not even based on individual selfishness. This is why it
is not possible to strike them by killing their Kings, but by making
them unstable through disturbing gestures that rely on their own log-
ic. […] Modern terrorism pretends (or believes) to have meditated on
Marx, but in fact, it meditated on Norbert Wiener on the one hand
and science fiction literature on the other. The problem is that it did
not meditate enough. Proof of this is that in all previous BR’s propa-
ganda they still talked of ‹striking at the heart of the State›, cultivating
on the one hand the nineteenth-century notion of State, and on the
other the idea that the adversary still has a heart or a head. […] In the
last leaflet, the BR abandon the idea of the heart, the State, the bad
capitalist, the ‹hangman› minister. Now the opponent is the system of
the multinationals, of which Moro is a committed follower, at most a
depositor of information. […] Once they have mastered the idea of
large systems, they mythologize it again, believing that these systems
have ‹secret plans› of which Moro would be one of the depositors. The
truth is that big systems have nothing to do with secrecy and we all
know exactly how they work.52
51 Eco 1983, 109–110, it.: «Dobbiamo avere il coraggio di dire che questo ‹delirante›
messaggio contiene una premessa molto accettabile e traduce […] una tesi che
tutta la cultura europea e americana, dagli studenti del Sessantotto ai teorici della
Monthly Review, sino ai partiti di sinistra ripetono da tempo. E dunque se ‹para-
noia› c’è, non è nelle premesse, ma […] nelle conclusioni pratiche che ne trag-
gono. […] [N]essuno si nasconde che la politica internazionale planetaria non è
determinata dai singoli governi ma appunto da una rete d’interessi produttivi (e
chiamiamola pure rete delle multinazionali) […].»
52 Eco 1983, 110–111; it.: «L’idea confusa che muove il terrorismo è un principio
molto moderno e molto capitalistico (rispetto a cui il marxismo classico si è
trovato impreparato) di teoria dei sistemi. I grandi sistemi non hanno testa, non
hanno protagonisti e non vivono neppure nell’egoismo individuale. Quindi non
si colpiscono uccidendone i Re, ma rendendoli instabili attraverso gesti di distur-
bo che si avvalgono proprio della loro logica. […] Il terrorismo moderno finge (o
crede) di avere meditato Marx, ma in effetti, ha meditato Norbert Wiener da un
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The fundamental mistake of the BR was thus their belief that power «still
has a heart or a head», that they could defeat an established power by kid-
napping the one person they regarded as embodying and representing
power. Moreover, they did not understand that their actions were function-
al to the maintenance and legitimization of what they called the «Imperial-
ist State of the Multinationals»:
Terrorism is not the enemy of large systems but, on the contrary, their
natural, accepted, and anticipated counterpart. The multinational sys-
tem […] accepts small local wars, which will, from time to time, be
disciplined and reduced by astute international intervention, and on
the other hand accepts terrorism. […] Terrorism also serves to give a
reason for being to police and armies, which, if they are made inopera-
tive, demand to realize themselves in some other wider conflict. Lastly,
terrorism serves to encourage disciplined action, where an excess of
democracy renders the situation ungovernable.53
Eco’s reflections are useful in clarifying the function of the «discourse of
sovereignty» and the «mythology of the state». A general critique against
the reintroduction of the concept of sovereignty in political theory as a
paradigm of governance is that it is incompatible with the paradigm of
governmentality. Different research fields have used the concepts of «gov-
ernmentality», «discipline», the «microphysics of power» and «biopolitics»
since Foucault introduced them in the 1970s. In particular, the idea of a
lato e la letteratura di fantascienza dall’altro. Il problema è che non l’ha meditata
abbastanza. Prova ne sia che in tutta la propaganda precedente le BR parlavano
ancora di ‹colpire il cuore dello Stato›, coltivando da un lato la nozione ancora
ottocentesca di Stato e dall’altro l’idea che l’avversario avesse ancora un cuore o
una testa. […] Nell’ultimo volantino le BR abbandonano l’idea di cuore, di Stato,
di capitalista cattivo, di ministro ‹boia.› Adesso l’avversario è il sistema delle
multinazionali, di cui Moro è un commesso, al massimo un depositario di infor-
mazioni. […] Una volta colta l’idea dei grandi sistemi, li si mitologizza di nuovo
ritenendo che essi abbiano ‹piani segreti› di cui Moro sarebbe uno dei depositari.
In realtà i grandi sistemi non hanno nulla di segreto e si sa benissimo come fun-
zionano.»
53 Eco 1983, 111–112; it.: «Il terrorismo non è il nemico dei grandi sistemi, ne è al
contrario la contropartita naturale, accettata, prevista. Il sistema delle multi-
nazionali […] accetta piccole guerre locali, che verranno di volta in volta disci-
plinate e ridotte da oculati interventi internazionali, e dall’altro lato accetta ap-
punto il terrorismo. […] Inoltre il terrorismo serve a dare una ragion d’essere alle
polizie e agli eserciti, che a lascarli inoperosi chiedono di realizzarsi in qualche
conflitto più allargato. Infine il terrorismo serve a favorire interventi disciplinati
là dove un eccesso di democrazia rende la situazione ingovernabile.»
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government over life, in the form of an «anatomo-politics of the body» and
«biopolitics of the population» has been employed productively in analyses
of welfarist and neo-liberal programs of governance.54 However, despite as-
sertions of the diminution in importance of the nation-state—through and
alongside work on globalization and trans- and multinationals corpora-
tions—Giorgio Agamben’s works on the sovereign ban and the state of ex-
ception highlight that the two paradigms of governmentality and
sovereignty do not exclude each other. On the contrary, techniques of
sovereignty and governmentality perfectly coexist. At the latest since the
French Revolution, the modern democratic state has not been able to exer-
cise violence without a moral justification, because it takes its legitimiza-
tion from a reference to human and citizens’ rights. What Benjamin calls
«law-preserving» state violence can be justified only through the presence
of an external threat.55 This is why terrorism is so convenient for the exer-
cise of power through both sovereign and governmental techniques: the
emergence of external, non-state violence allows not only the representa-
tion of state violence as necessary for the safety of the population, but also
the production of docile subjects that accept all kinds of governmental
techniques.
The coexistence of governmentality and sovereignty paradigms becomes
even clearer by looking to the discursive practices through which Aldo Mo-
ro was first represented as a great statesman, reduced to mere life and final-
ly declared a state martyr. As Sciascia masterfully describes, the kidnapping
of Aldo Moro allowed for the reemergence of a national rhetoric. In fact,
as the Sicilian writer notes, in the first days after the kidnapping and be-
fore his letters were published, the media began to represent Moro as the
«great statesman», while before he was referred to simply as the leader or
the President of the DC, as well as the weaver of political alliances. As dis-
cussed in the sixth chapter, this form of acclamation of sovereignty was ac-
companied, even before Moro died, by the first allocations of the martyr
role. Moro was thus represented as both a great statesman and as a state
martyr, almost indicating that Moro had to accept sacrifice, because he was
the sovereign; but when Moro began to oppose this national rhetoric, ex-
pressly criticizing the «line of firmness» as an appeal to an abstract «reason
of state», the situation changed:
54 Foucault 1978, 139.
55 Benjamin 2007, 284.
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An unexpected and immense state-idolatrous torchlight seems to have
been attached to the Christian Democracy and possesses it. Moro, who
continues to think as he always thought, is now an extraneous body: a
kind of painful biliary calculus to be extracted—with the state-idola-
trous ardor as an anesthetic—by an organism that, almost touched by
the miracle, has acquired the movement and the use of the ‹sense of
the State›. […] Independent and party newspapers, illustrated weeklies,
radio, and television: they are almost all there, in line to defend the
State, proclaiming Moro’s metamorphosis, his civil death.56
 
Influenced or persuaded, Moro now speaks like the Red Brigades: this
is the thesis that as a huge tombstone falls on the living man, combat-
ive and sharp, which is still in the ‹people’s prison›, while [the govern-
ment, parties and media] remember and celebrate the Moro that is al-
ready dead, the Moro to be monumentalized. 57
Sciascia discloses a fundamental point here: Andreotti, Cossiga, the DC, or
the government as a whole would not have been able to categorically reject
negotiations for the liberation of Moro if a number of discursive practices
produced by many social actors and diffused in different media had not
transformed Aldo Moro into a homo sacer. Moro’s voice had to be silenced,
constructing the opposition between a good Moro—before the letters—
and a bad Moro—the one who wrote the letters. Only after this procedure
of discursive reduction to bare life, and after his death, could he again be
acclaimed as a great statesman and finally glorified as a state martyr. This
does not only corroborate Agamben’s thesis, according to which «contem-
porary democracy is a democracy that is entirely founded upon glory, that
is, on the efficacy of acclamation, multiplied and disseminated by the me-
dia beyond all imagination», but also demonstrates that power over mere
56 Sciascia 1978, 130; it.: «[…] un’inaspettata e immane fiaccola statolatrice sembra
essersi attaccata alla Democrazia Cristiana e possederla. Moro, che continua a
pensare come pensava, ne è ormai un corpo estraneo: una specie di doloroso cal-
colo biliare da estrare – con l’ardore statolatrico come anestetico – da un organis-
mo che, quasi toccato dal miracolo, ha acquistato il movimento e l’uso del ‹senso
dello stato.› […] I giornali indipendenti e di partito, i settimanali illustrati, la ra-
dio, la televisione: sono quasi tutti lì, in riga a difendere lo Stato, a proclamare la
metamorfosi di Moro, la sua morte civile.»
57 Sciascia 1978, 73; it.: «Suggestionato o convinto, Moro ormai parla come le
Brigate Rosse: questa è la tesi che come un enorme pietra tombale scende sull’uo-
mo vivo, combattivo e acuto che è ancora nella ‹prigione del popolo›, mentre si
ricorda e si celebra il moro già morto, il Moro da monumentare.»
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life is endorsed by the means of discursive practices.58 The discursive
practices through which Moro was first excluded from the political sphere,
then repeatedly represented as a state martyr, can be described as hegemon-
ic procedures that regulate the formation of public opinion and political
will. Without such discursive performances, there could be no justification
for «sacrifice» and «martyrdom» for the state—no justification for the idea
that individual life is an exchangeable commodity with which a society can
buy its own welfare and security—since the rhetoric of sacrifice and mar-
tyrdom would otherwise appear to be what it is: a way to conceal the
necessity of terrorist violence for the preservation of the status quo.
The strongest pages in Sciascia’s book are probably those in which he ad-
dresses the situation of Moro in the « people’s prison» and attempts to op-
pose or subvert the hegemonic discourse. Firstly, he highlights that Moro’s
rejection of the rhetoric of the «reason of state» and of the «sense of the
state» in his first published letter is absolutely consistent with what Moro
had been saying for years:
The Moro who formulates this proposition is perfectly coherent with
the politician Moro and the teacher Moro that the Italians have known
for thirty years: with his vision of life, of Italian things, the develop-
ment of politics; with his sense of law and his sense of the State (and
this time not in quotation marks, the sense of the State: that is to say,
different from the ‹sense of the State› that some, by deception, im-
posed on him).59
In fact, Sciascia argues,
Aldo Moro, President of the Christian Democracy, had already said a
few years ago that, between saving a human life and keeping faith in
abstract principles, one had to force the legal concept of the state of ne-
cessity, so that it becomes the principle: the non-abstract principle of
the [primacy of] the salvation of the individual against abstract princi-
ples.60
58 Agamben 2011, 256.
59 Sciascia 1978, 51; it.: «Il Moro che formula questa proposizione è in perfetta co-
erenza col Moro politico e col Moro docente che gli italiani hanno conosciuto
per un trentennio: con la sua visione della vita, delle cose italiane, del corso della
politica; col suo senso del diritto e col suo senso dello Stato (e questa volta non
tra virgolette, il senso dello Stato: diverso, cioè, da quello che gli si è voluto, per
impostura, imporgli).»
60 Sciascia 1978, 61; it.: «Cosi pensava Aldo Moro, presidente della Democrazia Cris-
tiana, già qualche anno prima: che tra il salvare una vita umana e il tenere fede ad
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According to Sciascia, there is a passage in the second letter, which became
public when it was published on April 5, 1978, that demonstrates how Mo-
ro himself had a premonition that he would not survive. In this passage,
Moro admonished the PCI to remember that the kidnapping occurred the
same day in which all other politicians were going to the Chamber of
Deputies «for the consecration of the government», the same government
that he himself had helped to realize.61 According to Sciascia, the use of
the word «consecration» is
A lapse for a Catholic; a premonition for the man who feels himself ‹a
bit abandoned› (and he meant completely). ‹Referring to human af-
fairs›—says the Catholic Tommaseo—‹no one should never use that
great word … Consecrating making sacred what was not sacred, with
solemn words, acts, rites›. Solemn words: the defense of the State.
Rites: the massacre of five men, the execution of a death sentence.62
As previously mentioned, before his kidnapping Moro was known for his
ability to use language instrumentally to defend his party from different ac-
cusations, but after the kidnapping, and after he saw the reaction to his let-
ters, he began to use another language, a language that allowed him to be-
come aware of and express the function of power. Commenting on Moro’s
letter to the DC, published on April 29, 1978, Sciascia highlights a sort of
metamorphosis in Moro:
Here there is the word that for the first time he writes in the most atro-
cious nudity; the word finally revealed itself to him in its true, pro-
found, and terrible sense: the word ‹power›. ‹I do not want around me,
I repeat, the men of power›. But in the previous letter he spoke of
‹State authority› and ‹party men›: it is only now that he has come to
the right name, the frightening word. For power and from power he
had lived until nine o’clock in the morning of that 16 March. He
hoped to have it again: perhaps to return to take it fully, certainly to
astratti principi si dovesse forzare il concetto giuridico di stato di necessità, fino a
farlo diventare principio: il non astratto principio della salvezza dell’individuo
contro astratti principi.»
61 Moro 2008c, 13.; it.: «[…] per la consacrazione del Governo.»
62 Sciascia 1978, 64; it.: Un lapsus per un cattolico; un presentimento per l’uomo
che si sente «un po’ abbandonato» (e voleva dire del tutto). ‹Di cose umane› - dice
il cattolico Tommaseo - ‹non si dovrebbe mai adoperare quell’alta parola … Con-
sacrarsi facendo sacro quello che sacro non era, con parole solenni, con atti, con
riti.› Parole solenni. Difesa dello Stato. Riti: il massacro di cinque uomini, l’ese-
cuzione di una condanna a morte.»
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avoid facing that death. But now he knows that others have the power:
he recognizes in others its filthy, astonished, fierce face.63
Paradoxically or, as Sciascia says, tragically, imprisonment and the conse-
quent discovery of the true face of power allowed Moro to «save» himself:
Moro begins, pirandellianamente [in the manner of author Luigi Piran-
dello], to get rid of form, since he tragically entered into life. From
character to ‹lonely man›, from ‹lonely man› to creature: the steps that
Pirandello assigns to the only one possible salvation.64
Here the fundamental difference between Sciascia and Calvino becomes
manifest. The author of L’affaire Moro believes that, despite everything,
even when Moro was in the «people’s prison», reduced to bare life and to
the status of a «creature», there was still the possibility of salvation. What
kind of salvation did he have in mind? To answer this question, it is useful
to quote what, in August 1978, three months after Moro’s death, Sciascia
stated in an interview with the French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur:
Yes. Aldo Moro by dying—despite all his historical responsibilities—
has acquired an innocence that makes us all guilty, then me too. [...]
By dying, Aldo Moro was, so to speak, stripped of his Christian Demo-
cratic tunic. His body does not belong to anyone, but his death puts
everyone on trial.65
63 Sciascia 1978, 110; it.: «[…] ecco, c’è la parola che per la prima volta scrive nella
più atroce nudità, la parola che finalmente gli si è rivelata nel suo vero, profondo
e putrido significato: la parola ‹potere.› ‹Io non desidero attorno a me, lo ripeto,
gli uomini del potere.› Ma nella precedente lettera aveva parlato di ‹autorità dello
Stato› e ‹uomini di partito›: è soltanto ora che è arrivato alla denominazione gius-
ta, alla spaventosa parola. Per il potere e del potere era vissuto fino alle nove del
mattino di quel 16 marzo. Ha sperato di averne ancora: forse per tornare ad as-
sumerlo pienamente, certamente per evitare di affrontare quella morte. Ma ora sa
che c’è l’hanno gli altri: ne riconosce negli altri il volto laido, stupito, feroce.»
64 Sciascia 1978, 73; it.: «Moro comincia, pirandellianamente, a sciogliersi dalla for-
ma, poiché tragicamente è entrato nella vita. Da personaggio a ‹uomo solo›, da
‹uomo solo› a creatura: i passaggi che Pirandello assegna all’unica possibile salvez-
za.»
65 Quoted in Balducci/Ferrara/Katz 1987, 155; it.: «Sì, Aldo Moro morendo – nonos-
tante tutte le sue responsabilità storiche – ha acquistato una innocenza che rende
tutti noi colpevoli, dunque anche me. […] Morendo, Aldo Moro si è, per così
dire, spogliato della tunica democristiana. Il suo cadavere non appartiene ad al-
cuno, ma la sua morte ci mette tutti sotto accusa.»
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As Sciascia highlights some months later in L’affaire Moro, this acquisition
of innocence was not a reward obtained through sacrifice, but the result of
the awareness of the function of power or, more precisely, of the performa-
tivity of the language of power. Paradoxically, the condition of mere life is
the starting point from which it is possible to develop a language, a model
of representation and narration, by which one can unveil, or demytholo-
gize the discourse of sovereignty and the mythology of the state. From this
point of view, it can be said that Sciascia continues to develop the kind of
subversive narrative Moro had started in his letters. The paired concepts of
«innocence» and «guilt», as well as the idea of death that radically trans-
forms the moral status of both the victim and of those who are held re-
sponsible for violence, recall and iterate the rhetorical structure of Chris-
tian martyrology. Some might argue that the allocation of innocence and
guilt is also used in modern forensic and judicial discourses; but a closer
observation reveals that this view is inconsistent. There is no legal system
that «puts everyone on trial». Sciascia, by using the word «trial», does not
want to refer to the process in which the ultimate form of judgment is the
law of a country. What he has in mind, rather, is an analogy, however im-
plicit, to the judgment of Christ at the end of time.
But one must not be fooled. Sciascia, as an atheist, surely does not want
to say that on the Day of Judgment all Italians will have to take responsibil-
ity for what happened in the spring of 1978. Rather, he uses language units
and rhetoric patterns in order to provoke an emotional response in the
readers. As a Sicilian intellectual, Sciascia could not help but be aware of
the performative power of Christian language; but, in the mind of Sciascia,
there is no final judgment or redemption, but only historical guilt. In his
representation, Moro is a weakened martyr, who accused, desacralized and
delegitimized, but who «does not belong to anyone», not to the party, not
to the state, not to the Church and not to the country. Moro’s letters and
Sciascia’s book are attempts to propel people to become aware not only
that there is collective guilt and responsibility, but there is also the possibil-
ity of collective salvation. It is salvation from the thanatopolitics that char-
acterizes the function of modern and contemporaneous governmental
practices that can be achieved by becoming aware of this function. Salva-
tion can also be achieved by overcoming the correlation, within the hege-
monic discourse, between politics, violence and sacrificial rhetoric, which
is not a natural phenomenon, a discursive mirror image of a natural predis-
position of man, but the result of a historical and cultural development.
Only by forming a subversive discourse, by creatively developing discursive
practices that appeal to individuals to empower themselves, to not accept
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the exercise of sovereign power with docility and to overcome the politics
of fear on which this power is based, does it become possible to prepare a
new a way of conceiving and organizing the political community.
Moro’s Image on Television and in Italian Cinema
Every image or visual representation requires subjective positioning from
the spectator. Each image portraying individuals or situations, even if the
image documents a moment or gesture of daily life or if the individuals
portrayed are already dead and their names have been erased from collec-
tive memory, potentially functions as an aid to remembrance. The famous
photograph representing Moro’s body in the trunk of a Renault 4, sur-
rounded by police officers, carabinieri and journalists looking at the
corpse, does not capture an everyday occurrence, but rather an exceptional
event of death. It does not capture a man in his daily singularity, or in his
personal way of existing in the world, but instead captures a collective
event of historic significance. This image of Moro presents only the flesh,
where he is only a void body alone and abandoned.
Different scholars point out that the photographs of Moro’s corpse in
the trunk, as well as those taken by the BR and delivered to the newspapers
to prove he was alive, are forms of «degradation» of Moro.66 According to
Christian Uva, the two photographs showing Moro in the «people’s
prison» were part of the propaganda strategy of the BR, which consisted
not so much of proving that Moro was alive, but above all of forming a pic-
ture of Moro corresponding to that of the «naked king».67 Both Uva and
Pezzini refer to Sciascia and describe this as the deprivation of Moro’s po-
litical status. Undoubtedly, such images facilitated the operation by which
Moro was reduced to mere, killable life, and which, as we saw in the two
preceding chapters, in the spring of 1978 served to justify the line of firm-
ness, to legitimate the established political authority and to reactivate na-
tional rhetoric. Similarly, the image of Moro’s corpse was used to promote
the image of Moro as a state martyr, as the one who died to save state insti-
tutions and Italian society, symbolically represented by the policemen,
Carabinieri and journalists surrounding the dead man. However, these im-
ages were perceived, interpreted and used differently in the following
years. In different cultural productions they were not used to point out the
7.3
66 See Pezzini 2012, 136.
67 See Uva 2011, 261.
7.3 Moro’s Image on Television and in Italian Cinema
333
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
tragic inevitability of Moro’s death. On the contrary, they were used to en-
courage people to remember Moro differently: as the man who within the
«people’s prison» managed to make his voice heard, criticizing a certain
idea of the state, criticizing the operation by which he was represented as a
finished man, deprived of all dignity.
The first television productions addressing the events of 1978 focused
mainly on investigative journalism and historical divulgation. The empha-
sis was initially almost exclusively put on documentary and interview for-
mats. The first broadcast dedicated to Moro’s abduction was entitled Aldo
Moro: Il giorno più lungo della Repubblica (RAI 1, IT 16.3.1979). The
broadcast opens with a sequence of images and photographs of the assault
on Moro’s guards and the funeral of Domenico Ricci, Aldo Moro’s driver.
A speaker comments on the images and describes the four bodyguards as
«symbols for those who oppose violence». The broadcast includes a series
of interviews with political protagonists during Moro’s captivity, in which
Moro is described as «the man who had succeeded in realizing the policy
of national solidarity» (Ugo La Malfa); «our highest intellectual, moral, and
political guide» (Benigno Zaccagnini); and «one of the protagonists of the
formation of the new majority» (Enrico Berlinguer). In the first anniver-
sary of the attack in via Fani, the focus lies thus on the human and political
qualities of Aldo Moro, and not yet on the responsibility of the political
class or the mysteries related to the reconstruction of the event.
On March 21, 1988, after three trials (Moro-uno, Moro-bis and Moro-ter)
on the tenth anniversary of via Fani, Rai 1 aired the newscast special Dopo
il terrorismo, in which journalist Ennio Remondino interviews the former
BR members Renato Curcio, Barbara Balzerani and Mario Moretti, of
which the last two were directly involved in Moro’s abduction. In this spe-
cial program, all three declare that the «season of terrorism» is over, and as-
sume all moral and political responsibilities for the attack in via Fani and
the killing of Moro. After this first appearance, several members of the ter-
rorist group repeatedly reappeared on television and acquired a certain
celebrity status. For this reason, they were often accused of «mania of pro-
tagonism» and, in Miguel Gotor’s words, of «keeping [Moro] prisoner to-
day through an instrumental use of memory»: «A use that is necessarily
functional for the current (judicial, political, moral, psychological, reli-
gious) needs of free men or those in search of freedom, but not for the his-
torical reconstruction of what has happened, of a past on which they con-
tinue to exercise a monopoly and paradoxical dictatorship of testimony.»68
68 Gotor 2008a, xxii–xxiii.
7 Memorialization Practices and Memory Struggle
334
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
For this reason, Gotor considers it necessary to study Moro’s letters, which
he describes as «a living testimony to an ancient and perhaps unrepeatable
thing, the last death of a Christian ‹prince›. […] Visible manifestation […]
of Christian faith, consolation, relief, redemption, martyrdom.»69 In other
words, for Gotor the letters, like the Christian martyrologies, are living tes-
timony that compensate for the lack of an «integral witness».70
One of the broadcasts on television that strongly contributed to the ce-
menting of images of Aldo Moro as a martyr is undoubtedly the episode Il
caso Moro: dal sequestro all’omicidio – i 55 giorni che cambiarono
l’Italia (RAI 3, IT 10.5.2003) of the television program La storia siamo
noi presented by Giovanni Minoli.71 The program reconstructs the events
of the spring of 1978 by showing archive materials (videos broadcast dur-
ing the 55 days of Moro’s imprisonment), interviews with people who in-
vestigated the «Moro case» (the member of the first parliamentary commis-
sion of enquiry Sergio Flamigni, author Robert Katz, prosecutor general of
the fourth Moro trial Antonio Marini, and historian Francesco Biscione),
and excerpts from official videos of testimonies given by members of the
BR as well as by Moro’s wife in the trials. At regular intervals, the presenter
Minoli summarizes the events of 1978 as well as the results of investiga-
tions and trials. The fifty-two-minute documentary addresses two themes.
The first part (the first 30 minutes) addresses the alleged implications of
the Masonic lodge Propaganda 2 (P2), the possibility that part of the state
apparatuses could have thrown the inquiry off track, and the «foreign in-
terests concerning Moro’s fate», as Flamigni argues, who refers in particular
to the presence of the American expert on international terrorism, Steve
Pieczenik, as an adviser to the Italian government during Moro’s imprison-
ment. The second part addresses the conflict between advocates of the
«line of firmness» and those who promoted negotiations. The program de-
votes coverage to Aldo Moro’s letters by alternating between images of the
handwritten letters, the streets of Rome, photos of Moro and his wife
Eleonora, and a video filmed from the front of a car and at the height of
the plates, while a voice-over reads the letters. The first letter read aloud is
the one addressed to then Minister of the Interior Cossiga (first published
on March 30, 1978). The letter is read almost in full; after that the docu-
mentary shows an excerpt from the official video of Eleonora Moro’s de-
69 Gotor 2008b, 348.
70 Gotor 2008a, xxii–xxiii.
71 http://www.lastoriasiamonoi.rai.it/puntate/il-caso-moro/381/default.aspx
(accessed August 20, 2017).
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position at the first Moro trial, in which she expresses the conviction that
the letters were written by her husband in the absence of any coercion. The
same narrative strategy is used for the rest of the documentary, which alter-
nates between the reading of Moro’s letters and excerpts from the deposi-
tions in the fourth Moro trial of three former BR members who participat-
ed in the abduction (Anna Laura Braghetti, Barbara Balzerani and Valerio
Morucci). All three of them say that if the state had negotiated, they would
have freed Aldo Moro. While the speaker reads the letters, some of the
rhetorically stronger or more controversial passages—such as «I die, if my
party so decides, in the fullness of my Christian faith»72—are accentuated
with written words that cover almost half of the screen. The documentary
ends with the reading of different passages of Moro’s letters to his wife:
Someone should tell Giovanni [Moro’s son] what political activity
means. […] And Zaccagnini? How can he remain quiet in his position?
And Cossiga, who could not imagine any defense? My blood will fall
upon them. But that’s not what I want to talk about; but rather about
you, who I love and will always love, about the gratitude I have for
you, about the indescribable joy you gave me in life, about the little
one [Moro’s grandson] I loved to look at and who I will try to look at
to the last.73
 
At this moment, I feel an infinite tenderness for you, the memory of
everyone, a great love of seemingly insignificant but precious memo-
ries. […] Kiss and caress all of them for me, face to face, eyes for eyes,
hair for hair. […] Kiss and caress Fida, Demi, Luca (so much Luca),
Anna, Mario, the unborn little one, Agnese, Giovanni. I’m so grateful
for what they did. Everything is useless when one does not want to
open the door.74
72 Moro 2008l, 143; it.: «Muoio, se così deciderà il mio partito, nella pienezza della
mia fede cristiana […].»
73 Moro 2008d, 32-33: it.: «Bisognerebbe dire a Giovanni che significa attività politi-
ca. […] E Zaccagnini? Come può rimanere tranquillo al suo posto? E Cossiga che
non ha saputo immaginare nessuna difesa? Il mio sangue ricadrà su di loro. Ma
non è di questo che voglio parlare; ma di voi che amo ed amerò sempre, della
gratitudine che vi debbo, della gioia indicibile che mi avete dato nella vita, del
piccolo che amavo guardare e cercherò di guardare fino all’ultimo.»
74 Moro 2008m, 177–178; it.: «C’è in questo momento una tenerezza infinita per
voi, il ricordo di tutti e di ciascuno, un amore grande grande carico di ricordi ap-
parentemente insignificanti e in realtà preziosi. […] Bacia e carezza per me tutti,
volto per volto, occhi per occhi, capelli per capelli. […] Bacia e carezza Fida, De-
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Now, suddenly, when some hope had come up, incomprehensibly
comes the order of execution. Sweetest Noretta, I am in the hands of
God and yours. Pray for me, and remember me gently. Caress the
sweet little ones, everyone. God help you all. A kiss of love for you all,
Aldo.75
This selection of passages from the letters clearly aims at producing an
emotional response through a climax that begins with Moro’s anathema
against his party and against the government and ends with a declaration
of love for and gratitude to his family. Although the term martyr is never
used in the documentary—more often the term «sacrifice» is used by the
people interviewed in reference to Moro’s death—, it is clear that the docu-
mentary contributes to the formation of a hagiography of Moro, in which
his death and letters assume the double meaning of a witness of love and
faith and an accusation at the political class, the state authority. From this
point of view, the documentary can, in all respects, be considered a marty-
rological representation. However, the martyr figure takes on a different
role here, practically opposed to what he had and still has within hege-
monic discourse. It is no longer functional to the discourse of sovereignty,
but used to shape and reveal a discourse of rebellion that challenges the
doxological way of representing Moro’s death as a necessary sacrifice for
the sake of national security and unity.
Sergio Zavoli’s documentary series La notte della Repubblica simi-
larly challenges the doxological representation of Aldo Moro as a state mar-
tyr.76 Zavoli’s program blends excerpts from radio broadcasts, archive
footage, scenes from films, television reports and ad hoc shots filmed
specifically for the documentary, editing them in seamless sequences to
produce contrasting effects. The program gives credence to the importance
of oral testimony, individual memory as well as to «the figurative inscrip-
tion of events on the body, which television manages to convey to the
mi, Luca (tanto tanto Luca) Anna Mario il piccolo non nato Agnese Giovanni.
Sono tanto grato per quello che hanno fatto. Tutto è inutile, quando non si vuole
aprire la porta.»
75 Moro 2008n, 179; it.: «Ora, improvvisamente, quando si profilava qualche esile
speranza, giunge incomprensibilmente l’ordine di esecuzione. Noretta dolcissi-
ma, sono nelle mani di Dio e tue. Prega per me, ricordami soavemente. Carezza i
piccoli dolcissimi, tutti. Che Iddio vi aiuti tutti. Un bacio di amore a tutti, Aldo.»
76 La notte della Repubblica: Caso Moro – Prima parte (RAI 2, IT 21.2.1990);
La notte della Repubblica: Caso Moro – Seconda parte (RAI 2, IT 28.2.1990);
La notte della Repubblica: Caso Moro – Terza parte (RAI 2, IT 7.3.1990).
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viewing public.»77 The program narrates Moro’s abduction, imprisonment
and murder, the discovery of Moro’s corpse and the diverse reactions of so-
cial actors to these events. As Pezzini highlights, «Moro is re-evoked at
length first as a physical absence from the topical sites of Italian political
life (effectively portrayed in black and white in all their void monumentali-
ty); then as an image; intermittently as a shadow (the enigmatic figure ap-
pearing in archive footage, or in the famous photo the BR circulated as
proof that the statesman was still alive); and finally in the picture of his
corpse, unnaturally doubled over in the trunk of a red Renault 4.»78 The
program also devotes coverage to the recitation of Moro’s letters, highlight-
ing the banishment of Moro from political life and his attempt to be
heard. After addressing the abduction, the documentary provides a portrait
of Aldo Moro, which maintains a clear progression: «The image of Moro is
defined gradually over the course of the programme […] He goes from be-
ing a politician firmly positioned at the centre of power and of political
life in Italy to a man abruptly placed outside that political life, relegated to
a kind of anti-space. […] At the end of the narrative, the role that is ulti-
mately assigned to Moro is that of sacrificial victim, a role that is sealed by
the words of Pope Paul VI […] who, in the funeral eulogy, described Moro
as ‹buono, mite, saggio, innocente e amico› [‹good, mild, wise, innocent
and friend›].»79 However, although Moro is represented as a sacrificial vic-
tim, a role that the narrative progression renders almost predestined, Moro
undergoes a metamorphosis from an observed object to a subject that
poses questions and demands answers, challenges hegemonic discourse
and requires an emotional, moral and political stance. Furthermore, the
documentary shows both the politicians’ «pilgrimage» to via Caetani as
well as their presence at the official funeral in the absence of Moro’s body
(see figure 9). As Pezzini pointedly observes, the politicians’ «queuing for
Holy Communion seems to sanction their self-acquittal, their absolution,
while the gaze of the viewer becomes one with that of Moro himself. The
effect produced by the footage is that the body of Moro, doubly absent, is
in fact present in the form of a gaze granted to him by the camera, a gaze
which is united with that of the viewer.»80
77 Pezzini 2012, 143.
78 Pezzini 2012, 144.
79 Pezzini 2012, 146.
80 Pezzini 2012, 146–147.
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Bettino Craxi, secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, and Enrico
Berlinguer, secretary of the Italian Communist Party, at the offi-
cial funeral of Aldo Moro in the Archbasilica of St. John Lateran,
Rome, May 13, 1978.
On different occasions, Sergio Zavoli’s La notte della Repubblica uses
film sequences from Giuseppe Ferrara’s Il caso Moro (IT, 1986), which is
based on Robert Katz’s book Days of Wrath. The Public Agony of Aldo Mo-
ro.81 Katz himself collaborated on the screenplay of the film. It is the first
cinematographic production that explicitly addresses Moro’s abduction
and murder.82 The film pays particular attention to the involvement of the
CIA and summarizes the findings of the police investigations, the court
proceedings and the investigative exposés available at the time of its release.
It is defined as a «docudrama» and contains many of the characteristics of
PICTURE 9:
81 Katz 1980.
82 As Alan O-Leary points out, there are other films, in particular Ogro (Gilo Pon-
tecorvo, E/IT/F 1979) and Maledetti vi amerò (Marco Tulio Giorndana, IT
1980), that do not specifically adress the events of spring 1978, but which implic-
itly or implicitly refer to it. See O’Leary 2011, 34–45.
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television that is based on a true story.83 The thesis of the film is that the P2
Masonic lodge and the Italian secret services, sustained and influenced by
Americans, ensured that the «line of firmness» would end with Moro’s
death. The film represents the DC as an instrumentalized party that, with
its intransigence, was just as responsible for Moro’s violent death as the
jailers who left him dead in the trunk of a car. The central place of the Mo-
ro character, played by Gian-Maria Volonté in the role of a witness of truth
and an accuser of the government and parties, distinguishes Il caso Moro
from the other Moro films. Volonté’s choice is significant, since he previ-
ously played a main character in Elio Petri’s Todo modo (IT, 1976), which
was a parodic caricature of Moro. Todo modo is based on the homony-
mous novel by Leonardo Sciascia, who situates his protagonist, a painter,
in the milieu of a religious retreat at the Hermitage Zafer. Sciascia’s point
of departure was Ignatius of Loyola’s dictum: Todo modo para buscar y hallar
la voluntad divina («One must use every means to seek and find the divine
will»).84 Throughout the course of Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, several of
the retreatants, all from various influential institutions, are mysteriously
murdered. Don Gaetano, the retreat’s master played by Marcello Mas-
troianni, is himself eliminated at the conclusion of the retreat, and a
shroud of mystery hovers over the Hermitage as the novel ends.
Petri used this novel as a starting point to develop a highly politicized
and caustic film, which explicitly attacks and criticizes the DC. To make
his attack more explicit, Petri added specific details from the contemporary
political scene. He chose the prominent political figure «M» as his protago-
nist, which is a specific reference to Aldo Moro. As Michalczyk observes,
the portrait was sketched to cause maximum damage to Moro’s image as
well as to that of his party.85 In an interview, Petri recounted how strongly
Volonté identified with the image of Moro as the true embodiment of
power:
I scrapped the first two days of the making of Todo modo, in agree-
ment with the producer and Volonté, because the resemblance of Gian
Maria Volonté to Aldo Moro was nauseating, embarrassing, sickening
to the stomach. In that picture there was all the insidiousness, the cun-
ning of the political man.86
83 See O’Leary 2011, 51.
84 See Michalczyk 1988, 226.
85 See Michalczyk 1988, 228.
86 Manelli/Volonté 1998, 39; it.: «I primi due giorni di lavorazione di Todo modo
furono cestinati da me, d’accordo col produttore e con lo stesso Volonté, perché
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Years later, Volonté provided completely different interpretations of the
Moro figure, highlighting the process of metamorphosis that occurred in
the media perception of the politician. Volonté’s performances are inter-
preted as indicative of the responsibility felt by the left for the fate of the
DC leader.87 However, Volonté partially minimizes the difference between
the images of Moro depicted in the two films:
In Todo modo it [the image of Moro] was a mask, almost an imitation,
within an allegory, so it was necessary to achieve a detachment, a con-
tinuous alienation. It was as if I had pulled the wires of that character,
who was like a puppet, from the outside. In Il caso Moro, instead, I
wanted and had to look for internal paths, in the context of a dra-
maturgy that designed a progressive loss of power in a man and at the
same time his descent into death: a fall. […] But between the two char-
acters, if their contents are well analyzed, there is not the enormous
distance that someone wanted to indicate. In the Moro of Todo modo,
there is an almost disturbing sense of premonition; and even in that
movie, as a background, we choose to narrate the Christian Democra-
cy. While Petri and Sciascia had chosen the key of allegory […], on the
other hand, the authors of Il caso Moro […] rightly chose the tragedy.
[…] In Il caso Moro we referred to a real human experience that had
a recognizable conclusion in history, and for this very reference the
viewer cannot escape the human appeal of this character. 88
la somiglianza di Gian Maria Volonté con Aldo Moro era nauseante, imbaraz-
zante, prendeva alla bocca dello stomaco. In quell’immagine risultava tutta l’in-
sidiosità, l’astuzia dell’uomo politico.»
87 See O’Leary 2011, 52.
88 Balducci/Katz/Ferrara 1987, 19–20; it.: «In Todo modo si trattava di una
maschera, quasi un’imitazione, all’interno di un’allegoria, quindi era necessario
raggiungere un distacco, uno straniamento continuo. Era come se io tirassi
dall’esterno i fili di quel personaggio che era come un burattino. In Il caso
Moro, invece ho voluto e dovuto cercare percorsi interni, nell’ambito di una
drammaturgia che disegnava in un uomo la progressiva perdita del potere e con-
temporaneamente la discesa verso la morte: una caduta. […] Ma tra i due person-
aggi, se si analizzano bene i contenuti, non c’è poi l’enorme distanza che qual-
cuno ha voluto indicare. Nel Moro di Todo modo c’è un senso di premonizione
quasi inquietante; e anche in quel film, come fatto di fondo, si sceglie di raccon-
tare la Democrazia Cristiana. Se da una parte Petri e Sciascia avevano scelto la chi-
ave dell’allegoria […], dall’altra gli autori de Il caso Moro […] hanno giusta-
mente scelto la tragedia. […] Ne Il caso Moro noi ci siamo riferiti ad un’espe-
rienza umana, reale, che ha avuto una sua conclusione riconoscibile nella storia, e
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The intention of showing Aldo Moro’s humanity is explicit in the first
scenes of the film, in which he is represented as a benevolent father and
grandfather. In these scenes, he carefully asks his daughter Maria Fida if
she will celebrate Easter with him and his wife and lovingly talks with his
little grandson, Luca (see figure 10). The Moro we see here is fundamental-
ly the same as the Moro we see in the «people’s prison», where he tries to
convince the BR that their vision of politics is simplistic, almost infantile
(see figure 11). Moreover, it is the same Moro that tries to persuade the
government and public opinion that undertaking negotiations for his lib-
eration is both morally and politically necessary. So, as was already the case
in Sciascia’s L’affaire Moro and in the documentary La notte della Repub-
blica, the «humanization» of Moro does not correspond to the de-politi-
cization of Moro’s public image, but rather to the politicization of the man
reduced to mere life, a man who, in spite of his captivity, tries to bear wit-
ness, accuse and appeal.
Aldo Moro (Gian Maria Volonté) speaking with his daughter




proprio per questo riferimento lo spettatore non riesce a sottrarsi al fascino
umano di questo personaggio.»
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Aldo Moro (Gian Maria Volonté) speaking with one of the mem-
bers of the Red Brigades (Mattia Sbragia) in Il caso Moro
(Giuseppe Ferrara, IT 1986).
Paolo Sorrentino’s Il Divo (IT 2008), a biographical drama based on the
figure of Giulio Andreotti, further demonstrates that the image of Moro
underwent a metamorphosis. The film focuses on Andreotti’s political ac-
tivity and legal proceedings between the presentation of his seventh gov-
ernment in 1991 and the start of the Palermo trial against him for collu-
sion with the Mafia in 1993.89 Although the actor who plays Moro (Paolo
Graziosi) appears for only 14 seconds in the whole movie, his role in the
film is essential (see figure 12). The film begins with a long series of mur-
ders and the alleged suicides of different personalities—journalist Carmine
Pecorelli, General Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, judge Giovanni Falcone,
bankers Roberto Calvi and Michele Sindona, lawyer Giorgio Anbrosoli
and, last but not least, Aldo Moro—, insinuating, more or less explicitly,
that Andreotti is somehow implicated in all of them. Moro’s murder is
hinted at only by a short shot of his body in the trunk of the famous Re-
nault 4. After this montage of murders, we see Andreotti assuming, for the
seventh time, the office of Prime Minister. An interesting scene appears
PICTURE 11:
89 Andreotti was acquitted in the first instance on October 23, 1999. On May 2,
2003, he was judged and sentenced by the Palermo Court of Appeal for concorso
esterno in associazione mafiosa. However, the offense committed was no longer
punishable because of prescription.
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twenty minutes into the movie: the camera approaches slowly, moving
downward toward the bed of Andreotti, who is lying on his back, reading.
Once we see a close-up of the politician’s face, the camera continues to
move upward, where a painting depicting Karl Marx hangs over the bed.
Immediately after, we hear the sound emitted by a recorded audiocassette
reproducing the voice of Aldo Moro (played by Paolo Graziosi). This fea-
tured audiotape obliviously alludes to the hypothesis that emerged during
the investigations, trials and parliamentary commissions of enquiry, ac-
cording to which the recordings of the interrogations of Aldo Moro in the
«people’s prison» still exist, but have been hidden or concealed. However,
the text that the voice recites is not invented, but a combination of excerpts
from Moro’s «Memorial» and one of Moro’s letters to his wife:
What will they remember about you, honorable Andreotti? I do not in-
tend to rake up your dull career. That’s not a crime. What will they re-
member about you? A cold organizer: inscrutable, incapable of doubts
or thrills, incapable of pity. What will they remember about you?
Postscript: The Pope did ever so little; perhaps he will feel guilty.90
Aldo Moro as the accuser of Giulio Andreotti in the «people’s
prison» in Il Divo (Paolo Sorrentino, IT 2008).
 
PICTURE 12:
90 It.: «Che cosa ricordare di lei, onorevole Andreotti? Non è mia intenzione rievo-
care la sua grigia carriera. Non è questa una colpa. Che cosa ricordare di lei? Un
regista freddo, impenetrabile, senza dubbi, senza palpiti, senza mai un momento
di pieta umana. Che cosa ricordare di lei? Post scriptum: Il Papa ha fatto pochino.
Forse ne avrà scrupolo» (21:00–21:43). See Flamigni 1997, 325, 356; Moro 2008m,
179.
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While the voice-over recites this text, we see Andreotti walking back and
forth in a park or presumably in the garden of his residence in Rome. This
leads the viewer to presume that the politician cannot sleep, perhaps due
to feelings of guilt. Only after the voice pronounces the word «postscript»,
is there a sharp cut to a close-up of Moro; in the background stands the
flag with the five-pointed star of the BR. He looks firmly in the direction
of the lens or at the film’s audience. The camera moves horizontally back-
wards until it reaches a frame that can be recognized by anyone who has
seen the two Polaroid pictures shot by the BR. Here the scene, which lasts a
little over a minute, ends. There are at least two aspects of this scene that
can be highlighted. First, the prisoner is no longer represented here as a
man deprived of his dignity, as the accused under trial in the «people’s
prison», but rather as an accuser who testifies in the trial where Andreotti
is incriminated. Such an inversion was already emphasized by Sciascia,
who in L’affaire Moro argues that in the BR’s sixth communiqué, which
could be considered as the «dispositive of a sentence», Moro looks more
like a witness and an accuser than the accused.91 Second, the recited text
emphasizes the theme of memory three times (although the phrase «what
will they remember about you?» appears only once in Moro’s «Memorial»).
From this point of view, Andreotti is tried twice: once in the film in front of
the court of Palermo, and a second time by the film in front of the film’s
audience. Here, the relationship between the narrative level and the perfor-
mative or appellative intent of the film becomes manifest: just as it re-
counts the facts and events that are decisive for the accusation of collusion
with the Mafia in the Palermo trial, the film constitutes itself as a second
trial. This duplication is underlined at the end of the film, where we see
Andreotti appear as the accused in the Palermo trial, which was held in the
same bunker-courthouse where, between 1986 and 1992, 475 mafiosi were
indicted in the so-called maxiprocesso. This is considered to be the biggest
trial ever held in the world.92 While the camera is fixed on Andreotti’s face
as he sits in the dock, we hear the voice of Moro reciting the following text
from the «Memorial» (see figure 13):
Andreotti remained indifferent, leaden, distant, cocooned in his dark
dream of glory. He had to further his reactionary plan, not disappoint
the Communists, the Germans, and who knows who else. What was
the meaning, in the face of all this, of the inconsolable grief of an old
91 Sciascia 1978, 79.
92 See Giordano 2011, 68.
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spouse, the destruction of a family? What did all this mean for An-
dreotti, once he had achieved the power to do evil, just as he had al-
ways done evil in his life? All this meant nothing.93
Giulio Andreotti accused of collusion with the Mafia at the max-
iprocesso in front of the Palermo court in Il Divo (Paolo Sorrenti-
no, IT 2008).
Despite the metamorphosis of Moro’s image described up to this point, the
tendency to represent his death mythically as a sacrifice for the state also
survives in recent cultural productions, as in the case of Marco Tullio Gior-
dana’s Romanzo di una strage (IT/F, 2012). The film, shot in Turin and
Milan, deals with the reconstruction of the attack in piazza Fontana on De-
cember 12, 1969, as well as with the various inquiries made by the judicia-
ry about the death of Giuseppe Pinelli during the interrogation and subse-
quent killing of police commissioner Luigi Calabresi, who conducted the
investigations. This film is based on the book Il segreto di Piazza Fontana by
Paolo Cucchiarelli, in which he shares and enacts the thesis according to
which two bombs were placed in the National Bank of Agriculture: the
first by Anarchists as a demonstration attack, in which the bombs were
meant to explode when offices were already closed; the second by Fascists
PICTURE 13:
93 It.: «Andreotti è restato indifferente, livido, assente, chiuso nel suo cupo sogno di
gloria. […] Doveva mandare avanti il suo disegno reazionario, non deludere i co-
munisti, non deludere i tedeschi, e chissà quant’altro ancora. Che significava in
presenza di tutto questo, il dolore insanabile di una vecchia sposa, lo sfascio di
una famiglia? […] Che significava tutto questo per Andreotti, una volta conquis-
tato il potere per fare il male, come sempre ha fatto il male nella sua vita? Tutto
questo non significava niente» (01:41:16–01:41:57). Cfr. Moro 1997f, 326.
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(who had infiltrated the Anarchists), which caused the massacre and aimed
to make the attack appear as an act by leftist groups. It is not possible here
to reconstruct the official results of the investigations and trials or the dif-
ferent conspiracy theories related to the massacre of Piazza Fontana—
which, as we have seen, is seen as the starting point of the «years of lead»
and the «strategy of tension».94 The point of interest here is primarily the
role attributed to Moro in the political management of the events of 1969
and the relationship that the film constructs between these events and the
politician’s murder in 1978.
The Moro character appears six times in the film: in a church in Rome;
in the Palazzo del Quirinale, discussing the killing of a policeman during a
demonstration in Milan with the then President of Italy, Giuseppe Saragat;
in his office in Rome, discussing the threat of a coup d’état in Italy with the
colonel of the Carabinieri, Pio Alferano; in Paris, recommending that the
other members of the European Commission expel Greece from the Com-
mission (because of the Greek military junta of 1967–1974); again in his of-
fice, where Alferano delivers the report on his investigation into the mas-
sacre of Piazza Fontana to him; and finally, again speaking with President
Saragat. In this progression, Moro is represented as the politician who im-
mediately realizes that the attack was organized and implemented by the
Fascists, who opposes a series of repressive measures wanted by other mem-
bers of government (Moro in that period was Foreign Minister), who inves-
tigates and finds out that part of the secret services and state apparatuses
were involved, and who finally decides to keep information about the
strage di Stato («massacre of the state») secret. In his last appearance, Moro
submits Alferano’s report to the President and, after the latter admonishes
him not to make it public, he states:
If I made public what you just read, a civil war would break out, be-
cause for many people even the idea that some part of the state has cov-
ered or endorsed this horror would be intolerable. That is why we will
94 As noted in the fourth chapter, it was established that the right-wing group Or-
dine nuovo placed the bomb. In the «Memorial», Moro himself wrote that, when
the attack was perpetrated, he immediately assumed that it had been carried out
by right-wing groups in an attempt to «block certain political developments» [it.:
«bloccare certi sviluppi politici»] and expressed the conviction that «the interest
and the intervention were more foreign than national» [it.: «l’interesse e l’inter-
vento fossero più esteri che nazionali»]. See Moro 1997c, 230–232.
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not do anything; we will force them to cover everything, like cats with
their excrement.95
The most significant scene is undoubtedly the first one, which begins with
Moro in the Church of Santa Chiara, where we see him speaking with a
Catholic priest in what appears to be a confession, although the scene does
not occur within the confessional but on the church’s pew (see figure 14).
Here, he says:
I wonder what role the Lord has assigned me in the midst of this
stormy sea. I cannot understand it, Father. I cannot see it. I look at my
fellow man and I see nothing but iniquity and vanity; I see wailing, no
sense of community; no love except for their own reward; then cow-
ardice and opportunism; violence instead of ideas. Sometimes I think
that only things maintain dignity: trees, stones, nature. Sometimes I
think that Italy needs a catastrophe destroying all that we have built to
contrast [these things]—the ant’s nest, cars, cement—in order to bring
Italy back to the desert. To the bare earth it once was. So that nature
can regain control and start again from the first form of life, from the
first man, from the first fire. Here, of this cataclysm, Father, I feel ready
to be the first victim.96
95 It.: «Se io rendessi pubblico ciò che le ho appena fatto leggere, scoppierebbe una
guerra civile, perché per molti sarebbe intollerabile anche solo l’idea che una
parte dello stato abbia coperto o avvallato questo orrore. Per questo non faremo
nulla; li costringeremo a coprire tutto, come i gatti con gli escrementi» (01:15:28–
01:15:52).
96 It.: «Mi chiedo quale è il ruolo che il Signore mi ha assegnato in mezzo a questo
mare in tempesta. Non riesco a capirlo, Padre. Non riesco a vederlo. Guardo i
miei simili e non vedo che indisciplina e vanità; vedo furbizia; nessun senso della
comunità; nessun amore se non per il proprio tornaconto. Poi viltà e opportunis-
mo; violenza al posto delle idee. Alle volte penso che a mantenere un contegno
siano rimaste soltanto le cose. Gli alberi, le pietre, la natura. Talvolta penso che
all’Italia sia necessaria una catastrofe che distrugga tutto quello che vi abbiamo
contrapposto: I formicai, le auto, il cemento, e la riporti al deserto. Alla nuda ter-
ra di prima. Così che la natura possa riprendere il sopravvento e ricominciare dal-
la prima forma di vita, dal primo uomo, dal primo fuoco. Ecco, di questo cataclis-
ma, Padre, io mi sento pronto padre a essere la prima vittima» (05:54–06:50).
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Aldo Moro’s «confession» in Romanzo di una strage (Marco
Tullio Giordana, IT/F 2012).
In this scene, Moro basically expresses his willingness to accept martyr-
dom. The decision to set the scene in the same church where Moro went
on the day of his abduction is obviously not accidental. The scene works
with what Blumenberg calls «magic affirmation» (ger. magische Sicherung);
that is, the narrative construction of a meaningful relationship between the
juxtaposition of an event and another that precedes it. Moro’s confession
in the church in 1969 assumes the role of a premonitory sign, a prefigura-
tion brought to a pathetic excess, of what happened on March 16, 1978.
The film deploys the mythological conception already discussed above:
Moro’s death assumes the meaning of an expected sacrifice that is neces-
sary to restore the balance of the natural and socio-political cycle of life
and death, order and chaos.97 Moreover, Moro’s decision to maintain secre-
cy about the «massacre of the state» is denoted as a sort of «original sin»,
which can be expiated only by sacrifice. Sacrifice transforms guilt into in-
nocence. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that Moro’s last ap-
pearance—the scene with Saragat—is preceded by a short sequence (nine
seconds) in which we see him praying in church, and then followed by an
intertitle stating «The Reason of State». The meaningful analogy construct-
ed here is clear: the same «reason of state» that forced Moro into silence
about what «really» happened in 1969 will force him to accept his sacrifice
in 1978. His choice had a price, as the final title informs the audience be-
fore the closing credits: «Aldo Moro was assassinated by the Red Brigades
PICTURE 14:
97 As Alan O’Leary points out, the idea of the death of Moro as a sort of totemic
sacrifice is already present in Marco Tullio Giorndana’s Maledetti vi amerò (IT
1980). See O’Leary 2011, 38–45.
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on May 9, 1978». In short: Romanzo di una strage is more proof of the
widespread fascination with the mythical and sacrificial narrative model,
since personalities such as director Marco Tullio Giordana and writer Italo
Calvino, who are anything but naive and unprepared, failed to resist it.
In 2003, two films were released in cinemas that are quite different from
each other: Piazza delle cinque lune (Renzo Martinelli, IT/UK 2003) and
Buongiorno, notte (Marco Bellocchio, IT 2003). The former is a thriller
that brings the conspirational narrative plot to an unlikely and almost
grotesque excess: twenty years after the Moro events, a judge on the cusp of
retirement receives a film of the via Fani kidnapping from a mysterious fig-
ure and begins an investigation. The spectator comes to discover, after a se-
ries of revelations and twists, that Mario Moretti, the leader of the BR and
principal architect of the Moro kidnapping, is a spy working for the CIA.98
As O’Leary observes, Piazza delle cinque lune is «not a Moro film at all»,
since «it invokes Moro both as a metaphor (for victimhood as such) and
metonym (for the anni di piombo as a whole), but as a trope unhitched
from its specific historical circumstances.»99 Moreover, the film does not
pay attention to the «line of firmness» and to Moro’s letters, which is why
it has little relevance to this study. Much more interesting is the latter,
since it explicitly addresses the problem of martyrological representation
and the allocation of the martyr role. Buongiorno, notte is not interested
in providing knowledge or explanations of the events or in revealing and
conveying little known aspects that had been consigned to the dark cor-
ners of memory by media oblivion. The film combines historical reality
and fiction, almost becoming a story of counterfactual fiction: Moro is
symbolically «resurrected» to bring to fruition the hypothesis that Moro
might be set free from his BR prison and walk away undisturbed.
Buongiorno, notte is loosely based on the dramatic memoirs of the for-
mer BR member, Anna Laura Braghetti, who, according to her own ac-
count of the event, was a resident in the via Montalcini apartment
throughout Moro’s imprisonment. The film is conceived as a mixture of
fiction and news reportage.100 For the most part, the story is told from the
point of view of Chiara, the alter ego of the former female terrorist, who is
eventually moved by the humanity of Aldo Moro and distances herself
from the motives for the kidnapping and, above all, from the rationale of
the death sentence. The camera follows her through her daily life, yet also
98 For a critique of conspiracy theory in this film, see O’Leary 2011, 48–59.
99 O’Leary 2011, 59.
100 See Braghetti/Tavella 1998.
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depicts her dreams and fantasies. In the non-dreamlike dimension of the
film, the television is constantly on in the apartment where Moro is held
prisoner, transmitting the news reports and other programs of the time.
The original televisual images of the outside broadcasting from the loca-
tion of the via Fani attack are fused with other images in the film. The
dream sequences in the film also incorporate episodes of documentary cin-
ema and, in particular, fragments of Dziga Vertov’s Three Songs About
Lenin (USSR 1934) showing highlights of the Soviet revolution.
An important topic of the film is the problem of the historical memori-
alization of the Resistenza. The reference to the partisan struggle is already
present in one scene where Chiara attends a family reunion on April 25,
the anniversary of the Resistenza, during which the older family members
sing Fischia il vento, a popular song written in September 1943 at the incep-
tion of the partisan struggle; but the key scene in this regard is when
Chiara reads one of Moro’s letters to his wife, as already quoted above.101
As she reads the letter, we listen to the voice of Roberto Herlitzka, alias Al-
do Moro, reciting the letter’s content; after a while, his voice is replaced by
another voice who reads a letter from a member of the Italian Resistance
who is condemned to death. This scene is accompanied by Pink Floyd’s
song The Great Gig in The Sky and images of the atrocious executions of
partisans from the final scenes of Roberto Rossellini’s Paisà (IT 1946) (see
figure 15).102 We see, then, Chiara crying, as she realizes the analogy be-
tween Moro’s and the partisans’ ordeals. Moreover, the lyrics of the Pink
Floyd song emphasize the theme of death and the courage when one is
faced with death:
And I am not frightened of dying / Any time will do, / I don’t mind. /
Why should I / be frightened of dying? / There’s no reason for it, /
you’ve gotta go sometime. / I never said I was frightened of dying.
Undoubtedly, Bellocchio subverts and implicitly criticizes those who, as
previously seen, in the spring of 1978, compared the partisans’ letters and
the letters by Moro to make the latter appear like a coward. Moreover, by
combining fictional images of partisans’ executions with the reading of a
letter of a historical person who was actually executed, the director man-
ages to construct a powerful analogy between Moro’s letters and the par-
tisans’ letters and, at the same time, displays or unfolds the analogical con-
struction. In a sense, the film invites the public to become conscious of the
101 See foodnote 73.
102 See Pezzini 2012, 147.
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performative mechanism of prefiguration. Within the film, the situation of
the partisans condemned to death prefigures the situation of Moro within
the «people’s prison», allowing Chiara to become aware of the instrumen-
tality of the BR’s rhetoric and self-identification as legitimate heirs of the
Resistenza, since she understands that they are acting just like the Fascists
by condemning an innocent person or, at least, «the least implicated of
them all» to death. The spectator is encouraged to become aware that his-
torical memory is always the product of discursive practices. In other
words, Bellocchio uses images and words poetically and not instrumental-
ly, unveiling their historicity and exteriority.
Execution of partisans in Paisà (Roberto Rossellini, IT 1946).
The same approach is used in relation to the martyr figure in a scene where
Moro and Mariano (the name of a character that impersonates the Red
Brigades’ leader Mario Moretti) debate within the «people’s prison». The
scene begins with a close-up of Chiara’s eye, who looks at the «interroga-
tion» from a little hole in the wall that separates Moro’s cell from the rest
of the apartment and listens to what the prisoner and his jailer say:
 
Mariano: Are you afraid of death?
Moro: Why did you ask this?
PICTURE 15:
7 Memorialization Practices and Memory Struggle
352
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Mariano: Yet you believe in the afterlife.
Moro: Jesus was also frightened in Gethsemane.
Mariano: I remember that as a child I was so infatuated with religion
that I hoped to die in order to go to heaven as soon as possible. So ab-
surd!
Moro: Are you not afraid of dying?
Mariano: Every man one day has to die. But not all deaths have the
same meaning. I believe our superiority consists in this: we are willing
to die for our ideas. Communists are like that.
Moro: Like the first Christian martyrs. In the end yours is a religion,
like mine. In fact, it is much more severe. For example, it despises the
body far more than we Catholics do. Once also Christianity was like
this, but now no more. The last crusade was in 1270.103
 
In just over a minute, the dialogue uncovers the historicity of the martyr
figure and draws attention to its signatures. The Moro character highlights
the analogy between Communists and the first Christian communities in
their willingness to die for a «higher» cause. He thus draws attention to the
fact that both Christianity and Communism are based on a messianic and
eschatological conception of history.104 However, he also points out that
the ideology of martyrdom was and is used as an instrument for the legit-
imization and justification of violence and war, as in the case of the cru-
sades. In other words, Moro unveils, by the means of analogy, the instru-
mental use of memory: just as the crusaders understood themselves as the
legitimate heirs of early Christians, the BR represented themselves as the
legitimate heirs of Resistance fighters. The memory of early Christians and
partisans, both willing to die for their ideas, is instrumentally used to legit-
imize the willingness to kill for ideas. The Moro character underlines the
103 It.: «Mariano: Hai paura di morire? / Moro: Perché me lo chiede? / Mariano: Ep-
pure tu credi nell’aldilà? / Moro: Anche Cristo nell’orto del Getsemani ha avuto
paura. / Mariano: Mi ricordo che da bambino ero talmente infervorato dalla reli-
gione che speravo di morire per andare in paradiso il più presto possibile. Che
assurdità. / Moro: Lei non ha paura di morire? / Mariano: Ogni uomo un giorno
deve morire. Ma non tutte le morti hanno lo stesso significato. Io credo che la
nostra superiorità consista in questo: noi siamo disposti a morire per le nostre
idee. I comunisti sono così. / Moro: Anche i primi martiri cristiani. In fondo la
sua è una religione, come la mia. Anzi, è molto più severa. Per esempio disprez-
za il corpo, molto di più di quanto non facciamo noi cattolici. Un tempo il cris-
tianesimo era così, ma ora non più. L’ultima crociata è del 1270» (47:00–48:08).
104 As far as the analogies between Christian and Communist eschatology are con-
cerned, see Agamben 2005, 29–33.
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instrumentality of both practices of memorialization. From this point of
view, it is correct to affirm that Buongiorno, notte «is not a film about
the Moro events as such, but about the representational means through
which we construct our understandings of such events» and, more general-
ly, of history.105
Although the film focuses on the deconstruction of the BR’s rhetoric
and language, it also challenges the hegemonic discourse produced by the
government, major parties and established media. Again, it is the character
of Aldo Moro that unveils the instrumental use of language and rhetoric.
In the last dialogue before his death and resurrection, Moro tries to explain
to his jailers why death will be extremely counterproductive for them:
Moro: Do you not understand that I will become a martyr? [Do you
not understand that I will become] the idiot they will use to destroy
you? When television—it does not take much to understand it!—when
television and newspapers will show photos of my corpse, people will
not understand. They will hate you.106
The role of the media during Moro’s 55 days of imprisonment is constantly
underlined in the film, showing how, out of the «people’s prison», an un-
compromising position with respect to negotiation emerged and spread
quickly. Here, Moro essentially says to the BR that they are doing exactly
what the government, media and parties expect of them; but this does not
serve to convince the BR, except for Chiara, who expresses her disappoint-
ment since she cannot accept the idea of murder, and Ernesto, who seems
to understand Moro’s argument. In fact, speaking with Mariano, he states:
You heard what the president said. Think a little: Everybody wants him
dead and we are going to kill him. We will be doing them a great ser-
vice. We will kill him for them—do you realize that?107
105 O’Leary 2011, 61.
106 It.: Moro: «Ma non capite che diventerò un martire? L’idiota di cui si serviranno
per annientarvi? Quando la televisione – non ci vuole molto a capirlo! - quando
la televisione, i giornali, mostreranno le foto del mio cadavere la gente non
potrà capire. Vi odierà» (01:26:06–01:26:21).
107 It.: «Hai sentito cosa ha detto il presidente. Ragiona: tutti lo vogliono morto e
noi lo ammazziamo. Gli facciamo un gran servizio. Noi lo ammazziamo per
loro, ti rendi conto?» (01:30:47–01:30:56).
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Mariano does not realize and continues to justify the homicide as neces-
sary for the revolutionary cause:
If we kill him, we will prove that we are stronger because no pity can
stop us. We only respond to the proletariat and the working-class.108
Here, the film clearly highlights what Umberto Eco had already noticed,
namely that the BR’s actions and ideology were functional to the same sys-
tem they wanted to destroy.
Alternative ending: Moro walking away from the «people’s
prison» in Buongiorno, notte (Marco Bellocchio, IT 2003).
The final sequence of the film is a montage of two alternative outcomes of
the kidnapping, united by Pink Floyd’s song Shine On You Crazy Diamond
(Part One) on the soundtrack. In the first scenario, the female terrorist falls
asleep after taking a last look at the prisoner and opening the door of his
cell. The prisoner then gets up and, while everybody sleeps, leaves the
apartment and walks calmly out onto the street. In the second scenario, the
PICTURE 16:
108 It.: «Se lo ammazziamo dimostriamo che siamo più forti perché nessuna pietà ci
può fermare. Noi rispondiamo soltanto al proletariato e alla classe operaia»
(01:30:56–01:31:03).
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woman falls asleep and Moro is led blindfolded from his cell with the sign
«Buongiorno, notte», signaling the end. The film continues with a se-
quence of footage from the state funeral until the music changes: Schu-
bert’s Musical Movement in F accompanies the scene of Moro walking away
into the open space of the city of Rome (see figure 16). As O’Leary ob-
serves, «the confusion between the poetic reconstruction of events and
their revisionist reinterpretation in Buongiorno, notte is deliberate»,
since «the jarring interpolation of sequences from other films, while illus-
trating Chiara’s subjectivity, also force our attention to how film constructs
our impression of history precisely through a rhetorical invocation and em-
bellishment of the fact.»109 This is particularly evident in the way the film
refers to the martyr figure: instead of using it instrumentally, it poetically
uncovers its historical uses and abuses. Should Italian people consider Al-
do Moro a hero, a saint, a martyr? The director Bellocchio, in a cameo ap-
pearance, takes pleasure in not answering this question by saying: «Was it
true glory? Posterity will judge».110
Beatification Process
This reconstruction and deconstruction of memorializing representations
and practices of the abduction and death of Aldo Moro cannot end with-
out addressing a recent initiative: as reported firstly by the newspaper La
Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno in September 2012, the Diocesan Tribunal of
Rome approved an inquiry into the potential canonization and beatifica-
tion of Aldo Moro.111 The initiative was launched in May of the same year
by the Federazione dei Centri studi Aldo Moro and Renato Dell’Andro, led by
the engineer Luigi Ferlicchia, who organized a collection of signatures in
support of Moro’s «fame of sanctity». The Postulator of the Cause, Nicola
Giampaolo, provided the Supplice libello sulla fama di santità, that is,
«Pleading Pamphlet on the Fame of Holiness», to Cardinal and Archbishop
Agostino Vallini, Vicar of the Pope, who then addressed the statesman as
Servo di Dio (Servant of God). After this, the President of the Diocesan tri-
7.4
109 O’Leary 2011, 67.
110 It.: «Fu vera gloria? Ai posteri l’ardua sentenza» (01:18:55–01:19:00).
111 See Sorino, Benedetto, «Moro beato, via alla causa – agli atti c’è un miracolo»,
La Gazzetta del Mezziorgiono, 22.9.2012, http://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it
/news/home/397234/moro-beato-via-alla-causa-agli-attic-e-un-miracolo.html
(accessed August 23, 2017).
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bunal of Rome introduced the cause by acquiring the acts of the Supplice
libello sulla fama di santità.
The procedure of canonization and beatification is complex and can take
years, if not decades. Moreover, it cannot begin unless at least five years
have passed since the death of the person in question.112 Canonization is
the act by which the Catholic Church declares that a person who has died
is a saint; the person is included in the «canon», or list, of officially recog-
nized saints and can be venerated in the «universal Church» (while beatifi-
cation permits only veneration in «particular Churches», that is, in a cer-
tain diocese). The procedure of canonization has two phases: a Diocesan
and a Roman phase. The beatification and canonization of Aldo Moro is
still in the preliminary part of the first phase, called Inchiesta sull’eroicità
delle virtù o sul martirio del servo di Dio (Inquiry into the heroic virtue or the
martyrdom of the servant of God).113 The purpose of the inquiry is to col-
lect documentary evidence and testimonies pro et contra beatification and
canonization. People who lived with the potential saint and know about
his or her work and lifestyle initiate the process of canonization: the com-
munity of the parish, the religious congregation, the community in which
he or she worked, and so on.114 The «Actor»—that is, the group of people
initiating the process—charge a person they consider appropriate to sub-
mit a request to the competent bishop—the bishop of the diocese where
the potential saint died—to open the Diocesan Inquiry into possible beati-
fication. The person who submits the question is called the «Postulator of
the Cause». The Postulator carries out investigations into the life of the
«Servant of God» in order to know his «fame of holiness» and the ecclesial
importance of the cause and to report this to the bishop.115 The goal is to
verify the «heroic virtues» or the «martyrdom» of the dead person. As a le-
gal representative of the «Actors», the Postulator prepares the Supplice libel-
lo, that is, the petition in writing with which he officially begins the Di-
ocesan Inquiry. Along with this petition, the Postulator sends (a) a biogra-
phy of the potential saint, (b) all the writings that the potential saint pub-
lished or edited, (c) a list of «eyewitnesses» (de visu), that is, of texts that
contribute to the verification of the virtues or martyrdom of the potential
112 See Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004, 266.
113 See Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004, 255.
114 See Sanctorum mater, Art. 9-11, in: Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004,
411.
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saint.116 The bishop can accept the Supplice libello «after assessing the exis-
tence of the authentic and widespread fame of holiness or of martyrdom
and of signs.»117 For this reason, he must consult with other bishops on the
initiation of the cause as well as to «make known the petition of the postu-
lator […] with an edict, placed in a cathedral or published in the diocesan
newspaper (bulletin).»118 In this edict, he invites all believers to provide
useful information about the cause. Moreover, he must send a request to
the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, asking for its nulla osta (nothing
opposes).
In September 2016, Postulator Nicola Giampaolo declared to Radio Vati-
cana the following:
We are still gathering numerous postulations, testimonies of cardinals,
bishops, convinced of the opportuneness of this cause, but also of com-
mon people, politicians and intellectuals. We hope to be soon able to
request the ‹nulla osta› to proceed to the Italian Bishops’ Confer-
ence.119
This means that the preliminary phase of the Diocesan Inquiry has not yet
ended. Although the Supplice libello sulla fama di santità is not accessible to
the public, some information on its contents was disclosed to the media by
the Postulator. He declared three main arguments in favor of Moro’s fame
of holiness: his incontrovertible Christian and Catholic faith, his martyri-
um in odium fidei, and finally a miracle of intercession. According to the
Postulator, the Red Brigades were a terrorist group led by Communist ide-
ology in a war against Christianity, which is why Moro’s death can be seen
116 See Sanctorum mater, Art. 37, in: Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004, 418.
117 Sanctorum mater, Art. 40 – § 1, in: Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004,
419; it.: «[…] il Vescovo diocesano o aperchiale potrà accettare il libello di do-
manda per l’avvio della causa dopo aver valutato l’esistenza di un’autentica e dif-
fusa fama di santità o di martirio e di segni.»
118 Sanctorum mater, Art. 43 – § 1, in: Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004,
420; it.: «Il Vescovo deve rendere nota la petizione del postulatore di iniziare la
causa nella sua diocesi o perchia con un edito, affisso in catedrale o pubblicato
sul giornale (bollettino) parrocchiale.»
119 Quoted in Zenit. Il mondo visto da Roma, «Aldo Moro. Il Vicariato di Roma avvia
il processo di beatificazione», 24.9.2016, https://it.zenit.org/articles/aldo-moro-il-
vicariato-di-roma-avvia-il-processo-di-beatificazione/ (accessed August 23, 2017);
it.: «Attualmente stiamo ancora raccogliendo numerose postulatorie, testimoni-
anze di cardinali, vescovi, convinti dell’opportunità di questa causa, ma anche di
gente comune, politici e intellettuali. Quanto prima speriamo di poter
richiedere il ‹nulla osta› per procedere alla Conferenza Episcopale italiana.»
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as a form of martyrdom. Moreover, he also referred to the witness of Mon-
signor Francesco Colasuonno, who is known for having organized the
meeting between Gorbachev and Wojtyla and then being appointed Cardi-
nal by John Paul II himself. Colassuonno recounted that, when he was in
the Apostolic Nunciature in Mozambique in July 1978, a group of guerril-
las attacked, destroyed and killed everyone they encountered. Closed in a
room with a picture of Moro on the wall, Colasuonno began to pray, in-
voking his help. This is indicated as a miracle of intercession.120
For the purpose of this study, the second reason indicated by the Postula-
tor is particularly interesting. A manual for the Postulators published by
the Congregation for the Causes of Saints states that there are three funda-
mental elements that characterize «true Christian martyrdom»: «a) materi-
al martyrdom; b) formal martyrdom ex parte persecutoris, and c) formal
martyrdom ex parte victimae.»121 The material element is violent death;
however, for such a death to be regarded as martyrdom, «it is necessary that
those who commit death carry out such action because of their hatred of
faith or of a virtue related to the faith of God.» Moreover, the second neces-
sary element is «the voluntary acceptance of death for the sake of faith».122
Martyrdom therefore demands that the cause of death be the faith or prac-
tice of a faith-related virtue. Recalling Saint Augustine’s dictum non causa
sed poena facit martyrem, the manual states: «martyrdom does not depend
on the sufferance but on cause of this sufferance.»123
According to Monsignor Andrea Venezia, Presbyter of the Papal Arch-
basilica of St. John in Lateran, material and formal elements of martyrdom
are fulfilled in the case of Moro’s death. When interviewed by Radio Vati-
cana with the Postulator, Venezia stated:
The premise to open the cause of beatification was there, because if po-
litical activity is carried out according to the cardinal virtues of justice,
120 See Ferlicchia 2014, 559.
121 Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004, 61; it.: «Sono tre gli elementi impor-
tanti che caratterizzano il vero martirio cristiano, ed ogni processo per un’even-
tuale canonizzazione dovrà raggiungere la certezza morale a questo riguardo: a)
il martirio materiale ; b) il martirio formale ex parte persecutoris e )c) il martirio
formale ex parte victimae.»
122 Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004, 62; it.: «In primo luogo è necessario
che chi infligge la morte compia tale azione per odio alla fede o a una virtù re-
lazionata con la fede in Dio. […] Il secondo elemento formale […] è
l’ccettazione volontaria della morte per amore della fede […].»
123 Congregazione delle Cause dei Santi 2004, 64; it.: «[…] il martirio non dipende
dalla pena che si subisce, ma dalla causa di questa pena.»
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fortune, temperance, sobriety, and service to the common good, but
also in accordance with faith, it is the highest form of charity. For a
Christian like Aldo Moro, baptized and raised as a young man in
Christian consciousness, politics was certainly a charitable act that
lived up to the effusion of blood. Moro was not only barbarously
killed, as the images showing him as a ‹sacrificial lamb› show. But his
end was also the conclusion of a testimony and that is why we can talk
about martyrdom in his case. Not only did he testify to his faith with
his gentle and peaceful approach to the things of politics and govern-
ment activity, with his ability to listen, mediate, and reconcile oppo-
sites, but continued his testimony to the extreme consequences, to the
point of death. His was not tactics; it was a model of government. And
Moro was a politician also committed to a spiritual and transcendental
ideal that is called Christian faith.124
For Venezia, Moro was killed due to the inspiration of Christian ideals and
virtues in his political activity. Similarly, the Postulator Giampaolo argues
this in a book published in 2015 when he describes the politician’s «exer-
cise of charity as an authentic and essential testimony of faith.»125 More-
over, according to the Postulator, Moro «was sacrificed for the salvation of
so many […].» Here, the voluntary acceptance of martyrdom is explicitly
described as deriving from Moro’s understanding of love as «‹agape›, as a
124 Quoted in Zenit. Il mondo visto da Roma, «Aldo Moro. Il Vicariato di Roma avvia
il processo di beatificazione», 24.9.2016, https://it.zenit.org/articles/aldo-moro-il-
vicariato-di-roma-avvia-il-processo-di-beatificazione/ (accessed August 23, 2017);
it.: «Le premesse per aprire la causa di beatificazione c’erano perché l’attività po-
litica se svolta secondo le virtù cardinali di giustizia, fortezza, temperanza, sobri-
età e come servizio al bene comune, ma anche nella fede, è la forma più alta di
carità. Per un cristiano come Aldo Moro battezzato e cresciuto sin da giovane
nella coscienza cristiana, la politica è stata certamente un atto di carità vissuto
fino all’effusione del sangue. Non solo Moro fu ucciso barbaramente come testi-
moniano le immagini che lo mostrano come ‹agnello immolato.› Ma la sua fine
fu anche la conclusione di una testimonianza ed è per questo che nel suo caso
possiamo parlare di martirio. Non solo testimoniò la fede con il suo approccio
mite e pacato alle cose della politica e all’attività di governo, con la sua capacità
di ascolto, mediazione, conciliazione degli opposti, ma portò avanti la sua testi-
monianza fino all’estreme conseguenze, andando incontro alla morte. Il suo
non era tatticismo era un modello di governo. E Moro fu un politico impegnato
anche per un ideale spirituale e trascendente che si chiama fede cristiana.»
125 Giampaolo 2015, 52; it.: «Aldo Moro ha cercato di esercitare il servizio della car-
ità come una autentica ed essenziale testimonianza di fede.»
7 Memorialization Practices and Memory Struggle
360
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
gift of oneself to others.»126 We can find an explication in a book written
by Luigi Ferlicchia, one of the main initiators of the procedure of beatifica-
tion of Aldo Moro, of the first formal element of martyrdom, the hatred
for faith. Here, he describes the reasons why the BR killed Moro:
Moro, with his political reasoning, all logical and concatenated into
the strategy of attention, had foreseen and worked for the fall of Com-
munism, and for this the ‹priests of international Communism› saw
him as a danger that had to be eliminated with the armed struggle.
The BR, who considered themselves the depositors of communist
faith, in line with the Stalinist Communists of that time, came to the
crazy gesture of eliminating him. As the priests of the temple entered
into cahoots with ‹Roman power›, through the game of parties, in or-
der to sentence Christ to death, the same happened to Aldo Moro,
when the BR, in the logic of the non-decision of the ‹established pow-
er›, killed him. […] A martyr! And martyrdom immediately places
him among the defenders of faith in Christian values.127
With the BR as the priest of the temple, and the Italian State as the Roman
Empire, again, the mechanism of prefiguration is used to represent Aldo
Moro as a martyr. Obviously, there is a certain ambiguity in this representa-
tion as well as, more generally, in the initiative for the beatification of Mo-
ro, since the cause of his death is indicated in his political activity as a
statesman. Moro’s death seems to assume here the connotation of martyr-
dom, a witness of faith in both the Italian State and the Church, in secular
and religious power.
The initiative launched by Ferlicchia and carried by Postulator Giampao-
lo aroused some criticism and controversy in the press. To cite only one ex-
126 Giampaolo 2015, 52; it.: «L’amore egli lo intendeva e lo viveva come ‹agape›,
come dono di sé agli altri. E lui si è donato, si è sacrificato per la salvezza di tanti
altri che non hanno riconosciuto il suo sacrificio.»
127 Ferlicchia 2014, 549; it.: «Moro con i suoi ragionamenti politici, tutti logici e
concatenati sino alla strategia dell’attenzione, aveva previsto, intuito e operato
per la caduta del comunismo, e per questo era visto dai ‹sacerdoti del comunis-
mo internazionale› come un pericolo che andava eliminato con la lotta armata.
Le Br che si ritengono i depositari della fede comunista, in sintonia con i comu-
nisti stalinisti dell’epoca, arrivano al folle gesto di eliminarlo. Come per Gesù
Cristo i sacerdoti del tempio giungono in combutta con il ‹potere romano›, at-
traverso il gioco delle parti, alla condanna a morte del Cristo così per Aldo Mo-
ro, le Br nella logica della non decisione del ‹potere costituito›, giungono alla
sua eliminazione fisica. […] Un martire! Ed il martirio subito lo pone fra i
difensori della fede nei valori cristiani.»
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ample, in the right-wing newspaper Il Giornale, journalist Marcello
Veneziani argued that
Moro was a politician and acted as a politician, [but] he was not a
saint. His death still burns, but as Saint Augustine said, it is not the
sufferance but the cause that makes martyrs. And I do not see Moro [as
someone who was] moved by a Christian cause, but by [the cause of]
Christian Democracy. Or should we sanctify all the Catholic victims of
terrorism? True saints sacrificed themselves in the name of faith or de-
vote their lives to works of charity or do miracles. Does Moro fall into
these categories? There is already a political saint: it is Saint Thomas
More. That’s enough. God did not vote for the DC.128
This, like many articles and blog posts in favor of or against the beatifica-
tion procedure, demonstrates that even today the politician Aldo Moro is
controversial and that conflicting interpretations of the reasons, causes and
interests that led to his kidnapping and death still remain. What seems to
remain constant, within the various discursive and memorializing practices
concerning Moro and his violent death, is the figure of the martyr.
Whether the attribution and allocation of the martyr role is accepted or
not, it continues to dominate public debates and cultural productions.
This study shows how Aldo Moro has been constructed as a state martyr,
and how alternative and subversive forms of representation have chal-
lenged this construction. In years, maybe decades, we will learn if the ini-
tiative will lead to the politician’s beatification. For the moment, we can
only observe that the battle through which different social actors tried and
still try to take possession of the figure of the murdered politician, to rep-
resent and memorialize the events of 1978 in one way rather than in anoth-
er, continues.
128 Veneziani, Marcello, «Tommaso, l’unico Moro vero santo», Il Giornale,
20.7.2012, http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/tommaso-lunico-moro-davvero-santo.h
tml (accessed August 23, 2017); it.: «Moro fu un politico e si comportò da politi-
co, non da santo. La sua morte brucia ancora, ma come diceva Sant’Agostino
non è la pena ma la causa a fare i martiri. E non vedo Moro mosso da una causa
cristiana, al più democristiana. O dovremmo santificare tutte le vittime cat-
toliche del terrorismo? I veri santi si sacrificano nel nome della fede o dedicano
la loro vita a opere di carità o compiono miracoli. Moro rientra in questi
canoni? Un Santo Moro politico c’è già: è San Tommaso Moro. Basta lui. Dio
non votava Dc.»
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How to Narrate and Represent Political Violence
This study has identified and critically analyzed language units, narrative
models and rhetorical patterns used, within different media and over the
course of four decades, to represent and give meaning to a specific event of
political violence: the kidnapping, imprisonment and assassination of the
Christian Democrat politician Aldo Moro. Starting from the hypothesis of
a connection between procedures of legitimization of political authority
and power structures and the martyr figure, this study has addressed differ-
ent discursive, cultural, and memorialization practices, through which Mo-
ro’s death was successfully and effectively represented as a form of martyr-
dom necessary for the salvation of the Italian State and society. The study
has sought to show that through the allocation of the state martyr role,
Moro’s death acquired the meaning of a (voluntary) witness to the absolute
and meta-historical truth of human and citizens’ rights as well as the neces-
sity of the sovereign state to be the guarantor and defender of these rights.
It has also drawn attention to the intrinsic relationship between collective
identification processes, state martyrology and state mythology. Moreover,
this study has pointed out that the martyr figure can be and has been used
both poetically and instrumentally, that is: both as an instrument of
protest against and as the concealment of established relations, structures
and micromechanisms of power.
This chapter recapitulates the main insights and theses of the investiga-
tion. The first section addresses the theory and methodology of discourse
and cultural analysis, highlighting their heuristic value when it comes to
analyzing representations of political violence. The second section identi-
fies the main theses concerning the emergence, signatures, and performa-
tivity of the martyr figure. The third section specifically addresses the in-
sights gained from focusing on the Moro case as a paradigmatic example to
understand state mythology in the modern and contemporary world. The
final part of the chapter addresses the problematic relationship between
practices of mythicization and de-mythicization, that is: between hege-
monic and subversive representations. It thereby topicalizes the open-end-
ed question that concerns both realms of ethics and aesthetics: How can
we narrate and represent political violence?
8
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Discourse and Cultural Analysis
This investigation has made use of several tools of analysis and was inspired
by different theories and authors. Its discourse analytical approach has
made it possible to observe, describe and analyze both the historical emer-
gence and changes of the martyr figuration, its diffusion, and its function-
ality within a particular pragmatic and hermeneutic context. Referring to
the reshaping of discourse into cultural analysis as proposed by Stuart Hall,
it has defined and analyzed discursive practices as cultural practices of rep-
resentation capable of producing meaningfulness. In this way, the investi-
gation was able to highlight and focus attention on the performative force
and efficacy of different kinds of representations within different media.
Following reflections exposed by both Foucault and Derrida, this study
concentrated on the iterability, recognizability, materialization and mani-
festation of language units, narrative models and rhetorical patterns that
refer to political violence, rather than on the intentionality of the acting
subjects. It also referred to Louis Althusser’s concept of interpellation to
highlight the way in which discourse and cultural practices affect individu-
als, construct identity and subjectivity and shape their understanding of
things and events. Furthermore, it has operationalized the distinction of
instrumental and poetic uses of language, between hegemonic and subver-
sive representations, in order to bring to light, compare and analyze differ-
ent ways of iterating and recontextualizing the martyr figure. In this way,
the discursive formation referring to the event of political violence, could
be approached as a sort of battlefield in which hegemonic practices are
challenged by other alternative and subversive practices, which try to ex-
pose and criticize the mechanism by which historical events are mytholo-
gized.
This approach has been very useful in allowing us to observe the emer-
gence and use of the martyr figure from a specific perspective. In the first
place, by focusing on the martyrological representation of political vio-
lence and not understanding violence primarily from the point of view of
ritual theory, this study was able to analyze a concrete situation, in which
the victim of violence clearly expressed his rejection of the allocation of the
martyr role. Far from denying the relationship between rituality and per-
formativity, this investigation has addressed the ritualization of the event of
political violence—the construction and representation of the event as a
ritual—as the product of discursive and cultural practices. Moreover, this
perspective allowed for the observation and analysis of the production and
function of discursive and cultural practices without postulating on the so-
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cial actors’ consciousness of the instrumental dimension of their actions as
producers and consumers of representations. The conceptualization, ac-
cording to which language is used instrumentally when it conceals the his-
toricity and exteriority of language, does not necessarily imply that sub-
jects using language in this way are aware of what they are doing. On the
contrary, the efficacy of the instrumental use of language lies exactly in its
ability to conceal its function from both recipients and producers of dis-
cursive practices.
This approach has also made it possible to analyze the emergence of
martyrological and sacrificial representations in their specific historicity
without referring to universal assumptions. Ritual theories of sacrifice and
self-sacrifice tend to consider the use of violence to be a fundamental trait
of mankind, resulting in anthropological, universalistic and not historical
explanations of political conflicts. This is the case, in particular, with Gi-
rard’s scapegoat theory, which, despite its declared intention to overcome
the mechanism of sacrifice it analyzes, fundamentally legitimizes the exer-
cise of violence and other practices of coercion by so-called sovereign au-
thority by basically considering them necessary for containing the ever-
present threat of violence that «comes from the bottom» and which can,
potentially, always destroy society. From this point of view, universalistic
ritual theories in general and the scapegoat theory in particular, quiescent-
ly and covertly sustain the conceptualization of the state as a katechon, a
force necessary to avoid the «war of all against all»: since the predisposition
to violence is deeply-rooted in human nature, it is better that a sovereign
monopolizes violence. Within this narrative, self-sacrifice is the price that
individuals have to be willing to pay for the safety of society. By consider-
ing the sacralization connected with events of political violence as the
product of discursive practices, the study was able to observe and analyze
political violence as a fundamentally historical and thus contingent phe-
nomenon. Violence, to put it simply, happens; it does not have a meaning
per se, but always assumes meaning within a particular historical context.
There is no universal function or reason for violence, but only discursive
and cultural practices that construct violence as something meaningful.
Performativity and Signatures of the Martyr Figure
This study has demonstrated that the performative efficacy of martyrologi-
cal representations lies in their ability to appeal to people and to signify
events of political violence as sacrifices for a certain cause. Through marty-
8.2
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rological representation, violent death assumes the connotation of an act
or event with which the dead person witnesses the absolute and meta-his-
torical truthfulness of certain values, ideals and principles. Death then be-
comes a sort of truth-proof, which legitimizes the authority that the com-
munity experiences as sovereign. Furthermore, violent death assumes the
connotation of an accusation of the political authority, which is responsi-
ble or is experienced as responsible for political violence. Moreover, this
study has shown that the performative force of the martyr figure depends,
on the one hand, on its stratifications of meaning, its residues of religious
significance, its secret index and, on the other hand, on its spatial, temporal,
multimedial diffusion and manifestation in the public space. With regard
to this point, the study reconstructed the history of the martyr figure’s sig-
natures—the figure’s transpositions from certain pragmatic and hermeneu-
tic contexts to other contexts—at the end of which the state martyr figure
emerged.
In its original context of appearance, the martyr figure was part of what
has been defined as a narrative of rebellion, which is based on an eschato-
logical understanding of history. Within this narrative, the martyr is the
one who witnesses the truth of the soteriological power of Christ’s death,
resurrection and second coming at the end of time. The only authority that
is experienced as sovereign is that of God, which operates in history
through the Messiah, while the authority that subjugates the Christian
community by the means of violence is experienced as illegitimate. In this
context, martyrological representations appeal to people not as citizens
within the borders of a certain territory, or as appertaining to a certain eth-
nic group, but fundamentally as part of a universal community of believ-
ers.
Through a long process of re-signification, the martyr figure has been in-
corporated into and «domesticated» by the modern narrative of sovereign-
ty, which is functional to the construction of national identities and to the
legitimization of political authority within national borders. The state mar-
tyr figure is thus intrinsically linked to the emergence of nation-states in
modernity. The transcendental sovereignty of God is transformed into the
immanent sovereignty of political authority, but maintains a sacral dimen-
sion. Within this narrative, this martyr is the one that witnesses the abso-
lute necessity of the sovereign state to restrain the forces of evil that aim to
destroy society and establish a situation of anarchic chaos, of war of all
against all. Also, this narrative is based on an eschatological understanding
of history, but inverts its original telos: the state itself assumes the connota-
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tion of a kathechon, a power that restrains the forces of absolute evil from
destroying society and political order.
Within the messianic and eschatological narrative of rebellion, each in-
dividual life is considered sacred since it participates in the sacrality of the
Christian community, which in turn participates in the sacrality of God by
virtue of the soteriological power of Christ’s death and resurrection. Mar-
tyrdom, intended as a self-sacrifice witnessing truth, is the act-event that,
«repeating» the self-sacrifice of Christ, re-actualizes the sacrality of the
community. Precisely because life, independently from its political recog-
nition, from its participation in the public life of the polis, is sacred, mar-
tyrdom as self-sacrifice highlights the iniquity and profanity of the exercise
of violence by political authorities. Conversely, within Greco-Roman cos-
mology, the life that has been excluded from the political sphere and thus
belongs to the gods is sacred. Because of its exclusion from the profane
sphere of politics and its inclusion in the sacred sphere of the gods, this
mere life is no longer subject to the laws of the polis. The religious–politi-
cal authority that has the power to decide over mere life, that is, to exclude
it from the political sphere, is equally sacred, inasmuch as its decision tran-
scends legality and, paradoxically, establishes it. Within this cosmology,
both the sovereign and homo sacer are thus extra-legal figures, the former
because it lives in the state of exception and the latter because it decides on
the state of exception. This is why political authority permanently needs
spectacles of violence to visualize and expose its power over mere life, thus
demonstrating its sacredness. The radical subversiveness of the messianic
and eschatological narrative of rebellion lies precisely in its ability to over-
come this conceptualization of the sacred, to detach sacredness from the
exercise of violence, revealing violence’s contingency and iniquity. From
this point of view, the martyr can be considered the one that, from within
the state of exception, undermines the mechanism of the acclamation and
glorification of power.
The modern narrative of sovereignty brings and binds together elements
of Christian martyrology and eschatology with Roman procedures of accla-
mation, glorification and representation of power. If, within the narrative
of rebellion, the martyrological representation has the function of reveal-
ing the iniquity of the spectacularization of violence, with which political
authority exposes its power, the martyr figure assumes the function of con-
cealing the utility of events of political violence for the perpetuation of the
status quo of power relations within the narrative of sovereignty. A conditio
sine qua non of this domestication of the martyr figure is the discursive
construction of a perennial threat, of a sort immortal enemy, which can
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potentially destroy society and social order at any moment. This enemy is
mankind itself, which, in the absence of a sovereign authority that monop-
olizes the exercise of violence, lives in a situation of permanent «war of all
against all». It is for this reason that so-called sovereign states need myths
in order to legitimize their power to decide on the state of exception. With-
in these myths, events of political violence appear as the unavoidable out-
come of a cosmic and Manichean conflict between good and evil. This is
why, ultimately, terrorism is the natural, accepted, anticipated, and often
even promoted counterpart of bio- and thanatopolitics. In fact, the demo-
nization of organized criminal groups, of gangsters of all stripes, is the
most effective way of convincing people that they have to accept the politi-
cal status quo. Whenever one or more members of these groups kill some-
one with firearms, bombs, airplanes, or anything else that can act as a
weapon, there is a great opportunity to create a nation-state martyr, to rep-
resent events of political violence as unpleasant but necessary and expected
outcomes of a cosmic struggle between good and evil.
Within the modern narrative of sovereignty, the Christian conception of
the sacrality of individual life and the sacrality of both the homo sacer and
the sovereign figure are bound together to the point of becoming indis-
cernible. This strange, yet historically very effective union became particu-
larly blatant within this study when it came to analyzing the rhetoric of the
«reason of state». The idea of the sacrality of individual life has survived,
through and by the process of secularization, in the different declarations
of human and citizens’ rights. From this point of view, it does not seem hy-
perbolic to affirm that the idea of human rights and with it, modern con-
stitutionalism, are the secular pendant of Christian personalism. From the
French Revolution onwards, sovereign nation-states (the same goes for
state leagues or multinational states) have been understood as the «natural»
guarantors and defenders of human rights, and primarily of the right to
life of every human being. In the course of the twentieth century, other
bodies have emerged which, at least in theory, are supposed to guarantee
human rights—primarily the European Union and United Nations. How-
ever, sovereign states remain the principal bodies that have the mandate to
defend human rights and fight against their violation inside and outside
their national borders. But because they are sovereign states, that is, geopo-
litical entities that have sovereignty over delimited geographic areas, they
naturally tend to defend the rights and interests of their own citizens—
though often not even those—and not of humanity as a whole.
The idea of the sovereign as the sacred authority that has the power to
decide over mere life has been able to survive in modern political thought,
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because of the funding paradox of modernity, which lies in the fact that
sovereign states have de jure the mandate to guarantee and defend human
rights, but de facto are in a perpetual conflict with each other for economic
and political hegemony.1 The performativity of contemporary state
mythology lies in its ability to declare that every single human life is sacred
and thus inviolable, but at the same time to declare that each human life is
potentially expendable or, more precisely, can be excluded from the politi-
cal sphere in order to guarantee the salvation, perpetuation and prosperity
of society within the borders of nation-states. The rhetoric of the «reason
of state» is based, ultimately, on a very simple mechanism: it makes people
believe that the necessary price for guaranteeing the sacredness of individ-
ual life is the expendability of some «few» individuals. Or in other words:
some humans have to be declared and treated as homine sacri, so that the
sovereign state can guarantee the sacredness of individual life.
The Moro Case
My focus on the representation of the abduction, imprisonment and mur-
der of Aldo Moro had the dual function of exemplifying and at the same
time testing the heuristic value of these theses, their usefulness in analyz-
ing and understanding discourses on political violence in contemporary
world. In the first place, this study has demonstrated that the martyr figure
played and still plays a central role in an enormous number of discursive,
visual and memorializing practices that, since March 1978 onwards, have
given meaning to the kidnapping, imprisonment and final assassination of
Aldo Moro. It has thus highlighted that the allocation of the martyr role
was and still is one of the main strategies of constructing meaning and sig-
nifying the event of political violence. Further, the study has shown that
the martyr figure was used to justify the decision of not negotiating with
the Red Brigades for the liberation of Aldo Moro or, more precisely, to
make Aldo Moro appear as a martyr willing to die for the salvation of Ital-
ian society and its political system. Moreover, it has shown that martyrolo-
gical representations, together with the rhetoric of the «reason of state»,
were intrinsically linked to a mythological narrative of the state, in which
the Red Brigades were represented as absolute enemies who aimed only to
8.3
1 From this point of view, Carl Schmitt is perfectly right when he argues that at the
very root of the concept of state sovereignty and autonomy there is the distinction
between friend and enemy. See Schmitt 2002.
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destroy society and undermine political order and the state as absolutely
necessary to restrain this manifestation of absolute evil.
By analyzing the representations of the event of political violence, rather
than speculating about possible interferences, conspiracies and the direct
responsibilities of intelligence services, foreign governments, representa-
tives of political parties or secret organizations—that is, rather than focus-
ing on what is obscure and unknown—the study has been able to focus on
facts and events that are known, public, and accessible to everyone and has
yet managed to maintain a critical approach. The actual knowledge about
what happened in the spring of 1978 does not allow us to infer, with the
necessary certainty and «beyond reasonable doubt», that there was a con-
spiracy by individuals or groups operating outside the organization of the
Red Brigades seeking to eliminate Aldo Moro. Though it does not com-
pletely reject the possibility that there could have been different kinds of,
still unknown, interference or false leads in the so-called «Moro affair». In
fact, one of the main characteristics of the unknown, regardless of its prob-
ability or improbability, is that it cannot be falsified. This study demon-
strates that it is not necessary to postulate on the existence of occult forces
operating in history to highlight the instrumentalization of events of polit-
ical violence. In fact, as we saw, even in the first days after the kidnapping,
a discursive and rhetorical strategy was adopted, which de facto annihilated
or at least minimized the possibility of saving Aldo Moro. The event of po-
litical violence was used to construct a state martyr figure, which was very
useful for the maintenance of the political status quo and for the legitimiza-
tion of established authority and power relations. In other words, this
study has pointed out that martyrological representations of the event of
political power became part of a strategy, which was functional to the
preservation of power.
If Aldo Moro’s letters had not become public, the process of his marty-
rologization, which began with his kidnapping, would have proceeded
without problems. But Moro raised his voice and radically criticized and
questioned the hegemonic representations produced by the government,
major political parties and most of the established media. He rejected the
allocation of the martyr role and even came to curse the government, the
parties and the country for doing nothing for his salvation and, more im-
portantly, for surreptitiously betraying the ethics of the sacredness of indi-
vidual human life. In his letters, he subverted the rhetoric of the «reason of
state» by clearly addressing the safeguarding of the dignity and rights of ev-
ery single human being as the fundamental and, to some extent, unique
true duty of the state. From this point of view, Aldo Moro did really act as
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a martyr, but not in the sense of someone who witnesses by dying, but in
the sense of someone who witnesses with words the truth of the sacrality
and dignity of each singular human life by raising his voice.
For this reason, Moro had to be silenced and his personal dignity annihi-
lated. Within this study, the homo sacer theory has been implemented
specifically to highlight the mechanism by which Aldo Moro was silenced
and excluded from the public sphere. The sixth chapter highlighted the dif-
ferent strategies used to deprive Moro of his public role, to represent Moro,
no longer as Moro the politician, but as a drugged person at the mercy of
his kidnappers or, simply, as a coward who selfishly tried «only» to save his
own life. But despite this attempt at annihilating Moro’s voice—without
which the government, the major political parties and the established me-
dia would not have succeeded in declaring him as expendable, represent-
ing his death as the necessary cost of the salvation of society and the preser-
vation of social order—, Moro’s voice and words grafted like the roots of a
tree in the wall of hegemonic discourse. Precisely because Moro succeeded,
in spite of everything, in making his voice heard in the public space, the
task of silencing him and symbolically taking possession of his body was
not completely successful.
Over the years, Moro’s voice and words have found more and more peo-
ple willing to listen to them and use them to shape and give form to sub-
versive and alternative cultural and discursive practices with respect to
hegemonic discourse. As shown in the seventh chapter, despite attempts to
establish a shared and undisputed memory, especially through the occupa-
tion of the public space with memorial signs and institutionalized rituals
of annual commemoration, Aldo Moro and the events of spring 1978 were
and still are the subject of dispute and conflicting interpretations and rep-
resentations. In fact, his letters became the point of departure of different
cultural practices in which the martyr figure is used subversively and poeti-
cally. In these practices, Aldo Moro is not represented as the martyr who
belongs to the state, to the party, to the nation, or to the Church, but as the
one who, making use of the last liberty that he had—the freedom of using
language subversively—radically rejected any instrumental appropriation
of his person. In some cultural productions especially, Aldo Moro seems to
assume, at least partially, the role that the martyr figure had in its original
context of appearance, since it becomes a sort of spokesman for a radical
critique not only of the Red Brigades’ ideology of violence, but also and
above all of the rhetoric of the «reason of state». It thus seems that even if
the modern, mythical narrative of sovereignty has domesticated the martyr
figure, it is still possible to use it in a subversive way, that is, to reintroduce
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it in what could be seen as a (post-)modern narrative of rebellion. The ex-
emplarity of the Moro case lies precisely in this twofold usage of the mar-
tyr figure, in the fact that Aldo Moro was represented, remembered and
constructed as a martyr who witnesses both for and against the necessity of
sacrifice, who both conceals and reveals the mechanism by which power
relations perpetuate themselves.
This last point is actually the main reason why this investigation focused
on the cultural practices surrounding this particular and almost unique
event of political violence in modern history. The case of the martyrologi-
cal representation of Aldo Moro is, in some respects, what Agamben calls
an example with a «paradigmatic character», that is, a case that cannot be
explained by referring to the rule of a «generality preexisting the singular
cases», but rather as a case that constitutes itself as a rule.2 Agamben argues
that «a paradigm entails a movement that goes from singularity to singular-
ity and, without ever leaving singularity, transforms every singular case in-
to an exemplar of a general rule that can never be stated a priori.»3 The rela-
tionship between the rule and the example is not a logical one, where the
movement from the rule to the case is called deduction and from the case
to the rule induction. The heuristic value of a paradigm, of exemplarity, is
not to exemplify a general rule but to expose its own singularity, which can
then be used to make intelligible, and to analyze and interpret other cases
by the mechanism of analogy: «its specific operation consists in suspend-
ing and deactivating its empirical givenness in order to exhibit only an in-
telligibility.»4 In other words, the analysis of the martyrological and sacrifi-
cial representation of Aldo Moro does not validate any general rule—for
example: the martyr figure always functions in that way and not in another
—but is useful, as a paradigmatic case, for understanding and explaining
other cases of analogous representations of political violence.
Towards an Aesthetics of Resistance
If it is true that the martyr figure always returns, assuming new functions
and engaging in new pragmatic and hermeneutic contexts, then a very im-
portant question arises, which concerns both the domain of ethics and aes-
thetics: What kind of representation of political violence might be able to
8.4
2 Agamben 2009, 21; see also Ferrara 2008.
3 Agamben 2009, 22.
4 Agamben 2009, 25–26.
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overcome both the deadly rhetoric of sacrifice and the mythology of the
state? In other words, what kind of representation could be truly emancipa-
tory, appealing to people to reject any kind of legitimization of violence? In
a sense, it can be said that finding an answer to this question is the true
telos that motivated and continues to motivate me in reflecting on the use
and performativity of the martyr figure.
In the third chapter, I addressed the state martyr as a secularized figure,
that is, as a figure that has been transposed from the pragmatic and
hermeneutic context of Christianity and Christian theology in the late an-
tiquity and medieval times to the context of modern political thought and
society. In Agamben’s words: «secularization acts within the conceptual
system of modernity as a signature, which refers it back to theology.»5
What is at stake here is the way in which a certain «sign signifies because it
carries a signature that necessarily predetermines its interpretation and dis-
tributes its use and efficacy.»6 The premise or axiom of the theory of signa-
tures is that «pure and unmarked signs», which would signify and refer to
something «neutrally», do not exist.7 Signs are never neutral but always
marked by their signatures, that is, they are able to signify something only
because they are used within a certain context and refer back to precedent
uses within precedent contexts. It is thus by being performed, by being
used in a specific context and at the same time referring to precedent per-
formances, that signs are able to exert effects and thus appeal to people, to
produce and induce a certain subjectivity and worldview. In fact, this is
why Agamben also defines secularization as a «specific performance of
Christian faith that, for the first time, opens the world to man in its world-
liness and historicity. The theological signature operates […] as a sort of
tromp l’oeil in which the very secularization of the world becomes the
mark that identifies it as belonging to a divine oikonomia.»8 From this
point of view, the secularization of the martyr figure can be defined as a
practice that transposes it into the domain of profane politics, which in
turn assumes a sacral character.
Interestingly, in The Signature of All Things Agamben criticizes Hans Blu-
menberg, among others, for having not realized that secularization is not a
concept but a signature.9 This «liquidation» does not do justice to Blumen-
5 Agamben 2009, 77.
6 Agamben 2009, 64.
7 Agamben 2009, 64.
8 Agamben 2011, 4.
9 See Agamben 2009, 76–77.
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berg’s reflections on secularization, since I believe that there are, in the
writings of the German philosopher, interesting considerations which can
help us to understand the role of secularized Christian language in the
modern and contemporary world, as well as to relate the topic of seculariz-
ation to that of mythicization. The proximity of the concept of signature
with Blumenberg’s concept of prefiguration, which served as a heuristic
tool for the analysis of the martyr figure, was already highlighted in the
third chapter. In fact, one can say that the relationship of signatures to
signs is analogous to that of prefigurations to figures: in the same way that
signatures transpose signs, prefigurations transpose figures from one con-
text to another. Despite the two philosophers using two different concepts,
because they are referring to two different traditions of thought, I believe
that both are pointing out the same phenomenon. While Agamben refers
to the tradition of structuralism and post-structuralism, in particular to
thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, and Foucault, Blumenberg refers in-
stead to the tradition of German hermeneutics. Despite this proximity, I re-
ferred to both concepts because they highlight different aspects of the
common phenomenon of language transposition. The concept of signa-
ture was useful in highlighting and describing the long process of perenni-
al re-contextualization of the terms martyr and martyrdom, at the end of
which the state martyr figure emerged, and in pointing out that their his-
torical stratification affects their efficacy in the various contexts in which
they appear. On the other hand, the concept of prefiguration was instead
useful for drawing attention to the mechanism by which social actors used
and still use the martyr figure to signify and refer to an event of political
violence, in order to reduce the experienced contingency of the event and
thus create meaningfulness. In other words, the former has served to ex-
plain the way in which the martyr figure could be secularized and yet
maintain its efficacy, while the latter helped us to understand the reason
why social actors have recurred to this figure.
In the third chapter, I mentioned Girard’s scapegoat theory, which is
based on the anthropological assumption whereby human beings act vio-
lently, because they always desire what other human beings desire, which
results in a conflict between desiring parties. On the basis of this assump-
tion, Girard argues that sacrifice is a form of ritualized violence with which
social actors control their aggressive impulses by directing them on to a
victim that serves as scapegoat. Now, I reject and criticize this theory, not
because I generally dislike anthropological explanations, but simply be-
cause it is based on misleading anthropological assumptions, inasmuch as
it hypostatizes and universalizes the meaning and function of violence.
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Moreover, this theory ultimately reproduces a mythological understanding
of history, the same kind of mythological construction that this investiga-
tion has attempted to deconstruct. This is why I propose considering not
violence per se, but rather the signification of violence as an anthropologi-
cally derivable and explainable phenomenon. It is therefore not in the phe-
nomenon of violence that one has to search for and identify anthropologi-
cal constants, but rather in the way in which human beings give meaning
to violence, that is, in the relationship between human beings and the
world, which is always mediated by a process of linguistic and symbolic
construction. In other words, it is the need for the signification of violence,
which is a historical and anthropological constant. From this point of view,
the main question is not «why do human beings act violently?» but rather:
why do humans need to make sense of what happens around them (espe-
cially when what happens occurs violently)? Hans Blumenberg’s answer is
relatively simple: because the human being is a «lacking being» (Mangelwe-
sen) who compensates for this lack with action and, last but not least, with
rhetoric action:
The fact that man is not biologically fixed to a particular environment
can be understood as a fundamental lack of proper equipment towards
the purpose of self-improvement or as an openness to the abundance of
a world […]. The human being is defined by what it lacks, or by the
creative symbolism by which he resides in its own worlds. […] Action
is compensation for the ‹indeterminacy› [Unbestimmtheit, also ‹indeci-
siveness›] of the human being, and rhetoric is the strenuous produc-
tion of the consistencies [Übereinstimmungen] which compensate for
the [lack] of a ‹substantial› pool [Fundus] of regulations, so that action
is possible. From this point of view, language is not an instrument for
the communication of knowledge or truth, but primarily for the estab-
lishment of understanding, approval, or acquiescence, on which the
agent [the acting human being] is dependent. […] The human being’s
lack of a specific disposition to reactive behavior in the face of reality
[…] is the starting point for the central anthropological question, how
does this being exist despite its biological indisposition. The answer
can be reduced to the formula: by not engaging directly with this real-
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ity. Human reference to reality is indirect, laborious, decelerated, selec-
tive, and, above all, ‹metaphorical›.10
On the basis of this sort of anthropological theory of rhetoric, it is possible
to look at martyrological representations as rhetorical instruments that
compensate for the radical indeterminacy and contingency experienced by
humans when confronted with political violence and especially with vio-
lent death. The experience of death, especially of death inflicted by other
human beings, reminds us of the incommensurability and unpredictability
of what is happening in the world. The description of violence as what it
is, that is, the simple and rather banal clash of living bodies in a certain
space and time, resulting in the injury or annihilation of one or more of
these bodies, is not able to produce that meaningfulness without which in-
dividuals are incapable of acting, thinking, choosing and deciding. The
main and most powerful strategy of coping with contingency is the imple-
mentation of analogies and metaphors, whereby something seemingly in-
explicable is explained by something else.
In the case of prefiguration, the analogical construction produces mean-
ingfulness by referring to already known, historically stratified and conven-
tionalized forms of representation, with which past events were represent-
ed and made intelligible. Moreover, the specificity of prefiguration is that
it always refers to a past figure that, because of the meaning and even per-
formative force attributed to it, serves as a representational model and as
an «aid to decision-making» (Entscheidungshilfe): «What has already been
done does not require […] renewed consideration, confusion, perplexity,
[because] it is pre-determined by the paradigm.»11 From this point of view,
prefiguration can be defined as an analogical construction or metaphor
that always concerns actions. As this study has exposed, social actors have
represented the kidnapping, imprisonment and assassination of Aldo Mo-
ro by referring to a figure that was already used in the past to represent oth-
er events of political violence. Martyrological representation prefigured
Moro’s destiny as predetermined and thus unavoidable. «The prefigura-
tion»—Blumenberg argues—«gives legitimacy to a decision that may be
characterized by the utmost contingency» and in the case of Aldo Moro,
10 Blumenberg 2001, 406, 409, 415. Blumenberg refers to (and criticizes) Arnold
Gehlen’s famous work Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, pub-
lished in 1940.
11 Blumenberg 2014b, 9.
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the prefiguration served to legitimize the decision of not negotiating, of
doing nothing for his salvation.12
Ultimately, the use of the term «martyrdom» to signify the occurrence of
a violent death was metaphorical from the beginning: in the context of the
first Christian communities, the event of death was signified with a term
that previously, in antiquity, had been used to signify the speech act
through which a person bore witness to something. The term underwent a
signature through which events of death by the hands of the ruling political
authority could be signified as acts of dying. Through martyrological repre-
sentation, death assumed the meaning of a community-saving act, the wit-
nessing of absolute truth and an accusation of political authority. Repre-
sented as martyrdom, death is no longer a simple, meaningless event, but a
meaningful act, a way of doing something meaningful by dying. The suc-
cess of this metaphor depends on its ability to constitute itself as a
paradigm through regular and repetitive spatial, temporal, multimedial
diffusion and manifestation. As soon as the metaphor became so strongly
conventionalized that its previous use—let us call it pre-metaphorical—has
been forgotten, it basically ceased to be a metaphor. At the end of this pro-
cess of re-contextualization, which goes hand-in-hand with de-
metaphorization, the martyr established itself as one of the fundamental,
and to some extent, almost irreplaceable figures for the representation of
political violence.
Analogies, metaphors, and prefigurations are indispensable elements in
mythicization, the bricks with which myths are constructed. The phe-
nomenon of prefiguration especially, Blumenberg argues, «presupposes
that the mythical form of thought as a disposition to certain functions is
still virulent», since here «mythicization approaches the limit of magic, or
even exceeds it as soon as the explicit act of repetition of a prefigure
[Präfigurat] is associated with the expectation of the production of the
identical effect.»13 This process of mythicization is basically omnipresent in
modern and contemporary political discourses, especially when it comes
to giving meaning to political violence. Within state mythology, violence
always appears as the unavoidable outcome of the mythic struggle between
good and evil forces. Now, if Blumenberg is right and the production of
mythological narratives and the use of metaphors and prefigurations are
anthropologically derivable phenomena, since human beings need strate-
gies of complexity-reduction and meaning-construction in order to be able
12 Blumenberg 2014b, 10.
13 Blumenberg 2014b, 9.
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to act, to think and more generally to live in the world, then the question
arises: is it possible to represent events of political violence without
mythologizing them, without re-actualizing the myth that legitimizes the
use of violence? If the human being cannot live and act without myths, is
the mythicization of violence perhaps inevitable?
The «classic» approach in philosophy and cultural studies to counteract
the appellative efficacy of myths is to deconstruct them and bring their
function to light. Ultimately, philosophy was already a practice of de-
mythicization since its inception. In twentieth century philosophy, the
most paradigmatic attempt to deconstruct state mythology was perhaps
made by Ernst Cassirer, who, at the end of The Myth of the State, published
in 1946, argues that:
It is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy the political myths. A
myth is in a sense invulnerable. It is impervious to rational arguments;
it cannot be refuted by syllogisms. But philosophy can do us another
important service. It can make us understand the adversary. In order to
fight an enemy you must know him. That is one of the first principles
of a sound strategy. To know him means not only to know his defects
and weakness; it means to know his strength. All of us have been liable
to underrate this strength. When we first heard of the political myths
we found them so absurd and incongruous, so fantastic and ludicrous
that we could hardly be prevailed upon to take them seriously. By now
it has become clear to all of us that this was a great mistake. We should
not commit the same error a second time. We should carefully study
the origin, the structure, the methods, and the technique of the politi-
cal myths. We should see the adversary face to face in order to know
how to combat him.14
This study has taken Cassirer’s warning seriously, trying to show that even
after the Second World War, after the advent of the national myths of Fas-
cism and Nazi-Fascism, political myths continue to determine how indi-
viduals and peoples represent and understand themselves, others and the
world, particularly in situations of crisis and violence. In this sense, it can
be said that this investigation was an attempt to deconstruct the myth of
the self-sacrifice of the martyr-sovereign Aldo Moro by studying its origin,
structure, methods and technique. As Cassirer argues, philosophy and criti-
cal cultural analysis cannot defeat political myths, but they can at least
bring their function to light. However, I believe that only by means of ev-
14 Cassierer 1946, 296.
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eryday subversive practices, alternative representations of what is happen-
ing in the world as well as of what could happen differently, can dangerous
myths be opposed efficaciously. This does not reduce the margin of action
of philosophical thought and social and cultural studies, but, on the con-
trary, opens the horizons for a dual task: philosophical, cultural and social
research must not only criticize and deconstruct practices of mythicization,
but also reflect on the structure and function of what in the second chapter
of this study was defined as the poetic use of language, namely of forms of
representations using language units, rhetorical patterns and narrative
models without hypostatizing the relationship between words and things,
acts or events.
If it is true that human beings are not able to act, decide, and orient
themselves in the world without using metaphors, prefigurations and,
more generally, rhetoric, then we have to accept that myths cannot be de-
feated in a definitive way. The poetic use of language can subvert conven-
tional and instrumental uses of certain language units, rhetorical patterns
and narrative models, revealing and unmasking their exteriority, historicity
and contingency, only within certain delimited pragmatic and hermeneu-
tic contexts, and therefore cannot prevent the same being re-incorporated
and domesticated by hegemonic discourses in other contexts. For this rea-
son, the poetic use of language—as a «bipolar gesture, which each time
renders external what it must unfailingly appropriate»—should be regard-
ed as something that has to be done constantly in all possible pragmatic
and hermeneutic contexts.15
The distinction between instrumental and poetic uses of language can
be compared, to some extent, with Roland Barthes’ distinction between
encratic and acratic discourses:
Adopting an old Aristotelian notion, that of the doxa (public opinion,
the general, the ‹probable›, but not the ‹true›, the ‹scientific›), we shall
say that the doxa is the cultural (or discursive) mediation through
which power (or non-power) speaks: encratic discourse is a discourse
that conforms to the doxa, subject to codes which are themselves the
structuring lines of ideology; and acratic discourse always speaks out,
to various degrees, against the doxa (whatever it is, acratic discourse is
paradoxical). This opposition does not exclude nuances within each
type; but, structurally, its simplicity remains valid as long as power and
non-power are in their place; it can be (provisionally) blurred only in
15 Agamben 2015b, 86.
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the rare cases where there is a mutation of power (of the sites of pow-
er); thus, in the case of the political language in a revolutionary period:
revolutionary language issues from the preceding acratic language; in
shifting over to power, it retains its acratic character, as long as there is
an active struggle within revolution; but once this struggle dies down,
once the state is in place, the former Revolutionary language becomes
doxa, encratic discourse. […] Encratic language, supported by the state,
is everywhere: it is diffused, widespread, one might say osmotic dis-
course which impregnates exchanges, social rites, leisure, the socio-sym-
bolic field (above all, of course, in societies of mass communication).
[…] [A]cratic […] are all the languages which are elaborated outside
the doxa and are consequently rejected by it […]. By analyzing encratic
discourse, we know more or less in advance what we shall find (which
is why, today, the analysis of mass culture is visibly marking time; but
acratic discourse is by and large our own (that of the researcher, the in-
tellectual, the writer); to analyze it is to analyze ourselves as we speak:
always a risky operation and yet one that must be undertaken. […]
[T]here is an inverted relation between the two systems of discursivity:
patent/hidden, overt/covert.16
The two oppositional pairs of concepts poetic/instrumental and acratic/
encratic are not characterized by heuristic equivalency: the former serves to
indicate two different discursive modes of relating and referring to non-dis-
cursive things, acts or events, while the latter illustrates the discursive
practices’ different positions and relation to each other within a certain
field or context. Precisely because of their different heuristic value, both
oppositional pairs are useful in making two final remarks on the possibili-
ty of subverting and opposing mythicization.
Firstly, subversive and alternative practices of representation always ap-
pear at the margin of hegemonic discourses or, as Barthes puts it, are al-
ways articulated outside of the doxa. This marginality or externality should
not be considered an autonomous reality—this is why Barthes speaks of
para-doxical and not anti-doxical discourse—but rather as a space, a field
of action in which the same words, rhetoric and narratives used in hege-
monic discourses are appropriate and to the same extent expropriated. Sub-
versive and alternative practices, in other words, use language units, rhetor-
ical patterns and narrative models to maintain their performativity—that
is: their ability to appeal to people and to demand subjective positioning—
16 Barthes 1989, 120–123.
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without falling into the trap of mythicization. It is, ultimately, a use that
exposes the historicity and exteriority of language without disempowering
its performative force and efficacy. Secondly, any attempt to stop the spiral
of history (to use Gianbattista Vico’s beautiful metaphor) in order to con-
solidate and congeal a definitive and non-metaphorical language is illusory.
Blumenberg calls this the Cartesian «ideal of full objectification», which
corresponds to the ideal of «the perfection of a terminology designed to
capture the presence and precision of the matter at hand in well-defined
concepts.»17 This ideal is illusory because mythicization and de-mythiciza-
tion are two sides within an agonistic and dynamic struggle, where the
doxa is always changing. What, in a certain pragmatic and hermeneutic
context, is used in a subversive and para-doxical way—as the term martyr-
dom in the first and especially second century AD or, to some extent, in
the context of the French Revolution—in other contexts can become part
of hegemonic discourses. In this sense, we can say that the struggle against
mythicization cannot be won once and for all, but is something that must
be undertaken continuously. This study wanted to bring to light the role of
the martyr figure in this permanent struggle for hegemony and emancipa-
tion, for the concealment and disclosure of the relationship between pow-
er and violence, a struggle that cannot finish but will continue in the fu-
ture.
17 Blumenberg 2010, 7.
8.4 Towards an Aesthetics of Resistance
381
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845299372, am 02.12.2021, 23:02:14




_16_marzo_1978.jpg, AP-photo, public domain, accessed December 10, 2018.
Figure 2:
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caso_Moro#/media/File:Aldo_Moro_br.jpg, public
domain, accessed December 10, 2018.
Figure 3:
Photograph by Baldassare Scolari.
Figure 4: 
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caso_Moro#/media/File:Aldo_Moro3.jpg, public




accessed December 10, 2018.
Figure 6:





Screenshot, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODNyR_tTH9c, accessed 10
December 2018.
Figure 9:
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21.2.1990, 00:59:38.
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Film still, Il caso Moro, Giuseppe Ferrara, IT, 1986: DVD © 1986 Columbia
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Figure 11:
Film still, Il caso Moro, Giuseppe Ferrara, IT 1986: DVD © 1986 Columbia Pic-
tures Italia © 2005 Cecchi Gori Editoria Eletronica Home Video, 01:05:00.
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Film still, Il Divo, Paolo Sorrentino, IT 2008: DVD © 2008 Lucky Red, 00:21:48.
Figure 13:
Film still, Il Divo, Paolo Sorrentino, IT 2008: DVD © 2008 Lucky Red, 01:41:08.
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2012 01 Distribution, 00:06:26.
Figure 15:
Film still, Paisà, Roberto Rossellini, IT 1946: DVD © 2003 CG Entertainment
SRL, 02:04:15.
Figure 16:
Film still, Buongiorno, notte, Marco Bellocchio, IT 2003: DVD © 2003 Filmal-
batros and Rai Cinema © 2006 Wellspring Media, 01:34:19.
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